JUDGMENT : A. Misra, J. - Defendant is the Appellant. Plaintiff-Respondent filed the suit for a declaration that the Defendant has no right to Mahantship of the suit muths and their properties and for an injunction restraining him from acting as Mahant. 2. The case of the Plaintiff-Respondent is as follows: Mahant Shri Raghavananda Das Goswami was the Mahant of Raghunath Muth situate in Dengapadaro together with its three subsidiary muths situate at Manikyapur, Govindpur and Dharampur which belong to the category known as 'mourasi' muths. Plaintiff had been duly initiated and taken as chela by Raghavananda on 16-2.1941. Raghavananda suddenly died on 16 11-1959. On receiving information about his death, Plaintiff returned to Dengapadaro from Puri on 17-11-1959. By then, Defendant had already arrived there. After the obsequies were performed, Defendant produced a Will purported to have been executed by Raghavananda nominating and appointing him as Mahant of the main muth of Dengapadaro and its two subsidiary muths at Manikyapur and Govindpur and giving the Dharampur muth to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges - that the Will produced is not genuine and that it was not executed by Raghavananda in a Bound disposing state of mind and had been brought about by fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation by the Defendant's father, who was the brother of the deceased Mahant in his natural family. It is also stated that subsequently Raghavananda disapproving the behaviour and conduct of the Defendant revoked the said nomination. Even otherwise, it is averred that the nomination under the Will is invalid in law and that in any view of the matter, be (Plaintiff) alone as the senior chela is entitled to succeed. As Defendant applied to the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments for approving his nomination under the Will, the suit was filed for the aforementioned reliefs. 3. The case of Defendant-Appellant, on the other hand, is that Raghavananda validly initiated him as his chela on 19-9-1947. He had the absolute right to nominate or appoint any of his cables to succeed him as Mahant and the claim that the senior chela as such in a mourasi muth is entitled to succeed as of right is not correct. The case of Defendant-Appellant, on the other hand, is that Raghavananda validly initiated him as his chela on 19-9-1947. He had the absolute right to nominate or appoint any of his cables to succeed him as Mahant and the claim that the senior chela as such in a mourasi muth is entitled to succeed as of right is not correct. Raghavananda finding that Defendant was more suitable to succeed him executed the Will in a sound disposing state of mind about ten years prior to his death to the knowledge of Plaintiff and others expressly appointing him to succeed to the office of Mahant of the three muths of Dengapadaro, Manikyapur and Govindpur and gave the Dharampur muth to the Plaintiff. The allegation of fraudulent inducement or misrepresentation in bringing about the execution of the Will is denied. It is further averred that the muth at Dharampur is an independent institution and not an offshoot of or subsidiary to the Dengapadaro muth. As such by nomination of Plaintiff to Dharampur muth and Defendant to the other three muths, there was no division of the office of Mahantship. It is also alleged that under the prevailing practice, it was permissible to nominate different chelas to different muths. Lastly, it is stated that Plaintiff has lost his right even to the Mahantship of Dharampur muth by having contracted marriage with a Bengali lady at PurJ. 4. The trial Court decreed the Plaintiff's suit on the following findings: (1) Both the Plaintiff and Defendant were duly appointed chelas of late Mahant Raghavananda Das Goswami, Plaintiff being the senior chela initiated in 1941 and Defendant in 1947; (2) the right of nomination of a successor being an incidence of the office of a Mahant in a mourasi muth, the reigning Mahant can by a Will appoint a successor; (3) the senior chela has no right to inherit the office of Mahantship by virtue of his being the senior chela; (4) the Will (Ex. G) was executed by late Raghavananda when he was in a fit condition to know the nature of the document he was executing; (5) Raghavananda did not subsequently revoke the nomination under the Will; (6) Dharampur muth is not an independent and separate institution and Defendant has failed to prove any custom permitting partition of the office of Mahantship; (7) nomination of the Defendant under the Will is not valid as the same was not done in the interest and for the benefit of the suit muths, but the natural relationship of Defendant with the Mahant weighed heavily with the latter and while making the nomination, he virtually laboured under the idea of providing means for his nephew and also the terms amounted to a partition of the office of Mahantship; (a) Defendant's nomination being invalid, Plaintiff as senior chela is entitled to succeed to the Mahantship of the suit muths and (9) the alleged marriage of Plaintiff is not proved. 