Order The accused petitioners (who are four in number) were prosecuted for the offence under clause 3-A (a) and (b) of the Southern States (Regulation of Export of Rice) Order, 1964 (which will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the order’), punishable under section 3 read with section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, (which will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the Act’) before the Second Munsiff First Class Magistrate, Mysore. The trying magistrate, on the evidence let in the case, found that the accused were transporting 81 bags of boiled rice without a permit in Lorry bearing No. MYZ 4258 to a place in the b order area from a place outside that area. He further found that it is proved by the prosecution evidence that (he petitioners were transporting the said 81 bags of rice from within the b order area to another place in that area without a permit. On the basis of his findings he sentenced the petitioners under section 3, read with section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act that each of them should suffer simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 each, or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of 3 months. In an appeal, the Sessions Judge, Mysore, held that it is established by the prosecution evidence that the petitioners have contravened the provisions of sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause 3-A of the order. He therefore confirmed the conviction passed against the petitioners by the trying magistrate. He, however, reduced the substantive sentence of imprisonment imposed by the trial Court to the period of imprisonment already undergone by the petitioners, and confirmed the sentence with regard to fine imposed by the trial magistrate. With this modification, he dismissed the appeal. It is against the order of the Sessions Judge, that the petitioners have preferred this revision petition in this Court. The learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr. B.P. Karunakar frankly, and in my opinion rightly, conceded that the concurrent findings of the Courts below with regard to the question of fact cannot be disputed in a Court of revision. He, however, advanced three contentions before me. The learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr. B.P. Karunakar frankly, and in my opinion rightly, conceded that the concurrent findings of the Courts below with regard to the question of fact cannot be disputed in a Court of revision. He, however, advanced three contentions before me. Firstly, he submitted that it was for the prosecution to establish that the accused did not have a permit for transport and in the absence of such evidence, it was unnecessary for the accused to prove that they had a permit. Therefore the Court below was wrong in convicting the accused. Secondly, he argued that it was up to the prosecution to prove that the accused had mens rea necessary to constitute an offence and in the absence of the proof of the same, no conviction could be based against the accused for the offence charged. His last contention was that the Court below having found that the accused had contravened the provision of sub-clause (0) to clause 3-A of the Order, was not competent to pass an order of conviction against the petitioners for the contravention of the provision of sub-clause (b)to clause 3-A. I shall consider the contentions seriatum. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that no evidence has been let in, on behalf of the prosecution to prove that the accused petitioners did not have the necessary permit. Relying upon a decision of this Court in Kamegowda Jogappa Bagalli v. State of Mysore1 it was argued that it was incumbent on the prosecution to establish that the accused did not have the permit for transport and that it was not necessary for the accused persons to produce proof that they had a permit. It was urged, that no conviction could have been passed against the petitioners and that the Courts below had erred in convicting them. It was argued on behalf of the State that the decision relied upon on behalf of the petitioners was under the Arms Act of 1878 which did not contain a provision similar to section 14 of the Essential Commodities Act, and therefore, the decision relied upon by the petitioners cannot be of any help to them. I think there is force in the argument of the learned Public Prosecutor. I think there is force in the argument of the learned Public Prosecutor. It is not disputed before me that the Arms Act (XI of 1878) does not contain a provision similar to section 14 of the Essential Commodities Act. section 14 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, reads: “14. Burden of proof in certain cases-Where a person is prosecuted for contravening any order made under sect on 3 which prohibits him from doing any act or being in possession of a thing without lawful authority, or without a permit, licence or other document, the burden of proving that he has such authority, permit, licence or other document shall be on him.” It is clear from the language of the section that the burden of proving that he has a permit, is on the person who is prosecuted for the contravention of the provisions of the Act. In the presence of the express provision (i.e. section 14 of the Essential Commodities Act), the principle laid down in the decision relied upon on behalf of the petitioners cannot be made applicable to this case. section 14 of the Essential Commodities Act Jays down in express terms that the burden is on the per on who is prosecuted for the contravention of any order made under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. In the charge it is specifically mentioned that the accused petitioners did not have any permit to transport, which was admittedly read over to them. Therefore, in these circumstances, I do not find any force in the first contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners. The second contention is also devoid of force. In support of his contention, reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners on a decision of this Court in Central Excise Superintendent v. Arumugum.1 In that decision, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Vallabhdas Liladhar v. Assistant Collector of Customs2was followed. It was observed by this Court at page 177 of the report, “The words used in section 178 -A of the Sea Customs Act arc similar to section 123 of the Customs Act of 1962. Their Lordships have pointed out that in spite of the presumption under section 178 -A the prosecution had still to prove by further evidence that the accused had mens rea necessary to constitute the offence. Their Lordships have pointed out that in spite of the presumption under section 178 -A the prosecution had still to prove by further evidence that the accused had mens rea necessary to constitute the offence. In spite of the fact that burden to prove that the goods were not smuggled was on the accused, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove that the accused was carrying gold knowingly to evade the prohibition which the law imposed.” (Italicised is mine). The contention advanced on behalf of the State is that neither section (78-A of the Sea Customs Act (VIII of 1878) nor section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 is similar to the provision of section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. There fore, no assistance can be derived from the principle laid down in the decision of this Court cited on behalf of the petitioners. I thing that Mr. Dayanand, the learned public Prosecutor, is right in his contention. section 178 -A (1) ; of the Sea Customs Act (VIII of 1878) provide: “Where any goods to which this section applies are seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they arc not smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized.” The language of section 123 (1) of the Customs Act 1962 is substantially the same. It reads: “123. Burden of proof in certain cases-(1) Where any goods to which this section applies are seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized.” It