This second appeal raises the question about the true inter­pretation of Section 306 of Indian Suc­cession Act. 2. The facts culminating in this second appeal are that Narendra Kumar Paul filed a suit in the year 1945 against Prasanna Kumar Sil claiming damages arising allegedly out of his malicious prosecution by the latter. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court on 28-2-1959. Narendra Kumar Paul filed an appeal in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Tripura, Agartala, against the decree of dismissal. His appeal was accepted and the suit decreed in a certain sum. Prasanna Kumar Sil then lodged a second appeal in this Court against the decree of the first appellate Court. Be­fore that appeal could be heard on merits, Prasanna Kumar Sil died and since his representatives were not brought on the record within time, the appeal was dismissed on 24-8-1967. 3. Narendra Kumar Paul then sued out execution on 17-5-1968 against the legal representatives of the deceased judgment debtor. The legal representa­tives raised an objection in the execut­ing Court that since due to death of Prasanna Kumar Sil the second appeal had abated, it was not open to Narendra kumar Paul to claim execution of the decree which he had secured from the first appellate Court. Narendra Kumar Paul controverted that contention of the legal representatives on the score that the decree of the first appellate Court having not been set aside by any superior Court, he was entitled in law to claim the decretal amount from the legal representatives of the deceased. The objection raised by the legal repre­sentatives prevailed in the executing Court and so the latter rejected the ex­ecution application on the finding that in view of the death of Prasanna Kumar Sil before the second appeal could be decided -on merits, the cause of action could not have survived. 4. The decree-holder having felt aggrieved took the matter in appeal to the Court of Subordinate Judge, Agar­tala, who, by his judgment dated 24-6-1970, allowed the appeal on holding that the cause of action having merged in the decree made by the first appellate Court and that decree having not been set aside by the Judicial Commissioner's Court, nothing said in Section 306 of the Succession Act stood in the way of Narendra Kumar Paul to claim the amount of the decree from the legal re­presentatives of the deceased. It is that finding of the first appellate Court which is assailed in the present second appeal. 4-A. The fate of this appeal turns on the interpretation of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. That section runs as under:- "All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his ex­ecutors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party; and except also cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory." It is the middle part of the section, which reads "except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal in­juries not causing the death of the party." on which Shri M. K. Dutta. re­presenting the appellants, placed reliance to support the contention that with the death of Prasanna Kumar Sil during the pendency of the second appeal in this Court the cause of action stood exhaust­ed with the consequence that his repre­sentatives could not be proceeded against for recovery of the amount decreed by the-first appellate Court. The opposite contention raised in the Court below was that once a decree has been passed the cause of action stands merged therein and that the death of the judgment-debtor thereafter cannot nullify the decree and that in such cir­cumstances the proper course for the re­presentatives of the deceased judgment debtor is to prosecute the appeal against the decree if such an appeal had been filed by the deceased. Illustration (i) to the section appears to lend support to this latter contention. That illustration is in the following words:- "A collision takes place on a railway in consequence of some neglect or default of an official, and a passenger is severely hurt, but not so as to cause death. He afterwards dies without hav­ing brought any action. The cause of action does not survive." Illustration clearly suggests that the re­levant part of the section reproduced above does not operate after the cause of action becomes a part of the judicial record and ceases to exist as, for example, when a decree is passed on the basis thereof. He afterwards dies without hav­ing brought any action. The cause of action does not survive." Illustration clearly suggests that the re­levant part of the section reproduced above does not operate after the cause of action becomes a part of the judicial record and ceases to exist as, for example, when a decree is passed on the basis thereof. It was held in the case of Marwadi v. Samnaji. 