JUDGMENT G.D. Sehgal and G.S. Lal, J. - This special appeal has been preferred by Udham Singh against the dismissal of his writ petition by a learned single Judge of this Court relating to a matter arising under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Udham Singh was a worker employed with respondent No. 3 Messrs. Northern India Iron Press Works, Aishbagh, Lucknow. On 22-1-1965 he was served with a charge-sheet (copy of which is annexure 1 to the writ petition) together with a copy of the written complaint lodged against him by another worker Dayal. The charge was that Udham Singh had seriously beaten Dayal on 21-1-1965 during working hours within the factory premises. He was required to explain within three days as to why disciplinary action be not taken against him, as per Standing Orders, for his act of misconduct. It may be stated at this very place that in the written complaint it had also been alleged that Udham Singh had taken out forcibly some money from the pocket of Dayal, but the charge did -not contain this accusation. Udham Singh appellant filed a reply on 23-1-1965 (copy of which is annexure 2 to the writ petition) wholly denying the allegations against him and giving out that the management had cooked up the case against him in order to get rid of him as it was at his instance that a representative body of workmen had been formed some three years earlier and at his instance certain cases relating to bonus and dearness allowance, wages and gratuity and termination and suspension of certain workers had been raised from time to time. The management appointed one Sri R.S. Kela as an Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges. Sri Kela submitted his report dated 28-2-1965 holding the charge against the appellant proved (annexure 4 to the writ petition). The management agreed with the findings and as per order a copy of which is annexure 5 to the writ petition, the appellant's services were summarily terminated. 2. The appellant raised an industrial dispute relating to his dismissal and the matter was referred by the State Government to the Labour Court. The Labour Court gave its award on 23-6-1967 upholding the order of dismissal of the appellant. Aggrieved by the award, the appellant filed the writ petition in question, challenging the validity of the award on various grounds. The appellant raised an industrial dispute relating to his dismissal and the matter was referred by the State Government to the Labour Court. The Labour Court gave its award on 23-6-1967 upholding the order of dismissal of the appellant. Aggrieved by the award, the appellant filed the writ petition in question, challenging the validity of the award on various grounds. Those grounds were considered by the learned single Judge who found no merit in them and, therefore, dismissed the writ petition, making no order as to costs. 3. In the special appeal the points raised before the learned single Judge against the validity of the award have been pressed before us and we have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at some length. Since, in our opinion, there is no merit in the appeal, we have not called upon the respondents' counsel to address U9 in reply. 4. The first point urged before us is that the order of dismissal was passed in contravention of the requirements of Section 6-E (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Under the said provision of law, the dismissal of a workman concerned in an industrial dispute may be made by the employer for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, but if such dismissal is made during the pendency of the proceedings relating to that dispute, then an application has to be made by the employer to the authority before which the proceedings are pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. In this case admittedly no such application was made by the employer. The application would, however, have been necessary only if the appellant was concerned with any dispute which was pending at the time his dismissal took place. We find that a dispute was, no doubt, pending, but, as has been held by the learned single Judge, the appellant could not be regarded as a workman concerned in that dispute. Annexure 9 to the writ petition shows that Kanpur Iron and Steel Employees Union had raised an industrial dispute as against respondent No. 3 in regard to certain matters. Annexure 9 to the writ petition shows that Kanpur Iron and Steel Employees Union had raised an industrial dispute as against respondent No. 3 in regard to certain matters. It was, no doubt, stated in the earlier part of the Statement of the case that the present respondent No. 3 was not abiding by any law such as Factory Act, Employees' State Insurance Act and Provident Funds Act and was depriving the workmen from benefits provided under those Acts and the wages of workmen were also low, but ultimately when it came to specifying the reliefs claimed, it was only stated that four categories of workmen were not being paid adequate wages and their wages needed to be revised and fixed in a certain manner. The prayer was for constituting a Conciliation Board "for settlement of the dispute specified herein above to enable the workmen to the following relief". It has been found by the learned single Judge, and the finding has not been disputed before us, that it is nowhere borne out that the appellant belonged to any of the four classes of workmen in respect of whom relief was claimed. In our opinion it is immaterial that certain general allegations were made in the beginning by the applicant. As to what was the dispute has to be judged with reference to the relief claimed and the same was limited to raising: the wages of the four categories of workmen. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has cited a decision of the Supreme Court, M/s. New India Motors (P.) Ltd., New Delhi v. K.T. Morris, A.I.R. 1960 SC 875 to support his argument that the appellant was also a person concerned in the dispute. The said decision, however, interprets Sections 33 and 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central) which deal with the question as to who will be bound by the award and as to what meaning the expression "workmen concerned in such dispute" would carry. It was laid down therein that the expression would include all workmen on whose behalf the dispute has been raised and also those who would be bound by the award which may be made in the said dispute. This would include not only workmen directly or. actually concerned in the dispute but all workmen of the categories who would come in future as well. This would include not only workmen directly or. actually concerned in the dispute but all workmen of the categories who would come in future as well. This decision, it would appear, is not relevant to the matter for decision before us. The award will, no doubt, bind all the four categories of workers who are specified in the application annexure 9 and workers who may join even later on within those categories. There is nothing in this decision to show that a decision in respect of a particular category of workmen would bind all workmen of the concern though they do not belong to that category. We, therefore, find no breach of the provisions of Section 6-E (2) of the U. P. Industrial' Disputes Act in the dismissal of the appellant. 6. The next contention of the appellant is that Sri R.S. Kela was not competent to be appointed an Enquiry Officer. Reliance is placed on the Standing Order? for Workmen of respondent No. 3. Standing Order No. 6 provides the procedure for enquiring into complaints and clause (a) thereof states: "Any complaint arising out of his employment, shall be submitted by a workman, concerned to the Manager or Management or such other officer or officers as may be appointed in this behalf and the Manager or such officer shall personally investigate the complaint at the earliest practicable time in the presence of the complainant provided that complaints relating to: (i) Assault or abuse by any person holding a supervisory position; (ii) Refusal of an application for urgent leave, shall be enquired into without delay." Clause (b) of Standing Order No. 6 provides that if the enquiry has been carried out by an officer other than the Manager the record shall be sent to the Manager for recording his order. 7. Before the learned single Judge the argument on behalf of the appellant appears to have been that Standing Order No. 6 was not applicable to the appellant's case as the complaint did not arise out of his employment. There was, however, no other provision in the Standing Orders to deal with the procedure for enquiring into the complaints relating to misconduct. In the absence of any specific provision the learned single Judge held that an officer could be appointed to enquire into the complaint, provided that the finding was considered by the management and its opinion arrived at. There was, however, no other provision in the Standing Orders to deal with the procedure for enquiring into the complaints relating to misconduct. In the absence of any specific provision the learned single Judge held that an officer could be appointed to enquire into the complaint, provided that the finding was considered by the management and its opinion arrived at. Before us it has been urged that the only provision by which the matter can be governed is that in Standing Order No. 24 under which, it is contended, the Manager or Management has to adjudge any workman whether he is related to misconduct and the workman can be dismissed summarily if he is found guilty. We find that Standing Order No. 24 provides for penalties for misconduct and does not lay down any procedure. What clause (a) thereof provides is that "any workman who is adjudged by the Manager or Management on examination of the man if present, and on the facts to be guilty of misconduct is liable to be summarily dismissed without notice or compensation in lieu of notice, or alternatively to be suspended for a period not exceeding four days". This clause relates to the penalty of dismissal or suspension and shows that this punishment can be awarded if a workman is adjudged relating to misconduct by the manager or management. There is nothing therein to rule out the work of enquiring into a complaint of misconduct being carried out by an officer other than the manager or the management. Of course, the manager or the management must adjudge a workman guilty of misconduct before the penalty can be imposed. The position, therefore, remains that outside the provisions of Standing Order No. 6 there is no provision laying down any separate procedure for enquiring into misconduct. If Standing Order No. 6 does not apply, then there can be no bar to the appointment of an officer to make the enquiry which is a recognised practice and no fault can be found with the appointment of Sri Kela, tor conducting the enquiry into the complaint. In case Standing Order No. 6 applies, which in our opinion does apply, even then we find that there was no breach of the provisions of that Standing Order. In case Standing Order No. 6 applies, which in our opinion does apply, even then we find that there was no breach of the provisions of that Standing Order. The expression "any complaint arising out of his employment" does not necessarily mean a complaint relating to any terms of employment, but it as well means a complaint against a workman in his capacity as such. In the instant case the appellant was charged with having seriously beaten Dayal within the factory premises and within the working hours and in connection with certain work which Dayal performed in the course of his employment. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that under clause (a) of the Standing Order No. 6 an enquiry could be made only by the manager or management or such other (Officer or officers as may be appointed for the purpose of receiving complaints and in this case the complaint was not received by Sri Kela and there is also nothing to show that Sri Kela had been appointed as an officer for receiving the complaints. Taking into consideration the strict literal meaning of the wordings of clause (a) of Standing Order No. 6 (reproduced earlier), there may appear to be some force in the .argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, but the consequences of giving that meaning would be absurd. If a person receiving the complaint could alone investigate into the complaint and that too personally, then it would follow that if such a person happened to die or to be dismissed or to become incapable of investigating into the complaint, then the investigation into the complaint could not be made at all. There also appears to be no sanctity about the