D. A. DESAI, J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner No. 1 is a partnership firm and its partners petitioner 2 to 5 challenge in this petition the order of the Central Government dated November 7 1967 under sec. 19a of the Employees Provident Funds Act 1952 hereinafter referred to as the Act and the notices issued in pursuance to that decision requiring the petitioners to implement the provisions of the Act and the scheme in regard to their factory for manufacturing ophthalmic lenses. From April 1 1962 the petitioners factory began to employ the requisite number of 20 or more employees. Therefore the authorities imitated petitioner that they were bound to implement the Act and the scheme with effect from April 1 1962 This intimation was given to the petitioners on December 31 1965 There was some correspondence and ultimately the petitioners made an application to the Central Government under sec. 19a of the Act to determine this doubt as to whether the Act and the scheme applied to the petitioners factory. The Central Government considered the representations made by the petitioners and even further views expressed by the petitioners and finally gave the impugned decision on November 7 1967 holding that the petitioners had by means of the process of grinding surfacing and glazing of glass manufactured ophthalmic lenses in their factory. The petitioners industry was therefore covered by the Act. As the authorities began to enforce the Act and for that purpose served the impugned notice the petitioners have filed this petition challenging the impugned decision and the action of the authority against the petitioners factory. ( 2 ) MR. Abichandani at the hearing raised two points in the petition:- (1) That sec. 19a of the Act was ultra vires Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution as it amounted to giving arbitrary power to the Central Government by making excessive delegation without any guide lines and by imposing unreasonable restriction on the petitioners fundamental rights carry on their business; (2) That the scheduled industry was manufacture of glass as the basic product glass and manufactured ophthalmic lenses which was commercially a different substance from ordinary glass could never be covered within the scope of the scheduled entry glass. ( 3 ) SEC. ( 3 ) SEC. 19a runs as under:- if any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act and in particular if any doubt arises as to (i) Whether any establishment which is a factory is engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I; xx xx xx xx xx xx the Central Government may be order make such provision or give such direction not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for the removal of the doubt or difficulty; and the order of the Central Government in such cases shall be-final. Sec. 19a therefore enables the Central Government to make a quasi-judicial adjudication on the relevant statutory issues mentioned in sec. 19a one of which is whether the establishment which is a factory is engaged in any industry in Schedule J. Even though sec. 19a does not lay down the procedure for such a quasi-judicial adjudication this statutory power must be exercised in accordance with the principle of natural justice. The section provides for doubts being resolved because of which there might be difficulties in the expeditious implementation of the Act. The particular doubt which can be resolved by the Central Government is on certain important questions as to whether the factory establishment is a scheduled industry; or whether the particular establishment is an establishment falling within those establishments to which the Act applies because of the notification under sec. 1 (3) (b); or as to the number of persons employed or the number of years which have elapsed from the date of the set up of establishment or whether the quantum of benefits have been reduced by the employer. After the decision in P. L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1507 it is well settled that the duty to act judicially arises not only where a third party is to decide lis between the two contesting parties but even if there is on lis inter-partes and the contest is between the party proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. Even though statute may be silent in such latter type of cases as to whether the authority is to act judicially or not inference for this purpose has to be drawn by applying five factors; (1) express provision of the statute read along with the nature of the rights affected (2) manner of disposal of property (3) objective criterion if any to be adopted (4) effect of the decision on the person affected (5) other indicia afforded by the statute. Applying these tests it is obvious from the very nature of this power vested in the Central Government to make such a quasi-judicial determination which would have such a wide impact on the rights of the concerned subject and which is to be exercised according to the objective norms which have to be applied for arriving at this decision that the manner of the disposal of such an adjudication having such wide impact on the rights of the affected parties must be in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Therefore the duty to act judicially can be inferred in this case from the very nature of the power vested in the Central Government. It is equally well settled after the decision in Travancore Rayons case in 1969 (3) S. C. C. 869 that such quasi-judicial bodies must always give reasons for their orders and they must pars speaking orders. Writ jurisdiction or the power of superintendence under Articles 226 or 227 respectively or even of the appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution could be effectively exercised only if the authorities pass speaking orders when they are invested with the power of making such quasi-judicial decisions which are made final under the Act. The Section also lays down the