JUDGMENT :- One V. Kaunter, a permanent resident of State of Madras, died at Imphal on 18-5-1968, having been involved in a bus accident on that date. On 9-8-1968 Chinnathai Ammal, the widow of the deceased, and Chellathai and Periyasamy, his two minor sons, filed an application for compensation under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, hereinafter called the Act, before the Claims Tribunal, Manipur, presided over by the District Judge, Manipur. Along with the claim application an affidavit was put in by the first applicant, Chinnathai Ammal, praying for condonation of delay in filing the same. It was stated in the affidavit that the information about the death of Kaunter at Imphal reached the applicants in her village in Madras a few days after the tragic occurrence, that some time more was involved in securing the services of a dependable escort to a far off place like Imphal, that she actually reached Imphal on 7-8-1968, and that it took her another two days in consulting the counsel and collecting necessary data from the Police before she could make the claim on 9-8-1968. 2. All the three respondents, the first two being the drivers of the ill-fated bus and the third being Government of Manipur, opposed the prayer of the applicants for condonation of the delay. They pleaded in their respective written statements that no sufficient cause had been made out to support the prayer for condonation. 3. The Claims Tribunal agreed with the stand taken by the respondents and on holding that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 23 days had been established, rejected the prayer and with that stood dismissed the application for compensation. 4. Having felt aggrieved, the three applicants have come up in appeal to this Court. 5. The sole question that falls for determination is whether the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the claim application as barred by time. Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the Act provides that no application for compensation under the section shall be entertained unless it is made within sixty days of the occurrence of the accident. A proviso appended to the sub-section states that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of sixty days if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. A proviso appended to the sub-section states that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of sixty days if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. The relevant data on the record is that the accident occurred on 18-5-1968, that the three applicants belong to a village in Tiruchirappalli District of Madras State, that the applicant No. 1 is a widow and the other two applicants are minor sons of the deceased Kaunter, that the applicant No. 1 reached Imphal on 7-8-1968, and that she filed the application on 9-8-1968. Obviously, there has been a delay of 23 days in making the application. The question for consideration is whether sufficient cause in terms of the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the Act has been made out for condoning the delay of 23 days. Shri Budhachandra Singh, appearing for respondent No. 2, candidly conceded at the bar that in the background of the circumstances of the case the delay can legitimately be condoned. None put in appearance on behalf of respondent No. 3. It was only Shri Jyochandra Singh, representing the respondent No. 1, who urged that no case for condonation of delay is made out. 6. The expression "sufficient cause" is used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as also in Section 85 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and that expression has been the subject of a large number of judicial pronouncements including those of the Supreme Court. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed in Krishna v. Chathappan. (1890) ILR 13 Mad 269, that the words "sufficient cause" should receive "a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant." This interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause" was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 411 , Dinabandhu v. Jadumoni. The Supreme Court had to interpret in that case a like expression used in the proviso to Section 85 of the Representation of the People Act. The Supreme Court had to interpret in that case a like expression used in the proviso to Section 85 of the Representation of the People Act. Honble Venkatarama Ayyar, J., held, while speaking for the Court, that the proviso to Section 85 advisedly confers on the Election Commission wide discretion in the matter, and the obvious intention of of the legislature was that it should be exercised with a view to do justice to all the parties. Shri Joychandra Singh was unable to cite any other authority of the Supreme Court laying down a contrary interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause." The language in which Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the proviso to Section 85 of the Representation of the People Act is couched is almost identical with the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the Act. Therefore the words "sufficient cause" used in the latter proviso must also receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice provided of course no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the applicant. 6A. The decision in New India Assurance Co. v. Punjab Roadway, AIR 1964 Punj 235, cited by Shri Bhubon Singh, representing the appellants, illustrates the extent to which the Claims Tribunal can and should go to meet out Justice to the victim of an accident. There, one Lajwanti was involved in a bus accident on 16th November, 1959, and since she lost consciousness instantly and continued in that state for a long time, her husband Dev Raj made an application to the Tribunal on 27th November, 1959, in his own name under the bona fide belief that it had to be filed within 15 days of the occurrence. The case was tried and reached the stage of arguments on 5th October, 1980, with Dev Raj as applicant when the respondents raised an objection that Lajwanti being alive her spouse had no right to make the application or to claim compensation in his own name. To overcome that legal hurdle, Lajwanti and Dev Raj made separate applications under Order I, Rule 10, of the Civil Procedure Code for substitution of formers name for the latter, and the Tribunal allowed those applications by an order dated 2nd December, 1960, which was more than one year after the accident. To overcome that legal hurdle, Lajwanti and Dev Raj made separate applications under Order I, Rule 10, of the Civil Procedure Code for substitution of formers name for the latter, and the Tribunal allowed those applications by an order dated 2nd December, 1960, which was more than one year after the accident. This order of the Tribunal was challenged seriously in appeal filed against the final order of the Tribunal allowing compensation to Lajwanti, but the High Court upheld its validity on the basis that the words "sufficient cause" should receive liberal construction to advance substantial justice where no serious negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputed to the claimant, and added that where the injured person is incapacitated from presenting the application because of serious injuries the Tribunal can rightly extend time for presentation of the application. The High Court also took note of the fact that Section 110-F of the Act enjoins that where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claim for compensation shall be granted by the Civil Court. I may add that Parliament has recently extended the period of 60 days prescribed by sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the Act to six months realising that 60 days were not enough to meet the requirements in all cases. 7. An outstanding feature of the case in hand is that though the applicant No. 1 supported the facts set out in the application for condonation of delay by an affidavit, none of the three respondents put in an affidavit to controvert the veracity of the facts sworn to by her. Chinnathai Ammal was unequivocal in stating that she reached Imphal on 7-8-1968 and that she took another two days in consulting the counsel and in collecting the necessary material from the Police before she could present the application to the Claims Tribunal on 9-8-1968. Chinnathai Ammal was unequivocal in stating that she reached Imphal on 7-8-1968 and that she took another two days in consulting the counsel and in collecting the necessary material from the Police before she could present the application to the Claims Tribunal on 9-8-1968. On getting the tragic news about the death of her husband, Chinnathai Ammal could not have conceivably exhibited, judged by the standard of normal human behaviour in the background of culture of Indian women, any negligence or inaction in the matter of reaching Imphal which is in the extreme north-east of India from her village in remote South. It is also not abnormal that after reaching Imphal she should take another two days in presenting the application. Taking all these factors into consideration, I feel satisfied that the applicants were prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time and that the learned Claims Tribunal was not justified in brushing aside their prayer for condonation of delay of 23 days. 8. As a result, I allow the appeal, set aside the order dated 3-12-1968 of the Claims Tribunal and remand the case to it with the direction that it should enter it at its old number and proceed to try it on merits as the delay in making the application has been condoned. However, I make no order relating to costs. Case remanded.