38 Ind Cas 823 = (AIR 1918 Mad 1100) that if the plaintiff in a suit for libel fails to ob­tain a decree in the trial Court and then goes in appeal but dies during the pen­dency thereof, the appeal abates. It was observed further in that case that the rule is that personal actions so long as they remain unconverted into decrees abate on death Likewise, it was held in the case of Haridas v. Ramdas, (1889) ILR 13 Bom 677, that "It is a maxim of the common law that a personal action does not survive on the death, either of the person who did, or of the person who sustained, the wrong, and, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary. it still prevails unless the estate is affected by the tort." Reliance was placed by the Bombay High Court in support of that view on the observa­tions made in Phillips v. Homfray. (1883) 24 Ch D 439, wherein the following pro­positions were enunciated:- "...............the only cases in which, apart from questions of breach of con­tract, express or implied, a remedy for a wrongful act can be pursued against the estate of a deceased person who has done the act, appear to us to be those in which property, or the proceeds or value of property, belonging to another, have been approDriated by the deceased person and added to his own estate or moneys * * * * Where there is nothing among the assets of the deceased that in law or in equity belongs to the plaintiff, and the damages which have been done to him are unliquidated and uncertain, the ex­ecutors of a wrongdoer cannot be sued merely because it was worth the wrong­doer's while to commit the act which is complained of, and an indirect benefit may have been reaped thereby." 5. The facts of the case Bhim Sain v. Muhammad Ali, AIR 1929 Lah 807, provide almost a complete parallel to the facts of the case in hand. There one Muhammad All filed a suit for award of damages amounting to Rs. 10.000/-against Lachhman. The trial Court decreed the suit in the sum of Rupees 2,000/-. Both the parties felt aggrieved and so Lachhman filed an appeal against the decree made by the trial Court, while Muhammad Ali put in cross-ob­jections claiming that he should be .awarded additional Rs. 1,000/- by way of damaees. Lachhman, however, died be­fore the appeal and the cross-objections could be heard in the High Court and his legal representatives then happened to continue the appeal. The appeal was disposed of by the High Court on merits but the cross-objections were held to have abated with the death of Lachh­man. In support of the latter conclu­sion reliance was placed on Thiruvengada v. Swami lyengar, (1911) ILR 34 Mad 76 and Muzaffar Khan v. Ghulam Muhammad Khan. 1915 Pun Re 62 = (AIR 1915 Lah 378) which lay down that although the right of appeal survives to the tort-feasor's representatives after his death, the right of appeal does not survive in the same way in the plaintiff who claims further damages or further costs. The High Court of Lahore ultimately held that although an appeal by Muhammad Ali would have been perfectly compe­tent during the lifetime of Lachhman it must have abated on the latter's death; and it follows, therefore, that the cross-objections must similarly abate. 6. I may also usefully invite attention to another important judgment in AIR 1934 Nag 119, Gulabrao v. Deorao. The headnote of the case reads as under:- "In a suit for malicious prosecu­tion the plaintiff's right, which is a mere right to sue for damages for a personal injury, changes its character once it is merged in a decree. It then becomes a matter of record which is a right of higher nature. The rights and liabilities arising under a decree awarding damages for malicious prosecution therefore con­tinue when the plaintiff dies during the pendency of an appeal against the decree, so far as the appeal is concerned, but as regards the cross-objections they abate." 7. It then becomes a matter of record which is a right of higher nature. The rights and liabilities arising under a decree awarding damages for malicious prosecution therefore con­tinue when the plaintiff dies during the pendency of an appeal against the decree, so far as the appeal is concerned, but as regards the cross-objections they abate." 7. The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion of the various authorities is that once a cause of action has resulted in a decree of the Court, it ceases to exist as such and death of a party to the decree thereafter will not per se nullify the decree. The only way in which the aggrieved party, or his representatives can get over the decree is to successfully challenge it in the superior Irfal forum. Applying these principles to the case in hand, I see no escape from the conclusion that it was open to the representatives of the deceased Prasanna Kumar Sil to pro­secute the appeal in this Court on his death and that Section 306 of the Act lends them no help because it relates only to causes of action and has nothing to do when a cause of action has merged into a decree of the Court. Therefore, this appeal is without merit and so I dismiss it in limine. Appeal dismissed.