judgment Deshmukh, J. 1. These are tea petitions filed by various types of persons connected with the beedi industry who could be described in the language of the impugned Act as principal employers, contractors and employees. For the various reasons detailed in the petitions, all of them seek a writ of mandamus prohibiting the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 from giving effect to the provisions of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 (No. 32 of 1966) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and further seek a declaration that the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder are void, ineffective and beyond the legislative competence of the Legislature and interfering unreasonably with fundamental rights of the petitioners. 2. Out of these petitioners, the petitioners in Special Civil Application Nos. 391. 392, 393 of 1969, No. 409 of 1968, and Nos. 451 and 453 of 1969, as also those in Special Civil Applications Nos. 513 and 514 of 1069 are the beedi manufacturers who could be appropriately described as principal employers in the language of the Act; the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 410 of 1968 is a contractor, and the petitioner in Special Civil Application No, 411 of 1968 is an employee. 3. The provisions of the Act are impugned mainly on two grounds. It is urged that there was no legislative competence in Parliament in the matter of enacting this law and it is also urged that its provisions interfere with the freedom of contract and trade of the petitioners in a manner which is beyond the scope permitted by the reasonable restrictions in Clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. It is also argued that assuming that the restrictions were to be considered as reasonable they are not in the interests of the general public. A faint attack is also made on the ground of infringement of Article 14, inasmuch as the provisions of the Act are styled as arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive and discriminatory. 4. Before we go to the provisions of the Act and the attack of the petitioners against the general or specific provisions thereof, it may be noted that there seems to be a long history behind the dispute between the beedi manufacturers and the workers who arc employed in this industry. 4. Before we go to the provisions of the Act and the attack of the petitioners against the general or specific provisions thereof, it may be noted that there seems to be a long history behind the dispute between the beedi manufacturers and the workers who arc employed in this industry. The attempts made by the authorities till now to give some benefit to the workers of this industry have proved abortive. This measure on an all India basis is therefore enacted with a view to provide for the welfare of the workers in the beedi and cigar establishments and to regulate the conditions of their work and for other matters connected therewith. This being so, it would be necessary, in our view, to make a brief resume of the history or this dispute, as also to notice the peculiar working conditions that seem to exist in this industry, for the purpose of understanding the provisions of the Act, as also the attack that is made against it. The history relating to the dispute, as also the facts that constitute the present nature of the working of that Industry, have to be gathered from judicial decisions. So far as the pleadings are concerned, they were not particularly helpful from that point of view. When arguments progressed in that behalf it was conceded at the Bar that the prior history relevant to the background of this litigation and the provisions relating to the welfare of beedi workers may be gathered from judicial decisions. At a later stage, the learned Assistant Government Pleader made available to us a report of the Minimum Wages Committee appointed by the Government of Maharashtra for inquiring into the conditions of employment in any tobacco manufactory including beedi-making. This was a tripartite Committee in which the manufacturers, the labour and the State were represented. 5. Though beedi industry may exist all over this country, it seems to be in existence on a very large scale in the States of Madras, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. So far as the actual process of manufacture is concerned, it appears to be a very simple one. Bundles of wrapper leaves are soaked in water to soften them and then they are cut with a pair of scissors into rectangular shape of average dimensions. The dimensions, however, vary from qualily to quality and the brand of the manufacturer. So far as the actual process of manufacture is concerned, it appears to be a very simple one. Bundles of wrapper leaves are soaked in water to soften them and then they are cut with a pair of scissors into rectangular shape of average dimensions. The dimensions, however, vary from qualily to quality and the brand of the manufacturer. Generally it appears that it is somewhere between 3"" to 3.2"" in length and 1.5"" to L.8"" in breadth. On occasion, an improvised tin plate of the proper shape and size is provided to enable the workers to cut leaves into an appropriate size. The wrapper leaves are mainly obtained from the tendu plants which grow in the wild forests of Chanda and Bhandara districts in the Vidarbha Region of this State. It appears that so far as Maharashtra is concerned, the tobacco which is popular is Nipani and Gujarati varieties. In order to cheapen the cost of production, the manufacturers are also known to mix inferior quality of tobacco with this tobacco. A small quantity of tobacco is put on the leaf and then it is rolled into a triangular manner between the fingers and the palms of the hand into a conical shape and the top of the broad end is closed by bending it over the wrapper with the finders. The other tip is tied with a piece of thread of varying colour according to the choice of the manufacturer. The quality of the beedi depends upon the quality of the wrapper leaf, the quantity of tobacco, and the nature of the mixture, with of course proper rolling. Though there are three different ways in which the manufacture of beedi is done, in all those modes a common factor is that the worker is given leaves at home for the purpose of wetting and cutting, and the quantity of leaves as well as tobacco are issued to each worker on the basis of the mixture and leaves which may be required for winding 1000 beedis. This is the general mode, but the actual Issue to each worker consists of the quantity given on the basis of his capacity to be able to roll his beedis. 6. The three broad manners In which the manufacturer carries on this industry are (1) Factory or Sadar system, (2) Contract or Thekedari system, and (3) Khep or Gharkhata system. This is the general mode, but the actual Issue to each worker consists of the quantity given on the basis of his capacity to be able to roll his beedis. 6. The three broad manners In which the manufacturer carries on this industry are (1) Factory or Sadar system, (2) Contract or Thekedari system, and (3) Khep or Gharkhata system. There also appears to be a fourth system known as seller-buyer system, but the experience relating to this system and the studies made by the Committee show that this is more or less a theka or contract system, though it is given the form of sale and purchase. Investigations conducted regarding the accounts maintained by such manufacturers show that though an entry of sale of mixture of tobacco and leaves is made in the account, no cash is ever paid. While showing the purchase of beedis, what is paid is only the difference between the two. For the purpose of understanding the present dispute, this variation in the system is not strictly relevant and it would be enough to note the manner in which the three broad systems indicated above work. 7. In the factory system, a worker attends the factory between stated hours when tobacco is issued to him. He is supposed to have brought the wetted and cut leaves with him for the purpose of rolling beedis by sitting in the factory premises of the employer. He is paid, however, on a piece-rate basis on the strength of the beedis rolled by him during the day. Even in the matter of factory system, where the factory has some definite hours of work during the day so far as individual workers are concerned, there are no rigid working hours. The worker seems to be free to come and go at any time he likes but he is obliged to be present in the factory within stated hours when the issue of raw materials takes place. 8. Under the contract system, which is also the Thekedari system, the Thekedar is generally an experienced beedi roller who takes the work or getting beedis rolled by other workers. He agrees to produce a certain result, namely, the preparation of stated number of beedis within a stated period, and for this work he is given some margin or commission. 