The facts relevant to this second appeal are that the plain­tiff Shrimati Mata Maharani Kanchan Parava Mahadevi. the owner of Kayemi Taluk no. 169 in mouja Badharghat, settled 63 drones of land out of that Taluk with the defendant Amarendra Nath Mukhapadhya on Dar-taluki basis against an annual rental of Rs. 551/11/- inclusive of cess. In the suit for recovery of arrears of rent filed by the plaintiff she alleged that the defendant had surrendered 33 drones out of a total of 63 and so the proportionate rent payable by him for the balance of 30 drones was Rs. 254/3/9 per annum. It was pleaded further that the defendant had not paid the rent for the period 1369 T. to E. 1371 T. E. aggregating to Rs. 766/13 despite repeated demands and so it was prayed that a decree for the sum be awarded against him. The defendant resisted the suit. He admitted that he had taken 63 drones of land of Dar-taluki basis from the plaintiff but denied that he had ever surrendered 33 drones put of them. He averred that the question of surrender of 33 drones was res iudicata in view of a pervious judgment between the parties. The defendant alleged further that it was legally not open to the plaintiff to split up the holding and so the present suit for recovery of rent respecting a" part of the holding was not maintain­able. 3. The trial Court held that the plea of res judicata adopted by the defend ant was established by the inter parties judgment of which Ext. D-2 is the cop} but nevertheless the plaintiff was entitled to get a simple money decree for the amount in suit instead of rent decree claimed by her. Therefore, the plaintiff was awarded a money decree for Rs.766/13/6 with costs. 4. The defendant having felt aggrieved with the trial Court's decree took the matter in appeal to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Tripura. Shri S. M. Ali, the Presiding Officer of that Court, dismissed the appeal on 13-11-1967 but left the parties to bear their own costs in his Court. It is against the judgment and decree of the appellate Court that the instant second appeal was filed. S 5. The only point debated in this Court was whether a landlord can sue is tenant for recovery of rent for a portion of the demised property. It is against the judgment and decree of the appellate Court that the instant second appeal was filed. S 5. The only point debated in this Court was whether a landlord can sue is tenant for recovery of rent for a portion of the demised property. It may be mentioned here that Shri M. R. Choudhury. appearing for the plaintiff, conceded that the previous judgment (of which Ext. D. 2 is the copy) operates as res judicata on the point of alleged surrender of 33 drones of land by the defendant, and so it follows that the present suit is essentially for recovery of rent respecting a part of the holding. Shri Shyam Choudhury relied heavily on the decision in AIR 1938 Pat 124 Dwarka Prasad v. Babu Lal to buttress the proposition that a suit for rent res­pecting part of holding is not maintain­able. It was held in that case in clear terms that it is not open to the landlord to sue the tenant for rent in respect of a part of the holding. However, Dwarika Prasad's case is conspicuous by the fact that the High Court did not examine the proposition whether or not in such a suit a Dimple money decree for the arrears of rent can be awarded. Probably, this latter point was not raised on behalf of the landlord. Support for the view taken in Dwarika Prasad's case was gathered from a previous Division Bench authority of the same High Court report held in AIR 1922 Pat 608 (1) Maharaia of Dumraon v. Mathura Kuar. However, in another Division Bench authority of the same High Court reported in AIR ' 1932 Pat 304, Rambeas v. Akhauri Raj Mohan Sahay it was held that where suit is instituted for arrears of rent in respert of a part of holding, it can be treated as an ordinary money suit and decreed as such. It was specifically held that the effect of not including in the suit one of the plots comprised in the folding would not be to render the suit | non-maintainable. It was specifically held that the effect of not including in the suit one of the plots comprised in the folding would not be to render the suit | non-maintainable. It is interesting to observe that just as in the case of Dwarika Prasad the Court did not examine the question whether instead of a it decree a simple money decree would be awarded when the suit was settled in respect of a part of the holding, that question went by default even in he case of Maharaja of Dumraon. Therefore, those two cases must be considered as authority only for the proportion that a rent decree cannot be claimed in a suit relating to a part of the holding. They can certainly be not taken as authority for the proposition that in a rent suit respecting part of a holding even simple money-decree can also be not granted. Rent decrees have their special featu­res in terms of Bihar Tenancy Act (8 of 1934) and Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 under which the cases cited by Shri Shyam Choudhury were decided. Likewise was the situation in Tripura under the Law of Landlord and Ten­ant in the Independent State of Tripura. One of such special features is that rent decrees can be realized only by proceed­ing against the holding concerned and not personally from the tenant. But none of these Acts interdicts award of simple money decree in a suit of the present nature. Such a decree can be awarded in terms of Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Shri Shyam Choudhury was unable to find any fault with the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Rambeas. There is yet another single Bench decision of the Patna High Court which supports the view propounded by Shri M. R. Choudhury. It is reported in AIR 1937 Pat 558. Janki Singh v. Jevanandan Singh. In this latter autho­rity it was held that if a landlord brings a suit for the recovery pf arrears of rent in respect of a portion of a hold­ing, though he will not be entitled to claim a rent decree he nevertheless can pray for a money decree. The case of Maharaja of Dumraon (supra) was con­sidered in this judgment but was dis­tinguished on the footing that the ques­tion of awarding a money decree in the alternative was not examined therein. 6. The case of Maharaja of Dumraon (supra) was con­sidered in this judgment but was dis­tinguished on the footing that the ques­tion of awarding a money decree in the alternative was not examined therein. 6. It would be apparent form the above discussion of the authorities cited by the parties' counsel that though it is not open to a landlord to claim a rent decree in respect of a part of the hold­ing, yet he can legitimately pray for awarding him a simple money decree for the proportionate amount of the rent. Nothing said in the cases of Dwarika Parasad and Maharaja of Dumraon stands in the way of the Court granting a simple money decree for the propor­tionate amount. Actually, I may repeat, the question of awarding a money decree was never considered in the said two authorities. On the other hand, the deci­sions in the cases of Janki Singh and Rambeas lend unqualified support to the proposition that a simple money decree can be awarded to the landlord when he files a suit for arrears of rent in respect of a part of the holding. Indeed, that is the only practical view to adopt as it is at once equitable and not opposed to any provision or principle of law. Hence, I affirm the finding concurrently reached by the two Courts below that the was entitled to a simple money decree for the amount claimed in the suit. 7. The matter in issue admits of treatment from another standpoint as well. It was commonly agreed that in terms of the vesting order made by the Administrator on 14-11-1961 under the provisions of the Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act. 1960 the plaintiff Maharani has ceased to be Talukdar of the holding in dispute, and likewise the defendant has also lost his status as Dar-Talukdar in respect of the same holding. There­fore, as at present the plaintiff is not entitled to execute a rent decree against the holding which once stood in the name of the defendant. Consequently she can only pray for a simple money decree for the rent in arrears. Therefore the only decree that could be awarded to her is a simple money decree and this is exactly what has been done by the two Courts below. 8. Consequently she can only pray for a simple money decree for the rent in arrears. Therefore the only decree that could be awarded to her is a simple money decree and this is exactly what has been done by the two Courts below. 8. In view of the above discussion and the conclusions reached there this second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Second appeal dismissed