JUDGMENT.. This application has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying that the order of the Chairman, South Bihar Regional Trans port Authority, Patna, passed on the 3rd December, 1969 be quashed by a writ of certiorari. A copy of the order has been annexed as Annexure 3 of the writ application. The order states, in effect, that temporary permits were being granted to respondents no. 3 to 5 of this writ application on Arrah-Buxar route, in response to a short notice advertisement for grant of three temporary permits on that route. Out of 22 applications received in answer to the short notice advertisement, the applications of these three respondents were approved. The order dated the 3rd December, 1969 has been challenged on behalf of the petitioner on the ground that the Regional Transport Authority had contravened the bar imposed under the first proviso to Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, if it be considered that the order passed by the Chairman was order of the Regional Transport Authority. 2. The relevant facts may be stated thus: It is stated in the writ application that the petitioner had filed before respondent no. 2, Secretary, South Bihar Regional Transport Authority, Patna,' an application in the prescribed manner for grant of a permanent stage carriage permit for Arrah-Buxar route, which bad been received in the office of respondent no. 2 on the 19th November, 1969, and on the 20th November, 1969 the petitioner had learnt that respondent no, 2 had received applications from respondents no. 3 and 4 and some other persons for grant of temporary permits for the said route. Thereupon the petitioner filed a petition of objection on the 20th November, 1969 requesting the authorities not to grant any temporary permit daring the pendency of the petitioner's application for grant of a permanent stage carriage permit. It is alleged that in spite of this objection, respondent no. 2 recommended to respondent no, 1, Chairman, South Bihar Regional Transport Authority, Patna that temporary permits be granted to respondents no, 3 to 5. It is further alleged that respondent no. 1, without applying his mind to the question involved, accepted the recommendation made and passed the impugned order dated the 3rd December, 1969. 3, This application has been opposed by respondent no. It is further alleged that respondent no. 1, without applying his mind to the question involved, accepted the recommendation made and passed the impugned order dated the 3rd December, 1969. 3, This application has been opposed by respondent no. 4 and certain facts and circumstances have been relied upon on his behalf, which appear from a petition filed by him under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is mentioned therein that on the 6th November, 1969 (it short notice advertisement calling fall applications for temporary permits on certain routes, including Arrah-Buxar route, had been made. A copy of this advertisement has been annexed as Annexure A. It is stated that in response to the said notice, this respondent and others filed applications for temporary permits for Arrah-Buxar route, within the time granted for so applying. It is stated that one Baleshwar Nath Rai, own brother for the writ petitioner, had also filed an application for grant of temporary permit and when the present petitioner learnt that Baleshwar Nath Rai had no chance of getting temporary permit, the former with a mala fide motive, filed an application under Section 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act. on the 19th November, 1969, for a permanent permit on Arrah-Buxar route. It is alleged that this was done only to create a hurdle in the granting of temporary permits on the said route. It is mentioned in this application that the writ petitioner had not really filed his application for a permanent permit on the 19th November, 1969, in response to the Gazette Notification of that day inviting applications for grant of permanent permits, as the writ petitioner's application dated the 19th November, 1969 did not comply with the requirements of the Gezette Notification. It may be mentioned at this stage that these assertions have been made in this application filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the records show that there was an advertisement in the Official Gazette on the 19th November, 1969 calling for applications for permanent permits on certain routes including this Arrah-Buxar route. It is alleged further by respondent no. It is alleged further by respondent no. 4, that grant of temporary permits had been decided upon much before the 19th November, 1969 and applications for temporary permits had been filed by the 17th November, 1969, as acquired, and, therefore, the statutory prohibition under the first proviso to Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act could not be applicable. 4. In reply to the application filed by respondent no. 4 an affidavit in reply has been filed by the petitioner. The salient features mentioned therein are as follows : It is stated that the Regional Transport Authority at its meeting held on the 11th August, 1969 had sanctioned a large number of permanent vacancies on certain routes lying in the district of Shahabad. On the 5th November, 1969 the Secretary to the Regional Transport Authority made a recommendation to the Chairman to advertise certain temporary vacancies for some routes including Arrah-Buxar route. It is stated that in pursuance of the formal advertisement issued in the Gazette, the writ petitioner had bonafide filed his application under Section 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act on the 19th November 1969 for grant of a permanent stage carriage permit for Arrah-Buxar route. It is stated that the writ petitioner had filed appropriate application containing all particulars required by law in response to the Gazette notification. The petitioner has reiterated his stand in this reply that the first proviso to Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act was applicable and that order dated 3rd December, 1969 cannot be allowed to stand. Respondents no, 3 and 5 had alc1.o filed certain petitions at some earlier stage, But, Sri Shreenath Singh appearing for these respondents has stated that he bas no further instructions to oppose this writ application. There is another petition on record which has been filed by the petitioner praying that an order of temporary injunction may be passed restraining the Chairman and the Secretary of South Bihar Regional Transport Authority from considering the applications filed by respondents no. 3 and 5 (not respondents no. 3 to 5 as mentioned in the petition) for renewal of temporary permits on this Arrah-Baxar route, during the pendency of the petition filed by the writ petitioner for grant of a permanent stage carriage permit and till the disposal of this writ application. 