8. Under the contract system, which is also the Thekedari system, the Thekedar is generally an experienced beedi roller who takes the work or getting beedis rolled by other workers. He agrees to produce a certain result, namely, the preparation of stated number of beedis within a stated period, and for this work he is given some margin or commission. The contractor engages workers who prepare beedis either at their own residence or in any working place appointed for that purpose by the contractor. The workers prepare beedis in the same manner as in the factory and deliver to him the rolled beedis at the end of the day. The contractor examines them and such of them as he thinks are sub-standard are rejected and this is known as chhat. All the beedis so collected by the contractor after deducting the chhat are sent to the principal employer, who in most of the cases, has a second round of inspection and rejection. The double chhat is one of the grievances made in the industry and is being complained against by the workers. The principal employer pays the contractor at the stated rate, and after he collects this money after settling his account with the principal employer, the contractor pays the wages to the labourers engaged by him. 9. In the Gharkhata system, the worker takes the tobacco and beedi leaves home, cuts the beedi leaves at his residence, and delivers the prepared beedis at the work-place or the shop or the stock factory of the employer. In this system also, the contractor may intervene and do the work of distribution on behalf of the principal employer. It has been found by the Minimum Wages Committee appointed by the State of Maharashtra in their report published in 1964 that in all these systems the beedi leaves are almost invariably cut by the workers at their residence and this work takes about 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 hours. The Committee of course noted only one exception of a manufacturer at Pandharpur who was getting the work of cutting the leaves from male workers also in the factory and during the factory hours. The Committee of course noted only one exception of a manufacturer at Pandharpur who was getting the work of cutting the leaves from male workers also in the factory and during the factory hours. If this solitary exception is excluded, the normal manner of working appears to be that wetting and cutting is done at home and rolling is done either in the place provided by the contractor or in the factory of the principal employer. In the Gharkhata system both the process of wetting and cutting and rolling are conducted in the private house of the beedi roller. 10. It was found that the conditions of work of most of the workers in this industry were most unhygeinic and payments were extremely low. Attempt was therefore made in the erstwhile State of Bombay to fix the minimum wages by a notification under the Minimum Wages Act in the year 1951, which Order came into force from 31st March, 1952. The rates in the erstwhile State of Bombay were again revised in the year 1955. The rates in the Vidarbha Region were revised in June 1958 and in the Marathwada Region in July, 1959. However, the notification fixing the revised rates of wages in the Vidarbha Region did not have smooth sailing, and though the rates were fixed by the notification dated 11-6-1958, they came into force on 1-7-1958. However, these rates were not actually paid to the employees by the employers of Bhandara District and a large majority of the beedi factories in Bhandara District came to be closed as a protest against the alleged unduly high rates of wages. The notification then came to be challenged and Clauses 3 to 7 of that notification were struck down by the Supreme Court in Bidi, Bidi Leaves and Tobacco Merchants Association v. Bombay State, AIR 1962 SC 486 . It was held that Clauses 8 to 7 of the notification were ultra vires of the Minimum Wages Act but the rates fixed were valid and legal. It was assumed at that time that the Factories Act applied to the beedi industry and the Manager of a factory was prosecuted for violation of Section 79 (11) read with Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948. It was assumed at that time that the Factories Act applied to the beedi industry and the Manager of a factory was prosecuted for violation of Section 79 (11) read with Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948. The trial Court convicted him but in the revision application filed in the Court of Session the Sessions Judge took the view that he was not a worker within the meaning of the Factories Act. He therefore, made a reference to the High Court, but the High Court rejected the reference and confirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court, however, after entertaining tho appeal with special leave, held that the employee in the beedi industry was not a worker and the benefits of the Factories Act could not be extended to him. A notification was then issued by the State Government under Section 85 of the Factories Act extending the provisions thereof specifically to this industry. Even then the employee could not get any benefit as the Supreme Court again held in Bhikusa Yamasa Kshatriya v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1591 that the employee may be a worker under the Factories Act but he was still not entitled to the benefits of the Act as the provisions of Sections 79 and 80 of that Act required that a worker should be paid for the leavo allowed to him at the rate equal to the daily average wage of his total full time earnings for the days on which he worked during the month immediately preceding his leave exclusive of any overtime and bonus but inclusive of dearness allowance and cash equivalent of the advantage accruing through the concessional sale to the worker of foodgrains and other articles. It has been held in that judgment that order that the benefits of leave with wages may accrue, two things are necessary. The worker must work for a day, and during that day he must put in full-time work, so that the average wage of his total full-time earning could be calculated. Since in the beedi industry, there was no such time to be found for work either in the contract or in the statute, it was impossible to calculate the daily average wage on the basis of total full-time earnings. It is in this manner that the employees again failed to get any benefit whatsoever. Since in the beedi industry, there was no such time to be found for work either in the contract or in the statute, it was impossible to calculate the daily average wage on the basis of total full-time earnings. It is in this manner that the employees again failed to get any benefit whatsoever. It is against this background that the Committee was set up for investigation, and one of the recommendations of the Committee was that a comprehensive legislation seems to be necessary in order to provide better amenities for the workers of this industry. This therefore is the background against which the present Act has been drafted and it seeks to take into account not only what had taken place till now but also declares the object with which this piece of legislation has been undertaken by Parliament. 11. We were referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Act during the arguments at the Bar. It is true that for interpreting the provisions of a statute, the Statement of Objects and Reasons could not be strictly relevant, nor could it influence or decide the meaning of the provisions of the Act. However, it is equally a well-known method of trying to interpret a statute to see what is the mischief that was prevalent which was sought to be eradicated and what was the object in view of the Legislature, and to examine whether in the provisions we find in the statute that object has been carried out. It is only from that point of view that we have looked at the Statement of Objects and Reasons which is reproduced at page 1353, Part II, Section 2, of the Gazette of India Extraordinary: ""STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS 1. The working conditions prevailing in the beedi and Cigar establishments are unsatisfactory. Though at present the Factories Act, 1948, applies to such establishments, there has been a tendency on the part of employers to split their concerns into smaller units and thus escape from the provisions oS the said Act. A special feature of the industry is the manufacture of beedis through contractors and by distributing work in the private dwelling houses where the workers take the raw materials given by the employers or the contractors Employer-employee relationship not being well defined the application of the Factories Act has met with difficulties. A special feature of the industry is the manufacture of beedis through contractors and by distributing work in the private dwelling houses where the workers take the raw materials given by the employers or the contractors Employer-employee relationship not being well defined the application of the Factories Act has met with difficulties. The labour is unorganised and not able to look after its interests. 2. One or two State Governments passed special Acts to regulate the conditions of work of these workers but found themselves unable to enforce the law owing to the fact that the industry is highly mobile and tended to move on to an area where no such restrictive laws prevailed. It became necessary therefore to have Central legislation on the subject. The Bill seeks to provide for the regulation of the contract system of work, licensing of beedi and cigar industrial premises and matters like health, hours of world spread over, rest periods overtime, annual leave with pay, distribution of raw materials, etc. 3. The main provisions of the Bill have been explained in the notes on clauses."" The above quotation shows, that the Legislature was aware of the fact that the extension of the provisions of the Factories Act to the establishments of Beedi industry resulted invariably in splitting up the concerns into smaller units. The Legislature was also aware of the fact that special feature of the industry was that manufacture of beedis through contractors and by distributing work in the private dwelling houses where the workers take the raw materials given by the employers or the contractors. There is also further awareness that employer-employee relationship was not well-defined and therefore the application of the Factories Act met with difficulties, and that the labour in this industry was unorganised and was not able to look after its own interests. It was also noted that the attempt of some of the States to legislate in this behalf was not successful as the industry was found to be highly mobile. Under all these circumstances, the necessity for Central legislation was felt and a Bill was mooted to provide for the regulation of the contract system of work, licencing of beedi and cigar industrial premises and matters like health, hours of work, spread-over, rest periods, overtime, annual leave with pay, distribution of raw materials etc. 12. Under all these circumstances, the necessity for Central legislation was felt and a Bill was mooted to provide for the regulation of the contract system of work, licencing of beedi and cigar industrial premises and matters like health, hours of work, spread-over, rest periods, overtime, annual leave with pay, distribution of raw materials etc. 12. It may therefore, be noted that so far as the avowed object of this legislation, as seen from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, is concerned, it is to preserve the industry with all its component parts working in the manner they do but the anxiety is to introduce some regulation in the employer-employee relationship and to obtain certain benefits to the employees which were hitherto denied to them. We are particularly pointing out at this preliminary stage this background because the so-called contractor or the middle-man is styled by the employees have been a matter of some concern to the employees as well as to the State who wishes to look after the welfare of the employees. The judgments which we have referred to by way of historical background also indicate that there are certain good and bad points about the systems that are prevalent in the manufacture of beedis. The contractor, it is urged, is very often a man of straw. In fact, he is the creation of the principal employer who puts him forward on many occasions as a screen to avoid his own responsibility towards the employees. Another broad grievance was that there is double checking and rejection of beedis or double chhat, out of which the second chhat at the principal manufacturers place is invariably in the absence of the employee. This chhat was alleged to be most irrational and depending upon the whim of the employer. The judgments also show that so far as the housework or the Gharkhata system is concerned, there was an advantage to the employes with some land of disadvantage to the employer. Persons who could spare time in their own houses but could not move out for the purpose of employment get ready employment and can supplement their income from agriculture on other sources. They were in a position to work as and when leisure was available and like a factory employee there was no rigour of attending the factory or the work at stated time and for stated number of hours. They were in a position to work as and when leisure was available and like a factory employee there was no rigour of attending the factory or the work at stated time and for stated number of hours. As against this, the judgments again indicate, as also the report of the Committee shows, that pilfering was a vice of this industry and was reckoned as an existing factor. By pilfering the tobacco which is the most valuable ingredient, the employees were able to earn some income by again rolling it into beedis and selling them. 13. With all these factors known to the Legislature, an attempt is not made in this Act to eliminate or stop the contract system altogether. The attempt is to regulate it and also to regulate the employer-employee relationship with a view to make it more beneficial to the employee. That being so, we find several provisions in this Act which recognise the contractor as a part and parcel of the beedi industry. ""Contractor"" has been defined in Clause (d) of Section 2 of the Act, He is again referred to when the term ""contract labour"" or ""employee"" has been defined. Several functions which the employer has to perform are also performed by this contractor, in as much as he delivers tobacco and leaves to the home worker and collects the rolled beedis after application of chhat. He also makes payment to them. In the Act, as well as in the rules framed thereunder, how the raw materials shall be distributed, how the chhat shall be applied and what the principal employer or the contractor will do in that behalf has been laid down. It therefore, appears to us that the contractor as was understood in this industry has been retained as an integral part and there is no attempt to eliminate him altogether, though, of course, the attempt is to eliminate the vices that appeared to have crept into this industry through the agency of the contractor. 14. Before again we specifically deal with the objections raised on behalf of the petitioners, it may be noted that this is an Act in the nature of a restriction on the right of trade and commerce granted by the Constitution to any citizen. The right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business is guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g). The right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business is guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g). Undoubtedly the present Act is in the nature of restrictions on that, fundamental right. Since the fundamental right of the present petitioners falls under Clause (g) of Article 19 (1), it is open to the State to make laws imposing in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of that right. Shri Phadke for the petitioners argued that it is not being disputed in the returns, not could it be disputed that the impugned Act is in the nature of restrictions on the fundamental right of the petitioners to conduct their business of bidi manufacture. The moment it is possible to say that a particular statute or law or the rules made thereunder are in the nature of restrictions on the fundamental rights, it is for the State to point out that the restrictions embodied in the statute or the rules are reasonable and also necessary in the interests of the general public. It is not for the the petitioners to show that the restrictions are unreasonable, but the burden of proof is on the State to point out that looking to the public interests involved, the restrictions put are reasonable. In Vrajlal Manilal and Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1070 SC 120 the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of an Act enacted for regulating the trade of tendu leaves by creating the State monopoly and debarring some persons including contractors who had committed default in the prior contracts and those who had no prior experience from participating in the sale and purchase of tendu leaves. When such a restriction was challenged as unreasonable and infringing the provisions of Articles 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court observed as follows in paragraph 10: ""It is well recognised that when an enactment is found to infringe any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1), it must be held to be invalid unless those who support it can bring it under the protective provisions of Clause (5) or Clause (6) of that Article. To do so, the burden is on those who seek that protection and not on the citizen to show that the restrictive enactment is invalid."" From this point of view, we find that in the pleadings so-called, not much information was made available to this Court for judging how the restrictions contemplated by the impugned Act are reasonable or are in the public interests. However, whatever material the State wanted us to look into has now been examined by us. It consists of the findings given by Court dealing with the prior cases arising out of this beedi industry, the references to certain reports of Commissions from time to time, and the report of the Minimum Wages Committee appointed by the State Government in 1964. Having placed this material before us, it will have to be seen on examination of the restrictions, as also the approach of the State, whether those who support this Act have been able to discharge this burden to demonstrate that the provisions are not only in the public interests but the restrictions are reasonable. 15. We have already indicated that the attack is mainly twofold. The first attack is about the legislative competence, and the other is about the unreasonableness of some of the provisions contained in this Act. So far as the first attack is concerned, we do not find much substance in it. In the returns filed on behalf of the State, reliance is placed upon the Entry 24 of List III in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. That entry deals with the welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employer's liability, workmen's compensations, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits. While arguing before us, however, reliance was placed on behalf of the State by the learned Assistant Government Pleader on Entries 7, 22, 23 and 24. The learned Assistant Government Pleader alternatively argued that even if these entries mere found not strictly relevant, there is nothing to prevent Parliament from passing an Act like the one before us under Entry 97 of List I in the Seventh Schedule. If the matters contained in the Act squarely fall under the welfare of labour including their conditions of work, and the employers liability and the maternity benefit etc., then undoubtedly the Act is supported by the provisions of Entry 24 of List III in the Seventh Schedule. If the matters contained in the Act squarely fall under the welfare of labour including their conditions of work, and the employers liability and the maternity benefit etc., then undoubtedly the Act is supported by the provisions of Entry 24 of List III in the Seventh Schedule. If it were to be imagined that there is no specific provision anywhere in the entries contained in the other Lists, it would be a matter not enumerated in Lists II and III and would fall in the residuary Entry 97 of List I. Shri Dharmadhikari, learned Assistant Government Pleader, also relied upon a Judgment of the Madras High Court in Abdur Rahim v. State of Madras, 1961-2 Lab LJ 213 (Mad) to support his argument of the constitutionality of the Act. On an examination of the entries in List III, we are satisfied that the subject-matter of the present legislation could fall principally under Entry 24 but also partly under Entries 7, 22 and 23. Entry 7 deals with contracts of various types but excludes only contracts relating to agricultural land. Entry 22 deals with trade unions, as also with industrial and labour disputes. Entry 23 deals with social [security and social insurance, and employment and unemployment. Besides these three, entry 24 deals with welfare of labour 'including conditions of work, employer's liability and maternity benefits. There are other subjects covered by entry 24 but no reference need be made to them as the present Act does not contain any provision relating to those subjects. This Act, as we have pointed out, is principally for the purpose of providing better amenities to the workers in the beedi industry and to regulate their conditions of work, as also other matters connected therewith. If it is found that under the garb of a certain contract with a person who has no bargaining power, conditions of work are enforced which would otherwise be undesirable from the public point of view, it is competent for the State to intervene and to lay down conditions of work which will be consistent with the welfare of not only the employee concerned but also the welfare of the community at large, which is the public interest. We do not therefore see why the present legislation should not fall under one or all entries and principally under Entry 24 of List ITI in the Seventh Schedule. We do not therefore see why the present legislation should not fall under one or all entries and principally under Entry 24 of List ITI in the Seventh Schedule. We do not think that it is necessary to resort to the residuary Entry 97 in List I though undoubtedly if it were necessary to go to it, it would cover the present piece of Legislation. 16. Mr. Qazi for some of the employers argued that a very artificial definition of an ""employer"" has been enacted and persons who have no direct contract or nexus with the principal manufacturer or employer has been artificially made an employer under this Act and is further made answerable for various things which might occur behind his back and without his knowledge. If this grievance has any substance it would be a relevant point to consider when the reasonableness of the provisions is examined; but so far as legislative compe- tence is concerned. It is open to the Legislature to make a deeming provision and to attribute a certain character to a person which the contract made by him does not attribute to him. But hardship or unreasonableness is a different concept from legislative competence. We do not therefore think that it is possible to countenance the challenge of the petitioners that Parliament had no authority to enact the present Act. The challenge to the constitutionality of the Act thus fails. 17. The second challenge appears to us to be more substantial and requires a closer examination. In the context of the history behind this legislation and the prevailing method of manufacturing beech's, some of the provisions of this legislation may be noted for the purpose of understanding their implications. Section 2 deals with definitions. There is no particular quarrel with clauses (a) to (d) of that Section. However, so far as the definition of ""contractor"" contained in Clause (d) is concerned, it is to be noted that the contractor is defined to be a person who, in relation to a manufacturing process, undertakes to produce a given result by executing the work through contract labour or who engages labour for any manufacturing process in a private dwelling house and includes a sub-contractor, agent, munshi, thekedar or sattedar. So far as the arguments of the petitioners are concerned, what is to be noted is that the definition seeks to include the work got done by engaging labour for the manufacturing process in a private dwelling house as the work produced or the result produced by the contractor. This will have some relevance when the definition of employer is being considered. This will have some relevance when the definition of employer is being considered. The definitions which may be required to be referred to very often in the further discussions are the following ones in Section 2 of the Act: ""(d) ""contractor"" means a person who, in relation to a manufacturing process, undertakes to produce a given result by executing the work through contract labour or who engages labour for any manufacturing process in a private dwelling house and includes a sub-contractor, agent, munshi, thekedar or sattedar; (e) 'contract labour' means any person engaged or employed in any premises by or through a contractor, with or without the knowledge of the employer, in any manufacturing process; (f) 'employee' means a person employed directly or through any agency, whether for wages or not, in any establishment to do any work, skilled unskilled, manual or clerical, includes- (i) any labour who is given raw materials by an employer or a contractor for being made into beedi or cigar or both at home (hereinafter referred to in this Act as 'home-worker'), and (ii) any person not employed by an employer or a contractor but working with the permission of, or under agreement with, the employer or contractor; (g) 'Employer' means- (a) in relation to contract labour, the principal employer, and (b) in relation to other labour, the person who has the ultimate control over the affairs of any establishment or who has, by reason of his advancing money, supplying goods or otherwise, a substantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishments and includes any other person to whom the affairs of the establishment are entrusted, whether such other person is called the managing agent, manager, superintendent or by any other name; (h) ""establishment"" means any place or premises including the precincts thereof in which or in any part of which any manufacturing process connected with the making of beedi or cigar or both is being or is ordinarily, carried on, and includes an industrial premises; (i) 'industrial premises' means any place or premises (not being a private dwelling house), including the precincts thereof, in which or in any part of which any industry or manufacturing process connected with the making of beedi or cigar or both is being, or is ordinarily, carried on with or without the aid of power; (k) 'manufacturing process' means any process for, or incidental to, making, finishing or packing or otherwise treating any article. or substance with a view, to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal as beedi or cigar or both; (m) 'principal employer' means a person for whom or on whose behalf any contract labour is engaged or employed in any establishment; (n) ""private dwelling house' means a house in which persons engaged in the manufacture of beedi or cigar or both reside."" 18. It would be seen that the definition of ""contract labour"" includes any person engaged or employed in any premises by or through a contractor, with or without the knowledge of the employer, in any manufacturing process. We have pointed out while describing the method of manufacturing beedis that an employer can have a contractor with whom the very contract will be to supply raw materials and to receive finished product. How that contractor gets the work done is not the concern of the principal employer. However, by this definition in Clause (e), even the labour engaged or employed by such a contractor in any premises, namely, in his own premises or in the private dwelling house of the respective worker, with or without the knowledge of the employer, is to be treated as contract labour for the purposes of this Act. The next definition in Clause (f) relating to ""employee"" is again a very wide definition. It means a person employed directly or through any agency, whether for wages or not, in any establishment to do any work, skilled, unskilled manual or clerical and further includes any labour who is given raw materials by an employer or a contractor for being made into beedi or cigar or both at home, or any person not employed by an employer or a contractor but working with the permission of, or under agreement with, the employer or contractor. The person rolling beedis or cigars at his own home is described in this Act as ""home worker"". Not only those who are employed as such but those who are merely engaged for work or who are permitted to do certain work in the premises are included in the wide definition of employee by this Act. 19. It may bo noted that the above reference to the two definitions of ""contract labour"" and ""employee"" refers to establishments. This Act conceives of two different places of work. 19. It may bo noted that the above reference to the two definitions of ""contract labour"" and ""employee"" refers to establishments. This Act conceives of two different places of work. ""Industrial premises"" is therefore defined in Clause (i) to mean a place or premises, not being a private dwelling house, including the precincts thereof, in which or in any part of winch any industry or manufacturing process connected with the making of beedi or cigar or both is being or is ordinarily, carried on with or without the aid of power. What is manufacturing process is also defined in Clause (k) to cover any process for, or incidental to, making, finishing or packing or otherwise treating any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal as beedi or cigar or both. When the manufacturing process is thus known, a place or premises where any part incidental to this process goes on would be an industrial premises. A larger definition is still to be found when the word ""establishment"" is defined in Clause (h). It includes any place or premises including the precincts thereof in which or in any part of which any manufacturing process connected with the making of beedi or cigar or both is being, or is ordinarily, carried on and includes an industrial premises. ""Private dwelling house"" defined in Clause (n) means a house in which persons engaged in the manufacture of beedi or cigar or both reside. The cumulative effect therefore, is that the house of home workers would be ""establishment"" and industrial premises are included in the general definition of ""establishment"". The place where a worker also resides is specifically excluded from the definition of ""industrial premises"". It could thus be seen that whether the place where the manufacture of beedis takes place is a regularly engaged place by the employer or the contractor for the purpose of labourers to gather and perform, or whether it is merely a dwelling house where the home-worker takes leaves and tobacco and rolls them all of them would be covered by the definition of ""establishment"". With this wide meaning of ""establishment"" in view, it would at once be appreciated that the definition of ""employee in Clause (f) comprises in it every person, whether he is working in the regular factory premises as such or whether lie is working in his own home. With this wide meaning of ""establishment"" in view, it would at once be appreciated that the definition of ""employee in Clause (f) comprises in it every person, whether he is working in the regular factory premises as such or whether lie is working in his own home. It will also include not only those who are regularly employed but who are merely engaged to do certain types of work. It would further include a person who is merely permitted to work by the contractor or the employer. Very comprehensive definitions are thus made of the words ""employee"", ""establishment"", ""contractor"" and ""contract labour"". 20. With these definitions in mind, the definition of the word ""employer"" contained in Clause (g) of Section 2 has to he examined. It consists of two parts. Two types of persons are made employers for the purposes of this Act. Clause (a) of the definition covers in relation to the contract labour, the ""principal employer"". This would at once point out that where the contract labour is either engaged or employed by a contractor and the employer has no knowledge of whom the contractor has employed or engaged, he would still be the principal employer in relation to such contract labour. This is therefore a deeming definition of ""employer"" where the contractual relationship of employer and employee may not exist. Law attributes to such a person the character of being the employer vis-a-vis the contract labour. The second part of the definition contained in Sub-clause (b) makes the person employer in relation to ""other labour, when he has the ultimate control over the affairs of an establishment or who has, by reason of his advancing money, supplying goods or otherwise, a substantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishment, and includes any other person to whom the affairs of the establishment are entrusted, whether such other person is called the managing agent, manager, superintendent or by any other name. In this definition the basis is the establishment, and we have already seen how wide the definition of ""establishment"" is. The home-worker's home where the family is rolling beedis with the help of the raw material supplied to them becomes an establishment. In this definition the basis is the establishment, and we have already seen how wide the definition of ""establishment"" is. The home-worker's home where the family is rolling beedis with the help of the raw material supplied to them becomes an establishment. If a person has ultimate control over the affairs of such an establishment or even though he has no direct control but by reason of advancing money or supplying goods or otherwise, has a substantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishment, he would be the employer, no matter that he entrusts the actual affairs of such an establishment to be managed by a person designated as the managing agent, manager, superintendent or by any other name. The last clause will even include a contractor if that is the designation by a particular employer to a person who is looking after the affairs of an establishment but in which establishment he has a substantial interest in the control of its affairs by reason of his advancing money, supplying goods or otherwise. In other words, it appears to us that with a view to make certain provisions with the avowed object of passing on certain benefits to the workers of the beedi industry and to regulate their relationship with the employer, these definitions have been enacted for the purpose of incorporating the further provisions which now deal with the relationship between the employer and employee, as also the benefits which are to accrue from the administration of this Act. The learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners have very severely attacked the extended definition of ""employer"" contained in Sub-clause (a) of Clause (g) of Section 2, but we shall revert to it a little later. 21. As in many such regulatory measure, this Act envisages that no employer shall use or allow to be used any place or premises unless ho holds a valid licence issued under this Act, and no such premises shall be used except in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence. For the purpose of issuing such licences, as also for the purpose of performing all or any of the functions under the Act, the State Government is authorised to appoint a competent authority by notification in the official Gazette. That is the provision of Clause (c) of Section 2. For the purpose of issuing such licences, as also for the purpose of performing all or any of the functions under the Act, the State Government is authorised to appoint a competent authority by notification in the official Gazette. That is the provision of Clause (c) of Section 2. Section 4 enjoins on a person who wants to use or allows to be used any place or premises as industrial premises, to make an application in writing to the competent authority, in such form and on payment of such fees as may he prescribed, for a licence to use, or allow to be used, such premises as an industrial premises. It may at once be made clear that though manufacture of beedis is contemplated by this Act in industrial premises as well as other establishments, the need for a licence is confined to industrial premises only. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 vests the competent authority with the power to decide whether to grant or refuse a licence, and while doing so, it is required to have regard to the matters mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e) of that sub-section. They relate to the suitability of the place or premises, the previous experience of the applicant, the financial resources of the applicant including his financial capacity to meet the demands arising out of the provisions of the laws for the time being in force relating to welfare of labour, the disclosure whether the application is made bona fide-on behalf of the applicant himself or in benami for any other person, and the welfare of the labour in the locality, the interests of the public generally and such other matters as may be prescribed. Sub-section (7) of Section 4 deals with the State Government's power to issue directions and to prescribe conditions under which a licence could be issued. Sub-section (4) of Section 4 lays down the time-limit and validity of a licence and the method and manner of renewal thereof. Sub-section (5) of Section 4 lays down that the competent authority shall not grant or renew a licence unless it is satisfied that the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder have been substantially complied with. Sub-section (6) deals with the suspension and cancellation of a licence and the method thereof. Sub-section (5) of Section 4 lays down that the competent authority shall not grant or renew a licence unless it is satisfied that the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder have been substantially complied with. Sub-section (6) deals with the suspension and cancellation of a licence and the method thereof. Sub-section (8) enjoins a duty on the competent authority to pass an order in writing with reasons when a licence is being refused or is not renewed. 22. Section 5 deals with the appeals against orders refusing to grant or renew a licence or cancelling or suspending the same. It is not particularly necessary to note the provisions of the appointment of Inspectors and their powers which are contained in Sections 6 and 7. The provisions of Sections 8 to 16 are more or less similar to the provisions of the Factories Act dealing with the same subject and no particular grievance is being made before us so far as these provisions are concerned. The provisions of Section 17 which are again very similar to the provisions of the Factories Act contained in Chapter VI thereof relate to the working hours of industrial premises. Here attain no particular complaint is made; but reference to the working hours will be made when the questions of considering leave, the terms and conditions of working and the calculation of wages for leave period are to be taken into account. The same approach will apply to the provisions of Section 18 in the matter of deciding what is overtime. No particular reference was made to Sections 19 and 20. So far as Section 21 was concerned, there is no quarrel with Sub-section (1) relating to the closure of industrial premises on one day in a week. The dispute relates to Sub-section (3) dealing with the payment of wages for that day on the basis of the daily average of the total full-time earnings. We will consider this attack along with the common dispute relating to that expression and the method of calculation which is also relevant for the provisions of Sections 26 and 27. Sections 22 to 25 were also not referred to as disputed sections. 23. Sections 26 and 27 are subjected to a very serious attack by the employers. They object to the provisions of annual leave with wages contained in Section 26. Sections 22 to 25 were also not referred to as disputed sections. 23. Sections 26 and 27 are subjected to a very serious attack by the employers. They object to the provisions of annual leave with wages contained in Section 26. It takes a working day as a measure for calculating 20 days of work performed by him during the previous calendar year, for enabling the employee to obtain one day of leave with wages. Section 27 deals with the payment to be made for the leave with Wages and lays down the measure as the daily average of the total full-time earnings for the days on which he had worked during the month Immediately preceding his leave exclusive of any overtime earnings and bonus but inclusive of dearness and other allowances. What is total full-time earning Is a matter of serious contest and it will be considered separately in due course. Section 28 is not challenged as such but only in relation to the extended responsibility of the employer under the artificial definition contained in Sub-clause (a) of Clause (g) of Section 2. The provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 29 are challenged on the ground that they will entail considerable labour in maintaining accounts of the work done outside the industrial premises and all that work will not worth it at all. So far as Section 31 is concerned, the quarrel again is confined to a person who is not actually by reason of contract an employer but is artificially made an employer by the extended or deemed definition of this Act, Sub-section (1) of Section 31 enables an employer to terminate the services of an employee who has served with him for more than six months only by one month's notice and that too for a reasonable cause. If, however, the services of an employee are to be dispensed with on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence, no such notice is necessary. In either of these cases, the action taken by the intermediary like the contractor proving unreasonable or unlawful may be responsible in creating liabilities for the principal employer, though his own contract with the contractor or the contractor's contract with the employee does not contemplate any such effect. In either of these cases, the action taken by the intermediary like the contractor proving unreasonable or unlawful may be responsible in creating liabilities for the principal employer, though his own contract with the contractor or the contractor's contract with the employee does not contemplate any such effect. Sub-sections (2) and (3) or Section 31 are merely incidental to the dispute relating to the termination of services, and if the extent of reasonableness of the provisions of Sub-section (1) is once declared or decided, the other provisions will automatically apply to those persons who are in fact employers and are liable to answer for their own acts. 24. Section 33 deals with the general penalty for offences. Contravening any of the provisions of the Act or any rule made thereunder, or failing to pay wages or compensation in accordance with any order of the appellate authority passed under Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 31 is declared a penal offence punishable for the first time with fine which may extend to two hundred and fifty rupees, and for a second or any subsequent offence, with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month or more than six months or with fine which shall not be less than one hundred rupees or more than five hundred ruppees or with both. This provision again is challenged on the same ground that unreasonable vicarious responsibility is being extended even to penal consequences for acts which may have been done in utter ignorance of the principal employer. 25. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 is thereafter challenged as creating an unnecessary burden and a sort of hindrance in the smooth working of this industry which has traditionally gone on without much difficulty on either side. This relates to the application of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act to disputes between the employer and the employee relating to the issue by the employer of raw materials to the employees, the rejection by the employer of beedi or cigar or both made by an employee, and the payment of wages for the beedi or cigar or both rejected by the employer. By Rule 34 of the rules framed under Section 44, a dispute of this type is made referable to the Labour Officer notified under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, of the local area in which the industrial premises is situated. The Labour Officer is supposed to bold a summary inquiry, and for that purpose he is authorised to hold such inquiry as he may consider necessary after, or course, giving an opportunity to both sides to represent their cases. Section 40 deals with the effect of laws and agreements which are inconsistent with the present Act. Section 41 vests a power in the State Government to exempt certain industrial premises or class of employers or employees from the operation of this Act. Section 42 gives the Central Government power to give directions to a State Government as to the carrying into execution of the provisions of the Act. Section 43 excludes from the operation of this Act private dwelling houses where the owner or occupier carries on any manufacturing process In such private dwelling house with the assistance of the members of his family living with him in such dwelling house and dependent on him. There is a proviso to this section which says that the owner or occupier thereof should not be an employee of an employer to whom the Act applies. Section 44 is about the general rule-making power. 26. We have generally summarised the provisions of the Act to point out how the avowed intention of the Legislature is intended to be translated into action by making the various provisions. It would now be appropriate to consider the particular objections raised regarding the individual provisions of this Act. The principal argument in that behalf is that the definition of ""employer"" is unduly enlarged to cover relationship which is not that of an employer and employee at all and has therefore imposed obligations upon the principal employer which are far beyond the necessities of the situation. That the Legislature can enact a deeming provision and create a legal fiction is not being doubted. If this Act is in the nature of restrictions on the fundamental right of carrying on business and trade by a citizen, it is logical that the restrictions proposed to be imposed must, in the first instance, be in the interest of the general public and also answer the description of being reasonable. If this Act is in the nature of restrictions on the fundamental right of carrying on business and trade by a citizen, it is logical that the restrictions proposed to be imposed must, in the first instance, be in the interest of the general public and also answer the description of being reasonable. The concept of reasonableness has not been defined by the Constitution, and rightly so. It may not be possible always to lay down abstract standards of what reasonableness should imply, nor is it possible to indicate a general pattern which ought to be observed. Since life is becoming more and more complex, situations do arise in the matter of trade and business which were never conceived of. It would therefore be appropriate in each case to consider the nature or the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the evil that is sought to be eradicated and the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time and the nature of the trade and business which is sought to be controlled. These are all considerations which must enter the judicial verdict in finding out whether the particular restrictions are reasonable or otherwise. We may with advantage refer to the provisions of an Act which was passed by the then Legislature of the Central Provinces and Berar, namely, the C.P. and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act, 1948. In some of the districts of the then Central Provinces and Berar, it was found that the Agricultural labour and villagers generally took to beedi-making to such an extent that agricultural labour was not available in sufficient number for paddy cultivation. The Act of 1948 was therefore passed, which completely prohibited beedi-making in certain parts of the then State during certain period. Those restrictions were challenged as unreasonable and were struck down ultimately as unreasonable. That was in Chintamanrao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118 . While examining the provisions of that Act, the question that was formulated for consideration by their lordships was whether the total prohibition of carrying on the business of manufacture of beech's within the agricultural season amounts to a reasonable restriction on the fundamental rights mentioned in Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. While examining the provisions of that Act, the question that was formulated for consideration by their lordships was whether the total prohibition of carrying on the business of manufacture of beech's within the agricultural season amounts to a reasonable restriction on the fundamental rights mentioned in Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. It was observed that unless it was shown that there was a reasonable relation of the provisions of the Act to the purpose in view, the right of freedom of occupation and business cannot be curtailed by it. One of the tests of reasonableness therefore that was suggested was that there ought to be a reasonable nexus between the evil that is sought to be eradicated and the provision which is in the nature of a restriction. It was also indicated that even assuming that some restriction is necessary, the limitation proposed ought not to be arbitrary or excessive in nature beyond what is required in the interest of the general public. In that context, it was suggested that the word ""reasonable"" implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Article 19 (1) (g) and the social control permitted by Clause (6) of Article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality. In the course of the discussion, it was also suggested that a provision enacted may appear reasonable. However, from the language in which it is couched, it may be possible to extend those restrictions to purposes which are not constitutionally warranted. In such circumstances when the language employed is wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits constitutionally permissible the legislative action affecting such a right must be held to be wholly void. These generalizations, of course, are restricted to the particular facts of that case, but the principle underlying is of great assistance in judging what is reasonable in respect of a particular piece of legislation. We were referred to several judgments by the learned counsel on both sides which contained certain instances or illustrations where the provisions were either held valid or invalid. We may make a passing reference to them while examining the particular provisions of the impugned Act. We were referred to several judgments by the learned counsel on both sides which contained certain instances or illustrations where the provisions were either held valid or invalid. We may make a passing reference to them while examining the particular provisions of the impugned Act. They are essentially decisions dealing with the particular facts before the Supreme Court, but undoubtedly they are a good guide so far as the principles on which the conception of reasonableness is to be tested. 27. One of the principal grievances on behalf of the petitioners is that the principal employer who merely engages contractors in some cases at least, genuine independent contractors would find himself in a very precarious condition under the provisions of this Act. The definition of ""employer"" in Clause (g) of Section 2, and more particularly in Sub-clause (a) thereof, is emphasised in that behalf. The definition which we have quoted above shows that the employer means, in relation to contract labour, the principal employer. Now, the principal employer has been defined in Clause (m) to mean a person for whom or on whose behalf any contract labour is engaged or employed in an establishment. Now, ""establishment"" is again a very wide term, as we have already indicated. The words ""contract labour"" mean any person engaged or employed in any premises by or through a contractor, with or without the knowledge of the employer, in any manufacturing process. These definitions assume that there would be a contractor who is engaging or employing labour in any premises, namely, his own or in the respective premises of the home-workers, without the knowledge o£ the employer. The cases which have till now gone to the Supreme Court in the matter of beedi industry show that there were various contractors through whom the workers or the home-workers were engaged. The plea of the prosecution or the labourers, as the case may be, has always been that the principal employer is the real employer and not the contractor. The institution of contractor is a device created for the purpose of evading the provisions of the Factories Act. It is also created for the purpose of evading any responsibility for payment and looking to the welfare of the toiler in the industry. The decisions indicate that two different conclusions were reached depending upon the evidence led before the Court. The institution of contractor is a device created for the purpose of evading the provisions of the Factories Act. It is also created for the purpose of evading any responsibility for payment and looking to the welfare of the toiler in the industry. The decisions indicate that two different conclusions were reached depending upon the evidence led before the Court. In some cases, the contractor was held to be an independent contractor and the employees engaged by him could not therefore have any relationship of master and servant with the principal employer. In one of the judgments which were referred to, namely, D. C. Dewan Mohideen Sahib and Sons v. United Bidi Workers' Union, 1964-2 Lab LT 633 -- (AIR 1968 SC 370), a finding of fact was given by the Labour Court that the middleman, that is, the contractor was a mere camouflage and the real employer was the appellant himself. The Legislature therefore knew when the present Act was passed that there are manufacturers who have genuine contractors from whom they purchase beedis and to whom they supply raw materials at stated rates. There are also manufacturers who create the contractor as a mere middleman merely for the purpose of evading the responsibility cast upon the employer under the various laws. In fact, when the contractor is a sham contractor, the attempt is even to get rid of the contractual relations which ought to flow from the relationship of master and servant. Against this background, and with all the material that was collected through the various Committees and Commissions, the intention of the present Act certainly does not appear to eradicate the contractor altogether. Otherwise, a definition like the one in Clause (d) of Section 2 could not be thought of. In spite of the fact that there may be genuine contractors engaged by the principal employer, the concept of master and servant relationship has been extended to the labour engaged by the contractor with or without the knowledge of the principal employer. 28. The other part of the definition of the word ""employer' finds place in Sub-clause (b) of Clause (g) of Section 2. 28. The other part of the definition of the word ""employer' finds place in Sub-clause (b) of Clause (g) of Section 2. Not much fault could be found with this definition as it deals with a person who has the ultimate control over the affairs of any establishment or who has, by reason of his advancing money, supplying goods or otherwise, a substantial interest in the control of the_affairs of any establishment, and naturally includes any other person to whom the affairs of any such establishment are entrusted with whatever name or label that may be given to such person. Here the concept is that the person who is obviously the manufacturer has a direct interest in the affairs of the establishment. However, he has given it a different form by appointing a middleman like the managing agent, manager, superintendent or any other person, given a particular designation. This is the same concept which we find was a question of fact decided in the case of D. C. Dewan Mohideen Sahib and Sons, AIR 1966 SC 370 (cit; sup). Such a person is undoubtedly an employer and cannot evade the responsibility that ought to be fastened on the shoulders of the employer. There can therefore be no quarrel with the definition of ""employer"" in Sub-clause (b) of Clause (g) of Section 2. 29. What precisely is then the effect of the definition contained in Sub-clause (a) of Clause (g) of Section 2? He is the employer and would be as such answerable for everything that such an employer is required to do under the Act. The first and the primary necessity for him would be to see that not only does he obtain a licence for his industrial premises but he sees to it that a contractor who would have an industrial premises obtained a licence. This is clear from the provisions of Section 3 which lay down that the employer shall not use or allow to be used any place or premises as an industrial premises without obtaining a licence. So far as obtaining a licence for an industrial premises is concerned, we do not think that the idea of the licence by itself could be considered an unreasonable restriction. So far as obtaining a licence for an industrial premises is concerned, we do not think that the idea of the licence by itself could be considered an unreasonable restriction. If the industry is to be controlled for the purpose of enforcing certain provisions in the interests of the employees, directing the employer to have a licence which contained the conditions under which the industry is to be run is a normal and well known mode of controlling industries these days. The appointment of a competent authority with the powers to issue licence cannot therefore be complained of as unreasonable. We may incidentally point out that Mr. Qazi for some of the petitioners complained against the provisions of some of the clauses of Sub-section (3) of Section 4. Section 4 deals with the creation of a competent authority who will deal with the issue, cancellation and renewal of licences, as also with the terms and conditions on which licences have to be applied for and given., Mr. Qazi said that Sub-section (3) of Section 4 permits the competent authority to decide whether to grant or refuse a licence, and for that purpose it is to have regard to the matters mentioned in the clauses that follow. Even this broad provision is challenged by Mr. Qazi on the ground that it seems to leave an unfettered discretion in the authority either to grant a licence or to refuse a licence. The last clause of the opening portion of Sub-section (3) merely requires the competent authority to have regard to the matters that follow but it does not indicate that if an applicant fulfils the conditions that follow, a licence ought to follow as a matter of course. He further adds that Clause (b) in that Sub-section speaks of the previous experience of the applicant, and Clause (d) requires the applicant to disclose whether the application is made bona fide on behalf of the applicant himself or in benami of any other person. 30. We do not think that the criticism of Mr, Qazi has any substance. Provisions of this type where the competent authority is authorised to give licences with certain directions with regard to certain matters could not be styled by themselves as unreasonable. In Kishan Chand v. Commr. 30. We do not think that the criticism of Mr, Qazi has any substance. Provisions of this type where the competent authority is authorised to give licences with certain directions with regard to certain matters could not be styled by themselves as unreasonable. In Kishan Chand v. Commr. of Police, AIR 1961 SC 705 the question was whether the provisions of Section 39 of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866 were an unreasonable fetter or restriction on the fundamental rights of a citizen guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. Under that section, the Commissioner of Police was authorised to issue licences to eating houses. The provisions of Section 39 quoted in the judgment show that the Commissioner of Police was authorised at his discretion from time to time to grant licences to the keepers of such houses or places of public resort and entertainment upon such conditions to be inserted in every licence as he, with the sanction of the State Government from ti"