S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals are directed against the orders of summary dismissal recorded by Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta in First Appeal No. 502 of 1966 and First Appeal No. 503 of 1966. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in Letters Patent Appeal No. 44 of 1966 shortly stated are as under:- -THERE is a trust registered under Bombay Public Trusts Act known as Rahemtullabhai Sidibhai Trust at Viramgam. The objects of the trust are to enable the devotees to offer Namaz and perform other religious rites. The mode of succession to trusteeship is nomination by majority of Khoja Shiya Isna Sharif Jamat of Viramgam. The opponents were the trustees of the said trust. In or about 1959 they advanced a sum of Rs. 1000/out of the trust funds to one Alarakha Alibhai. They were therefore charged with having contravened the provisions of sec. 35 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act and were in that behalf prosecuted under sec. 66 of the said Act. Criminal Case No. 1746 of 1964 was instituted in that behalf and the learned City Magistrate 5 Court Ahmedabad convicted the opponents on their pleading guilty to the charge. The opponents Nos. 1 and 3 each were fined Rs. 25/and in default they were ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. The opponent No. 2 was fined Rs. 70/and in default he was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Thereafter the Charity Commissioner made an application under sec. 47aa of the said Act to the District Court at Narol for appointment of new trustees. The allegation which he made was that there was deliberate intentional and flagrant breach on the part of the opponents of the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The opponents Nos. 1 and 3 resisted the application firstly on the ground that it was not maintainable for non-joinder of parties because according to them there were two more trustees Kasamali Panji and Yusuf Mohmadbhai who ought to have been made parties to the application. The second plea of defence which they raised was that the said offence was really committed by the opponent No. 2 alone because the opponent No. 2 was the managing trustee in sole possession of the trust property and he dealt with the trust property without consulting them. The second plea of defence which they raised was that the said offence was really committed by the opponent No. 2 alone because the opponent No. 2 was the managing trustee in sole possession of the trust property and he dealt with the trust property without consulting them. They therefore averred that they had nothing to do with the offence. If they had committed any offence it was merely technical and nominal. According to them they were mere onlookers and had no knowledge of the said transaction of Rs. 1000. 00. ( 3 ) THE opponent No. 2. did not raise any defence. He did not raise any objection to his removal from the trusteeship. ( 4 ) AT the trial of the said application none of the opponents remained present even though they had filed their written statements. The learned advocate for the opponents Nos. 1 and 3 also was not present. The learned District Judge therefore heard the application exparte and decided it. He relied upon the conviction and made the following order. Opponents are removed from trusteeship of Rahemtullabhai Sidibhai Trust Viramgam. Inquiry to be held for appointment of new trustees. Opponents shall bear their own costs of this application and pay the Charity Commissioner his costs. ( 5 ) THE opponents Nos. 1 and 3 appealed to the High Court against the said order. It was First Appeal No. 502 of 1966 which came up for preliminary hearing before Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta who having found no substance in that appeal summarily dismissed it by his order dated 1st September 1966. ( 6 ) IT is against that order of summary dismissal that Letters Patent Appeal No. 44 of 1966 has been filed. ( 7 ) THE facts leading to Letters Patent Appeal No. 45 of 1966 briefly stated are as under:- -THERE is a trust called Khoja Shiya Isna Sharif Masjid Trust at Viramgam registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The opponents are the trustees of that trust also. The mode of succession to trusteeship is that the surviving trustee or trustees can appoint a new trustee. Amongst the objects of the trust are (a) setting apart two buildings for Ibadat Masjids and for use as Madressa (b) applying the income of other properties for Divabati etc. The opponents are the trustees of that trust also. The mode of succession to trusteeship is that the surviving trustee or trustees can appoint a new trustee. Amongst the objects of the trust are (a) setting apart two buildings for Ibadat Masjids and for use as Madressa (b) applying the income of other properties for Divabati etc. and for paying salary of the Molvi serving in the Madressa and (c) spending the remainder of the income for the welfare of the Jamat at Viramgam. The opponents who are the trustees of this trust are said to have committed the same offence as one alleged against them in Letters Patent Appeal No. 44 of 1966. The said conviction was relied upon by the Charity Commissioner. He therefore made an application under sec. 47aa of the Bombay Public Trusts Act for appointment of new trustees. The defences which the opponents raised in this case were the same as in the other case. This application was also