guide-lines because the power of the Central Government to issue directions under sec. 19a is restricted by providing that such a direction shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. Therefore the statute lays down its own perspective and the authority which has to decide this question so that the difficulty can be surmounted by resolving the doubt has to set within the scope of this perspective and the direction which the authority gives must be also consistent with the provisions of the Act. Therefore the statute lays down its own perspective and the authority which has to decide this question so that the difficulty can be surmounted by resolving the doubt has to set within the scope of this perspective and the direction which the authority gives must be also consistent with the provisions of the Act. The Central Government is not invested with any arbitrary or uncanalised power without any guidelines but with a quasi-judicial power of making adjudication on the various statutory issues on which there is doubt or in regard to which difficulties are experienced and it has to act within the four corners of the Act. It has also the duty to act judicially in the exercise of this quasi-judicial function in accordance with the principles of natural justice and it must pass speaking orders with reasons. Therefore such a power could never be said to violate the guarantee of just and equal treatment under Art. 14. It is true that the orders of the Central Government are given a finality. But such finality would be to those directions or orders which are passed as per the perspective laid down in sec. 19a and which are within the four corners of the Act. There would be no finality in case of ultra vires orders which could not only be challenged in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or under Art. 227 by way of superintendence or even by an appeal under Art. 136 but also before a Civil Court if the order plainly contravenes the Act. In such a case the order is no order at all but only a purported determination which would not have any finality under the Act. Therefore both as regards the manner of disposal and the objective criterions which have to be followed the order would be completely reviewable by the Court. It is the Central Government to whom it is left by the Legislature to determine how this Act shall be implemented from time to time in the various scheduled industries in the country. The power is delegated to the Central Government to extend the act by amending the schedule of industries and by notifying from time to time the class of establishments under sec. 1 (3) of the Act. The power is delegated to the Central Government to extend the act by amending the schedule of industries and by notifying from time to time the class of establishments under sec. 1 (3) of the Act. That is why when there is difficulty arising in giving effect to the provisions of the Act or a doubt arises as specified in all the five statutory issues the same Central Government is invested with the powers to give its quasi-judicial decision on these matters so that the Act may be implemented without the least delay. The Central Government should have the best materials in its possession and would have because of its accumulated experience the special fitness for decision in these matters. In any event the Central Government is made judge in these matters as it would help speedy implementation of the Act because recourse to Courts would have for a number of years made this statute a dead letter because of the pending litigation. Such a measure of special justice requires immediate implementation. Therefore if the Central Government is made the sole judge in the matter rather then the ordinary Courts the enactment could never be said to violate the principle of rationality. In Vellukunnel v. Reserve Bank of India A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 1371 at page 1388 Their Lordships pointed out that the exclusion of Courts is not lightly to be inferred nor lightly to be conceded. The reasonableness of such a law under which the Legislature leaves the determination of an issue to an expert executive like the Reserve Bank rather than to the ordinary Courts has to be judged by regard to the total circumstances. The legislature has to ask itself a question as to who would be the appropriate authority and to determine as to whether the decision of the issue should be left with the highest executive the Central Government or with the ordinary Courts. The Courts might be wholly unsuitable looking to the total circumstances of the case or because of the urgency of the circumstances demanding expeditious disposal and because of the consequent delay in the ordinary Courts. The Courts might be wholly unsuitable looking to the total circumstances of the case or because of the urgency of the circumstances demanding expeditious disposal and because of the consequent delay in the ordinary Courts. Therefore in such a measure of social justice where the disputes have to be immediately resolved so that the statute does not remain a dead letter and the benefits of this benevolent measure reach the employees concerned as expeditiously as possible the Legislature could well leave this function to the Central Government to decide such point of doubt or difficulty so that the Act could be speedily implemented. As we have already pointed out the power is to be exercised as per the various restrictions like any other quasi-judicial power and within the four corners of the Act and therefore it could never be said that such a quasi-judicial power is arbitrary or unreasonable power without any guidelines. Therefore the attack under Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) must fail. ( 4 ) MR. Abichandani however vehemently relied upon the decision in Jalan Trading Co. v Mill Mazdoor Sabha A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 691. At page 703 Their Lordships had struck down sec. 