S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiffs filed the present suit for recovering possession of the suit premises on the ground that the defendant had been in arrears of rent from 9th September 1958 to 8th December 1963 It was a period of four years and eight months. ( 2 ) THE defendant denied the plaintiffs claim challenged the validity of notice to quit served upon him and also denied the plaintiffs right to file the suit. ( 3 ) THE learned Trial Judge negatived the contentions raised by the defendant and passed in favour of the plaintiffs decree for possession of the suit premises and also decree for Rs. 1368/against the defendant. He made incidental and consequential orders also. ( 4 ) THE defendant appealed to the District Court. ( 5 ) THE learned Extra Assistant Judge allowed the appeal set aside the decree passed by the learned Trial Judge and dismissed the suit. The only ground which weighed with him in doing so was that the plaintiffs were not entitled to file the present suit. ( 6 ) IT is against that appellate decree that the plaintiffs have filed the present Civil Revision Application. ( 7 ) MR. Majmudar who appears for the plaintiffs contends that the finding recorded by the learned Appellate Judge that the plaintiffs were not entitled to file the suit is erroneous in law. According to his submission the decision of this High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 620 of 1961 decided by Mr. Justice Divan on 15th June 1965 has no application to the facts of the present case. In support of the decree Mr. Shah has firstly contended that the principles laid down in that decision are applicable to the facts of the present case and secondly he has tried to support the decree on certain other grounds. I shall first deal with two other grounds which Mr. Shah has raised before me for supporting the decree before I proceed to deal with the principal contention raised by Mr. Majmudar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I shall first deal with two other grounds which Mr. Shah has raised before me for supporting the decree before I proceed to deal with the principal contention raised by Mr. Majmudar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 8 ) THE principal contention on which arguments have been addressed by the learned advocates is whether it is necessary for all the heirs to join in filing the suit for possession or whether some of the heirs can file it. The learned Trial Judge negatived the defendants contention that some of the heirs cannot file it. The learned Appellate Judge upheld that contention and in doing so he relied upon the decision of this Court in Shantilal Jethalal Khatri v. Vora Kasambhai Rasulbhai and others Civil Revision Application No. 620 of 1961 decided by Mr. Justice Divan on 15 June 1965. On general principles it cannot be gainsaid that all the persons in whom the title vests must join in filing the suit. If all of them cannot join as plaintiffs those who refuse to join as plaintiffs must be joined as defendants. It is a well-settled principle to which no exception can be taken. The question is whether that principle can be applied to cases under the Bombay Rent Act which gives a special definition of the expression landlord. That expression came up for consideration of Mr. Justice Divan in the aforesaid Civil Revision Application. The case which Mr. Justice Divan was dealing with was a case where all the trustees had not been made parties to the suit for possession and it was a case where only the managing trustee had filed the suit. Secondly it was a suit for possession on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement. In the context of the facts of that case the learned Judge held that all the trustees must be joined to the suit either as plaintiffs or defendants in order to maintain the suit for possession against their tenant. In course of his judgment the learned Judge observed that it is well-settled that where there are several co-owners all co-owners must be parties to the suit. While reiterating that well-settled proposition in case of trustees Mr. In course of his judgment the learned Judge observed that it is well-settled that where there are several co-owners all co-owners must be parties to the suit. While reiterating that well-settled proposition in case of trustees Mr. Justice Divan had probably in mind the decision of the Privy Council in Rajendranath Dutt and others v. Shaik Mahomed Lal and others 8 Indian Appeals 135. That decision indeed applies to a case where a suit is filed by some of the trustees. The property of the trust vests in all the trustees as a unity and therefore all the trustees must be before the Court before a suit can be maintained by some of them. The question before me is whether that principle laid down by Mr. Justice Divan in a suit filed by some of the trustees can be applied in light of the definition of landlord in sec. 5 (3) of the Bombay Rent Act to cases of co-owners other than trustees. So far as that decision of Mr. Justice Divan is concerned it must also be observed that the learned Judge was deciding the case where decree for possession was sought on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement. So far as reasonable and bona fide requirement is concerned the ambit of the definition of landlord given in sec. 5 (3) of the Bombay Rent Act has been narrowed down by adding Explanation (b) to sub-sec. (2) of sec. 13 The said explanation reads thus; for the purposes of clause (g) of sub-sec. (1) the expression landlord shall not include a rent-farmer or rent-collector. Therefore the two propositions which emerge from the decision of Mr. Justice Divan are that where a suit is filed by some of the trustees and where other trustees have not been joined to the suit even as defendants the suit is not maintainable. The second principle which emerges from the decision of Mr. Justice Divan is that the definition of landlord given under sec. 5 sub-sec. (3) of the Bombay Rent Act in its wide amplitude has no application to cases where a suit is filed for possession on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement contemplated by sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. In the present case the plaintiffs who have filed the suit are not the trustees. Therefore the first principle laid down by Mr. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. In the present case the plaintiffs who have filed the suit are not the trustees. Therefore the first principle laid down by Mr. Justice Divan cannot apply to the facts of the present case on account of its own force. Secondly the present suit for possession has not been filed on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement. It has been filed only on the ground of arrears of rent. The second principle which emerges from the aforesaid decision of Mr. Justice Divan also therefore cannot apply the facts of the present case. If that is so what is the position under sec. 5 (3) of the Bombay Rent Act ? It defines landlord in the following terms. landlord means any person who is for the time being receiving or entitled to receive rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant; and includes any person not being a tenant who from time to time derives title under a landlord; and further includes in respect of his sub-tenant a tenant who has sublet any premises. This definition of landlord is indeed very wide. Mr. Shah has drawn my attention to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. In my opinion it is not necessary to refer to them because of the special definition given by the Bombay Rent Act. He has also invited my attention to the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Vagha Jesing v. Manilal Bhogilal Desai and others A. I. R. 1935 Bombay 262. That decision is based upon the general principles of law and it lays down that all the co-sharers or co-owners must be brought before the Court in a suit for enhancement of rent or for recovering rent on a new basis. Mr. Justice Broomfield who delivered that judgment was not dealing with the special definition of landlord such as one given in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 5 of the Bombay Rent Act. That decision to which Mr. Mr. Justice Broomfield who delivered that judgment was not dealing with the special definition of landlord such as one given in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 5 of the Bombay Rent Act. That decision to which Mr. Shah has invited my attention has therefore no application to the facts of the present case. ( 9 ) IF I turn once again to the definition of the word landlord in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 5 it appears clear to me that a person who is for the time being receiving rent in respect of any premises on his own account or on account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other person is also a landlord indeed except for the purpose of sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. Similarly a person who is for the time-being entitled to receive rent in respect of any premises on his own account or on account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other person is also a landlord. The definition of landlord given in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 5 is all pervasive. It brings within its compass even the rent collector and rent - farmer. For the purposes of the Bombay Rent Act they are also landlords entitled to file the suit except for the purpose of sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. In this case the suit was filed by four heirs out of six heirs of Madhavlal Chunilal The other two heirs who are not brought before the Court are Balgauri Natwarlal and Chandanben Bhagwanji Chokshi. Barring these two heirs the present four plaintiffs who were also the heirs of Madhavlal Chunilal Chokshi filed the present suit. If a rent - farmer or a rent collector who for the time being has been receiving rent on behalf of an owner of a property is a landlord within the meaning of the expression given in sec. 5 (3) except for the purpose of sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act there is no reason why some of the heirs cannot file a similar suit and why they cannot be termed landlord within the meaning of its definition given in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 5 of the Bombay Rent Act. 5 (3) except for the purpose of sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act there is no reason why some of the heirs cannot file a similar suit and why they cannot be termed landlord within the meaning of its definition given in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 5 of the Bombay Rent Act. Secondly one heir or some of the heirs receive rent when they do so both on their own account as co-owners and also on account of the remaining heirs or other co-owners. Payment to any one or more of them is a payment to all and gives a valid discharge to the tenant. The definition given in sec. 5 (3) upon a close examination easily submits to this construction. Similarly one heir or some of the heirs are entitled to receive rent both on their own account and on account of the remaining heirs as contemplated by that definition. Therefore it is open to a single heir or some of the heirs to file a suit for possession against the tenant under the Bombay Rent Act. The principle of all co-owners acting as a unity has by this special definition of landlord been overridden for the purposes of the Bombay Rent Act. A single heir or some of the heirs fully answer this special definition of landlord. In my opinion therefore the omission to bring before the Court two other heirs Balgauri Natwarlal and Chandanben Bhagwanji did not render the suit untenable and the learned Appellate Judge was in error in dismissing the plaintiffs suit merely on that ground. The decision rendered by Mr. Justice Divan in Civil Revision Application No. 620 of 1961 decided on 15th June 1965 is not applicable to the facts of the present case in light of the reasons stated above. To take any other view in the matter is in my opinion to ignore the special definition of the expression landlord given in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 5 of the Bombay Rent Act. Whatever Mr. Justice Divan has observed in the aforesaid decision in my opinion applies only to cases where trustees institute suits for recovery of possession on the ground contemplated by sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. (3) of sec. 5 of the Bombay Rent Act. Whatever Mr. Justice Divan has observed in the aforesaid decision in my opinion applies only to cases where trustees institute suits for recovery of possession on the ground contemplated by sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. ( 10 ) THE finding recorded by the learned Appellate Judge on that ground must therefore be set aside and I must hold that the suit filed by four out of the six heirs of Madhavlal Chunilal Chokshi for recovering possession of the suit premises on the ground of arrears of rent is maintainable. Application allowed. .