Order Both these revision petitions arise out of proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Criminal Revision Petition No. 502 of 1969 the final order was passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate. First Class, Jamkhandi, declaring that Party No. 1 was in possession. This order of the learned Magistrate, is being challenged by the petitioners in the said case. In Criminal Revision Petition No. 503 of 1969 it is directed by the learned Magistrate, by his order dated 29th November, 1969, that the auction lease, wherein the petitioners were purchasers, is cancelled. Against that order this revision petition has been preferred alleging that the learned Magistrate has passed the above-said order without hearing them. As both those revisions arise out of one and the same proceedings they are dealt with together and disposed of by a common order. In Criminal Revision Petition No. 502 of 1969, the petitioners before this Court are members of Party No. 2. The respondents are members of Party No. 1. The facts of the case are as follow: One Gurusiddappa was the owner of the lands in dispute i.e., Survey No. 239/1 consisting of 6 acres and 22 guntas and Survey No. 240/1-A consisting of 7 acres and 11 guntas. The respondents’ case is that as tenants of the said Gurusiddappa they have bean cultivating the lands mentioned above from the year 1965 onwards. It is also the respondents’ case that Gurusiddappa agreed to sell one of the survey numbers on 2nd January, 1967 to the 1st Respondent. In the meanwhile Gurusiddappa filed a suit in O.S. No. 231 of 1966 on 9th November, 1966 against the respondents before the Court of the Munsiff and J.M.F.C. at Jamkhandi praying for a permanent injunction restraining them from interfering with his possession. He got an order of temporary injunction on 9th November, 1966. But the said order of injunction was vacated by the learned Munsiff on 25th January, 1968. Gurusiddappa took up the matter on appeal in the Court of the Civil Judge, Bijapur, in Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1968. But the learned Civil Judge on 6th December, 1966 confirmed the order of the learned Munsiff vacating the temporary injunction granted in the said case. Gurusiddappa took up the matter on appeal in the Court of the Civil Judge, Bijapur, in Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1968. But the learned Civil Judge on 6th December, 1966 confirmed the order of the learned Munsiff vacating the temporary injunction granted in the said case. Thereafter Gurusiddappa filed a revision against the said order in this Court and this Court summarily dismissed the same at the stage of admission, Thereafter Gurusiddappa withdrew the suit on 18th November, 1969. The petitioners’ case is that during the pendency of the civil proceedings, on 14th June, 1967 Gurusiddappa entered into an agreement to sell Survey No. 239/1 in favour of the petitioners. Thereafter on 13th February, 1969 he executed a sale deed in favour of the petitioner No. I and his brother's son with regard to Survey No. 240/1-A. He also executed a sale deed on the same day selling Survey No. 239/1 in favour of the petitioners. As dispute arose with regard to the possession of these survey numbers, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Banahatti, submitted a report on 4th September, 1969, to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate praying that proceedings under section 145, of the Criminal Procedure Code, may be taken against the petitioners and the respondents in respect of the said two lands. The learned Magistrate pasted a preliminary order on 5thSeptember, 1969 and directed the receiver to take over possession of the disputed lands. After holding on inquiry, the learned Magistrate passed a final order on 24th November, 1969 declaring that members of Parly No. 1 were in possession of the said disputed lands. Against the said order this revision was filed by the petitioners before the learned Sessions Judge at Bijapur and the same was dismissed. In this revision petition the petitioner challenges the said order passed by the learned Magistrate declaring that members of Party No. 1 were in possession of the said disputed land is void. Sri K.A. Swami, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has contended that the order of the learned Magistrate is vitiated for various reasons. He argues that the Courts below erred in basing this decision under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, on the decision of the civil Court. Only an interim order was passed on the application for temporary injunction. The various affidavits filed in the case have not been considered by the learned Magistrate as unnecessary. He argues that the Courts below erred in basing this decision under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, on the decision of the civil Court. Only an interim order was passed on the application for temporary injunction. The various affidavits filed in the case have not been considered by the learned Magistrate as unnecessary. The Magistrate has also not given any finding that there is any likelihood of the breach of the peace in his final order. No good reasons have been given by the learned Magistrate to discard the documents produced by Party No. 2 such as the Pahani extracts and Record of Rights showing that the said lands were cultivated by the petitioners in the year 1969-70. It is also contended by Sri Swami that the preliminary order passed under section 145 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, is defective and without jurisdiction and the subsequent proceedings taken thereafter are all bad and are liable to be quashed. He strongly relied on a decision of this Court in Manjoor Khan v. State of Mysore1 in support of his said contention. He has also relied on number of decisions of this Court in S.A. Ahmed