5. 3 and 5 (not respondents no. 3 to 5 as mentioned in the petition) for renewal of temporary permits on this Arrah-Baxar route, during the pendency of the petition filed by the writ petitioner for grant of a permanent stage carriage permit and till the disposal of this writ application. 5. The substantial point for consideration is interpretation of the first proviso to Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and for convenience, the whole of Section 62 as it stands now is reproduced below: “62.A Regional Transport Authority may without following the procedure laid down in Section 57, grant permits, to be effective for a limited period not in any case to exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purposes of a seasonal business, or (c) to meet a particular temporary need. Or (d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit; and may attach to any such permit any condition it thinks fit. Provided that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the grant of a new permit under Section 46 or Section 54 during the pendency of the application: Provided further that a temporary permit order this Section shall, in no case, be granted more than once in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the renewal of a permit during the pendency of such application for renewal." It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the order incorporated in Annexure 3 could not have been passed, as the petitioner's application for grant of a new permit under Section 46 of the Act was pending on the 3rd December, 1969, in view of the proviso applicable to this case. It is also urged that the order incorporated in Annexure 3 was not valid in law, as the Chairman had not applied his mind to the note addressed to him and he had merely put his signature on the note submitted for grant of temporary permits to respondents no. 3 to 5. It is also urged that the order incorporated in Annexure 3 was not valid in law, as the Chairman had not applied his mind to the note addressed to him and he had merely put his signature on the note submitted for grant of temporary permits to respondents no. 3 to 5. On the face of the first proviso to Section 62 of the Act, there appears to be substance in the first argument raised on behalf of the petitioner, and in reply, learned counsel for respondent no. 4 has urged three points which will have to be dealt with seriatim. The first argument to show that first proviso to Section 62 is not attracted in this case is, that, as held by this Court, this proviso has been framed for a particular purpose, and the facts and circumstances of this case show that the grant of temporary permit in favour of respondent no. 4 did not fall within the prohibited regions enumerated by this Court. The reference is to the case of (1) Hari Narain Roy V. Regional Transport Authority and others, reported in A. I. R. 1959 Patna 248. It was held in that decision that the first proviso puts a limitation upon to Regional Transport Authority to grant of temporary permit when an application for regular permit is pending. It was said that the main object of this proviso was to prevent nepotism and undue favour to one of the applicants for a permanent permit to the disadvantage of other applicants. It was said that it was not unlikely that in the absence of such restriction, although several persons might have put in applications for permanent permits, one of them might be unduly favoured by the authorities and given temporary permits from time to time and to the detriment of other applicants. This would prevent expeditious disposal of the applications and cause unnecessary prejudice to other applicants for permanent permits. On these observations, learned counsel for respondent no. 4 has urged, that, as there had been a short notice advertisement in November, 1969, calling for applications for temporary permits, there was no restriction on the Regional Transport Authority in granting temporary permits, only on the ground that an application for a permanent permit was then pending. On these observations, learned counsel for respondent no. 4 has urged, that, as there had been a short notice advertisement in November, 1969, calling for applications for temporary permits, there was no restriction on the Regional Transport Authority in granting temporary permits, only on the ground that an application for a permanent permit was then pending. It is said that on the facts of this case, there could not have been a question of nepotism or undue favour to any of the parties, as bonafide applications were then pending for temporary permits. But, this decision is of no avail to the learned counsel for respondent no. 4, and as a matter of fact, this decision has been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner. Although the facts of Hari Narain Roy's case and the facts of the instant case are not identical, in the' sense that in Hari Narain Roy's Case, there was no question of applications for grant of temporary permits pending before applications for permanent permits had been filed, nevertheless the principle is clear from Had Narain Roy's case, that there is a prohibition contained in the first proviso to Section 62 in granting of temporary permits under this Section, when an application for grant of new permit under Section 46 is pending. The effect of the short notice advertisement for temporary permits may be dealt with now, as certain documents have been produced before us by learned counsel for the parties indicating how the question of grant of temporary permits and permanent permits had arisen. Our attention has been drawn to an order dated the 5th November, 1969, passed by the Chairman to show in a meeting of the Regional Transport Authority, held on the 11th August, 1969, a number of permanent vacancies on the Arrah-Buxar route, amongst others, had been sanctioned. As a matter of fact, in this order-sheet it had even been mentioned that permanent vacancies had been advertised the advertisement which has been mentioned above, dated the 19th November 1969, undoubtedly came out in the Bihar Gazette afterwards, but it seems t hat the notification had been signed by one Ramnath Jha, as Secretary, on the 14th October, 1969. As a matter of fact, in this order-sheet it had even been mentioned that