JUDGMENT : Divan, J. The petitioner herein has challenged the validity of Rule152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules as unconstitutional and void and has further prayed for a direction against the opponent's directing them to treat the show cause notice dated February 18, 1967, Annexure-1 to the petition and the Order, dated April 23, 1968. Annexure L to the petition as illegal, void and of no effect whatsoever. He has further sought for a direction against the opponents for treating the period of the petitioner's absence from duty from June 6. 1957 to October 28, 1965, as period spent on duty for all purposes and for a direction to the opponents to pay the petitioner full pay and allowances for the peeled from June 6. 1957 to October 28, 1965. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed a Junior Grade Clerk in the Civil Class III Post in the then Province of Bombay, on September 20. 1931 by the District Superintendent of Police. Ultimately on May 1, 1957, the petitioner was promoted as Herd Clerk to the District Superintendent of Police, Banaskantha District. On June 5, 1957, the petitioner was arrested for an alleged offence of criminal breach of trust in his capacity as Police Accountant when he was serving in the office of the District Superintendent of Police, Ahmedabad(Rural). The petitioner was suspended from service by an order, dated June 14, 1957 and his suspension was directed to take effect from June 5, 1957 afternoon. In respect of the criminal offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner he was prosecuted in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, II Court, Ahmedabad.for the offence under Section 409, Indian Penal Code. On February 27, 1959. the petitioner was convicted for the offence under Section 409, Indian Penal Code. Thereafter the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Sessions Court at Ahmedabad. The appeal was dismissed on July 22, 1959. Thereafter a Criminal Revision Application was preferred to the High Court of Bombay and in that Revision Application the judgment and order, dated November 14, 1959, an order for retrial of the petitioner was passed. On retrial by the Chief City Magistrate, Ahmedabad, the petitioner was acquitted so far as the charge of criminal misappropriate, in respect of the amount of Rs. 2800/ was concerned. On retrial by the Chief City Magistrate, Ahmedabad, the petitioner was acquitted so far as the charge of criminal misappropriate, in respect of the amount of Rs. 2800/ was concerned. A true copy of the judgment by which the petitioner was acquitted has been annexed as Annexure A to the petition Against this judgment and order of acquittal, Criminal Appeal No. 366 of 1962 was preferred by the Government of Gujarat but the appeal was dismissed by the High Court on August 5, 1963. In respect of another amount of Rs. 700/ the petitioner was also prosecuted before the City Magistrate, 5th Court, Ahmedabad and by the order and judgment, dated November 9, 1963, the learned Magistrate acquitted the petitioner. No appeal was filed by the Government of Gujarati against this order of acquittal. 3. While these criminal prosecutions were pending against the petitioner the Inspector General of Police by his Order, dated September 11,1959, dismissed the petitioner from servant on the basis of the conviction of the petitioner has the earlier, order, dated February 27, 1959,and the decision in the appeal, dated July 22. 1959. Against this order of dismissal the petitioner filed Special Civil Application No. 161 of 1961 in this Court challenging the order of dismissal During the pendency of the Writ Petition, the Government of Maharashtra set aside the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner by the Inspector General of Police and directed that the petitioner should be reinstated. This order was passed by the Government on February 20, 1965. In view of this order of reinstatement, the petitioner withdrew aforesaid Special Civil Application. For the recovery of the amount alleged to have been misappropriated by the petitioner, the Government of Gujarat had filed civil suit No. 620 of 1961 in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad, praying for a decree in the sum of Rs. 6017/- against the petitioner but after the petitioner was acquitted in the two criminal trial sand after the order of reinstatement was pasted by the Government of Maharashtra, the State of Gujarat withdrew the said suit on April 19, 1965. The Government of India has by its order dated June 11, 1965,allocated the petitioner to the State of Gujarat. 6017/- against the petitioner but after the petitioner was acquitted in the two criminal trial sand after the order of reinstatement was pasted by the Government of Maharashtra, the State of Gujarat withdrew the said suit on April 19, 1965. The Government of India has by its order dated June 11, 1965,allocated the petitioner to the State of Gujarat. By his letter, dated September 18, 1965, addressed to the Government of Maharashtra, the petitioner requested that the issuance of orders regarding the treatment of the period of suspension as well as the period of absence from duty from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement as period spent on duty should be expedited. The Government of Maharashtra replied by its letter, dated October 28, 1965, informing the petitioner that it was for the Government of Gujarat to issue orders