GOSWAMI, C. J.:- This application under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against notice of demand dated 11th October, 1969 issued by the Super­intendent of Taxes. Gauhati, directing the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 15,989 as tax under the Assam Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1956, hereinafter called the Act, for the period ending 31st March, 1969 and another notice dated 2nd December, 1969 issued by the same officer for submission of the return under the said Act for the period end­ing 30th September, 1969. 2. The petitioner is a partnership firm, of which all the partners are Indian citizens. The firm carries on the business of selling and supplying of various goods including vegetable oils, milk powder, dry fruits, sugar, caustic soda and soda ash etc. The petitioner imports such goods from outside the State of Assam for the purpose of sale in Assam. The firm is a registered deal­er within the meaning of sub-section (2J of Section 2 of the Act. It does not it­self manufacture, make or process any of the articles for the purpose of sale in Assam. The Assam Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1956 was passed in the year 1956 by the Assam Legislature. The Act purported to impose tax on sales of certain goods specified in the sche­dule attached to it. The Act was amend­ed by adding new items to the schedule. Vegetable oils, both edible and non-edi­ble, including ghee but excluding mus­tard oil. rape oil and admixture of mustard and rape oil were made tax­able under the Act by inclusion of entry 23 in the schedule. The petitioner paid taxes under the said Act since the com­mencement of its business till the period ending 30th September, 1968. The rate of tax as specified in Column III of the schedule against the items specified in entry Nos. 23, 50 and 56 has been en­hanced from tune to time by the Assam Finance (Sales Tax) Amendment Acts from five paise to six paise in a rupee and again from six paise to seven paise in a rupee. The petitioner is required under Section 8 of the Act to submit returns and the Superintendent of Taxes has issued notice dated 2nd December, 1969 directing it to submit returns for the period ending 30th September, 1969. The petitioner is required under Section 8 of the Act to submit returns and the Superintendent of Taxes has issued notice dated 2nd December, 1969 directing it to submit returns for the period ending 30th September, 1969. The Superintendent also issued notice of demand dated 11th October, 1969 asking the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 15,989 as tax for the period ending 31st March, 1969. 3. The petitioner avers that ever since the enforcement of the Act and the inclusion of goods specified in items 23, 50 and 56 in the Schedule, there has been no manufacture or production in the State of Assam of any of the goods as described in the said entries, nor is there any such manufacture or produc­tion of such taxable goods at. present in the State of Assam. The petitioner therefore submits that there is no pos­sibility of levying any sales tax at pre­sent or in the near future on the sale of such goods or similar goods manufac­tured or produced in Assam. The peti­tioner submits that the Act as amended providing for imposition of sales tax on goods described under entries 23, 50 and 56 of the schedule to the Act, produced in other parts of India and brought for sale in the State of Assam, offends the rights guaranteed under Article 301 of the Constitution and as such the Act is ultra vires, unconstitutional and void. The petitioner further submits that the said Act is not saved under the provi­sions of Article 304 of the Constitution. 4. Mr. Lahiri, the learned coun­sel for the petitioner, makes the follow­ing submissions: (i) A sales tax, whether discrimina­tory or non-discriminatory which direct­ly impedes the freedom of trade and commerce, is in contravention of Arti­cle 301 and is invalid unless saved by Article 304 (a) and (b) or Article 305. (ii) The levy of tax on a dealer, who imports the commodity and then sells it, directly impedes the freedom of trade and commerce and is not protected by, Article 304 (a) and (b). (ii) The levy of tax on a dealer, who imports the commodity and then sells it, directly impedes the freedom of trade and commerce and is not protected by, Article 304 (a) and (b). (iii) The impugned tax is not saved by Article 304 (a) inasmuch as it pro­vides for imposition of tax on vegetable oils, both edible and non-edible, manu­factured outside the State and brought for sale within the State and not on locally produced vegetable of, being no production and/or manufacture of the said products within the State, or there being no imposition of any tax on must­ard oil and rape oil. (iv) The impugned tax is repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution as, while excluding mustard oil and rape oil, the other vegetable oils both edible and non-edible have been arbitrarily taxed, there being no basis for differentiation. (v) Lastly, it is submitted that the impugned provision is violative of Arti­cle 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. 