5. The following facts are not disputed: By the time of his death on 16-11-1959, Raghavananda Das Mahant of Raghunath muth at Dengapadaro was also in management of three other muths situate at Manikyapur, Govindpur and Dharampur, which belong to the category known as 'mourasi' muths. Raghavananda executed the Will (Ex. G) in 19:19 appointing Defendant as his successor to the Raghunath Muth at Dengapadaro as well as the other two muths situate at Manikyapur and Govindpur and Plaintiff as his successor to the muth at Dharampur. 6. In view of the respective contentions of the parties and the findings of the Court below, the following points arise for determination in this appeal: (1) Whether both Plaintiff and Defendant were duly constituted chelas of late Raghavananda; (2) whether in a mourasi muth, the Mahant has the right to nominate or appoint his successor or whether succession to Mahantship devolves as of right by inheritance on the senior chela; (3) whether the Will (Ex. G) on 4-1-1949 is genuine and executed by Raghavananda in a sound disposing state of mind and the nominations made therein are bona fide and in the interests and for the benefit of the muths; (4) whether nomination under Ex. G was subsequently revoked by Raghavananda; (5) whether the Dharamvur muth is an offshoot of or subsidiary to the main muth at, Dengapadaro or it is an independent institution and (6) whether the terms of Ex. G was subsequently revoked by Raghavananda; (5) whether the Dharamvur muth is an offshoot of or subsidiary to the main muth at, Dengapadaro or it is an independent institution and (6) whether the terms of Ex. G amount to partition of the office of Mahantshiv of the suit muth and if so, whether such partition is permissible under the prevailing custom and circumstances of the case. 7. Point No. 1-The learned Addl Subordinate Judge on an elaborate discussion of the oral and documentary evidence and taking into consideration certain admissions made by the p.ws. has given a categorical finding that both the Plaintiff and Defendant were validly taken as chelas of late Mahant Raghavananda Das, the former being the senior chela initiated in 1941 and the latter in 1947. Neither party has challenged this finding before us, and therefore, it is unnecessary to deal with the evidence on this aspect. 8. Point No. 2-The finding of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge on this point is that the presiding Mahant or superior of a mourasi muth has the right to nominate his successor from among his chelas and the senior chela has no right of inheritance to the office of Mahantship by virtue of his being senior chela. There is no dispute that except where a rule of succession is laid down by the founder himself, the succession to Mahantship of a muth or religious institution is regulated by the custom or usage of the particular institution. So far as mourasi muths are concerned, the principle of law is well settled that the right of nomination of the successor being an incidence of the office of a Mahant, the senior chela as such acquires no right of inheritance to the office simply by virtue of his seniority. In the decision reported in Sital Das Vs. Sant Ram and Others Mukherjea, J., as be then was has observed: It cannot also be disputed that Mahantship is not hereditary in the sense that on the death of an existing Mahant his chela succeeds to his office as a matter of course. He can acquire rights only by appointment and the authority to appoint is vested in the Bhek and the Sewaka. On a review of various decisions and authorities, this Court in a decision reported in Mahant Tulasiram Das alias Baidhar Das v. Ram Prasanna Das and Ors. I.L.R 1955 Cutt. He can acquire rights only by appointment and the authority to appoint is vested in the Bhek and the Sewaka. On a review of various decisions and authorities, this Court in a decision reported in Mahant Tulasiram Das alias Baidhar Das v. Ram Prasanna Das and Ors. I.L.R 1955 Cutt. 653, explained the principle of law as follows: It is thus clear on the authorities that the right of nomination of a successor is an incident of the office of Mahant in a mourasi muth, and a senior chela acquires no right to the office only by reason of his seniority in the line of succession. In the absence of a special custom to the contrary this rule is of universal application. 9. In his book "Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts", 2nd Edition at page 320 by B.K. Mukherjea, the principle of law has been summarised as follows. In a hereditary (Mourasi) muth the succession goes in the first place according to the text of Yajnavalkya to Satsisya or virtuous pupil. So, in order to entitle a person to succeed to the office of a Mahant, it is not enough to show that he is a chela or disciple of the latter. He must be a Satsisya or disciple endowed with good qualities. The question arises as to how it is to be determined whether a chela fulfils this requirement or not? The way of determination must depend either upon the express directions of the founder of the endowment, if any or upon the custom in Each foundation. The custom in certain institutions may be that the seniormost chela is entitled to succeed as he is presumed to be virtuous, or a Satsisya may be only that chela who is nominated or appointed by the Guru during his life time,... 