about the treatment of the period of suspension find absence from duty. Thereafter correspondence went on and ultimately on February 18, 1967, the Government of Maharashtra issued a show cause notice calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why the period of the petitioner's suspension from July 1, 1957 to September 10, 1959, should not be treated as such and the period of suspension and the petitioner's absence from duty from September 11, 1959 to October, 28 1965 should not be treated as leave due and admissible including extraordinary leave under the provisions of Rule 152 of the B.C.S. Rules. The petitioner showed cause in response to this notice and thereafter by the Order, dated April 23, 1968, the Government of Maharashtra decided to treat the period of suspension of the petitioner tom July 1, 1957 to September 10, 1959 as such and the period of absence from September 11, 1959 to October 28, 1965, as leave due and admissible including extraordinary leave. It may be pointed out that the show cause notice, dated February 18, 1967. proceeded on the footing that the acquittal of the petitioner from the charges famed against him was on the basis of benefit of doubt and hence this acquittal could not be treated as honourable. It was on that basis that the show cause notice was issued by the Government of Maharashtra on February 18, 1967 and it is on that footing that the Order, dated April 23, 1968, appears to have been passed by the State Government. 4. It was on that basis that the show cause notice was issued by the Government of Maharashtra on February 18, 1967 and it is on that footing that the Order, dated April 23, 1968, appears to have been passed by the State Government. 4. Rule 152 of the B. C. S. Rules provides as follows "152 (I) when a Government servant who has been dismissed. removed or suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order- (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty; and (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. (2) Where the authority mentioned in clause (1) is of opinion that the Government servant has been fully exonerated or, in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall be given the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed removed, or suspended, as the case may be." Though the show cause notice, dated February 18, 1967, Annexure J to the petition, uses the words "honourable acquittal" in substance what appears to have been in the mind of the authorities concerned is the concept of full exoneration set out in sub-rule (2) of Rule152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. 5. In Gopalkrishna v. State of M P., AIR 1968 SC 240 , the Supreme Court considered a-similar rule, viz., Fundamental Rule 54 applicable to the employees in the Public Works Department of the Madhya Pradesh Government, Shelat, J., delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court pointed out in para 9 at page 243 of the report : "It is true that the order under Fundamental Rule 54 is in a sense a consequential order. In that it would be passed after an order of reinstatement is made. But the fact that is a consequential order does not determine the question whether the Government servant has to be given an opportunity to show cause or not. It is also true that in a case where reinstatement is ordered after a departmental inquiry the Government servant would ordinarily have had an opportunity to show cause. But the fact that is a consequential order does not determine the question whether the Government servant has to be given an opportunity to show cause or not. It is also true that in a case where reinstatement is ordered after a departmental inquiry the Government servant would ordinarily have had an opportunity to show cause. But there are three classes of cases as laid down by the proviso in Article 311 of the Constitution of India where a departmental inquiry would not be held. Since there would be no inquiry. In these classes of cases the authority would not have before him any explanation by the Government servant. The authority in such cases would have to consider and pass the order merely on such facts which might be placed before him by the department concerned. The order in such a case would be ex parte without the authority having the other side of the picture. In such cases the orders that such authority would pass would not be a consequential order as where a departmental inquiry has been held. Therefore, an order passed under Fundamental Rule 54 is not always a consequential order nor is such order a continuation of the departmental proceeding taken against the employee. xx xx xx In such a case if an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed is not afforded, as admittedly it was not done in the present case, the order is liable to be struck down as invalid on the ground that it is one breach of the principal of natural justice. xx xx xx We find that the High Court of Maharashtra has also taken in V R. Gokhale v. State of Maharashtra ILR (1963) Bom 537 =(AIR 1963 Bom137), the same view which we are inclined to take of the nature of function under Rule 152 of the Bombay Civil Service Rules, 1959 a rule in terms identical to those of Fundamental Rule 54 before us." 6. In the instant case, we find that following the correct Illegal principles, the State of Maharashtra did issue the show cause notice but the show cause notice and the final order passed under Rule 152 both proceed on the footing that the petitioner was not honourably acquitted; or to use the language of Rule 152 (2) "was not fully exonerates". 