Sri Yasin Mia, an Advocate by profession, filed a suit on 28th of October, 1957, in the Court of Subordi­nate Judge, Agartala, for possession by partition of a large number of proper­ties mentioned in the schedule attached to the plaint. As many as 26 persons were cited as defendants. A preliminary decree for partition was passed in the suit on 22-6-1960. An appeal lodged against that decree by one of the defend­ants was rejected by this Court on 20th of November, 1967. Thereafter, the trial Court took steps for effecting partition of the various properties by metes and bounds. In the meantime, a large number of applications were made containing various prayers primarily arising out of transfers of certain properties by way of sales and gifts by defendants on the record. In one application moved on 22-5-1970 by a set of the defendants, the revision petitioners herein, the prayer made was that since the plaintiff had taken no active steps to secure partition of the properties for a long time, they should be transposed as plaintiffs to en­able them to pursue the matter with vigour. Before this set of applications could be disposed of, the plaintiff Yasin Mia presented an application on 16-6-1970 requesting the trial Court for per­mission to withdraw from the suit with liberty to institute a new suit on the same cause of action. That prayer of the plaintiff was opposed by some of the defendants, particularly who are now the revision petitioners, but the Court by its order dated 25-6-1970 allowed the same. The petitioners having felt ag­grieved have come up in this Court to assail its validity. 2. This revision petition had to be heard ex parte because the plaintiff-respondent failed to put in appearance despite service. Sub-rule (2) of R. 1 of O. 23 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that where the Court is satisfied:- (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that there are other -sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to in­stitute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to with­draw from such suit or abandon such part of a claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of a claim. Ex facie the trial Court allowed the withdrawal of the suit with liberty to institute another one in terms of Cl. (b) of sub-rule (2). A perusal of the order of the trial Court reveals that the withdrawal was allowed on the follow­ing grounds:- (1) That the decree "is not likely to be executed"} (2) That a number of persons, who had moved miscellaneous applications, had not filed sale deeds and gift deeds "on the strength of which they want to be added as parties to the suit and the genuineness of the said transactions is also challenged on behalf of the defend­ant No. 1"; (3) "It Is also an admitted fact that some of the defendants left for Pakistan for good and it is, therefore, absolutely necessary for the ends of justice that fresh evidence about the right, title and interest of the parties in the suit land is necessary"; (4) That the suit which was filed in the year 1957 A. D. "is being dragged till today and as many as 8 petitions are filed for impleading the applicants as parties to the suit"; and (5) "There are as many as 26 defend­ants in the suit and it is likely that some more applications may be filed taking advantage of the absence of the defend­ants who left for Pakistan for good and it is not known how long it will take to dispose of the case when it is pending for the last 13 years." The question that arises for determina­tion is whether all or any of the grounds on which the withdrawal was permitted fall within the ambit of Cl. (b) of sub-rule (2). It is well settled that the ex­pression "other sufficient grounds" used in that clause has to be construed ejus-dem generis with the expression "formal defect" mentioned in CL (a) of the sub-rule. In some judicial decisions undou­btedly opinion expressed is that the ex­pression should be given a wider mean­ing but in those cases too it has been held that the grounds must be, if not ejusdem generis with "formal defect", at least analogous to it. Indeed the two expressions, "formal defect" and "other sufficient grounds", were not meant by the Legislature, in view of differing texts, to be conterminous in all respects, and the adjective "other" in the second expression positively indicates that the grounds covered by Cl. Indeed the two expressions, "formal defect" and "other sufficient grounds", were not meant by the Legislature, in view of differing texts, to be conterminous in all respects, and the adjective "other" in the second expression positively indicates that the grounds covered by Cl. (b) need not necessarily be of the nature of "formal defect". Nevertheless, it looks plain that the ground adopted to support the prayer for withdrawal must be one not affecting the merits of the case but should be one arising out of some error made in good faith by the plaintiff which can only be effectively set right by a trial de novo. If the defect is such that it can be cured by amendment of the pleadings or by addition of the neces­sary parties, no withdrawal in fairness to the other party to the suit should be allowed, 3. It is in the light of the above principles that the five grounds on the basis of which the withdrawal was per­mitted in the present case have to be examined to determine whether they are sufficient grounds within the meaning of Cl. (b). The first ground stated by the trial Court is clearly not intelligible. I cannot comprehend what "decree" the Court had in mind which it said is not likely to be executed. The petitioners herein had moved an application on 22-5-1970 praying that they be transpos­ed as plaintiffs so that they could take steps for partition of the properties by metes and bounds according to the shares determined by the preliminary decree. Obviously, this set of defendants was out to implement the terms of the pre~ liminary decree and if their prayer had been allowed and a final decree passed they would surely have executed the latter decree. Therefore, the first ground adopted by the trial Court is simply non­existent. 4. If during the pendency of the the suit certain transfers of the pro­perties in dispute had been made and the transferees had applied for being brought on the record, the mere fact that the transfer deeds had not been pro­duced or that an objection had been raised by some party to the suit that these deeds were not genuine would not constitute a sufficient ground for allow­ing the plaintiff to withdraw from the suit with liberty to file another on the same cause of action. The proper course for the Court to follow in such a situa­tion would be to insist on the produc­tion of those deeds and then record evi­dence about the genuineness or other­wise thereof, and thereafter either dis­miss the applications if the deeds are found to be non-genuine, else bring the transferees on the record. The state­ment in the impugned order that the genuineness of the transactions evidenc­ed by the transfer deeds had been chal­lenged on behalf of defendant No. 1 and so there was sufficient ground to per­mit the plaintiff to withdraw from the suit gives the impression that the Court wanted to shirk somewhat arduous work involved in finding out whether the documents were genuine or otherwise. 