5. Before we deal with the above submissions of the learned counsel, it may be appropriate to refer to the law laid down by the Supreme Court with regard to the scope of Article 301 and other Articles in Part XIII of the Con­stitution with particular reference to the decisions relied upon at the Bar, The most important decision of the Supreme Court dealing with- these Arti­cles is Atiabari Tea Company case reported in AIR 1961 SC 232 . The majority of the Supreme Court in that case held as follows:-• "Thus considered we think it would be reasonable and proper to hold that restrictions freedom from which is gua­ranteed by Article 301, would be such restrictions as directly and immediately restrict or impede the free flow or move­ment of trade. Taxes may and do amount to restrictions; but it is only such taxes as directly and immediately restrict trade that would fall within the pur­view of Article 301. The argument that all taxes should be governed by Arti­cle 301 whether or not their impact on trade is immediate or mediate, direct or remote, adopts, in our opinion, an, extreme approach which cannot be up­held. The argument that all taxes should be governed by Arti­cle 301 whether or not their impact on trade is immediate or mediate, direct or remote, adopts, in our opinion, an, extreme approach which cannot be up­held. XXX We are, therefore, satisfied that in determining the limits of the width and amplitude of the freedom guaranteed by Article 301 a rational and workable test to apply would be: Does the impugned restriction ope­rate directly or immediately on trade or its movement?" (Para 51) Dealing with the particular Act, namely the Assam Taxation (on Goods Carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act (13 of 1954) in that case, their Lord­ships observed:- "We are dealing in the present case with an Act passed by the State Legisla­ture which imposes a restriction in the form of taxation on the carriage or movement of goods, and we hold that such a restriction can be imposed by the State Legislature only if the relevant Act is passed in the manner prescribed by Article 304 (b)." (Para 54) Since there was no compliance with the provisions of Article 304 (b), the Act was declared to be void. This decision was upheld by the majority in the case of Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, reported hi AIR 1962 SC 1406 where after approving the majority view in the Atiabari case, AIR 1961 SC 232 (sura), their Lordships introduced a qualification in the following words: "Such regulatory measures as do not impede the freedom of trade, com­merce and inter-course and compensa­tory taxes for the use of trading facili­ties are not hit by the freedom declared by Article 301. They are excluded from the purview of the provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution for the simple reason that they do not hamper trade, commerce and inter-course but rather facilitate them." (Para 14). Dealing with the validity of R. 16 of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turn­over and Assessment) Rules, 1939, in Firm Mehtab Majid and Co. v. State of Madras, reported in AIR 1963 SC 928 . their Lordships observed as follows: "It is therefore now well settled that taxing laws can be restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse, if they ham­per the flow of trade and if they are not what can be termed to be compen­satory taxes or regulatory measures. v. State of Madras, reported in AIR 1963 SC 928 . their Lordships observed as follows: "It is therefore now well settled that taxing laws can be restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse, if they ham­per the flow of trade and if they are not what can be termed to be compen­satory taxes or regulatory measures. Sales tax, of the kind under considera­tion here, cannot be said to be a mea­sure, regulating any trade or a compen­satory tax levied for the use of trading facilities. Sales tax, which has the ef­fect of discriminating between goods of one State and goods of another, may af­fect the free flow of trade and it will then offend against Article 301 and will be valid only if it comes within the terms of Article 304 (a)." (Para 10). The learned counsel also drew our attention to the following passage: "The contention that Article 304 (a) is attracted only when the impost is at the border, i. e., when the goods enter the State on crossing the border of the State, is not sound. Article 304 (a) allows the Legislature of a State to im­pose taxes on goods imported from other States and does not support the contention that the imposition must be at the point of entry only." (Para 12) The question for consideration in the Firm Mehtab Majid's case. AIR 1963 SC 928 is whether the impugned rule dis­criminates between hides or skins im­ported from outside the State and those manufactured or produced in the State, and their Lordships held Rule 16 (2) to be invalid as it contravened the provi­sions of Article 304 (a) of the Constitu­tion. We have next to notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Khyerbari Tea Co's case reported in AIR 1964 SC 925 . Their Lordships, there, were dealing with the Assam Taxation (on Goods Carried by Road or on Inland Water­ways) Act (10 of 1961). This Act was passed by the Assam Legislature after complying with Article 304 (b) of the Constitution which was lacking in the earlier Act that had been held invalid by the Supreme Court on that score. Their Lordships, there, were dealing with the Assam Taxation (on Goods Carried by Road or on Inland Water­ways) Act (10 of 1961). This Act was passed by the Assam Legislature after complying with Article 304 (b) of the Constitution which was lacking in the earlier Act that had been held invalid by the Supreme Court on that score. Their Lordships observed as follows: "It is, of course, true that the vali­dity of tax laws can be questioned in the light of the provisions of Articles 14, 19 and Article 301 if the said tax direct­ly and immediately imposes a restric­tion on the freedom of trade, but the power conferred on the Court to strike down a taxing statute if it contravenes the provisions of Articles 14, 19 or 301 has to be exercised with circumspection, bearing in mind that the power of the State