person receiving the complaint alone making an enquiry. The clause contemplates that any number of officers could be appointed for the purpose of receiving complaints and there is no qualification laid down about the officers who could be appointed for the purpose. The broad idea appearing from the clause is that while the manager or the management could, of course, receive complaints, they could also appoint any officer or any number of officers to receive complaints. The broad idea appearing from the clause is that while the manager or the management could, of course, receive complaints, they could also appoint any officer or any number of officers to receive complaints. If any such officer could investigate into the complaint, any officer could as well be appointed for the purpose of investigating the complaint without deviating from the idea underlying the provisions of the clause. The fact that Sri Kela was appointed to investigate the complaint though he had not been appointed as an officer for receiving complaints would, therefore, be immaterial. It does not offend against any idea underlying the provisions of clause (a). It will also appear that under clause (a) a complaint can be given to the management. Management has been defined in clause (c) of Standing Order No. 2 to mean "the Factory or Industrial Establishment, Director or Directors, Managing Agent or Agents, Proprietor or Proprietors, Secretary or Secretaries, or such other nominee or nominees as may be authorised in this behalf and notified by a notice pasted on the Factory's Notice Board". Since "management" means factory or industrial establishment as well, a complaint if to be submitted to the management, could be submitted to the office of the factory or industrial establishment neither of these being living human beings. If the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, it would mean that the factory or the industrial establishment would have to personally investigate the complaint, which is an impossibility. We, therefore, hold that Sri Kela could be appointed to investigate the complaint even under Standing Order No. 6. 8. It has been urged that Sri Kela was only a Legal Advisor of respondent No. 3 and not an officer. In view of the unrebutted assertion in the counter affidavit that he was Labour Officer of respondent No. 3, that position of Sri Kela has to be accepted and he was, therefore, an officer of respondent No. 3. 9. It has also been pointed out that Dayal complainant had stated in his complaint that Sri Kela be appointed to investigate the complaint and in that situation Sri Kela should not have been appointed as the officer to investigate the complaint. There is, however, no allegation that Sri Kela was friendly to Dayal or was favourably inclined towards him or even that he was prejudiced against the appellant. There is, however, no allegation that Sri Kela was friendly to Dayal or was favourably inclined towards him or even that he was prejudiced against the appellant. So the mere request of Dayal for Sri Kela being appointed to investigate the complaint did not disqualify Sri Kela from being appointed. 10. We thus find the second ground too to have no merit. 11. The third point raised on the appellant's side is that the enquiry was made in violation of the principles of natural justice and accordingly all that followed the result of such enquiry should be struck down. It has been urged that the appellant requested for being represented at the enquiry by Sri Umesh Chandra Srivastava Advocate but on objection from the side of the management the request was disallowed. It is said that the appellant was an illiterate workman and by disallowing this request he was prejudiced. In our opinion, no circumstances have been brought out to make out the necessity of the appellant being represented by a lawyer. It was a simple enquiry into a question of fact. In this connection reliance had been placed before the learned single Judge on the side of respondent No. 3 to a decision of the Supreme Court in N. Kalindi v. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1960 SC 914. It has been laid down in that case by the Supreme Court that when the general practice adopted by domestic tribunals is that the person accused conducts his own case, it is not possible to accept an argument that natural justice demands that in the case of enquiries into a charge-sheet of misconduct against a workman he should be represented by a member of his Union. In that particular case it was held that a workman again%t whom an enquiry was held by the management had, in the absence of any specific provision, no right to be represented at such enquiry by a representative of his Union. It was, no doubt, observed that the employer in his discretion could allow his employee to avail himself of such assistance. In the instance case the representation was sought for through a lawyer which was not provided for by the Standing Orders and which is against the general practice. 12. It was, no doubt, observed that the employer in his discretion could allow his employee to avail himself of such assistance. In the instance case the representation was sought for through a lawyer which was not provided for by the Standing Orders and which is against the general practice. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant has, on the other hand, cited the decision of the - Supreme Court in The Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen, A.I.R. 1965 SC 1392 in support of his argument that principles of natural justice required that the appellant should have been allowed to be represented by a person of his choice. But all that the said decision of the Supreme Court lays down is that in holding domestic enquiries reasonable opportunity should be given to the delinquent employees to meet the charge framed against them and it is desirable that at such an enquiry the employees should be given liberty to represent their case by persons of their choice if there is no standing order against such a course being adopted and if there is nothing otherwise objectionable in the said request. It is noteworthy that what was observed was that it was desirable and it was not said that it was incumbent upon the employer to allow representation through persons of the choice of the workman. In the instant case we are satisfied, as already observed, that the facts of the case did not necessitate representation by a lawyer and no' prejudice has been caused to the appellant by the refusal to be represented by a particular lawyer. On the appellants side we have been referred also to an English case, Pett v. Greyhound. Racing Association, Ltd., (1968) 2 All ER 545, but in the face of the decisions of the Supreme Court this English case can be no authority for laying down any different proposition of law on the subject. 