10. As Plaintiff has sought to establish his claim on the ground that be is the senior moat chela., it is clearly incumbent upon him not only to show that he is the senior chela, but also to prove existence of a custom in a particular muth to the effect that the senior most chela is entitled to succeed being presumed to be virtuous and the presiding Mahant had no power to nominate his successor. No attempt has been made to prove any custom depriving the presiding Mahant's right to nominate his successor. No attempt has been made to prove any custom depriving the presiding Mahant's right to nominate his successor. On the other hand the evidence shows that in the past successive Mahants invariably nominated their successors, such as, Atmaram Das having nominated Raghavananda under the document (Ex. F) and Atmaram having been nominated by his Guru Laxman Das. Mr. Dasgupta" learned Counsel for Respondent does not dispute the general proposition that in a mourasi muth, the presiding Mahant has the right to nominate his successore He, however, contends that though the, right of nomination of the Successor is an incidence of the office of Mahant in a mourasi muth, in case of absence of such nomination, or if the nomination, if any, is found to be invalid in law, the senior chela is entitled to succeed to the vacant office, unless he is found to be otherwise disqualified. Therefore the point that arises for consideration is whether in the present case the nomination of Defendant under Ex. G is invalid on any of the grounds alleged or if such nomination was subsequently revoked. 11. Point No. 3.-On a consideration of the evidence, the trial Court, while finding that Raghavananda executed Ex. G when he was in a fit condition to know the nature and purport of the document he was executing, held that the nomination of Defendant thereunder is invalid on two ground section Firstly, the Domination was not in the interests and for the benefit of the institution, but was done with the object of providing means for his nephew and secondly, the terms of Ex. G created a partition of the office of Mahantship and as such invalid in law. Learned Counsel for Respondent during the course of argument tried to support this finding on another ground that as Defendant was not found to be a Satsisya, he was disqualified to be appointed as successor. 12. It is urged by learned Counsel for Appellant that as these grounds on which the nomination is found to be invalid have not been alleged in the plaint, it was not open to the trial Court to rely on such grounds in considering the validity or otherwise of the nomination under Ex. 12. It is urged by learned Counsel for Appellant that as these grounds on which the nomination is found to be invalid have not been alleged in the plaint, it was not open to the trial Court to rely on such grounds in considering the validity or otherwise of the nomination under Ex. G. According to him, the grounds on which the validity of the nomination is challenged are contained in para a(a) of the plaint as fraudulent inducement and representation in bringing about the execution of Ex. G. Learned Counsel for Respondent during the course of argument stated that he does not press the ground of fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation alleged in the plaint. Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to consider the merits of these allegations, though we may observe that there is practically little evidence on record to prove that Ex. G. is vitiated by fraudulent inducement and representation. The grounds on which the trial Court found the nomination invalid and which were urged at length have not been specifically pleaded in the plaint, but as appears from the judgment of the trial Court, both parties joined issues during the course of the trial on the said grounds without any objection. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary to deal with the technical objection taken by learned Counsel for Appellant about absence of these grounds in the pleadings. 13. The trial court relied on two main circumstances for its conclusion that the nomination under Ex. G. was not in the Interests of the institution, but the object of Raghavananda was to benefit his nephew. The first circumstance is the registration of Ex. G. at Boirani situate 16 or 17 miles from Dengapadaro instead of it being registered at Berhampur where it was scribed or at the registration offices of Hinjlikatu, Sorada and Hadakhimedi within whose jurisdiction the three muths are situate. The suggestion seems to be that by presenting the document for registration at Boirani Raghavananda was trying to keep the matter a secret which he would not have done had he felt that his action was above-board. We find no justification in drawing such an inference. Ex. G. was executed about ten years prior to the date of death of Raghavananda. Exs. We find no justification in drawing such an inference. Ex. G. was executed about ten years prior to the date of death of Raghavananda. Exs. 8, 9 and P afford ample evidence to show that Plaintiff was fully aware of the Will and on more than one occasion approached different Courts to get himself substituted in place of Raghavananda in litigations relating to the properties of Dharampur muth. This he did on the basis of Ex. G. similarly, in Ex.3, an objection petition submitted by Raghavananda to the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments on 24.12.1955, he clearly stated that he had nominated two successors, the Plaintiff and Defendant for the different muths under a registered Will executed by him. This shows that no attempt at secrecy about execution of Ex. G was being made at any time and Plaintiff was fully aware of the same. In such circumstances, presentation of Ex. G for registration at Boirani can hardly be taken as a circumstance to show that Raghavananda was trying to maintain secrecy. 