v. Suleman Hajee2, Hanadev Ahmad Patil and G. Venkata Naidu v. Bellary Central Co-operative Stores Ltd.5 in support of his contention that the order passed by the learned Magistrate is illegal and defective. He has also argued that though the civil proceedings were pending, section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, is no bar and the petitioner could acquire the said suit lands. He has relied on decisions of the Supreme Court in Naguray v. B. Shama Rao6 and……… Annammal v. Chellakutti7 in support of the said contentions. Sri Deshpende, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has contended that the defects if any, pointed out in the order of the learned Magistrate are only irregularities curable under section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He has stressed that section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, proceedings are summary proceedings and if there was any material on record to show that Party No. 1 was in possession of the suit land, the Court would be justified in passing an order. Sri Deshpande has stressed that the finding of the competent civil Court in the matter was that the respondents were in possession of the disputed lands as tenants. Sri Deshpande has stressed that the finding of the competent civil Court in the matter was that the respondents were in possession of the disputed lands as tenants. This finding of the civil Court is binding on the criminal Court and the criminal Court cannot go behind this finding and is bound to accept the same. The learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge have merely acted on this finding of the civil Court that the respondents were in possession of the disputed lands. In view of this finding of the civil Court, which was binding, the learned Magistrate, thought it unnecessary to go into the affidavits filed by the interested parties which are bound to be conflicting. Sri Deshpande has strongly relied on the decisions of this Court in Imambu v. Husserbi8, Multani and Shankarappa v. Ramanna Gouda11 in support of his contentions that the Criminal Court is bound to follow even a temporary order passed by the civil Court regarding possession of the disputed lands in question. It is also argued by him that under sections 63 and 64 of the Bombay Tenancy Act and also under section 39 of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, the petitioners could not have purchased he properties from Gurusiddappa as respondents were tenants of the said land being in possession of the same. During the period of tenancy neither the petitioner nor even Gurusiddappa, the owner himself, could dispossess the respondents. There is no evidence whatsoever on record that the respondents were so dispossessed at any time from the possession of the said lands. It is also contended by Sri Deshpande that the various decisions of this Court relied upon by Sri Swami, learned Counsel appearing an behalf of the petitioners, are not binding in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court as rendered in R.R. Bhutani v. Mani1. In the said decision their Lordships have stated that satisfaction under sub- section (1) of section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is that of the Magistrate. The question whether on the materials before him, he should initiate proceedings or not is within his discretion, and he can arrive at his satisfaction both from the police report and from other information. The said decision has also laid down that it is unnecessary for the Magistrate to give a finding that there was a likelihood of breach of the peace in his final order. The said decision has also laid down that it is unnecessary for the Magistrate to give a finding that there was a likelihood of breach of the peace in his final order. Hence it is contended that the various decisions of this Court relied on by Sri Swami are by implication overruled. It is also contended by Sri Deshpande, that the record of rights relied on by the petitioners were got up later, and the petitioner's name was shown therein for the first time in April, 1969, and the same was certified on 23rd July, 1969. It is stressed that all the civil Courts and also the criminal Court have come to the conclusion that the respondents were in possession of the disputed lands and interests of justice do not call for interference with the order of the Courts below. In the civil suit in O.S.No.221 of 1966 filed by Gurusiddappa against the respondents, it was urged by him that the respondents were cultivating the lands as his servants. The case of the respondent-was that he was in possession of the said lands as tenant of Gurusiddappa. The finding given by the civil Courts was that respondent-1 was in possession of the said land as tenant of Gurusiddappa. In the appeal filed against the order vacating the interim injunction, the learned civil Judge has observed as follows: “The plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of the suit lands bearing R.S. No. 239/1 and 240 of Chimnad village and that defendants arc his farm servants; that the defendants (farm servants) began to disturb the possession of the plaintiff alleging that they are the tenants of the suit lands which necessitated the filing of the present suit. The bone of contention therefore between the parties is as to whether the defendants are the farm servants or the tenants of the suit lands. The bone of contention therefore between the parties is as to whether the defendants are the farm servants or the tenants of the suit lands. At the time when the learned Munsiff passed the order vacating the temporary, injunction on 25th January, 1968, he held that there was prima facie evidence to show that the defendants were tenants of the suit lands and that therefore he passed an order vacating the temporary injunction which was granted ex parte in favour of the