ORDER :- By an order dated 7th of June, 1967, the Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur, issued notice under sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, to N. Dhani Singh, a temporary Stenographer in the Manipur Secretariat, intimating that his services shall stand terminated one month after the service of notice on him. N. Dhani Singh, the writ-petitioner herein, filed an appeal with the Chief Commissioner, Manipur, assailing the validity of the notice served on him. That appeal was rejected by the Chief Commissioner on 15th of July," 1967. On 16-1-1968 the present writ petition was filed wherein it was alleged that the orders of the Chief Secretary and the Chief Commissioner were violative of the rules of law and principles of natural justice and so it was prayed that they be quashed by a writ of certiorari. 2. The petitioner was temporarily appointed a Stenographer in the Manipur Secretariat on 1st of December, 1958. According to his allegations, his wife was taken seriously ill and so he prayed for leave sometime in March, 1967. That leave, it is said, was granted upto 23-3-1967: Thereafter, he applied for extension of leave upto 29-4-1967. Since his wife was recommended some major operation, which probably could not be done at Imphal, the petitioner left that station on 26-4-1967 for Dibrugarh in Assam. He happened to address another application to the Chief Secretary, before leaving for Dibrugarh, for extension of leave upto 31-5-1967. After the necessary treatment at Dibrugarh the petitioner returned to Imphal on 27-5-1967 and sent a copy of the medical certificate secured by him from the hospital at Dibrugarh to the Under Secretary at Imphal, apparently to justify his departure for Dibrugarh without permission to leave the station of his posting. Though the petitioner had enjoyed leave firstly from 24th of March to 29th of April, 1967, and then from 30th of April to 31st of May, 1967, without the same being first sanctioned, the Government ultimately, as a measure of good-will, granted him leave right upto 31-5-1967. The petitioner attended office on 1-6-1967 and on the 7th of June, as stated above, he received a notice from the Chief Secretary terminating his services. 3-4. The termination of his services was challenged on the following grounds outlined in Para. The petitioner attended office on 1-6-1967 and on the 7th of June, as stated above, he received a notice from the Chief Secretary terminating his services. 3-4. The termination of his services was challenged on the following grounds outlined in Para. 7 of the writ petitions : (1) The order terminating his services offends the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution inasmuch as he was a quasi-permanent Government servant and not a merely temporary employee; (2) The juniors of the petitioner having been continued in service, the termination of his services offends the principles of natural justice; and (3) The impugned order was mala fide. In their counter-affidavit the respondents, who are the Chief Commissioner of Manipur and Union of India, opposed the prayer made in the writ petition principally on the ground that the petitioner having been appointed as a temporary Stenographer his services could be terminated by a months notice in terms of Rule 5 (1) of the Rules. It was vehemently denied that the case fell within the ambit of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, or that any principles of natural justice had been violated, or that the order was mala fide. 5. The only point canvassed at the bar on behalf of the petitioner by his counsel Shri Charu Gopal Singh was that since the petitioner had been appointed on 1st December, 1958, and so by 7-6-1967 he had put in more than 3 years service, he had acquired by the latter date the status of a quasi-permanent employee and as such his services could not be dispensed with in terms of Rule 5. In support of that submission he placed reliance on the decision in G. Vasantha v. State of Nagaland, AIR 1969 Assam and Nagaland 3. A close study of that case would bring out that that it is clearly distinguishable from the one in hand on facts. The High Court reached the definite conclusion in the reported case that on the date of termination of the services of G. Vasantha, she was holding a permanent post. Undeniably, the provisions of the Rules do not govern a permanent Government servant. The High Court reached the definite conclusion in the reported case that on the date of termination of the services of G. Vasantha, she was holding a permanent post. Undeniably, the provisions of the Rules do not govern a permanent Government servant. It is correct that the Assam and Nagaland High Court made reference to Rule 2 (b) and Rule 3 of the Rules to examine an argument raised on behalf of the State that G. Vasantha was a temporary employee on the date on which her services were terminated. However, the final decision made in the case rested not on the provisions of those Rules but on the finding, supported by a Government Notification dated 10-10-1966, that the petitioner had been declared to be a permanent employee. Nothing stated in that case lends support to the view that immediately after a temporary employee has served for three years he acquires the status of quasi-permanent employee ipso facto. 6. Coming to the case in hand, it looks necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Rules to find out if the petitioner Dhani Singh had acquired the status of semi-permanent Government servant by 7-6-1967. Though in the petition and in the counter-affidavit the parties had relied upon the Rules made by the Government in 1965 in support of their rival contentions but during the course of arguments Shri Charu Gopal Singh for petitioner and Shri N. Ibotombi Singh, the learned Government Advocate, for the State, commonly stated that the Rules of 1949 shall cover the present case. Rule 3 of those Rules runs as under :- "A Government servant shall be deemed to be in quasi-permanent service : (i) if he has been in continuous Government service for more than three years; (ii) if the appointing authority, being satisfied as to his suitability in respect of age, qualifications, work and character, for employment in a quasi-permanent capacity, has issued a declaration to that effect, in accordance with such instructions as the Governor-General may issue from time to time." It was the contention of Shri Charu Gopal Singh that according to this Rule a Government servant shall acquire quasi-permanent status if he has either put in continuous service for more than 3 years, or, alternatively, if the appointing authority has issued a declaration that he has acquired such a status. However, this interpretation of Rule 3 cannot be sustained on the plain reading of the Rule or in the context of the phraseology of the other Rules. Shri Charu Gopal Singh strenuously urged that he would like this Court to assume the existence of the word "or" after sub-clause (i) of Rule 3. However, if such were the intention of the Rule-making authority it could have conveniently inserted that word after clause (i). The non-existence of that word cannot be attributed to accidental omission. 