5. The third ground pressed into service by the trial Court is much too flimsy. If some of the parties to the suit had left for Pakistan for good after the preliminary decree had been made, they could surely be proceeded against ex parte. There was definitely no necesisity of recording any "fresh evidence! about the right, title and interest" of those who had left for Pakistan. All those matters had been dealt with in the! judgment culminating in the preliminary! decree. 6. The fourth ground adopted by the trial Court was that the suit had been pending since 1957 and as many as 8 petitions had been filed for impleading certain persons as parties. Here, I again, it is not possible to agree with the trial Court. The fact that the case) had been pending for a long time is surely not a ground on the basis of which) withdrawal can be allowed, especially when such a prayer is opposed by the other party and a preliminary decree in, the suit had been passed. The eight petitions made by various persons for being brought on the record should and can be dealt with on their merits. Mere volume of work involved in a suit can hardly be a ground for taking recourse to Cl. (b) of sub-rule (2). 7. The last ground mentioned in the order is that there are 26 defendants in the suit and some more out of them may leave for Pakistan in which case the Court could expect additional appli­cations of miscellaneous varieties by persons who may misuse the circum­stance of some defendants having left for Pakistan. (b) of sub-rule (2). 7. The last ground mentioned in the order is that there are 26 defendants in the suit and some more out of them may leave for Pakistan in which case the Court could expect additional appli­cations of miscellaneous varieties by persons who may misuse the circum­stance of some defendants having left for Pakistan. This ground is clearly imaginary and is indicative only of an­xiety on the part of the Court to get rid of an old suit. Sub-rule (2) evident­ly had not been enacted to serve the purpose of drop-scene respecting vexa­tious and inconvenient suits. 8. The above discussion would reveal that none of the grounds adopt­ed by the trial Court for permitting the plaintiff to withdraw from the suit with liberty to bring another on the same cause of action falls within the scope of Cl. (b) of sub-rule (2). 9. The decision in Debi Chand v. Parbhu Lai, AIR 1926 All 582. is autho­rity for the proposition that when once there has been a preliminary decree ordering the taking of accounts, if the plaintiff desires to withdraw his original claim for rendition of accounts but the defendant desires the case to proceed, the proper course is not to allow the plaintiff to withdraw from the suit but to transpose the parties. Another rele­vant consideration arising out of the plain wording of sub-rule (2) is that even if the case is found to fall either under Cl. (a) or Cl. (b) thereof, the Court has the discretion, as indicated by the word "may" used therein, to either allow the prayer for withdrawal or re­ject the same in the background of all the relevant facts and circumstances. The present litigation has been pending for more than 13 years and the parties have expended enough of labour and expense in fighting out firstly the suit in the trial Court and thereafter the appeal in this Court. It would be a real hardship to the defendants if they were left to face another ordeal of protracted litiga­tion. Therefore. apart from the fact that none of the grounds mentioned in the impugned order brings the case within the gamut or sweep of Cl. (b) cf sub-rule (2), it would be really hard to force the parties to another trial of strength just because it is the plaintiff's fancy. 10. Therefore. apart from the fact that none of the grounds mentioned in the impugned order brings the case within the gamut or sweep of Cl. (b) cf sub-rule (2), it would be really hard to force the parties to another trial of strength just because it is the plaintiff's fancy. 10. It is in order to point out that the trial Court adopted some grounds for allowing the prayer for withdrawal which had actually not been adopted by the plaintiff in his applica­tion dated 16-6-1970. All that he had said therein was that the suit had been pending for a long time, that some of the defendants had died while others had transferred their shares in the properties in dispute pendente lite, and that in consequence it would take him con­siderable time to collect the names and addresses "of the co-sharers" and then make them parties. The plaintiff never said that the preliminary decree was in-executable or that there was any dispute about the genuineness of the transfer deeds executed by some of the defend­ants respecting the properties in suit. The Courts in India, it may be emphasis­ed, have no general power of allowing a suit to be withdrawn with liberty of filing another on the same cause of ac­tion apart from the power given to them by sub-rule (2). It follows that the Court cannot allow withdrawal of the suit on a ground or grounds other than those relied upon by the plaintiff. Therefore, the trial Court had clearly overstepped the jurisdiction vesting in it for per­mitting the plaintiff to withdraw from the suit. In AIR 1935 Mad 445 , Seetha-rama Ayyar v. Sama Subba Iyer, the Madras High Court held that an order permitting a partition suit to be with­drawn after the preliminary decree has been passed is open to revision under Section 115 of the Code. This would be specially so if the withdrawal is allow­ed on grounds not pleaded by the plain­tiff or on grounds which do not fall within the purview of sub-rule (2). The case in hand falls in the latter category and as such the impugned order is revisable. 11. In the result, I allow the revi­sion petition and on quashing the trial Court's order dated 25-6-1970 I remand the case to it with the direction that it should proceed with it in accordance with the provisions of law. The case in hand falls in the latter category and as such the impugned order is revisable. 11. In the result, I allow the revi­sion petition and on quashing the trial Court's order dated 25-6-1970 I remand the case to it with the direction that it should proceed with it in accordance with the provisions of law. Since the respondent has not turned up to oppose the revision petition, I make no order as to costs. Revision allowed.