14. The next circumstance relied upon by the trial Court is relationship of Defendants with the deceased Mahant. There is no dispute that Defendant is the son of Raghavananda's brother in the natural family. The evidence of d.w. 2, Mahant of Khanduru muth, a person whose veracity cannot be doubted and that of d.w. 10 shows that it is usual and common for Mahants to take members from their natural family as chelas who ultimately succeed to the office. The uncontroverted evidence is that Atmaram Das, Guru of Raghavananda was his paternal uncle. So also, Laxman Das, Guru of Atmaram was his paternal uncle. Mr. Dasgupta, learned Counsel for Respondent concedes that the circumstance of a chela who ultimately succeeds to the Gaddi having once belonged to the natural family of the Mahant by itself does not and cannot be a circumstance to invalidate his nomination on the ground that such a selection is not for the benefit of the institution. The reason is obvious. The effect of a person's entry into a religious order has been explained in a decision reported in Sital Das Vs. Sant Ram and Others as follows: The entrance into a religious order generally operates as a civil death. The reason is obvious. The effect of a person's entry into a religious order has been explained in a decision reported in Sital Das Vs. Sant Ram and Others as follows: The entrance into a religious order generally operates as a civil death. The man who becomes a ascetic severs his connection with the members of his natural family and being adopted by his preceptor becomes, so to Bay, a spiritual son of the latter. The other disci pies of his Guru are regarded as his brothers, while the co-disciples of his Guru are looked upon as uncle and in this way a spiritual family is established on the analogy of a natural family. 15. Thus, on initiation as a chela, Raghavananda himself ceased to be a member of his natural family and when in 1947 Defendant was taken as chela, his connection with his natural family also come to an end. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has clearly erred in assuming that Defendant still continues as a member of the natural family or that Raghavananda by nominating him was intending to confer a benefit on his brother's son. Thus, these two grounds which seem to have weighed with the learned Subordinate Judge about the object of Raghavananda in nominating his successor and holding that the said nomination was not for the benefit of the institution are totally untenable. 16. Point No. 4.-The next point for consideration is whether the nomination under Ex. G was subsequently revoked by Raghavananda as alleged in the plaint. The finding of the trial Court is that Raghavananda never revoked the Will Ex. G executed by him. This finding is not assailed by Respondent, but it is argued that the letters (Exs.2, 2/b and K) show 'that Raghavananda was displeased with the conduct and behaviour of Defendant and felt that such conduct amounted to immorality. Therefore, it is argued that Defendant having been found an Asatsisya was disqualified for appointment to the office of Mahant. To invalidate a nomination on this ground, there must be positive proof of immorality. Merely because in certain circumstances the Mahant expressed his displeasure or disapproval of the conduct of the nominee, such conduct cannot be treated as amounting to immorality to make the nomination invalid. To invalidate a nomination on this ground, there must be positive proof of immorality. Merely because in certain circumstances the Mahant expressed his displeasure or disapproval of the conduct of the nominee, such conduct cannot be treated as amounting to immorality to make the nomination invalid. In the decision reported in Ramalingam Pillai v. Vythilingam Pillai 20 Ind App 150 the nomination was held to be invalid as the appointment was made by a person who had ceased to be Dhurmakartah having been removed from his office by the Court for embezzlement and being at the time subject to a charge of criminal breach of trust. In Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das and Ors. 43 Ind App 73 the appointment was found to be invalid as the Mahant relinquished the office and collusively appointed his nephew whom he knew to be a married man and consequently disqualified. In the decision reported in Sethu Ramaswamiar v. Meruswamier 48 Indian Appeals, 1, the appointment was held to be invalid, because it was made under a compromise to avoid a threatened prosecution for forgery. The circumstances in which an appointment or nomination becomes invalid are explained in the decision reported in 43 Ind App 73, as where the person chosen becomes disqualified by reason of bodily deformity, of bodily disease, such a, leprosy, or disease of the mind, or of leading a life which is immoral or is inconsistent with the religious views of the brotherhood. The evidence in the present case shows that the Mahant was displeased with Defendant for getting involved in a criminal case for having obstructed the Supplies Supervisor in removal of paddy from his custody. This conduct of the Defendant cannot be considered as amounting to leading a life which is immoral or inconsistent with the religious vows of the brotherhood. Hence, the nomination of Defendant, if it is found otherwise valid, cannot be struck down as invalid on the ground that he was an Asatsisya. 