to levy taxes for the purpose of governance and for carrying out its wel­fare activities is a necessary attribute of sovereignty and in that sense it is a power of paramount character." (Para 45) It should be borne in mind that the tax­ing event in the above Assam Act is the carriage of goods through Assam. Their Lordships observed: "It is the physical fact of carriage of goods through a part of Assam that attracts the levy of the tax imposed by Section 3." Another passage in the Khyerbari case to which our attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner may be quoted: "It would thus be clear that an Act passed under Article 304 (b) can be held to be valid if it is shown that the res­trictions imposed by it are reasonable and in the public interest. It is true that before a Bill is introduced in that behalf, the previous sanction of the President has been obtained; but that does not take away the jurisdiction of the Court to consider the question as to whether the Act passed with the pre­vious sanction of the President satisfies the requirements of Article 304 (b) Since Article 304 (b) permits restrictions to be imposed on the freedom of trade the Constitution has made it clear that the said restrictions can be sustained only if they are reasonable and are re­quired in the public interest." (Para 31) The learned counsel also drew our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006 and strenuously relies on the fol­lowing observations in that case:: "There can be no doubt that the tax payable at the point of sale by the importer in Madhya Bharat directly im­peded the freedom of trade and com­merce guaranteed by Article 301 of the Constitution. It is true that the import by itself would not bring in the liabi­lity to tax and that if the imported goods were not sold in Madhya Bharat no tax would be payable Quite clearly however by far the greater part of the tobacco leaves manufactured tobacco (for eating and smoking) and tobacco used for Bidi manufacturing that would be imported into the State would be sold in Madhya Bharat. xxx There can be no doubt therefore that even though it is the sale in Madhya Bharat of the imported goods that creates the liability to tax and not the import by itself, the trade and com­merce as between Madhya Bharat and other parts of India is directly impeded by this tax. On the authority of this Court's decision in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 232 it must therefore be held that the tax con­travenes the provisions of the Article 301 of the Constitution. It may be mention­ed that the later decision of this Court in AIR 1962 SC 1406 which slightly modified the majority decision in Atia­bari Tea Co.'s case, AIR 1961 SC 232 does not alter this position. If the tax could have been claimed to be regula­tory or compensatory it would have got the benefit of the latter decision. There is however no scope for such a claim." (Para 9). If the tax could have been claimed to be regula­tory or compensatory it would have got the benefit of the latter decision. There is however no scope for such a claim." (Para 9). Although the learned counsel tried to base his whole argument relying on this passage, the legal position is made clear in the next paragraph where their Lord­ships observed as follows: "The tax could still be good if even if even though it contravened the provi­sions of Article 301 it came within the saving provisions of Article 304 (a) of the Constitution. That Article provides in its clause (a) that notwithstanding anything in Article 301 or Article 303 the Legislature of a State may by law impose on goods imported from other States any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject so however as not to discri­minate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced. X X X In our opinion, the only reasonable interpretation of the notification as it stands, viz., that tax on tobacco leaves, manufactured tobacco and tobacco used for Bidi manufacturing would be pay­able at the point of sale by the import­er, is that only the sale of goods which the importer had imported would be liable to tax and not sale of any other goods by him." (The underlining is mine). It is clear therefore that taxing event in Bhailal Bhai's case, AIR 1964 SC 1006 is the import of the goods and that would directly impede free flow of goods from one State to another and since it was discriminatory the tax was held to be invalid. The learned counsel also referred to another decision of the Supreme Court in Kalyani Stores v. State of Orissa, re­ported in AIR 1966 SC 1686 and the following passage was relied upon by him: "Exercise of the power under Arti­cle 304 (a) can only be effective if the t»" or duty imposed on goods imported from other States and the Tax or duty imposed on similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are such that there is no discrimination against im­ported goods. As no foreign liquor is produced or manufactured in the State of Orissa the power to legislate given by Article 304 is not available and the restriction which is declared on the freedom of trade, commerce or inter­course by Article 304 of the Constitu­tion remains unfettered." (Para 7). This case dealt with a notification issued under Section 27 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act (2 of 1915) imposing a coun­tervailing duty on foreign liquor im­ported into the State under Entry 51 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. This is clear from the ob­servations in para 4 of the decision: "The fact that countervailing duties may be imposed at the same or lower rates suggests that they are meant to counterbalance the duties of excise im­posed on goods manufactured in