permanent vacancies had been advertised the advertisement which has been mentioned above, dated the 19th November 1969, undoubtedly came out in the Bihar Gazette afterwards, but it seems t hat the notification had been signed by one Ramnath Jha, as Secretary, on the 14th October, 1969. In the order dated the 5th November, 1969 it was mentioned that the last date of receiving applications for permanent vacancies was 15th December, 1969, and in those circumstances, it had been mentioned that as there was seemingly public demand for additional services, some temporary vacancies on the common routes may also be created for four months meeting the temporary needs. In those circumstances, it appears that there was a short notice advertisement for temporary permits. Learned counsel for the parties have also shown us a notice which had been hung up in October, 1969, signed by the then Secretary, indicating the necessity of giving permanent permits on Arrah-Buxar route. This notice had also mentioned that applications for permanent permits had to be made by the 15th December, 1969. Thereafter, it is difficult to hold, even on the facts relied upon by learned counsel for respondent no. 4. that, as respondents no. 3 to 5 had applied for temporary permits on the 17th November, 1969, whereas the Gazette notification is dated the 19th, November, 1969, the first proviso to Section 62 was not applicable. No doubt according to the Case of respondent no. 4, the petitioner of the writ application had applied for a permanent permit on the 19th November, 1969 with a mala fide motive. as he was sure that his brother, an applicant for a temporary permit, was going to fail in his attempt, but all such assertions have been controverted by the petitioner, and on the facts and circumstances of the case, we must proceed on the footing that the petitioner had applied on the 19th November, 1969, for a permanent permit, because the authorities were desirous of giving permanent permits to three services on Arrab-Buxar route. Learned counsel for respondent no. 4 has also relied upon the case of (2) Anamalais Bus Transport (P) Ltd. V. Regional Transport Authority, Coimbatore, reported in A. I. R. 1970 Madras 41. Learned counsel for respondent no. 4 has also relied upon the case of (2) Anamalais Bus Transport (P) Ltd. V. Regional Transport Authority, Coimbatore, reported in A. I. R. 1970 Madras 41. In my opinion, this decision is quite distinguishable on facts, even if the learned Judge was right in balding that the first proviso to Section 62 was not applicable on the facts of that case. It was mentioned by the learned Judge that be had held earlier that when a petitioner filed an application for a permanent permit, after proceedings for the grant of temporary permit bad been initiated, the first proviso to Section t2 would not apply. In the instant case, as I have indicated above, the matter of grant of permanent permits. had been initiated earlier. It was only during the period when no applications were pending for grant of permanent permit that the question of granting temporary permits bad arisen. Therefore, it is difficult to bold that in this case the first proviso to Section 62 cannot be attracted, Learned counsel for respondent no. 4 bas also relied upon the case of the (3) Madhya Pradesh State Board Transport Corporation V. R. P. Upadbyaya and others, reported in A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court 156. But, in my opinion, that decision is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not hold that there was no question of application of the first proviso to Section 62 during the pendency of an application for grant of a temporary permit. All that their Lordships of the Supreme Court held was that where the Regional Transport Authority considered that in a Case of permanent need of transport facility there was also a particular temporary need and had granted temporary permit, the grant could not be challenged as legally invalid. In that case there was a need for grant of temporary facility. Their Lordships held that both the needs could co-exist on• a particular route and that there was no anti thesis between a particular temporary need and a permanent need. In the instant case, we have actually the words of the Statute to consider which says that a temporary permit under Section 62 cannot be granted in respect of any route specified when an application for grant of a new permit under Section 46 is pending. In the instant case, we have actually the words of the Statute to consider which says that a temporary permit under Section 62 cannot be granted in respect of any route specified when an application for grant of a new permit under Section 46 is pending. On the date on which the order incorporated in Annexure 3 was passed, namely 3rd December, 1969, an application for grant of a permanent permit on a common route, namely, Arran-Buxar route, was pending under Section 46 by virtue of an earlier decision to grant permanent permits on that route. Therefore, it must be held that the authorities had no jurisdiction to grant temporary permits on Arrah-Buxar route on the 3rd December 1969. This conclu sion will also be the answer to the last argument advanced on behalf of respondent no. 4, which is that the order dated the 3rd December, 1969 was an appealable order under Section 64, and as no appeal had been filed by the present petitioner, he is not entitled to a writ. If it be held that the first proviso to Section 62 stood in the way of grant of a temporary permit in this case, the writ petitioner cannot be defeated merely because he had not filed an appeal from an order which the authority concerned had no power to pass. Learned counsel for respondent no. 4 bas also referred to a fact mentioned in respondent no. 4's application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is that the writ petitioner had filed a civil suit earlier and had tried to obtain an order of injunction and having failed there, he has filed this writ application suppressing full facts. This contention is also not valid. It is stated that the suit has now been withdrawn and in any event, on the interpretation of the first proviso to Section 62 given above, there cannot be any obstacle in the way of the petitioner getting an order holding that temporary permits on Arrah-Buxar route ought not to have been granted on the 3rd December, 1969. 6. For the reasons given above, the writ application must be allowed and the order incorporated in Annexure 3 quashed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. C. P. SINHA, J. I agree. Application allowed.