S. N. Shankar ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act (Act 14 of 1939 ). On May 20, 1957, one Kuldip Kumar who was riding a bicycle was knocked down by the respondent Gulzar Singh driver as a result of which he received injuries and eventually died On May 19, 1958, Kulbir Chand, Bharat Bhushan, Varinder Kumar, Surinder Kumar, brothers of the deceased and Nirmal Kumari and Subhas Kumari sisters of the deceased who are appellants in this appeal lodged a claim with the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for recovery of a sum of Rs. 50,000/ against the owners of the truck, its driver and the Insurance Company where the truck was insured. The respondent resisted the claim and amongst others it was pleaded that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application and that the applicants also did not have locus standii to file the application for compensation under the Act. On the pleadings before him the Tribunal framed the following preliminary issues : (1) Are there sufficient grounds for condoning the delay in presenting the petition and is the petition within time ? (2) Has not this Tribunal jurisdiction to try this application ? (3) Do the applicants have locus standii to claim the compensation ? ( 2 ) ISSUE No. 2 was not pressed at the time of arguments. After hearing the parties the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the appellants had failed to establish a sufficient cause for condonation of delay and as the application had not been made within 60 days from the date of the accident, it was barred by time. Under issue No. 3, it was held that the appellants were not the legal representatives of the deceased within the meaning of section 110-A, clause (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act and were, therefore, not entitled to claim compensation under the Act. With these findings, he dismissed the application. ( 3 ) MR. V. D. Mahajan, appearing on behalf of the appellants has strongly assailed both these findings of the Tribunal. He contended that on the day when the accident took place there was no Tribunal in Delhi constituted under section 110 of the Act. It came into existence only on the 24th October, 1957. ( 3 ) MR. V. D. Mahajan, appearing on behalf of the appellants has strongly assailed both these findings of the Tribunal. He contended that on the day when the accident took place there was no Tribunal in Delhi constituted under section 110 of the Act. It came into existence only on the 24th October, 1957. As such he maintained that no claim in respect of this accident could be filed before the Tribunal. He further submitted that period of limitation for filing a suit for recovery of damages suffered as a result of the accident was one year commencing from the date of the accident and this was a vested right and could not be taken away by a change in law curtailing the period of limitation for such actions. ( 4 ) IT is not possible to sustain these arguments of the learned counsel. It is correct to say that the period of limitation prescribed is essentially a matter of procedure. Right to file a suit for compensation for injuries sustained may in a given case, be vested right but the period during which this right can be enforced or the forum in which it can be enforced are both matters relating to the domain of procedure. Change in the law of procedure cannot be said to affect a vested right. It is true that period for filing a suit for recovery of compensation was one year but this period could be changed by the Legislature without in any way affecting the substantive right. Reference in this connection may be made to Thomas and others v. Messrs Hotz Hotels Ltd. and others (1968) Accidents Claims Journal 86) where on page 89 of the report, the Court said : "the right to sue for the recovery of compensation for injuries sustained in an accident, is no doubt, a vested right and cannot be taken away retrospectively except by an express statutory provision. But the matter of enforcing that right in Civil Court or in any other forum is only a matter of procedure. No person has a vested right in procedure and the change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and is not only prospective. The constitution of the Claims Tribunal did not take away the right of the plaintiffs to claim compensation. No person has a vested right in procedure and the change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and is not only prospective. The constitution of the Claims Tribunal did not take away the right of the plaintiffs to claim compensation. It simply changed the forum for enforcing that right from the Civil Court to the Claims Tribunal. After the constitution of the Claims Tribunal claim for compensation for injuries sustained in a motor accident could only be filed before the Claims Tribunal if the accident had occurred before the constitution of the Claims Tribunal. There is, therefore, no merit in the submission that the period of limitation prescribed for enforcing the claim under the Limitation Act was a vested right. ( 5 ) AFTER the constitution of the Tribunal under section 110 of the Act on October 24, 1957 instead of filing a suit the appellants could have filed an application before the Tribunal. The learned counsel contended that in terms of sub-section (3) of section 110a this claim could be filed before the Tribunal only within 60 days of the accident but as the Tribunal itself had not been constituted in Delhi till after the expiry of this period, the prescribed limitation in this subsection would not apply to this case. This argument loses sight of the proviso to section 110a. This proviso gives power to the Tribunal to entertain an application after the expiry of the period of sixty days if it was satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. The fact that the Tribunal had not been constituted would have been a sufficient cause The submission, therefore, that the limitation prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 110 was not intended to cover such cases has no merits. ( 6 ) A reference to the application made before the Tribunal in this case shows that the appellants did invoke this proviso to their aid while filing this application. In paragraph 8 of the application, they stated that the application was being filed after sixty days because at the time when the accident took place there was no Claims Tribunal for (the Union Territory of Delhi and that the Tribunal had been set up many months after the accident and that when it was set up, the petitioner did not know about it. It was further pleaded that the delay had also occurred because of the criminal case pending against the driver Gulzar Singh, respondent No. 3, which was decided by the trial Magistrate on January, 24, 1958 but against which an appeal had been filed and which was eventually decided by the Additional District and Sessions Judge on April 24, 1958 and as soon as the certified copy of the order of the appellate court was secured by the applicants they filed this petition. In case this explanation of the delay was found to be sufficient cause within the meaning of proviso to section 110-A the application inspite of the lapse of sixty days would have been within time. Unfortunately, however, no sufficient cause was made out on these pleas. As stated earlier, it is correct that there was no Tribunal at the time when the accident took place. It is also true that the Tribunal was constituted on October 25, 1957 but there is no dispute that it was constituted in accordance with the provisions of section 110 by means of the notification by the State Government in the Official Gazette. The plea, therefore, that the appellants were not aware of the constitution of the Claims Tribunal cannot for a moment be sustained to explain the delay. Then again, the pendency of the case in the Criminal court against the driver could have nothing to do with the filing of the application before the Tribunal. At best it could be used only by way of a sort of evidence in the loose sense in support of the claim. Even the Criminal case is stated to have been finally decided on April 24, 1958, but the present application was not filed before the Tribunal till May 19, 1958. No extension of limitation is permissible on this ground, (See Chandra Dutt v. Amar Nath Jolly and others ). ( 7 ) IN these circumstances, it has to be held that the present application had not been filed by the appellants before the Tribunal within the time prescribed by section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and they had also failed to make out a sufficient cause for the condonation of delay. The application, for these reasons, merits dismissal and I have no hesitation in endorsing the finding of the learned Tribunal that it was barred by time. The application, for these reasons, merits dismissal and I have no hesitation in endorsing the finding of the learned Tribunal that it was barred by time. ( 8 ) IN this view of the matter the second question raised by Mr. Mahajan that the appellants had the locus standii to file this application does not at all arise for consideration. ( 9 ) F. A. O. No. 85-D of 1959, is therefore, dismissed but the parties are left to bear their own costs.