the State. XXX It seems, therefore, that counter­vailing duties are meant to equalise the burden on alcoholic liquors imported from outside the State and the burden placed by excise duties on alcoholic liquors manufactured or produced in the State. If no alcoholic liquors similar to those imported into the State are pro­duced or manufactured, the right to im­pose counter-balancing duties of excise levied on the goods manufactured in the State will not arise. It may therefore be ac­cepted that countervailing duties can only be levied if similar goods are ac­tually produced or manufactured in the State on which excise duties are being levied." It _ is in the above context their Lord­ships made the observations in para 7 quoted above and relied on so strenu­ously by Mr. Lahiri. The learned Advocate General, Assam, relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Andhra Sugars Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 1968 SC 599 . Dealing in that case with Section 21 of the Andhra Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act No. 45 of 1961, the Supreme Court observed: "The tax under Section 21 is essen­tially a tax on purchase of goods. The taxable event is the purchase of cane for use, consumption or sale in a factory and not the entry of cane into a factory. The taxable event is the purchase of cane for use, consumption or sale in a factory and not the entry of cane into a factory. As the tax is not on the entry of the cane into a factory, it is not payable on cane cultivated by the factory and en­tering the factory premises." Thereafter it was again observed: "A non-discriminatory tax on goods does not offend Article 301 unless it directly impedes the free movement or transport of the goods." The Court referred in that decision to both the Atiabari case, AIR 1961 SC 232 and the Automobile Transport case, AIR 1962 SC 1406 . Their Lordships observed: "Normally, a tax on sale of goods does not directly impede the free move­ment or transport of goods. Section 21 is no exception. It does not impede the free movement or transport of goods and is not violative of Article 301." The learned Advocate General also drew our attention to a passage in Automobile Transport case, AIR 1962 SC 1406 (supra), which may be quoted: (at page 1418): "Thus the States In India have full power of imposing what in American State Legislation is called the use tax, gross receipts tax etc., not to speak of the familiar property tax, subject only to the condition that such tax is im­posed on all goods of the same kind pro­duced or manufactured in the taxing State, although such taxation is un­doubtedly calculated to fetter inter-State trade and commerce. As was observed by Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 252 the commercial unity of India is made to give way before the State powers of imposing 'any' non-discriminatory tax on goods imported from sister States." The learned Advocate General also relied upon certain observations of the Supreme Court in The State of Madras v. N. K. Nataraja Mudaliar, reported in AIR 1969 SC 147 , which may be quoted: "The flow of trade does not neces­sarily depend upon the rates of sales tax: it depends upon a variety of fac­tors, such as the source of supply, place of consumption, existence of trade chan­nels, the rates of freight, trading facili­ties, availability of efficient transport and other facilities for carrying on trade. Instances can easily be imagined of cases in which notwithstanding the lower rate of tax in a particular part of the country, goods may be purchased from another part, where a higher rate of tax prevails. XXX Existence of long-standing business relations, availability of communications, credit facilities and a host of other fac­tors.........natural and business enter into the maintenance of trade relations and the free flow of trade cannot necessarily be deemed to have been obstructed merely because in a particular State the rate of tax on sales is higher than the rates prevailing on other States." The above decision was also referred to In Rattan Lai and Co. v. Assessing Authority, Patiala, reported In AIR 1970 SC 1742 . The learned Advocate General also referred to a passage in T. G. Venkata-raman v. State of Madras, reported in AIR 1970 SC 508 , which appears at para 15: "Freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed by Article 301 of the Constitution is protected against tax­ing statutes as well as other statutes, but by imposition of tax on transactions of sale of "cane jaggery" no restriction on the freedom of trade or commerce or in the course of trade with or within the State is imposed. The tax imposed on transactions of sale of "cane jaggerv" does not affect the freedom of trade within the meaning of Article 301. As observed by this Court in AIR 1969 SC 147 "a tax may in certain cases directly and immediately restrict or hamper the free flow of trade, but every imposition of tax does not do so." In V. Venugopala Ravi Varma Rajah v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1969 SC 1094 , the Supreme Court observed: "Again tax laws are aimed at deal­ing with complex problems of infinite variety necessitating adjustment of seve­ral desperate elements. The Courts ac­cordingly admit, subject to adherence to the fundamental principles of the doc­trine of equality, a larger play to legi­slative discretion in the matter of classification. The Courts ac­cordingly admit, subject to adherence to the fundamental principles of the doc­trine of equality, a larger play to legi­slative discretion in the matter of classification. The power to classify may be exercised so as to adjust the system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways: the