17. Points Nos. 5 and 6.-The next question for consideration is whether the nomination of Defendant under Ex. G. is invalid on the ground that it amounts to a partition of the office of the Mahant. According to Plaintiff, the three muths at Manikyapur, Govindpur and Dharampur being offshoots of and subsidiary to the Raghunath muth at Dengapadaro, all of them appertain to one Mahantship. G. is invalid on the ground that it amounts to a partition of the office of the Mahant. According to Plaintiff, the three muths at Manikyapur, Govindpur and Dharampur being offshoots of and subsidiary to the Raghunath muth at Dengapadaro, all of them appertain to one Mahantship. Nomination of different chelas to succeed to different offshoot muths appertaining to one office of Mahant amounts to partition of the office, which is not permitted under law. The case of Defendant-Appellant, on the other hand, is that the Dharampur muth is not an offshoot of the Raghunath muth at Dengapadaro, hut is an independent institution, the management of which, had been entrusted to the Mahants of Dengapadaro. As such, entrustment of the Dharampur muth to a different chela does not amount to a partition of the Mahantship of Dengapadaro. Alternatively, it is urged that under the prevailing practice from the time of predecessors of Raghavananda different chelas were being dominated to different muths. Therefore, even if Dharampur muth is found to be an offshoot of the main muth at Dengapadaro, the nomination under Ex. G. will not be invalid. 18. The Judicial Committee in the decision reported in Sethu Ramoswamiar v. Meruswamier 48 Ind App 1, observed that the headship of a muth is not a matter for partition. That decision, however, related to a, case where in a partition suit, besides partition of joint family properties, it was also prayed to frame a scheme in respect of certain properties attached to an office relating to a muth held by the Manager. In the decision reported in Ram Charan Ramanuj Das v. Govind Ramanuj Das and Ors. 56 Ind App 104, this question of partibility where anum her of asthals were held by a single person at a particular point of time came up for consideration. Their Lordships observed as follows: There is no direct authority as to the power of a Mahant who has anum her of separate asthals which by usage have been held by one man to provide for their division between his successors, or to saddle the property of one or more of the component asthals with a reservation in favour of the others. All that can be safely said is that, as the essence of the law governing these muths lies in the following of custom or usage prima facie such a separation would be improper, unless there were special circumstances justifying it. While making the above observations, their Lordships made it clear as expressing no determination upon the point as it was not necessary for the decision of that case. The above observations indicate that prima facie the office of the Mahantship of a muth where the Mahant by virtue of his office holds a number of asthals or muths which are offshoots of or subsidiary to the main muth is not divisible except in cases where custom, usage or peculiar circumstances justify it. It follows that if some of the institutions for the time being held or managed by the Mahant are not offshoots of or subsidiary to the main muth to which the office appertains but are separate and independent institutions, entrustment of the same to a chela other than the one nominated to succeed to the Mahantship will not amount to division of the office. 19. The first point which therefore arises for consideration is whether the Dharampur muth is an off-shoot of or subsidiary to the main muth at Dengapadaro to which the office of the Mahantship appertains or it is an independent institution which had been entrusted to the management of the Mahant. The recitals in Ex. U a deed of gift dated 27-5-1878 executed by Baino Padhan and Benu Padhan in favour of Laxman Das, one of the predecessor Mahants of Dengapadaro muth give a clear picture of the origin of the Dharampur muth and its endowments. They show that the ancestors of the executants founded the Dharampur muth installing the deity Raghunath Mahaprabhu and endowed 72 and odd bharans of land for the seba puja of the deity. This institution with its endowments remained under the management and control of the founders and their family members till the date of execution of Ex. U. Under Ex. They show that the ancestors of the executants founded the Dharampur muth installing the deity Raghunath Mahaprabhu and endowed 72 and odd bharans of land for the seba puja of the deity. This institution with its endowments remained under the management and control of the founders and their family members till the date of execution of Ex. U. Under Ex. U the institution loosely described as the Dharampur muth, with its endowments were gifted to Laxman Das, the then Mahant of Dengapadaro with the stipulation that out of the income of the endowed property after payment of taxes, etc., the balance was to be utilised for the bhog of the deity and the