is clear from both the sections that when the goods arc seized in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, only then the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods is placed on the person from whose possession the goods were seized. Therefore, the initial burden of proving mens rea necessary to constitute the off nee was held to be on the prosecution in view of the provision of those enactments. Therefore, the initial burden of proving mens rea necessary to constitute the off nee was held to be on the prosecution in view of the provision of those enactments. But in the instant case section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (as it stood after the amendment in 1967 by Act XXXVI of 1967 ) cannot be said to be in pari materia with the provisions of either section 178-A of the Sea Customs Act or section 123 of the Customs Act of 1962. section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, reads: “7. Penalties-(1) If any person contravenes, whether knowingly,. Intentionally or otherwise any order made under section 3, (a)he shall be punishable……………………………………(The remaining portion of the section is not relevant for our purpose).” The words ‘or otherwise’ an all comprehensive. Whether the contravention mentioned in section 7 was done knowingly intentionally or not, such contravention becomes punishable under sub- section (1) of section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. Neither section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 nor section 178-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 contained such a provision. In the decision of this Court Central Excise Superintendent v. Arumugham1 it has been observed, “In spite of the fact that burden to prove that the goods were smuggled was on the accused, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove that the accused was carrying gold knowingly to evade the prohibition which the law imposed.” In this case it is clear that no such obligation is cast on the prosecution under the provision of sub- section (1) of section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. On the other hand, it has been expressly provided that any person contravening whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise, any order made under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, shall become liable for punishment. Therefore the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners is unsustainable. The third contention that has been advanced on behalf of the petitioners was that having come to the conclusion that the accused petitioners transported the rice into the b order area from a place outside that area, the Court below was wrong in basing a conviction against the petitioners under sub-clause (b) of clause 3-A of the Order. The third contention that has been advanced on behalf of the petitioners was that having come to the conclusion that the accused petitioners transported the rice into the b order area from a place outside that area, the Court below was wrong in basing a conviction against the petitioners under sub-clause (b) of clause 3-A of the Order. He submitted that sub-clause (b) to clause 3-A of the order would contemplate a case where the goods have been transported from any place in the b order area to any other place in that area and it does not envisage a case in which the goods had been transported into the b order area and then taken to some other place in the b order area. In other words, according to him, in order to attract the provision of sub-clause (b) of clause 3-A of the Order the starting point of the movement should be in the b order area itself and where the goods have been transported from any place outside the b order area to any other place within the b order area, sub-clause (b) of clause 3-A will not have any applicability. It is not possible to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners. Clause 3-A of the Order reads: “3-A. Restriction on transport of rice or within the b order area.-No person shall transport, attempt to transport or abet the transport of rice- (a) to any place in the b order area from any place outside that area; or (b) from any place in the b order area to any other place in that area; except under and in accordance with a permit issued by the State Government or any officer authorised by that Government in this behalf.” Both the Courts below, on the evidence, found that the lorry bearing No. MYZ 4258 containing 81 bags of boiled rice was stopped at a distance of 100 feet from the Kerala Border. The fact that the lorry was stopped within the b order area is not disputed before me. Sub-clause (b) to clause 3-A prohibits transfer of rice from any place in the b order area to any other place in that area. Sub-classes (b) is a separate and independent provision and should be understood accordingly. The fact that the lorry was stopped within the b order area is not disputed before me. Sub-clause (b) to clause 3-A prohibits transfer of rice from any place in the b order area to any other place in that area. Sub-classes (b) is a separate and independent provision and should be understood accordingly. It does not admit a construction as argued on behalf of the petitioners that the transportation should commence within the b order area. If transport of rice is made in the b order area without a permit and the vehicle was stopped and the goods were seized after the vehicle travels for some distance within the b order area, and if there is no evidence with regard to the transport of rice from any place outside the b order area, there is no reason why conviction should not be passed for an offence for transporting rice without a permit from a place within the b order area to any other place in that area, i.e., under sub-clause (b) to clause 3-A of the Order although there was no evidence to prove that the same had been transported from a place outside the b order area. The wording of Sub-clause (b) to Clause 3-A is couched in wide terms. Therefore, it should be construed liberally. Consequently conviction could validly be based for an offence under sub-clause (b) to clause 3-A of the Order even in the absence of evidence to establish transport of rice from a place outside the b order to any place in the b order area without a permit. Though the petitioners have been convicted under both the counts, sentence against them have not been prescribed under each count separately. As stated above, each of the petitioners was sentenced to suffer Simple Imprisonment for a period of 3 months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 each or in default of payment of fine to suffer 3 months’ more Simple Imprisonment. The lower appellate Court while confirming the conviction under both the counts, reduced the substantive sentence of imprisonment to one already undergone by the petitioners and to that extent modified the order regarding sentence passed by the trial Court. The lower appellate Court also did not prescribe separate sentence under each count. The lower appellate Court while confirming the conviction under both the counts, reduced the substantive sentence of imprisonment to one already undergone by the petitioners and to that extent modified the order regarding sentence passed by the trial Court. The lower appellate Court also did not prescribe separate sentence under each count. Admittedly, both the offences under sub-clauses (a) and (b) to Clause 3-A of the Order were committed in the course of the same transaction. The facts which formed the basis of conviction and sentence under one charge cannot form the basis of conviction and also separate sentence in another charge which was alternative. There cannot be cumulative sentences though a conviction can take place on in alternative charge or even on both the charges. In these circumstances, therefore, I do not think I would be justified in interfering with the order of the Courts below and prescribed separate sentence under the second charge. On the reasons stated above, this revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. S.V.S.----- Petition dismissed.