( 1 ) THIS petition is by the fifth respondent in HRC. No. 738 of 1961 on the file of the Court of the Principal First Munsiff, Bangalore. It is directed against an Order made bv the learned Additional District Judge, Bangalore in HRCA. No. 237 of 1964, on 10-1-1967. That appeal had been preferred by the petitioner herein against a decree for eviction made in HRC. No. 738/61 aforementioned. ( 2 ) THE few facts relevant for the disposal of the petition are as follows: the original petition for eviction was preferred by respondents 1 and 2 herein against respondents 3 to 6 and the petitioner, in respect of certain shop premises described in the schedule to the petition. The case of the petioner therein is that the premises were leased to one K. C. Ramiah on a monthly rent of Rs. 150 in his 'personal capacity'. The said K. C. Pamiah died on 26-6-1961. After his death, respondents 1 to 4 who are his legal representatives became the tenants of the premises. With regard to the fifth respondent, it is alleged that he has been made a party "as he claims adversely to the interests of respondents 1 to 4 and is stated to bo in actual possession of the premises since the death of the deceased tenant". The eviction from the premises has also been claimed on the ground of the premises being required for the personal use and occupation of the landladies. It is further the case of the petitioner that the deceased tenant during his life time "permitted respondent 5 to occupy the schedule premises. This was done without the written consent of the petitioners. ( 3 ) FURTHER respondent 5 by the fact of his possession is carrying on a new business in the schedule premises under the name and style of K. L. Venugopal. The old business carried on by the deceased no longer exists in the eye of law and, as a maftter of fact in the schedule premises. By these arts the respondents are liable to be vacated. " In addition to these averments, the case is also based on non-payment of rents. ' With this question we are not concerned in the present case. By these arts the respondents are liable to be vacated. " In addition to these averments, the case is also based on non-payment of rents. ' With this question we are not concerned in the present case. ( 4 ) THE revision petitioner, who was the fifth respondent in the case, pleaded by way of defence that the lease in favour of late K. C. Ramiah was really for and on behalf of the joint family consisting of the said ramiah and the petitioner and others. It is alleged by him that the actual possession of the premises has been with him for the last two decades. He has further denied that respondents 1 to 4 were the tenants, although they are the legal representatives of late K. C. Ramiah. In view of these averments, the petitioner asserts that he was a tenant in the premises. It is not necessary to refer to other allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties for our present purpose. ( 5 ) THE trial Court made an Order of eviction against all the respondents and the same was confirmed in appeal as mentioned earlier. Before adverting to the contentions advanced, it is necessary to refer to certain circumstances relating to an additional plea regarding want of jurisdiction in the Court to make an Order of eviction, raised by means of a supplementary application. It would appear that the said application was dismissed by the trial Court. In appeal also, the petitioner sought to raise that plea. Although, it is not clear from the Order under revision, that such a plea was disallowed, one thing is clear that the question of jurisdiction has been considered by the appellate Court. I have thought it necessary to refer to this circumstance, because of a contention of Sri E. V. Mathew, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the landladies, that such a plea ought not to be allowed to be raised in revision, and that, as a matter of fact, it was not allowed to be raised before the appellate Court. It is not necessary to say anything on this controversy, as in my opinion, this is a question which goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court, competent to make a decree for eviction, and as such, it should not be shut out from consideration. It is not necessary to say anything on this controversy, as in my opinion, this is a question which goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court, competent to make a decree for eviction, and as such, it should not be shut out from consideration. ( 6 ) THE contention of Sri T. Krishna Rao, the learned Counsel appearing in support of the petition, is two fold: (1) that there cannot be a decree for eviction against the present petitioner arrayed as the fifth respondent in the case, in the absence of specific and un-equivocal averment that their was a subsisting tenancy between the landladies and this petitioner, or that he was a sub-tenant in respect of the premises. According to him, the averments in the petition clearly point to the fact that the petitioner was treated as a person holding adversely to the interests of respondents 1 to 4, who are admittedly the legal representatives of late K. C. Ramiah. Further, the case is that the fifth respondent was merely permitted to occupy the shop premises by the tenant, the deceased K. C. Earaiah, during his life time. Therefore, the question of jurisdiction of the Court must be judged exclusively with reference to the case made out by the petitioners in the original petition for eviction. The pleas of the respondents in defence cannot be taken jnto account for that purpose. It is also submitted by him that the Court, functioning as it does under the Mysore house Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act, is one of limited jurisdiction exercising powers conferred on it by the said statute. That Act permits orders of eviction to be made only against tenants and not against any one in the position of the present petitioner. (2) That there was no notice terminating the tenancy in accordance with the provisions of S. 106 of the Transfer of property Act. The proposition in that behalf is that the notice issued on 10-6-1961 on behalf of the landladies to the tenant, K. C. Ramiah, was not a notice which terminates the tenancy but is only a request claiming possession of the premises on the ground that the premises were required for their personal use. The proposition in that behalf is that the notice issued on 10-6-1961 on behalf of the landladies to the tenant, K. C. Ramiah, was not a notice which terminates the tenancy but is only a request claiming possession of the premises on the