plaintiff.” After considering the evidence in the case the learned civil Judge has held as follows: “These two documents prima facie disclose that the defendants are in possession of the suit lands in their capacity as tenants.” It is clear from what has been stated above, the finding of the civil Courts was that the respondents prima facie, were in possession of the lands as tenants. The revision filed against the said order of the learned civil Judge was dismissed by this Court. In Imambu v. Hussenbi2 Hegde, J., as he then was, has stated that a Magistrate acting under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, ought to respect any recent decision given by a competent civil Court on the question of possession. The decision given by the civil Court does not deprive him of the jurisdiction conferred by section 145, but it is a question of judicial propriety which has now ripened into a rule of law. As a corollary, if the civil Court decides the question of possession for the purposes of giving an interim relief, the Magistrate acting under section 14.5, should respect that decision as well. In Multani v. Shah Abdu Turab Qudari1 this Court has laid down: “If there is a decision of a civil Court, the Magistrate is expected to respect and sustain it. The decision of the civil Court for this purpose is not to be confined to final decisions in suits by way of decrees. In Multani v. Shah Abdu Turab Qudari1 this Court has laid down: “If there is a decision of a civil Court, the Magistrate is expected to respect and sustain it. The decision of the civil Court for this purpose is not to be confined to final decisions in suits by way of decrees. Even when an interim injunction is granted for the duration of a pending suit for perpetual injunction, the civil Court does come to a prima facie finding that the party in whose favour it grants the injunction is in possession of the property, in respect of which the injunction is granted.” In Shankarappa Gurappa Kiranji v. Ramannagouda Sankaragouda Patil2 this Court has pointed out, where a civil Court two months before the proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, are instituted, declared that Party No. 2 was in actual possession and in that behalf passed a decree against Party No. I, it would not be proper for the Magistrate to entertain a petition under section 145. This Court has pointed out that where a civil Court has come to a definite finding that the land in dispute was in possession and enjoyment of a certain party, the policy of the law is to give preference to such a finding in matters of this nature. It is well established that it is the duty of the Magistrate to give effect to the decisions of the civil Courts and see, as far as possible, that the decrees of the civil Courts are maintained. Otherwise, it would only amount to putting a premium upon the high-handed and unlawful activities of the other side. The object of section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, undoubtedly is to compel the parties go to the civil Courts to settle their disputes and to get adjudication of their rights to immovable properties. When that is done by a competent civil Court, on the guise that there is likelihood of breach of peace between the parties, the Magistrate ought not to exercise his powers under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. The finding of the civil Court was that the respondents were in possession of the suit properties, and the learned Magistrate was bound to respect the said finding of the civil Court. He therefore thought it unnecessary to go into the various affidavits filed by the interested parties which were bound to be confiding. The finding of the civil Court was that the respondents were in possession of the suit properties, and the learned Magistrate was bound to respect the said finding of the civil Court. He therefore thought it unnecessary to go into the various affidavits filed by the interested parties which were bound to be confiding. Sri Swami, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has strongly relied on various decisions of this Court mentioned above in support of his contention that the order of the learned Magistrate is legally defective. But the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court, as laid down in R.H. Bhutani v. Marti3 has altered the position. In paragraph 9 of the said judgment their Lordships have stated as follows: “The satisfaction under sub- section (1) is of the Magistrate. The question whether on the materials before him, he should initiate proceedings or not is, therefore, in his discretion which, no doubt, has to be exercised in accordance with the well recognised rules of law in that behalf. No. hard and fast rule can, therefore, be laid down as to the sufficiency of material for his satisfaction. The language of the sub- section is clear and unambiguous that he can arrive at his satisfaction both from the police report or” from other information “which must include an application by the party dispossessed. The High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the Magistrate.” In the instant case it is clear that a report was made to the learned Magistrate on 4th September, 1969, by the Police Sub-Inspector, Banahatti, that there was an apprehension of breach of the peace due to disputes for possession of the lands in question. The records disclose, that the Sub-Inspector had recorded the statements of number of persons which indicated that there was dispute likely to cause breach of the peace between the parties. Along with his report the Sub-Inspector of of Police submitted the statements of various persons recorded by him. The learned Magistrate after going through the same, satisfied himself that there was likelihood of the breach of the peace and passed the preliminary order under section 145 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. Along