7. 7. In this context we may point out that a similar problem arose before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Union of India v. Jayaram, AIR 1960 Mad. 325; and Rajamannar, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Division Bench pointed out :- "There Is no conception like ""honourable acquittal" in Criminal Procedure Code The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and, if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry. Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the hill pay during the period of his suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply. " Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words "fully exonerated" the words were "honourably acquitted". With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of honourable 'acquittal' or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon by showing charge level against him and he may meet the charge-(a) by showing that he prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that. is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version and the prosecution version is not correct. In any one of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the Prosecution version, the Criminal Court is bound to acquit the accused. In any one of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the Prosecution version, the Criminal Court is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete Innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since he is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of honourable acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C. J., in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325. 8. We find that this decision of the Madras High Court was followed by the Punjab High Court in AIR 1967 Punj. 422 and -by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Ghulam Nabi v. State, AIR 1966 J. and K. 27. 9. As against these three decisions and our view regarding the position as it emerges from the Criminal Procedure Code and Criminal Jurisprudence,the learned Assistant Government Pleader. on behalf of the first respondent relied upon certain observation of Narasimham, C.J. in State of Orissa v. Sailabehari, AIR 1963 Orissa 73, The learned Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court has observed at page 78 of the report: "But the learned Sessions Judge did not acquit the respondent honourably on the ground that the evidence of Gopal Sahu was not false.On the contrary he expressly stated that though there was a strong suspicion against the respondent, the prosecution evidence did not completely exclude the possibility of the theory of planting. This only shows that the learned Judge applied the well known rule of criminal jurisprudence that in a criminal case the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt, thereafter further departmental enquiry in respect of the same subject matter was not excluded especially as the standard of proof required in such an enquiry against a delinquent public servant is not the same as that required against an accused in a criminal case." With respect to the learned Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, we are unable to agree with his reasoning that where ever an accused person has been acquitted in a criminal trial because of the application of the rule of benefit of doubt being given to the accused, there cannot be said to be honourable acquittal. In our opinion, it would be proper on our part to follow the decision of Rajamannar, C.J., cited above rather than the decision of Narashimham, C.J, and we prefer to follow the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. 10. In the instant case, it was open to the Government of Maharashtra if it so chose. to start a departmental enquiry in the proper manner for the purpose of establishing whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the petitioner had been fully exonerated or deserved to be fully exonerted or not. In the absence of any such departmental Enquiry, it cannot be said that the State of Maharashtra has applied the correct principles to the facts of the present case. 11. Under these circumstances, the order passed by the State of Maharashtra on April 23, 1968 and communicated to the petitioner by the District Superintendent of Police. Banaskantha District, by his letter, dated(June 27, 1968) must be set aside and it must be held that the petitioner, who was suspended because there was criminal prosecution against him and was reinstated after he was acquitted. is entitled to full pay during the period of his suspension as required under the general provisions of law. 12. We, therefore, quash and set aside the show cause notice, dated February 18, 1967 and the Order dated April 23, 1968 and we direct the opponents to treat the entire period from June 6, 1957 to October 28, 1965, as period spent on duty and we further direct the opponent to pay to the petitioner full pay and allowances for the entire period. The opponents will pay the costs of this petition to the petitioner. We further direct that the amount shall be paid to the petitioner within three months of the issuance of the Writ of this High Court. In the result, this Special Civil Application is allowance and the rule is made absolute. Rule made absolute.