ground that the premises were required for their personal use. His further submission is that it is merely an intimation to the tenant that the landladies would like to avail themselves of a ground specified in the relevant Act. The further inference sought to be drawn by the learned Counsel from this fact is that the issuance of a notice to quit in accordance with the previsions of S 106 of the T. P. Act was not at all in the minds of the persons responsible for the issue of such a notice. ( 7 ) THE contention of Sri Mathew, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the landladies (respondents 1 and 2) is that the fifth respondent is a person in the position of a transferee from a tenant falling within the provisions of S. 8 (2) (iii) (a) of the Act. He further submits that having regard to the provision? of S 18 of the Act, the fifth respondent was a necessary party to the proceedings. That the fifth respondent is a person claiming under a tenant, in the sense that he was a transferee of of the lease, can be gathered by reading the pleadings as a whole, including submission in defence, of the fifth respondent. Even otherwise, he proceeds to submit that reading the petition by itself as a whole, the factual position that would emerge is that the fifth respondent was transferee of the lease. ( 8 ) I shall now proceed to deal with the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. The second of the contentions, relating to the validity of the notice terminating the tenancy, can in my opinion, be easily disposed of. The objection as regards the validity Of the notice is merely made dependent on the absence of express words relating to the termination of the tenancy. It is no doubt true that a notice terminating the tenancv should be explicit and should satisfy the provisions under S. 106 of the T. P. Act. The objection as regards the validity Of the notice is merely made dependent on the absence of express words relating to the termination of the tenancy. It is no doubt true that a notice terminating the tenancv should be explicit and should satisfy the provisions under S. 106 of the T. P. Act. But the intention to terminate the tenancy can be inferred, provided there are sufficient indications pointing to that fact, in such a notice. What is also required to be seen is that in the absence of such words, whether the tenant has been prejudiced. My attention was invited to the reply sent to the notice in question. It is clear therefrom that the fifth respondent has not been prejudiced thereby. Reading the notice and the reply together, I am unable to accept the contention advanced in this regard. ( 9 ) AS regards the other question canvassed on behalf of the petitioner. I am of the opinion that the contention urged is sound and should be accepted. A brief reference to certain provisions of the Act relied on by the parties would be relevant. S. 2 (9) of the Act defines a 'tenant' for the purposes of the Act. It is seen therefrom that that expression does not include 'a person placed in occupation of a house by its tenant'. The opening clause of S. 8 (1) provides that a tenant shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Act, S. 8 (2) provides for the light of a landlord to move the Court whenever it is sought to evict tenant on one or more grounds specified therein, as also for the jurisdiction of the Court o grant or refuse an order of eviction. It is relevant to refer to a ground specified in S. 8 (2) (iii) (a) on which some reliance is placed on behalf of the respondents. Sri Mathew, the learned Counsel, submits that on the allegations in the main petition, the Revision Petitioner must be deemed to be in the position of a transferee of a right under the lease, the transferor being the tenant, Ramaiah. Sri Mathew, the learned Counsel, submits that on the allegations in the main petition, the Revision Petitioner must be deemed to be in the position of a transferee of a right under the lease, the transferor being the tenant, Ramaiah. That clause merely makes a provision in the nature of a ground on which a landlord may seek eviction of a tenant, and it does not in terms lay down that an Order for eviction could be made against such a transferee of the right under the lease. 1 consider it appropriate to dispose of this contention urged on behalf of the respondents by their learned Counsel at this stage itself. On the allegations in the present case, the revision petitioner cannot be said to be a transferee of a right under the lease in favour of Ramiah. The case as clearly laid by the petitioner is that that person was merely permitted to occupy the premises by Ramiah. No other term or condition governing the transaction between Ramiah and the petitioner has been expressly pleaded, or is implied, as can be seen from the allegations in the main petition. In short, there was no transfer of the lease in favour of the fifth respondent. Hence this conteniton of Sri Mathew has no force. Now reverting to the other provisions of the Act, S. 18 provides for the binding effect of the order for eviction, on sub-tenants. It no doubt states that an order of eviction shall be binding on a sub-tenant, whether such sub-tenant is a party to the proceeding or not. On this an argument is sought to be constructed by Sri Mathew that an order for eviction could be made against persons other than a tenant in a proceeding under the act. In other words, the submission is that such persons could be made parties in proceedings for eviction of a tenant. Assuming that Sri Mathew is right in this contention, it will be of no avail to him in the present case as it is nowhere the case of the main petitioners that the fifth respondent is in fact such a sub-tenant. In fact, such a contention has been expressly negatived by the lower Courts. Assuming that Sri Mathew is right in this contention, it will be of no avail to him in the present case as it is nowhere the case of the main petitioners that the fifth respondent is in fact such a sub-tenant. In fact, such a contention has been expressly negatived by the lower Courts. ( 10 ) IT is clear, therefore, from the above provisions that a landlord can seek eviction under the Act only against a tenant or his legal heirs, particularised in the definition of 'tenant' under S. 2 (9) of the Act. It is further clear from the provisions of S. 8 of the Act above mentioned that a court exercising jurisdiction under the Act is competent to make an order for eviction of only a tenant as defined under the Act. In this connection, i wish to remark that I should not be understood as deciding the question whether