37 of the Payment of Bonus Act 1965 on the ground that it amounted to delegation of the essential legislative function itself to the Central Government. Sec. 37 of the said Act enabled the Central Government to pass orders for removal of doubts or difficulties in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. It should be noted that the language of the Bonus Act was totally different. It enabled the Central Government to pass any order which was not inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. Nobody could ever dispute that the purpose of the Act was to give bonus to the employees and relying on such wide power under sec. 37 the Central Government could well remain within the scope of that section by passing any order even contrary to or in modification of the terms of the Act so long as it was passing the order as regards the payment of the bonus which was the purpose of the Act. 37 the Central Government could well remain within the scope of that section by passing any order even contrary to or in modification of the terms of the Act so long as it was passing the order as regards the payment of the bonus which was the purpose of the Act. Their Lordships held that such a power to remove doubt or difficulties by order altering the provisions of the Act would in substance amount to exercise of legislative authority which could not be delegated to an executive authority. Besides sec. 37 (2) of that Act which purported to make an order of the Central Government in such cases final accentuated the vice in sec. . 37 (1) since by enacting that provision the Government was made the sole judge where difficulty or doubt had arisen in giving effect to the provisions of the Act whether it was necessary or expedient to remove the doubt or difficulty and whether the provisions enacted was not inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. In the present case sec. 19a is not in pari materia the same terms. There is no delegation of the legislative power and the legislature has not abdicated its function. In the present case it has only delegated ordinary quasi-judicial function to the Central Government instead of leaving it to ordinary Courts. Besides the directions are under sec. 19a required not to be inconsistent with the Act and therefore the language is not so wide as in sec. 37 (1) of the Payment of Bonus Act so that to serve the purpose of the Act any direction may be made even in plain violation or modification of the Act. That is why the decision in Jalan Trading Companys case was distinguished by Their Lordships in Kalahari Devi v. I. T. Commissioner W. B. A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 162 where the vires of sec. 298 of the Income-tax Act 1961 was upheld. That is why the decision in Jalan Trading Companys case was distinguished by Their Lordships in Kalahari Devi v. I. T. Commissioner W. B. A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 162 where the vires of sec. 298 of the Income-tax Act 1961 was upheld. Sec. 298 (1) also provided that if any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of the Act the Central Government may by general or special order do anything not inconsistent with such provision which appears to be necessary or expedient for the purposes of removing difficulty - Their Lordships held that when such a power was left to the executive to determine if the difficulty of the nature indicated in the section had arisen and then to make such order or to give such directions as appear to be necessary to remove the difficulty would not make the section ultra vires because it was not unconstitutional for the legislature to leave it to the executive to determine the details relating to the working of the taxation laws. Their Lordships in terms held that sec. 37 of the Payment of Bonus Act was different and it was not a taxing law - Therefore the first contention raised by Mr. Abichandani must fail that this was delegation of the essential legislative power as it is really a delegation of only the normal quasi-judicial function. ( 5 ) MR. Abichandani in this connection vehemently relied upon Bharat Board Mills Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner A. I. R. 1957 Cal. 702 where the learned Single Judge (Bose J.) struck down sec. 19a on the ground that the Government was not required to disclose its reasons for making the order and the matter was left to the subjective satisfaction of the Government and there were no means for checking whether the order was arbitrary or mala fide or not and because recourse to civil Court by the aggrieved party was barred by making the order conclusive unless it can be established that the Government acted outside the four corners of the statute and in excess of its jurisdiction. The learned Judge also observed that there was no specific procedure laid down for making a determination and so the Government may or may not give any opportunity of hearing before making the order and the subject was thus left at the sole mercy of the executive. The learned Judge also observed that there was no specific procedure laid down for making a determination and so the Government may or may not give any opportunity of hearing before making the order and the subject was thus left at the sole mercy of the executive. In these circumstances the learned Judge held that sec. 19a lacked the element of reasonableness and abridged fundamental rights under Article 19 (1) (g ). With great respect we differ as the learned Judge has not approached the question from the settled principles which we have already discussed. We however completely agree with the reasoning of V. S. Deshpande J. in Wire Netting Stores v. Regional Provident Funds Commissioner A. I. R. 1970 Delhi 143 where he upheld the vires of sec. 19a. Therefore the first ground urged by Mr. Abichandani must fail as the vires of sec. 19a could not be challenged on the ground that it violates Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g ). ( 6 ) AS regards the second ground there is no dispute as to the material facts even in the application under sec. 19a which was made by the petitioners on September 16 1966 the petitioners have mentioned that in their factory they were manufacturing ophthalmic lenses from the glass purchased by them from the market by the process of grinding surfacing and grazing the same. Therefore there is no substance in the contention of Mr. Abichandani that the petitioners were not processing glass purchased from the market. His only contention is that the entry No. 8 glass in the scheduled industry must be interpreted narrowly by confining it only to the basic product glass. This contention of Mr. Abichandani is totally against the settled principles of construction of such benevolent legislation where an entry capable of two constructions must be interpreted widely so as to carry out the benevolent object of the enactment in question. Schedule 1 opens out with the words Any industry engaged in the manufacture of any of the following namely item 8. Glass xxx. Under sec 1 (3) (a) the Act applies to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I and in which twenty or more persons are employed. Therefore if the factory is engaged in the scheduled industry at item No. 8 viz. Glass xxx. Under sec 1 (3) (a) the Act applies to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I and in which twenty or more persons are employed. Therefore if the factory is engaged in the scheduled industry at item No. 8 viz. in the manufacture of glass the Act would apply from the date when the number of persons employed becomes 20 or more. The expression manufacture or manufacturing process is defined in sec. 2 (ia) as meaning any process for making altering repairing breaking up demolishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use sale transport delivery or disposal. Therefore the expression manufacture could cover even treatment or adaptation of an article or a substance with a view to its use or sale. In the present case the particular treatment or processing work which is done on ordinary glass converts it by that manufacture into ophthalmic lenses by surfacing grinding and glazing. These processes are to be on the basic substance glass with a view to convert it into a saleable article ophthalmic lenses. Therefore even though ordinary glass by process of manufacture or treatment so gets converted into marketable commodity manufactured glass known as ophthalmic lenses these manufactured glasses would still remain glass and would not be converted into any substance different from glass itself. What is material in the operative part of the Schedule 1 is the character of the industrial activity in which the factory is engaged which is the manufacture of glass. Therefore the schedule industry would not be one which is engaged in the mere production of the ordinary glass but the industry which is engaged in all sorts of manufacture of glass by different processes of adaptation and treatment so long as the ultimate process remains manufactured glass and does not change its essential character. The contention of Mr. Abichandani would substitute the expression any industry engaged in the production of glass instead of the relevant expression used by the legislature i. e. any industry engaged in the manufacture of glass. The legislature therefore clearly intended not only to cover within the scope of the scheduled industry industrial activity consisting of the production of glass itself but any industrial activity which would come within the scope of the manufacture of glass. The legislature therefore clearly intended not only to cover within the scope of the scheduled industry industrial activity consisting of the production of glass itself but any industrial activity which would come within the scope of the manufacture of glass. So long as the industry manufactured glass it would remain within the scope of the scheduled industry even though it may have adapted or treated ordinary glass by its manufacturing process. In fact this question is really concluded by the decision in Regional P. F. Commissioner v. Shibu Metal Works A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1076. At page 1080 their Lordships pointed out that if two constructions were reasonably possible the settled rule was to adopt that construction in such a benevolent measure which could achieve its object. Of course it would never justify the straining of the words or putting unnatural or unreasonable meaning or the words just for the purpose of introducing a broader construction. At page 1080 their Lordships pointed out that the correct question which was to be passed in the context of Schedule I was the character of the industrial activity carried on by the factory and the question was not so much as to what was the produce finally produced. It was the nature of the industrial activity in question which determined the relevant question and one must always hark back to this relevant consideration that the entries in the schedule were intended to describe the industry as falling within the scope of the Act and so what was relevant was whether the said industry was engaged in the manufacture of the various products which were mentioned in the various items. Their Lordships also held at page 1081 that the construction suggested that the general engineering products would in the commercial sense simply mean machines or other parts was too narrow a construction for determining the content of that entry. Similarly their Lordships held that the other construction that the process must be one of electrical mechanical or general engineering so that the product would be within the scheduled industry of electrical mechanical or general engineering product was too wide a construction because it treated the process of production as the crux of the entry. Similarly their Lordships held that the other construction that the process must be one of electrical