with his report the Sub-Inspector of of Police submitted the statements of various persons recorded by him. The learned Magistrate after going through the same, satisfied himself that there was likelihood of the breach of the peace and passed the preliminary order under section 145 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the satisfaction under sub- section (1) of section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, was of the Magistrate. On the materials placed before him, he came to the conclusion that there was likelihood of the breach of the place and passed the preliminary order in question. It is therefore not possible to agree with the contention of Sri Swami, that the preliminary order is defective and without jurisdiction, and in view of the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is unnecessary co consider the decisions of this Court relied on by him. In paragraph 8 of the above said decision, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have pointed out, that it is unnecessary at the time of passing the final order that the apprehension of breach of peace should continue to exist. In this case admittedly, the disputed lands in question were taken possession of by the Receiver and it could not be stated that there was any likelihood of the breach of the peace when the final order was passed by the learned Magistrate. Therefore, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is not necessary that at the time of passing the final order, the learned Magistrate should give a finding that there was any likelihood of the breach of the peace. The learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge have merely based their decisions on the finding of the civil Courts. As pointed out by the various decisions of this Court, the Criminal Court is bound to follow any order, even if it is an interim order of the civil Court in dealing with the question of possession of the disputed lands. After giving anxious consideration to the various points urged before me by the learned Counsel, I am of the opinion, that the order of the Courts below cannot be said to be illegal. There are no good grounds to interfere with the order of the Courts below. Hence the Revision Petition No. 502 of 1969, is dismissed. After giving anxious consideration to the various points urged before me by the learned Counsel, I am of the opinion, that the order of the Courts below cannot be said to be illegal. There are no good grounds to interfere with the order of the Courts below. Hence the Revision Petition No. 502 of 1969, is dismissed. In Criminal Revision Petition No. 503 of 1969 it is contended by Sri Swami, that in the auction held by the Receiver, the petitioners were the highest 1 hidders and the disputed lands were given to them on lease for the year 1969-70. The petitioners have paid the bid amount of Rs. 1,400-00 and Rs. 760-00. They were also put in possession of the said land, and even now they continued to be in possession of the said lands. In the affidavits filed by the petitioners, they have set out the various expenses incurred by them after taking possession of the said lands. They lave stated that they have spent an amount of Rs. 3,000 for maintaining, manuring the sugarcane crop and other minor crops. They have also stated that they have raised new crops of wheat and maize after the auction sale in the month of November, in an area of nine acres. For this purpose they have spent an amount of Rs. 1,000 and the petitioners have also been incurring the expenses of more than Rs. 15 per day for watering the crops by way of lifting water from the well with the help of an oil engine, and for manual labour, watch and ward, etc. Without notice to them, the learned Magistrate, cancelled the said lease and directed them to hand over possession of the suit properties to the respondents. Sri Swami, had strongly relied on the decision of (1970) 1 Supreme Court Weekly Reports p. 194,wherein their Lordships have laid down: “Granting that the order was administrative and not quasi-judicial, the order had still to be made in a manner consonent with the rules of natural justice when it affected the respondent's rights to property. The rule that a parly to whose prejudice the order is intended to be passed in entitled to a hearing applied alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. The rule that a parly to whose prejudice the order is intended to be passed in entitled to a hearing applied alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers” Sri Swami, has also relied on a decision of this Court in M.C.C. Ramaiah v. Appaiah1 wherein it is stated that rules of natural justice would require the Court while passing judicial orders under section 145 (4), Criminal Procedure Code, to give notice to the interested persons before passing the said order. It has not been disputed that in this case there were no irregularities in the auction held, and that the petitioners had been put in possession of the properties. The petitioners had incurred expenditure for manuring and for raising the crops and that the learned Magistrate, without giving notice to them, had cancelled the lease and directed them to hand over possession of the disputed properties to the respondents. The order passed by the learned Magistrate is opposed to natural justice and cannot be supported. It is therefore set aside. The petitioners will continue in possession of the said lands till the expiry of the period of the auction lease. After the said period of lease is over they will hand over possession the said lands to the Receiver. The bid amount deposited will be paid to the respondents. For the reasons mentioned above the Revision Petition No. 503 of 1969 is allowed and the order passed by the learned Magistrate is set aside. S.V.S. ----- Petition No. 503 allowed; Order set aside.