donee was prohibited from alienating or otherwise encumbering any of the endowed properties. From these recitals, it is clear and cannot be controverted that the Dharampur muth was not founded by the Mahant of Dengapadaro nor was it an off-shoot of the Dengapadaro muth. Mr. Dasgupta, learned Counsel for Respondent, while conceding that at one particular point of time the Dengapadaro muth and the Dharampur muth were independent entities, argues that the gift under Ex. U having been made to the Dengapadaro muth through the Mahant, there was a merger of the two institutions, and since then, the Dharampur muth was treated as a branch and became a subsidiary muth of the Dengapadaro muth. In support of this contention, be relies on Exs. 14 and 15 to show that in 1928 the Commissioners of the Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras did not treat the Dharampur muth as a separate entity, but referred to the Dengapadaro muth as the main muth and the three other muths including the one at Dharampur as attached muths. In the scheme framed, the three other muths including the Dharampur muth have been referred to as minor muths attached to the muth of Raghunath Mahaprabhu situate at Dengapadaro. In Ex. 3, the objection petition filed by Raghavananda before the Endowment Commission on 24-12-1959, be referred to the three muths including the one at Dharampur as sakh or branch mutha. So also, in Ex. G, Manikyapur, Govindpur and Dharampur muths have been described as sakha or branch muths. In Ex. 3, the objection petition filed by Raghavananda before the Endowment Commission on 24-12-1959, be referred to the three muths including the one at Dharampur as sakh or branch mutha. So also, in Ex. G, Manikyapur, Govindpur and Dharampur muths have been described as sakha or branch muths. Relying on these recitals, it is contended by him that whatever might have been the position at the inception, subsequently Dharampur was all along treated as a branch or subsidiary muth of Dengapadaro, and as such it cannot, now be treated as an independent institution. 20. In our opinion, this contention of Mr. Dasgupta is not tenable. As the history of the origin of the institution known as Dharampur muth and its endowments shows, the institution did not originate as a muth in its true sense. The endowments were created in favour of the deity installed by the Karji family who founded the institution at Dharampur. It remained under their management and control till transfer under Ex. U to the then Mahant of Dengapadaro. It is well settled that in case of such debottar endowments, the dedicated property vests in the idol, a juristic person and neither the executant of Ex. U nor the donee thereunder was competent to put an end to the dedication or give a different turn to such debottar property by creating a merger with the Dengapadaro muth. Though the Dharampur institution is loosely described as a muth, in essence, it is only a debottar in its origin. The primary distinction between debottar and a muth lies in the fact that unlike debottar where the essential or central part of the institution is the reality or idol, the presiding element in a muth is an ascetic or religious teacher. An institution which at his inception is debottar, the endowments vesting in the deity or idol cannot subsequently be transformed to a muth in its real sense nor a muth at its inception can be treated as a temple or debottar merely because subsequently some idol is installed therein. Each category, there fore, continues to maintain its distinctive characteristics which cannot be altered or converted from one to other by subsequent conduct of the parties. Each category, there fore, continues to maintain its distinctive characteristics which cannot be altered or converted from one to other by subsequent conduct of the parties. Therefore, though the Madras Board in 1928 described the Dharampur institution as an attached muth of Dengapadaro month and though Raghavananda in subsequent documents purports to describe the Dharampur institution loosely as a branch muth, in the eye of law, the identity of the Dharampur muth as a separate and independent institution with its intrinsic characteristics continues. The position of the successive Mahants of Dengapadara muth vis-a-vis the Dharampur institution was only that of persons entrusted with the control and management of the institution which was transferred to them under Ex. U by the successors of the original founders. Appellant referred to budget estimates for different years submitted to the Secretary to the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa which have been marked as Ex. E series to show that Dharampur muth was treated as an independent institution. Exs. E/1 and E/4 are budget estimates of the Dharampur muth, while others in Ex. E series appertain to budget estimates of the muths at Dengapadaro, Manikyapur and Govindpur. Similarly, he also refers to the property registered (Ex. M/13). It is not necessary to deal with these documents as they show nothing more than the manner in which the Mahant was administering the different moths under his management. For the reasons already discussed, we find that Dharampur moth originated and continued as an independent institution and it IS not an off-shoot institution of the Dengapadaro muth. Therefore, nomination of Defendant as successor to the office of Mahant of Dengapadaro muth together with its branch muths at Govindpur and Manikyapur and nomination of Plaintiff as successor to the Dharampur muth under Ex. G cannot amount to a partition of the office of Mahant. 