heard exparte as all the opponents and the learned advocate for the opponents Nos. 2 and 3 had been absent at the hearing of the application. ( 8 ) THE learned District Judge made the following order in said application. ` opponents are removed from trusteeship of the Khoja Isna Sharif Masjid Trust Viramgam. Inquiry to be held for appointment of new trustees. Opponents shall bear their own costs of this application and pay the Charity Commissioner his costs. ( 9 ) AGAINST that order the opponents Nos. 2 and 3 filed in this High Court First Appeal No. 503 of 1966. It came up for preliminary hearing before Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta who having found no substance therein summarily dismissed it by his order dated 1st September 1966. ( 10 ) IT is against that order of summary dismissal that Letters Patent Appeal No. 45 of 1966 has been filed. ( 11 ) AT the hearing of these two Letters Patent Appeals the first contention which has been raised by the learned Assistant Government Pleader is that these appeals are not maintainable. In order to examine the contention raised before us it is necessary to turn to the provisions of sec. 47aa which provides as under. Where a trustee of any public trust is convicted of an offence punishable under this Act or any amount surcharged on him under sub-sec. (1) of sec. In order to examine the contention raised before us it is necessary to turn to the provisions of sec. 47aa which provides as under. Where a trustee of any public trust is convicted of an offence punishable under this Act or any amount surcharged on him under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 41 the Charity Commissioner may apply to the Court for the appointment of a new trustee and thereupon the provisions of sub-secs. (3) (4) (5) and (6) of sec. 47 shall apply as they apply to an application made under sub-sec. (1) of that section. Sec. 47 to which reference has been made in sec. 47aa deals with the power of the Court to appoint new trustee or trustees as the case may be under the circumstances mentioned in sub-sec. (1) thereof. On reading sec. 47aa in light of the provisions of sec. 47 to which reference has been made in sec. 47aa one thing which becomes clear to us is that an appellation which the Charity Commissioner may make under sec. 47aa is placed on par with the applications contemplated by sub-sec. (1) of sec. 47. Having done so the. Legislature in the matter of applications under sec. 47aa has by incorporation brought into play sub-secs. (3) (4) (5) and (6) of sec. 47 and therefore the provisions of sub-sec. (3) (4) (5) and (6) of sec. 47 apply to the applications made under sec. 47aa. It is sub-sec. (6) of sec. 47 (applicable to applications under sec. 47aa) which provides for appeal to the High Court. It is in the following terms. The order of the Court under sub-sec. (3) shall be deemed to be the decree of the Court and an appeal shall lie therefrom to the High Court. On reading sub-sec. (6) therefore it is clear to us that an appeal to the High Court lies only against those orders which are made under subsec. (3) and which are within its compass. Sub--sec. (3) of sec. 47 provides as under. The Court after making an inquiry may by order appoint the Charity Commissioner or any other person as the trustee to fill up the vacancy. Sub-sec. (3) contemplates only orders making appointments of the Charity Commissioner or any other person as the trustee to fill up the vacancy. It does not contemplate any other orders. Therefore it is the order of appointment made under sub-sec. Sub-sec. (3) contemplates only orders making appointments of the Charity Commissioner or any other person as the trustee to fill up the vacancy. It does not contemplate any other orders. Therefore it is the order of appointment made under sub-sec. (3) which has been made appealable to the High Court by sub-sec. (6) of sec. 47. The said position holds good with regard to sec. 47aa in light of the language used in that section. In our opinion therefore unless there is an order of appointment under sec. 47aa read with sub-sec. (33 of sec. 47 no appeal will lie to the High Court under sub-sec. (6) both in case of applications presented under sec. 47 as well as in case of applications presented under sec. 47aa. ( 12 ) THE orders of the learned District Judge passed in these two cases and reproduced by us hereinabove show that the opponents have been removed from the trusteeship of the respective trusts but no new appointments have been made. In fact both the orders clearly show that the appointment of new trustees has been deferred pending an inquiry to be made in regard to the mode of succession and other incidental matters. In our opinion therefore in light of the provisions contained in sec. 47aa read with sub-secs. (3) and (6) of sec. 47 the First Appeals which were filed in this High Court were in absence of any order of appointment incompetent and were therefore not maintainable. If the First Appeals were not competent under sub-sec. (6) of sec. 47 then Letters Patent Appeals filed against the orders recorded in them would be much less maintainable. In our opinion therefore both the Letters Patent Appeals are incompetent and not maintainable. ( 13 ) IN the view which we take it is not necessary for us to examine the merits of the contentions raised by the learned advocates before us. ( 14 ) IN the result both the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed. .