S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Revision Application arises out of an order made by the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad extending time under sec. 28 of the Arbitration Act 1940 for the arbitrator to make an award. The impugned order was made by the learned Trial Judge ex parte upon the application made in that behalf by the arbitrator. ( 2 ) IT is contended by Mr. M. C. Shah that the scheme of sec. 28 of the Arbitration Act 1940 is that that the Court has the jurisdiction and power to make an ex parte order without hearing the parties and without issuing notice to them of the application made by the arbitrator under sec. 28. For the reasons which follow I am unable to accede to that contention raised by Mr. M. C. Shah. ( 3 ) IT is necessary to refer to sec. 28 of the Arbitration Act in order to examine the soundness of the contention raised by Mr. M. C. Shah. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 28 provides as follows:-THE Court may if it thinks fit whether the time for making the award has expired or not and whether the award has been made or not enlarge from time to time the time for making the award. Sub-sec. (2) provides as follows:- any provision in an arbitration agreement whereby the arbitrators or umpire may except with the consent of all the parties to the agreement enlarge the time for making the award shall be void and of no effect. Turning to sub-sec. (2) it is clear that the arbitrators or umpire have no jurisdiction to make orders extending time for them for making awards. Firstly if there is no provision in the arbitration agreement for extension of time cannot be extended by the arbitrators in any case. If however there is an express provision in the arbitration agreement whereby the arbitrators or umpire are empowered to enlarge time for making the award that provision in the arbitration agreement is void and of no affect unless the parties to the agreement consent to the enlargement of time. Sub-sec. (2) therefore in my opinion in terms provides that express provision in the arbitration agreement and the consent of all parties to the agreement are necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the arbitrators or umpire to enlarge time. Sub-sec. (2) therefore in my opinion in terms provides that express provision in the arbitration agreement and the consent of all parties to the agreement are necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the arbitrators or umpire to enlarge time. It therefore necessarily follows that even though there may be an express provision in the arbitration agreement for enlargement of time the arbitrators or umpire cannot extend time for them to make the award. In such a case the arbitrator has got to resort to sub-sec. (1) and make an appropriate application before the Court upon which jurisdiction has been conferred to enlarge from time to time the time for making the award. Resort to sub-sec. (1) generally will be had by the arbitrator only if parties do not agree to enlargement of time in cases where there is an express provision in the arbitration agreement. The very fact that the parties did not consent outside the Court to enlargement of time pre-supposes some controversy between them in the matter of enlargement of time. If that is so it is necessary that the controversy or the dispute relating to the enlargement of time between the parties must be adjudicated upon by the Court when an application is made under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 28 of the Arbitration Act for the purpose of enlargement of time for making the award. In that view of the matter I am of the opinion that the Court cannot on a mere application made by an arbitrator enlarge time without issuing notice To the parties and without hearing them. In this case the Trial Court extended time on a bare application made by the arbitrator without issuing notice to the parties and without hearing them. In that view of the matter in my opinion the order made by the Trial Court is not in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions of subsec. (1) of sec. 28. ( 4 ) THE order made by the Trial Court therefore is set aside and the original application is remanded to the Trial Court for fresh hearing and decision on merits after issuing notice of hearing to the opponents in the original proceedings. Rule is made absolute. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. .