21. The next contention of Appellant is that even if it be assumed that the Dharampur muth is an off-shoot of the main muth at Dengapadaro, nomination of Defendant as successor to the three muths at Dfengapadaro, Manikyapur and Govindpur and that of Plaintiff to the muth at Dharampur is valid being permissible under the prevailing custom and usage. Learned Counsel for Appellant, as already indicated, contended that Defendant's nomination under Ex. Learned Counsel for Appellant, as already indicated, contended that Defendant's nomination under Ex. G not having been specifically challenged on the ground that it amounted to a division of the office, he had no opportunity to prove the existence of custom or usage to the contrary. Learned Counsel for Respondent, on the other band, argued that a custom or usage to the contrary not having been pleaded in the written statement, it is not open to Defendant to rely on such usage or custom in support of divisibility of the muths. though in the plaint, the validity of the Domination under Ex. G was not challenged on the specific ground that it amounted to a division of the office and a custom or usage to the contrary was never specifically pleaded by Defendant, in the trial Court, parties adduced evidence on such an issue and the learned Additional Subordinate Judge also considered it on its merits. We, therefore, propose to consider the evidence on this question. 22. For Appellant, it is contended that there is sufficient evidence on record to prove that the predecessor Mahants of this institution on some occasions had nominated different chelas to succeed to different muths under their control. Plaintiff has admitted in the witness-box that one Muralidhar Das Naga, founder of the Khanduru muth also established the muth at Dengapadaro. d.w. 2 is the present Mahant of Khanduru muth. According to his evidence, the two muths at Khanduru and Dengapadaro remained under one Mahant for four generations. Thereafter, for each of these muths different successors were nominated. It is undisputed that Laxman Das, the donee under Ex. U was the Mahant of Dengapadaro muth at one particular point of time. Atmaram succeeded him. This Atmaram had two chelas Ramanuja and Raghavananda. Atmaram executed Ex. F. dated 9-10-1911 under which he nominated Ramanuja to succeed to the Dharampur muth and Raghavananda to succeed to the remaining muths. Ramanuja who became Mahant of Dharampur died in 1934 without taking any chela on which Raghavananda succeeded to it as Guru Bhai. Thus, Defendant relies on these two instances to prove that in the past entrustment of different muths to different chelas had occurred without any objection which proves the prevailing usage of the institution. Learned Counsel for Respondent, however, contends that though under Ex. Thus, Defendant relies on these two instances to prove that in the past entrustment of different muths to different chelas had occurred without any objection which proves the prevailing usage of the institution. Learned Counsel for Respondent, however, contends that though under Ex. F Atmaram gave the Dharampur muth to Ramanuja and nominated Raghavananda to the other muths, this document was never acted upon, and in fact, Ramanuja did not become the Mahant of Dharampur. The learned Subordinate Judge seems to have accepted the explanation put forth by Plaintiff-Respondent mainly relying on Exs. 14 and 15, the enquiry report and the scheme framed by the Madras Hindu Religious Endowment Board in 1928. These documents show that the muths at Govindpur, Manikyapur and Dharampur were treated as minor or attached muths of the main muth at Dengapadaro, and therefore, one scheme was framed. It is argued that if Dharampur was an independent institution as Ramanuja was alive by then and was the Mahant of the said mu the he would not have allowed his muth to be included in the scheme for the Dengapadaro muth. Presumably, the scheme was framed on the basis of a report furnished by the Inspector and there is nothing to show that Ramanuja had any notice of the said proceeding which ultimately ended in framing of the scheme. Further, these documents cannot outweigh other important evidence to the contrary available on record. Under Ex. F executed as early as 1911, Atmaram made a division of the muths under his management and nominated Ramanuja to succeed to the Dharampur muth. There is no satisfactory explanation as to why be would have so done had he not intended it to be acted upon. In Ex. G executed by Raghavananda in 1941, there are clear recitals that himself and Ramanuja were two chelas of Atmaram and that under Ex. F. dated 9-10-1911 Atmaram had divided the muths according to which each of them succeeded to and remained in possession of the muth given to him. It is also stated therein that on Ramanuja's death without leaving a chela, Raghavananda succeeded to the Dharampur muth as Guru Bhai. This is an admission by Raghavananda that Ramanuja functioned as Mahant of Dharampur muth and no explanation has been offered as to why he would have made such a statement in 1949 if it was not a fact. Ex. This is an admission by Raghavananda