13. It has been urged that the representative of the management was heard by the Enquiry Officer but the request of the appellant for being represented through an Advocate was rejected on the objection of the representative of the management. 13. It has been urged that the representative of the management was heard by the Enquiry Officer but the request of the appellant for being represented through an Advocate was rejected on the objection of the representative of the management. It is contended that this shows that the management, which had ultimately to adjudge the guilt and to decide about the punishment, partook into the enquiry as a party act in this way the principles of natural justice were violated. The very nature of such enquiries necessitate the representation of the management before the Enquiry Officer. It was not a hearing before a court with the complainant and the person complained against being the two parties to the enquiry. Here the complaint had been made to the management who had to take action upon it after satisfying themselves about the truth of the complaint. The charge-sheet had been given by the management and it was their business to produce the persons who had been disclosed by the complainant to have witnessed the occurrence. Moreover, the management was also interested in seeing that the enquiry was properly conducted and any assistance needed from it was available to the Enquiry Officer in conducting the enquiry properly. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended that the appellant had been called upon to produce his witnesses immediately. While this allegation of fact itself does not appear to be clearly borne out by any thing on the record, we may point out that no such plea was taken before the Labour Court and a point not taken before the Labour Court though it could have been taken there cannot be urged before us in challenging the award and we shall not entertain any such new point in support of the appellant's case for quashing the award. 15. It was lastly pointed out in connection with the ground under consideration that the very person who passed orders along with another holding the charge to be proved and dismissing the appellant had appeared as a witness before the Enquiry Officer. The order of dismissal (annexure 5) was passed by the Manager Ram Manohar but was also signed by Deokinandan who was one of the proprietors. This Deokinandan had signed the charge-sheet also. He had appeared as a witness before the Enquiry Officer. A perusal of his statement contained in Annexure 'A' to the counter affidavit. The order of dismissal (annexure 5) was passed by the Manager Ram Manohar but was also signed by Deokinandan who was one of the proprietors. This Deokinandan had signed the charge-sheet also. He had appeared as a witness before the Enquiry Officer. A perusal of his statement contained in Annexure 'A' to the counter affidavit. however, shows that he was examined not as a witness relating to the incident but simply to testify that he was not displeased with the appellant Udham Singh. When an allegation had been made against Deokinandan in the appellant's reply to the charge-sheet that he (the person giving the charge-sheet) had manufactured the case in order to be able to dispense with the services of the appellant, Deokinandan could properly have come to refute that part of the allegation under the reply. It is, therefore, immaterial that he came as a witness and later joined in the passing of the order of dismissal. The third ground, therefore, also fails. 16. Yet another point urged on the appellant's side and calling for consideration is that there was no misconduct proved and,, therefore, no punishment could have been awarded. As to what acts or omissions would constitute misconduct are specified at length in Standing Order No. 23. Clause (i) of that Order is relevant and under it drunkenness, fighting, riotous or disorderly behaviour or conduct likely to cause a breach of the peace or conduct endangering the life or safety' of any other person or any act subversive of discipline and efficiency within the Factory premises would also constitute misconduct. In the instant case, the charge on being established would make out misconduct by reason of the conduct of the appellant amounting to disorderly behaviour and an act subversive of discipline. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, contends that in Standing Order No. 24 dealing with penalty for misconduct it has been laid down in clause (d) thereof that in awarding any punishment under the Standing Orders the management shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record, if any, of the workman and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist. It is, therefore, argued that because there has been no compliance with the requirements of clause (d), no misconduct was made out. This argument has no basis. It is, therefore, argued that because there has been no compliance with the requirements of clause (d), no misconduct was made out. This argument has no basis. What could be urged was that in awarding the punishment for misconduct the requirements of clause (d) have not been followed. This point was not raised before the Labour Court. It was, no doubt, raised before the learned single Judge. The contention was repelled by the learned single Judge with the observation that having regard to the facts of the case as found by the punishing authority, it appeared that there was hardly any occasion to take into consideration the previous record because it would not be any extenuating circumstance and whether the act was grave enough or not was essentially a question of fact within the competence of the punishing authority and the Labour Court and it could not be reassessed by this Court. We agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge in the matter. 17. In the result, the special appeal is dismissed with costs.