Legislature may select persons properties, transactions and objects, and apply different methods and even rates for tax, if the Legislature does so rea­sonably, XXX XXX If the classification is rational, the Legislature is free to choose objects of taxation, impose different rates ex­empt classes of property from tax­ation, subject different classes of property to tax in different ways and adopt different modes of as­sessment. A taxing statute may contra­vene Article 14 of the Constitution if it seeks to impose on the same class of property, persons, transactions or occu­pations similarly situate, incidence of taxation, which leads to obvious inequa­lity." (Para 14). It was also observed) "It is for the Legislature to deter­mine the objects on which tax shall be levied, and the rates thereof. The Courts will not strike down an Act as denying the equal protection of laws merely be­cause other objects could have been, but are not, taxed by the Legislature." (Para 15). 6. With the above survey of the decisions bearing upon interpretation of Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution vis-a-vis Articles 14 and 19 and bearing in mind the legal propositions enuncia­ted by the Supreme Court, let us now deal with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Re­verting, therefore, to the first submis­sion of Mr. Lahiri, it is sufficient to state that there can be no dispute with re­gard to the proposition advanced by him. According to the learned counsel, if a sales tax directly impedes freedom of trade and commerce, it contravenes Article 301 unless it comes under the saving provisions of Article 304 (a) and (b). His submission is that tax levied on Vanaspathi and other goods mention­ed in the Entries 23, 50 and 56 of the schedule to the Act directly affects the flow of trade in these commodities, as these are imported goods and not manu­factured in the State of Assam. He, therefore, wants to invoke the ratio of the Atiabari Tea Co. case, AIR 1961 SC 232 (supra). He, therefore, wants to invoke the ratio of the Atiabari Tea Co. case, AIR 1961 SC 232 (supra). There is, however, one fall­acy in his argument, namely that while the taxing event in the Atiabari case, AIR 1961 SC 232 was the carriage of goods, that under the impugned Act is the sale of these goods. There is noth­ing to show that if these goods are manufactured or produced in the State they will Dot be liable for sales tax.^ There is, therefore no foundation for the argument that the Atiabari decision is at all attracted to the instant case. The first submission of Mr. Lahiri is therefore without any force. 7. The second submission of Mr, Lahiri will also fail for the reasons given while disposing of the first submission. Since the provisions of Arti­cle 301 are not at all contravened in this case, the question of application of Arti­cle 304 (a) and (b) would not even arise. There is, therefore no foundation for the third submission of Mr. Lahiri. 9. Regarding the fourth submis­sion of the learned counsel, invoking Article 14 of the Constitution, it is suf­ficient to state that the Legislature can pick and choose commodities for purpose of levying tax. The fact that mustard oil and rape oil have been excluded from other vegetable oils would not make the classification unreasonable. Vanaspathi, which has been taxed, is commercially a distinct commodity and there may be several factors which ap­pealed to the Legislature, in their wis­dom, to pick and choose Vanaspathi leaving out mustard oil and rape oil. Even the class of consumers may be dif­ferent for these two commodities. The choice of selection must be left to the Legislature and cannot be a subject-matter for decision by the Courts un­less it can be shown to .make gross dis­crimination. The challenge under Arti­cle 14 of the Constitution therefore is without substance. 10. Lastly, Mr. Lahiri contends that the tax is violative of Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution inasmuch as the res­triction imposed on these goods is not reasonable, nor in the interest of gene­ral public. He also contends under this head, as he did earlier in dealing with Article 304, that tax imposed on these goods and progressively enhancing the same are not reasonable, nor in ';he interest of general public. He also contends under this head, as he did earlier in dealing with Article 304, that tax imposed on these goods and progressively enhancing the same are not reasonable, nor in ';he interest of general public. The learned counsel particularly emphasises that since there is no manufacture or pro­duction of these goods in this State, such a restriction in the sale of these imported goods is violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. If his argu­ment is accepted, no undeveloped State will be able to realise sales tax on -my sale of goods that take place inside that State of commodities which are import­ed from other States. It is common knowledge that many States do not grow or manufacture many essential commodities of daily life and these have got to come from other States. It will be unreasonable to fetter the power of the State to impose sales tax simply on the ground that the commodities which are subject-matter of sale in the State are imported from other States and are not manufactured within the States. We are also not impressed by the submission that the enhancement of the tax is so heavy that it can be called unreasonable. This argument of the learned counsel is therefore of no avail. II. In the result, the application is dismissed. We will, however, make no order as to costs. M. C. PATHAK, J.:- 12. I agree. (Note: Leave to appeal to Supreme Court was applied for but was refused.) Application refused.