7. The expression "quasi-permanent service" is defined in Rule 2 (b) as "temporary service commencing from the date on which a declaration issued under Rule 3 takes effect and consists of periods of duty and leave (other than extraordinary leave) after that date." This definition demonstrably brings out that one can become a quasi-permanent servant only on a declaration being issued under Rule 3 and not otherwise. If the interpretation placed by Shri Charu Gopal Singh on Rule 3 were accepted, then in terms of clause (i) of Rule 3 a Government servant would acquire quasi-permanent status immediately after putting in 3 years of service without any declaration to that effect having been made by the appointing authority : How ever, the definition of the expression "quasi-permanent service" specifically envisages a declaration by the competent authority and the declaration finds mention only in clause (ii) of Rule 3. Therefore, a combined reading of Rule 2 (b) and Rule 3 leaves no room for doubt that instead of assuming the word "or" after clause (i) of Rule 3, as suggested by Shri Charu Gopal Singh we have to assume the word "and". Put in other words, the two clauses of Rule 3 have to be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. Therefore, Appellant Government employee can acquire quasi-permanent status only if he has put in continuous service for more than 3 years and the appointing authority has issued a declaration to that effect after taking into consideration the factors mentioned in clause (ii). The interpretation canvassed by Shri Charu Gopal Singh cannot reconcile clause (i) of Rule 3 with Rule 2 (b) and therein lies its infirmity. The interpretation canvassed by Shri Charu Gopal Singh cannot reconcile clause (i) of Rule 3 with Rule 2 (b) and therein lies its infirmity. According to well settled principles of interpretation of statutes, in which category the Rules under consideration fall, effort has to be made to reconcile the various parts of the statute, and on that footing alone the proposition solicited on behalf of the writ-petitioner stands at discount and so has to be discarded. 8. The legal point debated in this Court is happily not res Integra. The Supreme Court held in the case of Champaklal v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 1854 , that Rule 3 must be read along with Rule 2 (b) which defines "quasi-permanent service" and that the context of Rule 3 itself requires that it must be read in harmony with the definition of "quasi-permanent service" in Rule 2 (b). The Supreme Court observed further that the rule making authority could possibly not have the intention to create disharmony between the definition in Rule 2 (b) and the provisions in Rule 3 and that as such under Rule 2 (b) quasi-permanent service begins from the date on which a declaration is issued under Rule 3, that being the sine qua non for the commencement of quasi-permanent service. The Supreme Court clinched the issue by adding that without such a declaration quasi-permanent service cannot begin. It was pointed out further that Rule 2 (b) and Rule 3 when read together inevitably yield the conclusion that the two sub-clauses of Rule 3 must be read conjunctively and both conditions must be fulfilled before a Government servant can be deemed to be in quasi-permanent service, namely, (i) that he has been in continuous Government service for more than three years, and (ii) that the appointing authority after satisfying itself as to his suitability in various respects for employment in quasi-permanent capacity has issued a declaration to that effect. Concluding the discussion the Supreme Court remarked that the scheme of the Rules following Rule 3 makes it clear that the two clauses of Rule 3 should be read conjunctively. 9. Since admittedly no declaration had been made in respect of the petitioner in terms of Rule 3, his contention that he had acquired the status of quasi-permanent servant by merely putting in more than 3 years of service cannot be sustained. 9. Since admittedly no declaration had been made in respect of the petitioner in terms of Rule 3, his contention that he had acquired the status of quasi-permanent servant by merely putting in more than 3 years of service cannot be sustained. Therefore, I hold, accepting the contention of the learned Government Advocate, that the petitioner was Appellant temporary servant on 7-6-1967 when notice terminating his services was issued by the Chief Secretary. If so, it was not disputed, his services could be terminated by one months notice in terms of Rule 5 which provides, inter alia, that - (a) the service of a temporary Government servant who is not in quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant; and (b) the period of such notice shall be one month, unless otherwise agreed to by the Government and by the Government servant. Hence, I see no escape from the conclusion that the petitioners services had been validly terminated. 10. Shri Charu Gopal Singh did not urge any other point on behalf of the petitioner. He did not contend that the provisions of Article 311 (2) are attracted in the present case; nor he pressed the plea of mala fides of which, I may add, no particulars had been given in the writ petition. 11. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocates fee Rs. 32/-. Petition dismissed.