a sub-tenant is a necessary party or not in a proceeding for eviction, in the light of the provisions of S. 18 of the Act, as incidentally contended by Sri Mathew. ( 11 ) IN support of the submission that in determining the question of jurisdiction to entertain a case, the allegations made in the petition for the institution of the proceedings should alone be considered, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Raizada Torandas v. Gorakram Gokalchand, AIR 1964 SC 1348 . ( 12 ) THE facts of that case are as follows: In a suit instituted in the Bombay city Civil Court (to be distinguished from the Court of Small Causes, bombay), there was a prayer for declaration and injunction and for payment of certain sums Of money due by way of commission in accordance with an agreement between the parties. The plaint proceeded on the footing that daring the period of the agreement the appellants (defendants) were mere licensees, and after the expiry of the agreement they were trespassers and had no right to be in the shop. The plaint in terms negatived any relationship of landlord and tenant as between the parties to that suit. The defence was that the plaintiff was a tenant himself and the defendants were the tenants under the plaintiff under a contract of subtenancy. The plaint in terms negatived any relationship of landlord and tenant as between the parties to that suit. The defence was that the plaintiff was a tenant himself and the defendants were the tenants under the plaintiff under a contract of subtenancy. Since such sub-tenancy could not be legally created at the time without the consent of the landlord, by reason of the provisions of the bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the agreement in question was entered into and the same was never acted upon as it was intended to be a cloak to conceal the true nature of the transaction. On these averments in the written statement the appellants (defendants) took the plea that as the question involved in the suit related to the possession of premises as between a landlord and his tenant, the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, alone had jurisdiction to try the suit. ( 13 ) THE Supreme Court, after referring to the general principle elucidated in a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in ILR 52 All. 501, and in disposing of an argument relating to the interpretation of S. 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, has observed at page 1352 of the report thus:"we do not think that the section says or intends to say that the plea of the defendant will determine or change the forum. It proceeds on the basis that exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on certain courts to decide all questions or claims under the Act as to parties, between whom there is or was a relationship of landlord and tenant. It does not invest those courts with exclusive power to try questions of title, such as questions as between the rightful owner and a trespasser or a licensee, for such questions do not arise under the Act. If, therefore, the plaintiff in his plaint does not admit a relation which would attract any of the provisions of the Act on which the exclusive jurisdiction given under S. 28 depends, we do not think that the defendant by his plea can force the plaintiff to go to a forum where on his averments he cannot go. If, therefore, the plaintiff in his plaint does not admit a relation which would attract any of the provisions of the Act on which the exclusive jurisdiction given under S. 28 depends, we do not think that the defendant by his plea can force the plaintiff to go to a forum where on his averments he cannot go. The interpretation canvassed for by the appellants will give rise to anomalous results; for example, the defendant may in every case force the plaintiff to go to the Court of small Causes and secondly, if the Court of Small Causes finds against the defendant's plea, the plaint may have to be returned for presentation to the proper court for a second time. " ( 14 ) AGAIN at page 1354 it has referred with approval to the principle as stated by the High Court in the judgment under appeal before them. The passage reads thus :"a suit which is essentially one between the landlord and tenant does not cease to be such a suit merely because the defendant denise the claim of the plaintiff. In the same way, a suit which is not between the landlord and tenant and in which judging by the plaint no claim or question arises out of the Rent Act or any of its provisions does not become a suit covered by the provisions of S. 28 of the Act as soon as the defendant raises a contention that he is a tenant. "in my judgment, the above enunciations clearly support the contention advanced on behalf of the present petitioner, namely, that a question of jurisdiction of a forum must be judged with reference to allegations in the petition or plaint presented by a party who seeks relief before such forum, irrespective of the allegations in the wrtten statement of defence, when there is not any plea as regards want of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in such Court. Judged from this point of view, and in view of the fact that the allegations in the main petition did not disclose a case that the fifth respondent was either a tenant or sub-tenant within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Act, I am clearly of the opinion that the main petition would not be maintainable against the fifth respondent. ( 15 ) IT follows, therefore, that the court is not competent to make a decree for eviction against the present petitioner. Sri Mathew contends that this decision is distinguishable and, therefore inapplicable to the facts of the present case. I am not persuaded to agree with this submission. The distinguishing facts, in my opinion do not make any difference to the applicability of the principle elucidated therein. I should like to make it clear that in arriving at the above conclusion, i should not be understood as saying in any manner that the fifth respondent cannot be evicted in execution of an Order for eviction against the other respondents either pursuant to the provisions of S. 18 or any other procedural law governing the matter. ( 16 ) FOR the above reasons, the petition succeeds and is allowed in so far as it concerns the present petitioner, who is the fifth respondent in the main petition. In other respects, the Order remains unaffected. The Order of eviction, therefore, stands modified and as against the fifth respondent is set aside. In the Circumstances, I make no Order as to costs. --- *** --- .