mechanical or general engineering so that the product would be within the scheduled industry of electrical mechanical or general engineering product was too wide a construction because it treated the process of production as the crux of the entry. Their Lordships held that the correct interpretation of the content of the entry was that it was not the process of production which was important in construing the entry but it was the character of the industrial activity which should clinch the issue. Therefore their Lordships held that the manufacture of brass utensils should be reasonably regarded as the activity the object of which is the manufacture of general engineering products. Applying the aforesaid ratio to the facts of the case there can be no doubt that if the narrow construction of looking at the product alone is not to be accepted we cannot go by the test canvassed for by Mr. Abichandani that in commercial world the ophthalmic lenses are regarded as a different marketable commodity than the ordinary glass. What we are concerned with is not the product but the essential character of this industrial activity of manufacture of this factory which is only the manufacture of glass and nothing else. The industrial activity is not the production of glass but the manufacture of glass which is made the scheduled industry. ( 7 ) MR. Abichandani next argued that in various items like rubber plastics milk etc. rubber products plastic products and milk products were specifically added by the legislature. Therefore if glass products were intended to be covered by the scheduled industry the delegate of the legislature would have added even the glass product. This argument of Mr. Abichandani is thoroughly misconceived. When the rubber products plastic products and milk products are included in the scope of the scheduled industry the scope of the entry would be much enlarged. It would not remain at the stage of manufacturing simply rubber or plastic or milk but even manufacturing rubber products plastic products or milk products. The term product may not only include something manufactured from the original substance but even a wider category of things which are manufactured by using the basic substance in conjunction with other substances. It would not remain at the stage of manufacturing simply rubber or plastic or milk but even manufacturing rubber products plastic products or milk products. The term product may not only include something manufactured from the original substance but even a wider category of things which are manufactured by using the basic substance in conjunction with other substances. Rubber products and plastic products would therefore have a much wider coverage and that is why the delegate of the legislature had to widen the scope of that entry. That however would not justify giving a narrow construction so as to carve out something even from the originally manufactured substance and by restricting the original scheduled entry to one producing the basic substance itself. If glass product was included in the scope of the scheduled industry the coverage of this industry would be much wider. Mr. Abichandani on the other hand seeks to narrow down the scope of the scheduled industry of manufactured glass to only simply produced ordinary glass which had not undergone any further process of the manufacture. Such a construction was in terms repelled by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision and as per the settled legal position it could never be accepted. Mr. Abichandani in this connection vehemently relied upon the decision of Tulzapurkar J. in Kamlakar v. Central Board of Trustees A. I. R. 1967 Bombay 259 where the learned Judge held that paper cones and paper tubes industry would not come within the scheduled industry of paper manufacture. With great respect to the learned Judge he has not properly discussed the-ratio in Shibu Metal Works where the narrow construction of these entries was not upheld. The learned Judge did not pose the right question as what was material was not the product or process but the essential nature of the industrial activity. Therefore even if to make paper saleable as a commercial commodity it was turned into paper tubes or paper cones the manufacture of items of paper tubes would still be the industrial activity of the manufacture of paper alone. Therefore even if to make paper saleable as a commercial commodity it was turned into paper tubes or paper cones the manufacture of items of paper tubes would still be the industrial activity of the manufacture of paper alone. It is not the basic material paper whose production alone would only fall within the scope of the scheduled industry but even all other industrial activities for the manufacture of paper by putting further processes on the original paper so as to treat it or adapt it by converting it into any other article with a view to sale transport use delivery etc. It is only if the ultimate product ceased to be manufactured paper and got converted into something else that such a paper product would require an express inclusion for falling within the scope of the scheduled industry. With great respect we differ from the aforesaid reasoning of the learned Single Judge of the Maharashtra High Court. The decision could not help Mr. Abichandani. ( 8 ) IN that view of the matter the decision of the Central Government is really in accordance with the settled principles by interpreting this entry in a reasonable way so as to carry out the benevolent object of this entry. Therefore no ground whatever has been made out which would justify any interference with the impugned decision of the Central Government either on the ground of sec. 19a brining ultra vires or on the ground that this decision is perverse and so one which could not have been arrived at by any reasonable person. This petition therefore fails and the rule is discharged with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. .