that Ramanuja functioned as Mahant of Dharampur muth and no explanation has been offered as to why he would have made such a statement in 1949 if it was not a fact. Ex. 16 is the certified copy of a previous deposition of Raghavananda in a Title Suit in the year 1954. Raghavananda stated there that Ramanuja lived in the Dharampur muth for about ten years till 1930 whereafter he came to Dengapadaro muth where he died within a year or two. He further stated that he assumed management of the Dharampur muth since Ramanuja's death. The entry at serial 13 in Ex. E/13 refers to the deceased Mahant's Mahotsaba. p.w. 11 in his evidence stated that this entry related to the Mahotsaba ceremony of late Ramanuja Das. p.w. 11 further stated as follows: Because a Will was executed in favour of late Ramanuja Das, he was the Mahant of Dharampur muth. It is also in evidence of d.w. 2 that Ramanuja's samadhi was constructed in the Dharampur muth. Thus, there is overwhelming evidence to show that in pursuance of the nomination made under Ex. F. by Atmaram, Ramanuja became the Mahant of Dharampur, continued as such till his death, but as he died without leaving a chela, Raghavananda, his co-disciple succeeded him. Learned Counsel for Respondent argues that the aforesaid evidence only proves that out of respect for the wishes of Atmaram it can at best be said that Ramanuja was only allowed to manage as Mahant of Dharampur, though legally he was not installed as Mahant. We are unable to agree with this contention. In the face of the overwhelming evidence referred to above it will not be correct to rely on Exs. 14 and 15 and come to a finding that the nomination under Ex. F was not acted upon and Ramanuja was not, in fact was installed as Mahant of Dharampur muth. Thus, at least two instances have been established where the predecessor Mahants had appointed different chelas for different muths under their control. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has observed and it is also argued before us that such isolated instances cannot amount to proof of a valid custom or usage and a party who seeks to rely on a custom or usage must prove its antiquity, continuity certainty and reasonableness. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has observed and it is also argued before us that such isolated instances cannot amount to proof of a valid custom or usage and a party who seeks to rely on a custom or usage must prove its antiquity, continuity certainty and reasonableness. In appreciating evidence of proof of a custom or usage, no general rule about the quantum of evidence can be laid down. Each case will depend on its own circumstances. In a decision reported in 34 Ind Cas 875, it is observed: In appreciating evidence as to custom, I do not think, any general rule applicable to all cases can be laid down other than that the custom must be proved by clear and cogent evidence. It would be unfair to demand exactly the same quantum of proof in a case where the custom alleged is not at variance with any law as in a case where the custom is completely opposed to the existing law. When a right is exercised in a certain way upon the only two occasions on which it is known to have arisen during the last 150 years and these two occasions are separated by an interval of 45 years, there is strong evidence to support the theory that the particular methed of exercising the right is the customary one. In the present case, it is fairly established that during the tenure of the predecessor Mahants at least on two occasions nomination of different chelas to different muths had taken place without any objection. The observations of the Judicial Committee in the decision reported in Ram Charan Ramanuj Dag v. Govind Ramanuj Das and Ors. 56 Ind App 104, recognise that such division is permissible where custom, usage or peculiar circumstance justify it. When in the past, such division had occurred, so far as this institution is concerned, without any objection or exception having been taken, in our opinion, it amounts to the existence of a usage permitting nomination of different chelas to different muths for the time being under the control of one Mahant. Considered from this point of view also, the nomination of Defendant to succeed to the there muths and of Plaintiff to succeed to the Dharampur muth cannot be treated as invalid. 23. Learned Counsel for Appellant also argued that Plaintiff is estopped from questioning the validity of nomination of Defendant under Ex. Considered from this point of view also, the nomination of Defendant to succeed to the there muths and of Plaintiff to succeed to the Dharampur muth cannot be treated as invalid. 23. Learned Counsel for Appellant also argued that Plaintiff is estopped from questioning the validity of nomination of Defendant under Ex. G. in view of the compromise entered into under the agreement (Ex. N.) and in view of acceptance of the validity of the Will on the basis of which substitution was sought in pending litigation under Ex. a. As we have found that the nomination of Defendant under Ex. G. is valid, it is not necessary for us to consider the merits of this contention. 24. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the trial court are set aside and the suit is dismissed with costs throughout. S. Acharya, J. 25. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed