KANTILAL J. SANGHAVI v. VINAY SHARMA — 1970 DIGILAW 85 (GUJ)

T. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is concerned with the affairs of Jamnagar Municipality which is governed by the provisions of Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The petitioners have challenged the validity of rules 45 and 46 framed under sec. 58 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 (which are also applicable to the Municipalities working under the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 relating to the power of the Municipal President to adjourn a general meeting of the Municipality under certain circumstances. The petitioners have further prayed for quashing the order passed by the Collector Jamnagar District on 13-5-1970 under sec. 258 of the Act holding that the adjournment of the general meeting of the Municipality held on 4th March 1970 by the then Presiding authority one Mr. Madam was legal and hence the subsequent continuation of the said adjourned meeting by the rest of the members under the Chairmanship of one Mr. Radia and the resolutions passed in that continued meeting are illegal and void. The petitioners have further challenged the validity of sec. 258 under which the Collector had passed the above referred order. This sec. 258 of the Act empowers the Collector to suspend the execution of orders etc. of the Municipalities functioning under his jurisdiction under certain circumstances. ( 2 ) SHORT facts of the case are that the petitioner no. 1. Dr. Kantilal J. Sanghvi is the President of the Jamnagar Municipality while the petitioner no. 2 Madhusudan C. Purohit claims to have been elected as the Chairman of the Secondary Education Committee in the disputed general meeting of the Municipality held on 4tb March 1970 under the chairman ship of above referred Mr. Radia. Respondent no. 1 is the Collector Jamnagar District while respondents nos. 2 3 and 4 are the councilors of the Jamnagar Municipality. Respondent no. 5 is the Chief Officer of the said Municipality. ( 3 ) A meeting of the general board of the Municipality was held ors 4 March 1970 as contemplated by sec. 51 of the Act. At that meeting the first petitioner who is the President of the Municipality was absent and therefore the vice-President of the Municipality one Mr. Hematlal R. Madam presided over that meeting. It is an admitted fact that 26 councilors of the Municipality attended that meeting. 51 of the Act. At that meeting the first petitioner who is the President of the Municipality was absent and therefore the vice-President of the Municipality one Mr. Hematlal R. Madam presided over that meeting. It is an admitted fact that 26 councilors of the Municipality attended that meeting. The record of the case reveals that after the meeting started and one formal resolution was passed the presiding authority proposed to take item no. 40 first into discussion. As against this one Bhikubhai Vaghela proposed that the first item should be first taken up for discussion. That proposal of Mr. Bhikubhai Vaghela was ruled out by the presiding authority. However Shri Bhikubhai persisted in his proposal and insisted that he was willing to cite a rule in support of his proposal. Thereafter as the presiding authority proceeded further with the conduct of the meeting one Mr. Radia one of the councilors present there raised a point of order. Thereafter other councilors also tried to raise points of order. The presiding authority Mr. Madam thereupon found that further proceedings of the meeting were not possible as councilors were shouting against each other. He therefore adjourned the meeting. It is further that one councilor Mr. Dalsukhbhai who was also present the meeting drew the attention of the presiding authority that he had power to adjourn the meeting. It is said that he requested the presiding as well as other councilors not to withdraw from the meeting. Mr. Madam adjourned the meeting and left the place. It is said he had adjourned the meeting sine-die. On this adjournment 14 including the presiding authority left that place. But 12 who remained there decided to continue the meeting. By this time two of the councilors who had already left the meeting returned and joined the remaining 12 councilors. This made up the quorum with the result that all these 14 councilors then proceeded with the business of the meeting after electing the councilor Mr. Radia as the Chairman of the meeting. The meeting thus continued thereafter took up for its consideration the remaining business and constituted various committees of the Municipality for the ensuing year 1970-71. The meeting also elected chairman of various committees so constituted and did other business with which we are not concerned in this petition. Radia as the Chairman of the meeting. The meeting thus continued thereafter took up for its consideration the remaining business and constituted various committees of the Municipality for the ensuing year 1970-71. The meeting also elected chairman of various committees so constituted and did other business with which we are not concerned in this petition. The proceedings of this continued meeting were recorded and they are also produced in the record of this petition. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER on 21st March 1970 another meeting of the general board of the Municipality was held. In that meeting the proceedings of what had happened at the previous meeting held on 4th March 1970 including the proceedings of the continued meeting under the chairmanship of Mr. Radia were read over and were approved by a ruling given by the President of that meeting. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER on 24th March 1970 the respondents Nos. 2 3 and 4 who are councilors of the Municipality made an application to the Collector Jamnagar under sec. 258 of the Act requesting him to declare the meeting held under the chairmanship of Mr. Radia and the action taken by that meeting as illegal and ultra vires. It is found that similar application was also made by other councilors of the Municipality. The Collector after hearing the parties decided these applications on 13th May 1970 holding that under the Act as well as the rules Nos. 45 and 46 above referred to the President or the presiding authority has powers to adjourn the meeting over which he presides and therefore Mr. Madam was within his powers when he adjourned the meeting after seeing that some of the councilors were shouting against each other. In this view of the matter the Collector further held that the continuation of that meeting under the chairmanship of Mr. Radia was without authority and illegal. He therefore quashed the proceedings of this continued meeting and exercising his powers under sec. 258 of the Act ordered the restoration of status-quo. Being aggrieved by this order of the Collector the petitioners have preferred this petition. Radia was without authority and illegal. He therefore quashed the proceedings of this continued meeting and exercising his powers under sec. 258 of the Act ordered the restoration of status-quo. Being aggrieved by this order of the Collector the petitioners have preferred this petition. ( 6 ) THE petitioners have raised the following main contentions in this petition:- - (I) It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the President or the authority presiding over a general meeting has powers of adjournment only with the consent of the majority of that meeting as provided in sec. 51 (11) of the Act. According to the petitioners therefore Shri Madam was not within his rights to adjourn the meeting properly called on 4th March 1970 without taking the consent of the majority. (II) It is further contended that rules Nos. 45 and 46 which invest the President with the unfettered powers to adjourn any meeting are ultra-vires the provisions of sec. 51 (11) of the Act as they do not provide for the necessity of taking the consent of the majority of the councilors present at the meeting for the purpose of adjournment. It was therefore contended that the adjournment ordered by Shri Madam by exercising his powers under these two rules was illegal and therefore the councilors who objected to this adjournment were entitled to continue the meeting by electing a new chairman. (III) Attacking the order of the Collector passed under sec. 258 of the Act )the petitioners have contended that this section offends the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution in as much as it gives right of appeal only to the Municipality and not to any other aggrieved party against the decision of the Collector. (IV) It was further contended that even apart from the vires of sec. 258 the Collector has no power to interfere under that section with the domestic matters of the Municipality and to give a declaratory relief. In this connection it was further urged that if it is held that the meeting continued under the chairmanship of Mr. Radia was illegal resolutions passed by the Municipality and therefore the Collector would have no power to take action under sec. 258. It was contended that at any rate under sec. 258 of the Act the Collector has no power to restore status-quo. Radia was illegal resolutions passed by the Municipality and therefore the Collector would have no power to take action under sec. 258. It was contended that at any rate under sec. 258 of the Act the Collector has no power to restore status-quo. ( 7 ) IN reply to these contentions it was urged on behalf of the respondents that:- - (I) The chairman or the authority presiding over a meeting has got powers to adjourn the said meeting under sec. 45 (a) of the Act. In support of this contention it was further pointed out that sec. 51 (11) of the Act is merely an enabling section giving additional powers to the presiding authority to adjourn a meeting under certain circumstances. (II) As for rules nos. 45 and 46 it was contended on behalf of the respondents that they are not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act as they derive their validity and authority from the provisions of sec. 45 (a) of the Act. (III) As for the constitutional validity of sec. 258 of the Act it was contended on behalf of the respondents that this section gives purely administrative and not judicial powers to the Collector. It was pointed out that even if it was believed that the provisions contained in this section as regards appeal are discriminatory inasmuch as they give a right of appeal only to the Municipality and not to any other aggrieved party the whole sec. 258 does not become void as provisions regarding appeal are severable from the rest of the provisions of the section. (IV) As regards the fourth contention raised on behalf of the petitioners it was urged by the respondents that the action taken by the meeting continued under the chairmanship of Mr. Radia is covered by subsec. (1) of sec. 258 of the Act as these actions purport to be on behalf of the municipality. ( 8 ) OUT of these four contentions mentioned above we find that our decisions on contentions nos. 3 and 4 are not called for as in our opinion our decisions on the first two contentions would be sufficient in disposing of this matter fully. Therefore in the subsequent discussion we propose to concentrate our attention only on the merits of the first two contentions. 3 and 4 are not called for as in our opinion our decisions on the first two contentions would be sufficient in disposing of this matter fully. Therefore in the subsequent discussion we propose to concentrate our attention only on the merits of the first two contentions. ( 9 ) IT will be apparent from the summary of the contentions raised by both the sides as given above that the controversy as regards the power of the president or the presiding authority to adjourn a meeting over which he presides centres round the interpretation of secs. 45 (a) 51 of the Act and rules nos. 45 and 46 framed under the Act. Sec. 45 deals with the functions of a Municipal president and it says that it shall be the duty of the president of a municipality to preside unless prevented by reasonable cause at all meetings of the municipality and subject to the provisions of the rules for the time being in force under clause (a) of sec. 271 to regulate the conduct of business at such meetings; This section makes reference to sec. 271 of the Act which provides for the rule making power of the municipality. Clause (a) of that section authorises the municipality to make rules for regulating the conduct of its business. It is an admitted position that rules nos. 45 and 46 derive their authority from these two provisions of the Act. It would therefore be necessary at this stage to quote both these rules:- -The English version of both these rules is as under:- - 45 Regarding the adjournment of a meeting of on account of rowdy conduct of any of the members of that meeting:- - the presiding authority has power to close a meeting which is already in session if any of the members is found inclined to become rowdy and is found not obeying his ruling as regards a point of law or proceedings of the meeting. A note of the reasons regarding this shall be taken in minute book. Thereafter; this authority shall fix another date and time for the next meeting without taking the consent of the members present in cases covered by this rule. 46 Regarding adjournment of a meeting :- - -The presiding authority has power to adjourn a meeting at any time. A note of the reasons regarding this shall be taken in minute book. Thereafter; this authority shall fix another date and time for the next meeting without taking the consent of the members present in cases covered by this rule. 46 Regarding adjournment of a meeting :- - -The presiding authority has power to adjourn a meeting at any time. Moreover such an authority adjourn a meeting even in cases where a proposal for adjournment is passed (in the meeting ). If such a proposal for adjournment is not passed the same shall be allowed to be moved again only after an interval of fifteen minutes. Along with the sec. 45 (a) and the above quoted rules we should also read the provisions of sec. 51 (11 ). Sec. 51 makes provisions with regard to the meetings of the municipality and the procedure to be followed at these meetings. To summarise shortly the provisions of this section sub-sec. (1) thereof says that there shall be held four ordinary general meetings in each year for the disposal of the general business and it shall be the duty of the president to fix the dates for all ordinary general meetings; subsec. (2) provides for the requisition for the purpose of calling a special general meeting sub-sec. (3) provides for services of notices of the general and other meetings. sub-sec. (4) provides for the places of meetings subsec. (5) states as to who shall preside over the meeting sub-sec. (6) says that every meeting shall be open to the public sub-sec. (7) provides for the quorum and adjournment of the meetings sub-sec. (8) provides for the order in which the business of these meetings should be transacted sub-sec. (9) provides for the recording of the minutes etc. of these meetings sub-sec. (10) provides for the majority decision to be taken in such meetings and sub-sec. (11) provides for the adjournment of these meetings. There are other sub-sections in this section with which we are not concerned for the purpose of this petition. Now the bone of contention of the petitioners is that if general meetings called under sec. 51 are required to be adjourned they should be adjourned only as provided in sub-sec. (11) of sec. 51 and therefore if the rules of the municipality provides something which is not consistent with the provisions of sub-sec. (11) of sec. Now the bone of contention of the petitioners is that if general meetings called under sec. 51 are required to be adjourned they should be adjourned only as provided in sub-sec. (11) of sec. 51 and therefore if the rules of the municipality provides something which is not consistent with the provisions of sub-sec. (11) of sec. 51 for the purpose of adjournment of the meetings these rules should be struck down as inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Sub-sec. (11) of sec. 51 is found in the following terms:- - (11) Any general meeting may with the consent of a majority of the councilors present be adjourned from time to time to a later hour on the same day or to any other day; but no business shall be transacted at any adjourned meeting other than that left indisposed of at the meeting from which the adjournment took place. A notice of such adjournment posted in the Municipal office shall be d sufficient notice of the adjourned meeting. ( 10 ) NOW the first question which arises to be determined is what are the powers of the president or any other presiding authority regarding adjournment of the meeting presided over by him ? ( 11 ) IT is evident from the provisions of sec. 45 (a) of the Act that it is the duty of the president to regulate the conduct of the business of the meeting. The respondents have put reliance upon these provisions in support of their contention that if the president is supposed to regulate the conduct of the business of the meeting over which he presides he can have all the powers necessary for adjourning that meeting because such powers are implied in the power to regulate the conduct of the business of the meeting. As will be clear from the discussion which follows we find that clause (a) of sec. 45 does not confer unfettered powers on the president to order adjournment of a properly called meeting at his sweet will and discretion though it is clear from the terms of clause (a) of sec. 45 that the president can have all the powers which are necessary for regulating the conduct of the business of the meeting over which he presides. 45 that the president can have all the powers which are necessary for regulating the conduct of the business of the meeting over which he presides. The pertinent question which arises to be determined is whether power to adjourn a meeting can be derived from the power to regulate the conduct of the business of the meeting and if so to what extent. ( 12 ) IN order to determine this question it is first necessary to inquire where apart from the specific provisions of law the power to adjourn a meeting inherently lies. ( 13 ) IN this connection it should be noted that a Municipality is a statutory body and that all the different organs constituting a Municipality have to discharge statutory functions under the Act. One of these statutory functions is the calling of general meeting as provided ill sub-sec. (1) of sec. 51 of the Act. As already noted above this sub-sec. (1) of sec. 51 casts a duty on the President to fix the dates of all ordinary general meetings. Therefore if such a general meeting is properly called in ordinary course that meeting should continue till its business is finished. Under ordinary circumstances it would be for that meeting itself to consider whether it should continue till the business on hand is finished or should for some valid reasons adjourn even before finishing the business on hand. If a reference is made to different provisions contained in sec. 51 and especially sub-secs. 1 7 10 and 11 thereof it will be found that the proceedings of a meeting including the question as regards its adjournment are left by the Legislature mainly in the hands of the meeting itself. When a meeting of the councilors is properly called every - councillor attending the meeting has equal rights as other councilors. Thus the meeting consists of persons enjoying equal rights and having equal obligations to discharge their duties under the Act. That being the position the authority presiding over that meeting cannot claim any right which would arbitrarily interfere with the rights of councilors attending the meeting. It is for this reason that sub-sec. (11) of sec. 51 of the Act provides for obtaining the consent of the majority before a meeting is adjourned. ( 14 ) THIS seems to be the position at common law in England. It is for this reason that sub-sec. (11) of sec. 51 of the Act provides for obtaining the consent of the majority before a meeting is adjourned. ( 14 ) THIS seems to be the position at common law in England. There the right to adjourn is considered inherent in the assembly itself. Shackleton in his book on The Law and Practice of Meetings observes as under at page 48 of the Fourth Edition of that book:- -THERE is a power at common law to adjourn a meeting. The right is vested in the assembly itself unless there are particular regulations which vest this power in the chairman. Crew another well known author of the Conduct of Meetings observes as page 151 of 20th Edition of his book as under:- -WHERE no provision is made by the articles as to the adjournment of a meeting the power of adjourning is apparently vested in the meeting. In Stoughton v. Reynolds (1736) 2 Strange 1044 a similar question arose on the following facts. A vestry meeting was held for the election of churchwardens at which the Vicar presided. He had as his nominee for the office of churchwarden one Chapman but the parishioners nominated two other individuals Messrs. Stoughton and Farren. Before the election was completed however the Vicar at the desire and with the consent of Chapman adjourned the meeting against the wish of many present to the next day. Stoughton and those in sympathy with him remained behind and completed the poll whereby he had a majority of votes. The next day the Vicar and Chapman and their supporters met and continued the poll. On these facts it was held that the right of adjournment was in the parish at large. In the case in question there was no custom found and as no precedent in the common law could be found resort therefore was made to the common right which was in the whole assembly where all were upon an equal footing. It is thus evident that so far as the common law position is concerned it is the inherent right of the assembly itself to adjourn its deliberations. ( 15 ) NO such inherent right is found to be in the presiding authority. It is thus evident that so far as the common law position is concerned it is the inherent right of the assembly itself to adjourn its deliberations. ( 15 ) NO such inherent right is found to be in the presiding authority. On this question we find the following important observations at page 57 of the above referred book of Crew:- -IF the chairman leaves the meeting before the business is completed or if he purports to adjourn the meeting without authority the meeting may if a quorum still remains appoint another chairman and proceed with the business for the chairman has no right to adjourn the meeting without the consent of the meeting itself unless the business for which it was conveyed has been done or an express power in that behalf is given to him by the relevant rules. Halsbury in Vol. No. 6 of Third Edition observes in para 663 at page 338 as under:- -EXCEPT where empowered by the regulations of the company the chairman cannot adjourn the meeting nor dissolve it while any of the business for which it was called remains un-transacted; and if he refuses to act the meeting may elect another chair man. If he has the right with the consent of the meeting to adjourn it the majority of the members present at the meeting cannot compel him to do so. He cannot however adjourn or dissolve the meeting against the wish of the majority. We find that a leading case on this point is National Dwellings Society v. Sykes (1894) 3 Ch. 159 where it is held that it is the duty of a chairman to preserve order conduct proceeding regularly and take care that the sense of the meeting is properly ascertained with regard to any question before it; but he has no power to stop or adjourn a meeting at his own will; and if he purports to do so it is competent for the meeting to resolve to go on with the business for which it has been conveyed and to appoint another chairman for that object. In Andhra Pradesh case of Ved Prakash Dusaj v. The Municipal Corporation of The City of Secunderabad reported in (1958) I. L. R. Andhra 17 Clause (a) of sec. 88 of Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act (II of 1956) which was similar to sub-sec. (11) of sec. In Andhra Pradesh case of Ved Prakash Dusaj v. The Municipal Corporation of The City of Secunderabad reported in (1958) I. L. R. Andhra 17 Clause (a) of sec. 88 of Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act (II of 1956) which was similar to sub-sec. (11) of sec. 51 of the Act was considered. The meeting there was adjourned by the concerned Mayor. With reference to this adjournment and after construing the provisions of above referred clause (m) of sec. 88 it was observed that if the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor or both of them as the case may be find it inconvenient to go on with the meeting they cannot adjourn the meeting at their will and pleasure without the consent of the majority and if they do so and leave the hall they would be deemed to be absent within the meaning of clause (g ). We find that similar view is taken in several Indian decisions namely the case of Gopal Narayan Kulkarni and others v. Sanmukhappa Ningappa Angali and others reported in A. I. R. 1927 Bombay 603 and two Madras cases of Narayana Chettiar v. The Kaleeswarar Mills Ltd. reported in A. I. R. 1952 Madras 515 and the other B. Gnanaraj v. A. M. Vedanayagam reported in A. I. R. 1966 Madras 372. As the same principle is discussed in all these cases we dont find it necessary to refer to the facts of these cases and the observations made by the learned Judges in these decisions. It would be sufficient to state that in all these cases the principle which is accepted is that the right to adjourn a meeting which is properly convened inherently vests in the meeting itself and that the chairman presiding over that meeting has no un-fettered right to adjourn the said meeting and to interrupt its work at his sweet will. ( 16 ) THEREFORE broad principles which can be deduced from the above discussion can be summarised as under:- (1) It is the inherent right of the meeting itself to decide whether it should adjourn before transacting its business fully. ( 16 ) THEREFORE broad principles which can be deduced from the above discussion can be summarised as under:- (1) It is the inherent right of the meeting itself to decide whether it should adjourn before transacting its business fully. (2) The chairman has no inherent power to adjourn this meeting at his sweet will and (3) The duty of the chairman is to regulate the conduct of the meeting but not to encroach upon the right of the members of the meeting to discharge their statutory duties to continue their deliberations. In fact the duty of the chairman is to be helpful in the conduct of the meeting. ( 17 ) IT is in back-ground of these three principles that the provisions contained in sub-sec. (11) of sec. 51 of the Act should be construed. If once it is believed that it is the meeting which has an inherent right to adjourn itself and that such an inherent right is not vested in the presiding authority it should follow that the presiding authority should be clothed with necessary power of adjournment in case the majority of the members present at the meeting so desires - It is for this reason that sub-sec. (11) of sec. 51 invests the presiding authority with a special power to adjourn a meeting in case the majority of the councilors present so desires. ( 18 ) BUT in order to see that even the majority should not decide upon the adjournment capriciously the Legislature has by the use of the word may invested the president with a discretion. The use of this word suggests that even if the majority has expressed its desire to adjourn the presiding authority is not bound to adjourn. Such a view was taken by Privy Council in Salisbury Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. Hathorn and others (1897) A. C. 268 and by High Court of Bombay in Purushuram Dattaram v. Tata Industrial Bank Ltd. XXV Bom. L. R. 1083. Scheme of sub-sec. (11) of sec. 51 thus provides for necessary checks and balances on the powers of the president and the majority of the members with a view to ensure that the business of the meeting is not held up without sufficient reasons. ( 19 ) IT is thus evident that sub-sec. (11) of sec. L. R. 1083. Scheme of sub-sec. (11) of sec. 51 thus provides for necessary checks and balances on the powers of the president and the majority of the members with a view to ensure that the business of the meeting is not held up without sufficient reasons. ( 19 ) IT is thus evident that sub-sec. (11) of sec. 51 does nothing more than to invest the president with the power which he would not ordinarily possess under the common law. Since this power can be enjoyed by the president only with the consent of the majority it is difficult to comprehend how under the rules framed under the Act he can be authorised to enjoy the very same power without the consent of the majority. At this stage therefore it would be proper to make a reference to rule 46. We have already quoted the provisions of this rule. These provisions show that the authority presiding over a meeting is invested with wide and unfettered power to adjourn a meeting at his sweet will at any time and under any circumstances. In other words rule 46 confers on the presiding authority carte-blanche powers and makes him the sole authority to arbitrate over the statutory right of the councilors to meet and to transact their business. In our opinion conferment of such powers on the presiding authority is consistent neither with common law principles stated above nor with the provisions of the Act itself as embodied in sec. 51 thereof. We therefore hold that rule 46 must be struck down as invalid and ultra-vires the provisions of the Act. It follows therefore that Mr. Madam who presided over the meeting of the general board of the municipality on 4th March 1970 could not have validly acted under rule 46 for the purpose of adjourning that meeting. ( 20 ) HOWEVER the action of Shri Madam in adjourning the meeting is sought to be justified also under rule 45. It is therefore necessary to consider the validity of that rule. . ( 21 ) THIS rule 45 authorises the president to adjourn the meeting presided over by him under certain circumstances. ( 20 ) HOWEVER the action of Shri Madam in adjourning the meeting is sought to be justified also under rule 45. It is therefore necessary to consider the validity of that rule. . ( 21 ) THIS rule 45 authorises the president to adjourn the meeting presided over by him under certain circumstances. It states that if any of the councilors present does not accept a ruling given by the president with reference to the proceedings of the meeting and if the president finds that the inclination of that councilor is to become rowdy then the president can stop further business of the meeting and adjourn the same. We have already quoted above this rule together with the heading which is given to it. Now the contention of the petitioners is that power to adjourn a meeting which is properly called can be exercised by the president or the presiding authority only under sub-sec (11) of sec. 51 i. e. only with the consent of the majority of the councilors. In our opinion this contention is too wide to be accepted because we find that power to adjourn under certain special circumstances can be read even from the provisions of sec. 45 under which it is the duty of the president to regulate the conduct of business of the meeting presided over by him. Sec. 271 clause (a) authorises the municipality to frame rules regarding the conduct of business. Therefore the pertinent question which arises to be considered while construing the provisions contained in sec. 45 of the Act is what exactly is meant by the regulation of the conduct of business of a meeting. Suppose under certain circumstances a meeting becomes uproarious rowdy and unmanageable what the president or the presiding authority is supposed to do with a view to regulate the conduct of business of that meeting. Is it not open to him to adjourn such a meeting for a while for the purpose of regulating its conduct is a question which assumes much importance while considering such a situation. Is it not open to him to adjourn such a meeting for a while for the purpose of regulating its conduct is a question which assumes much importance while considering such a situation. In our opinion if the president or the presiding authority acts bonafide he has an inherent power to adjourn the meeting with a view to regulate its conduct in case the meeting becomes unruly and unmanageable because we find that without the exercise of such a power it would obviously be impossible for such an authority to discharge his duty to regulate the conduct of business of the meeting over which he presides. Therefore the power to adjourn a meeting under special circumstances to enable the members to transact their business is in our opinion implicit in the power to regulate the conduct of the business of that meeting. ( 22 ) IF that is so the municipality acting under its rule making powers vested in it by sec. 271 (a) can legitimately frame rules enabling the president to adjourn a meeting for the purpose of regulating the conduct of its business. ( 23 ) HOWEVER the limitation to be borne in mind at the time of framing such rules is that the power of adjournment should be conferred on the president or the presiding authority only to the extent to which such conferment is found necessary for the purpose of regulating the conduct of business of a meeting properly called. If this limitation is transgressed then it would be a transgression on the right of the councilors attending the meeting to take their own decision regarding adjournment. In our opinion such a transgression would take the case out of the preview of sec. 45 of the Act and if once that is done the rule in question is liable to be struck down as going beyond the scope of the statute. ( 24 ) IT is in context of this principle that we shall now proceed to examine the validity or otherwise of rule 45 under which Mr. Madam is said to have acted for the purpose of adjourning the meeting called on 4 March 1970 Now if a reference is made to this rule it will be found that it is most unhappily worded. The heading which is given to this rule speaks of rowdy conduct of any of the members attending the meeting. Madam is said to have acted for the purpose of adjourning the meeting called on 4 March 1970 Now if a reference is made to this rule it will be found that it is most unhappily worded. The heading which is given to this rule speaks of rowdy conduct of any of the members attending the meeting. But the main body of the rule speaks of -inclination to become rowdy. This is one contradiction between the heading and the main body of the rule. Another contradiction is that while the heading speaks of an adjournment the rule itself speaks about the closure of the meeting. Apart from these contradictions we find that the rule itself is very wide in its effect and does not fit in within the important limitation contemplated by sec. 45 of the Act namely that the adjournment should be only for the purpose of regulating the conduct of the business of the meeting. According to the rule as it stands to-day even if one of the councilors present is found to be inclined to become rowdy the president can adjourn the whole meeting. In our opinion such a wide power of adjourns not necessary to regulate the conduct of business of the meeting because if one of the councilors present in the meeting is found inclined to become rowdy the purpose of regulating the conduct of business of the meeting can be fully served by expelling that councilor from the meeting. For the apprehended fault of one councilor we do not think it is necessary to adjourn the whole of the meeting sine-die and to stop other councilors from discharging their statutory duties under the Act. Moreover if adjournment is found necessary it should not necessarily be sine-die because the purpose of this adjournment is obviously limited inasmuch as its resort is only to enable the presiding authority to regulate the conduct of business to be transacted at the meeting. In most of the cases the purpose would be served by adjourning the meeting for a limited period as the exigencies of the situation would require. In most of the cases the purpose would be served by adjourning the meeting for a limited period as the exigencies of the situation would require. It is thus apparent that rule 45 as it stands to-day does not provide any guide lines for the presiding authority to come to a proper conclusion about the action to be taken by him for the purpose of regulating the conduct of business of the meeting over which he presides and gives arbitrary power to that authority to adjourn the meeting at a mere apprehension of likely rowdy conduct of a single councilor present there. In our opinion this rule is too wide to fall within the ambit of sec. 45 of the Act. ( 25 ) IN this connection we find that some of the observations made by Megarry J. in John v. Rees and others 1969 (2) All England Reports P. 274 are very pertinent to this point. In this decision the learned Judge has lucidly discussed the nature of the powers of a chairman of a meeting to adjourn it in the event of a disorder and the limitation over such powers. Since some of the observations made by the learned Judge in this case are very much pertinent to the facts of the case before us we take liberty to refer to the facts relating to that case at some length. ( 26 ) THESE facts show that the annual meeting of the Pembrokeshire Divisional Labour Party (P. D. L. P.) was held on 6th April 1968 It was properly constituted meeting at which the plaintiff as president of the P. D. L. P. took the chair. On 28th March D. the member of Parliament for the constituency had been expelled from the National Labour Party and at this meeting a profound conflict of views arose between those supporting Ds views and those who opposed them. There was evidence of a good deal of noise disorder and some minor violence and after warnings from the plaintiff that it would be impossible for the meeting to continue if the disorder persisted he announced that he adjourned the meeting sine die and walked out followed by about 20 others. There was evidence of a good deal of noise disorder and some minor violence and after warnings from the plaintiff that it would be impossible for the meeting to continue if the disorder persisted he announced that he adjourned the meeting sine die and walked out followed by about 20 others. The meeting which however continued after he had left elected the second defendant as president of the P. D. L. P. in place of the plaintiff the third defendant was elected treasurer and the first defendant remained secretary. Thereafter the plaintiff issued a writ in which he claimed as representing all members of the P. D. L. P. except the defendants and personally and by notice of motion sought an injunction restraining the defendants from handling the property of the P. D. L. P. until trial of the action. On these facts the question which arose for consideration was as regards the duties of a chairman of a meeting to secure its orderly conduct according to its rules. While stating these duties the learned Judge observed that the chairman had of course wide powers to regulate the conduct of business of the meeting but he has also the duty of using those powers for proper and not improper purposes. It was further observed that above all his duty is to act not as a dictator but as a servant of the members of the body according to law. During the course of the discussion about the powers of a chairman to conduct the meeting the learned Judge agreed to the proposition that chairman of every meeting has an inherent power to adjourn it with a view to secure regular conduct of the meeting over which he presides. The learned Judge has further taken care to describe at length the limitations for the exercise of such a power. While doing so he has relied on the following observations found in R. v. Churchwardens of St. Mary Lambeth (1832) 1 Ad. and El. 346. The learned Judge has further taken care to describe at length the limitations for the exercise of such a power. While doing so he has relied on the following observations found in R. v. Churchwardens of St. Mary Lambeth (1832) 1 Ad. and El. 346. In Lembeth case there was a discussion about the above referred case of Stoughton v. Reynolds and referring to this case it was observed as under:-THIS decision by no means interferes with the right which every chairman has to make a bona fide adjournment whilst a poll or other business is proceeding if circumstances of violent interruption make it unsafe or seriously difficult for the voters to tender their votes; nor of adjourning the place of polling if the ordinary place used for that purpose be insufficient or greatly inconvenient In most of such cases the question will turn upon the intention and effect of the adjournment if the intention and effect were to interrupt and procrastinate the business such an adjournment would be illegal; if on the contrary the intention and effect were to forward or facilitate it and no injurious effect were produced such an adjournment would it is conceived be generally supported. Relying on this observation Megarry J. states as under:-THIS seems to me sound sense. It does not appear to be inconsistent with any of the authorities and in its essentials I adopt it for the purpose of this judgment. I do not think it can be right to say that the chairman of a meeting has no inherent power to adjourn the meeting for disorder. It seems generally accepted that one of his functions is to preserve order:- if despite his efforts serious disorder persists and he is denied any power of adjournment what is he to do ? The disorder will almost by necessity make it impossible for the meeting to pass a resolution for adjournment. One must remember that serious disorder may put in a dilemma many of those who are peacefully attending the meeting - If they retire from it they may afterwards find that the disorder soon subsided and that the meeting then transacted its business without their voice and vote and in a sense contrary to their wishes. If they remain their personal safety may be in peril. If they remain their personal safety may be in peril. The frail and timorous are as much entitled as the robust and bold to a meeting to which they can give their attention and at which they may make their voices heard without fear of violence; and they need it more. Further speaking about the duty of a chairman of a meeting to keep order he has made the following observations:-THE first duty of the chairman of a meeting is to keep order if he can. If there is disorder his duty I think is to make earnest and sustained efforts to restore order and for this purpose to summon to his aid any officers or others whose assistance is available. If all his efforts are in vain he should endeavour to put into operation whatever provisions for adjournment there are in the rules as by obtaining a resolution to adjourn. If this proves impossible he should exercise his inherent power to adjourn the meeting for a short while such as 15 minutes taking the due steps to ensure so far as possible that all present know of this adjournment. If instead of mere disorder there is violence I think that he should take similar steps save that the greater the violence the less prolonged should be his efforts to restore order before adjourning. In my judgment he has not merely a power but a duty to adjourn in this way in the interests of those who fear for their safety. I am not suggesting that there is a power and a duty to adjourn if the violence consists of no more than a few technical assaults and batteries. Mere pushing and jostling is one thing; it is another when people are put in fear where there is heavy punching or the knives are out so that blood may flow and there are prospectus or more of grievous bodily harm. In the latter case the sooner the chairman adjourns the meeting the better. At meetings as elsewhere the Queens peace must be kept. Thereafter referring to the limitations of the power of the chairman in exercise of his inherent duty to adjourn the learned Judge has observed as under:-IF then the chairman has this inherent power and duty what limitations if any are there on its exercise ? At meetings as elsewhere the Queens peace must be kept. Thereafter referring to the limitations of the power of the chairman in exercise of his inherent duty to adjourn the learned Judge has observed as under:-IF then the chairman has this inherent power and duty what limitations if any are there on its exercise ? First I think that the power and duty must be exercised bona fide for the purpose of forwarding and facilitating the meeting and not for the purpose of interruption or procrastination. Second I think that the adjournment must be for no longer than the necessities appear to dictate. If the adjournment is merely for such period as the chairman considers to be reasonably necessary for the restoration of order it would be within his power and his duty; a longer adjournment would not. One must remember that to attend a meeting may for some mean traveling far and giving up much leisure. An adjournment to another day when a mere 15 minutes might suffice to restore order may well impose an unjustifiable burden on many for they must either once more travel far and give up their leisure or else remain away and lose their chance to speak and vote at the meeting. We find that these observations fully support the view which we are taking. A Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court has summarised its findings on all the controversial points which are involved in this petition as under in Deodutt Sharma v. Zahoor Ahmed Zaid and others A. I. R. 1960 Rajasthan 25 :-FROM the aforesaid view of cases the following principles clearly emerge :- 1 That once a meeting had been properly called and it meets the chairman of the meeting can only adjourn it with the consent of the majority of the members subject of course to the rules and regulations of the particular body in relation to which such a question might arise. Thus where a meeting according to a statute or the rules under which it has been called must have a certain quorum and such quorum is not present the chairman will have the authority to adjourn the meeting because in its absence no lawful meeting can be held. Thus where a meeting according to a statute or the rules under which it has been called must have a certain quorum and such quorum is not present the chairman will have the authority to adjourn the meeting because in its absence no lawful meeting can be held. 2 In the absence of any rule to the contrary the common law doctrine should be held to prevail that the adjournment of the meeting rests with the majority of the members present and is not a matter merely of the pleasure of the chairman. 3 An exception to the aforesaid rule which has been almost universally accepted is that where disorder breaks out at a meeting the chairman has an inherent right even if it has not been granted by statute or the rules to adjourn the meeting without consulting the majority. 4 These exceptions apart if the chairman adjourns a meeting contrary to the wishes of the members present and thereby interrupts or leaves unfinished the business for which the meeting was summoned the remaining members can lawfully continue the business; and in the absence of their proper chairman it is open to them to elect another chairman to act as his substitute and continue the business and any business which was duly notified in the notice for the meeting could be transacted to completion and if it is so transacted it would be valid. 5 Where however the adjournment has been properly ordered by the chairman or it having been ordered the members have acquiesced in it and thereafter it dawns on or strikes some of them to continue the business of the meeting then such continuance should be held to be invalid as being a surprise or a fraud on the members who may have already left the meeting. ( 27 ) TO conclude therefore we hold that rule No. 45 as it is found to-day is beyond the scope of sec. 45 of the Act. We however want to clarify that a suitable rule enabling the presiding authority to adjourn a meeting in certain circumstances with a view to enable him to regulate the conduct of business of the meeting over which he presides would be well within the scope of sec. 45 of the Act and would in no manner infringe the letter and spirit of sec. 45 of the Act and would in no manner infringe the letter and spirit of sec. 51 (11) as both these sections operate in different fields. So far as rules Nos. 45 and 46 are concerned their existence in our opinion cannot be justified by reference to sec. 45. They should therefore be struck down as invalid and of no legal effect. ( 28 ) IN this view of the matter it is found that the adjournment of the general meeting held under the chairmanship of Mr. Madam on 4th March 1970 was illegal and inoperative. From the proceedings of the meeting continued under the chairmanship of Mr. Radia it is evident that the attention of Mr. Madam and other councilors who were present at the meeting was drawn to the fact that the presiding authority had no power to adjourn and yet Mr. Madam and some of the councilors left the meeting with the result that the remaining members continued the meeting and finished the business on hand under the chairmanship of Mr. Radia. We find that these remaining members were justified in doing so and therefore the meeting which was continued under the chairmanship of Mr. Radia was properly held and the business transacted by that meeting is found to be legal. This being so the Collectors findings on these points cannot be justified and therefore the order which the collector is found to have passed under sec. 258 of the Act deserves to be set aside. ( 29 ) IN view of these findings it is not necessary to decide rest of the points which touch the vires of sec. 258 of the Act and other points relating to the propriety of the action of the Collector under that section. ( 30 ) WE therefore hereby declare that rules 45 and 46 of Jamnagar Municipality are illegal and ultra-vires the provisions of the Act. We further declare that the adjournment of the general meeting held on 4th March 1970 under the chairmanship of Mr. Madam was illegal and that the continuation of the said meeting as well as the business transacted at the continued meeting are legal. The order of the Collector passed under sec. 258 of the Act on 13-5-70 is therefore unsustainable. The respondents are therefore restrained from enforcing that order of the Collector. Madam was illegal and that the continuation of the said meeting as well as the business transacted at the continued meeting are legal. The order of the Collector passed under sec. 258 of the Act on 13-5-70 is therefore unsustainable. The respondents are therefore restrained from enforcing that order of the Collector. This petition is therefore allowed and the rule is made absolute with costs. Rule made absolute. .