COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX M P v. BHOPAL DAL AND FLOUR MILLS
1970-09-11
BISHAMBHAR DAYAL, S.P.BHARGAVA
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JUDGMENT : BHARGAVA, J. In this reference under section 44 of the M. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, the following three questions have been referred by the Board of Revenue for the opinion of this court : " (1) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case a sale of goods purchased after payment of tax is liable to sales tax under the Central sales tax law in the event of such goods being sold in the course of inter-State trade and commerce ? (2) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case no sales tax is leviable on pulses, cereals and rice in view of Notification No. 1069-V/st dated 22nd April, 1963 ? (3) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the imposition of penalty under section 43 (1) was legal ?" The first question has been referred at the instance of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, and the second and third questions have apparently been referred for opinion on the oral request of the assessee-respondent. 2. The facts, which are material for the disposal of this reference, may be briefly stated thus. The assessee is a registered dealer. It carries on business in food-grains, oil-seeds etc. , and manufactures and sells pulses. For the assessment period commencing from 16th November, 1963, to 3rd November, 1964, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bhopal, assessed the assessee to a total tax of Rs. 11,718. 87 in the case of assessment under the M. P. General Sales Tax Act and the assessee was assessed to a total tax of Rs. 12,962. 49 in the Central sales tax assessment case. The Assistant Commissioner imposed in both the cases a penalty of Rs. 1,500 under section 43 (1) of the Act on the finding that the returns of turnover submitted by the assessee were not correct and that he had failed to make the correct returns on the false ground that the pulses were exempt from tax. On appeal, the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore, allowed an exemption of Rs. 70,000 on the sale of husk of pulses over and above the deduction which was allowed by the Sales Tax Officer. He thus reduced the tax liability of the assessee by Rs. 700. He further reduced the amount of penalty in both the cases to Rs.
On appeal, the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore, allowed an exemption of Rs. 70,000 on the sale of husk of pulses over and above the deduction which was allowed by the Sales Tax Officer. He thus reduced the tax liability of the assessee by Rs. 700. He further reduced the amount of penalty in both the cases to Rs. 750 in each case and maintained the assessment pertaining to the Central sales tax. 3. On appeal to the Board of Revenue, it exempted from tax the entire turnover arising out of the sale of husk. The sale amounted to Rs. 2,09,461. No further dispute arises in respect of this exemption. 4. It was further contended before the Board of Revenue that the sum of Rs. 1,52,836 representing the turnover arising out of sale in the course of its inter-State trade and commerce of tax paid goods should also be exempted from tax. The Board of Revenue accepted the contention of the assessee on the basis of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Mysore v. Yaddalam Lakshminarasimhiah Setty and Sons ([1965] 16 S. T. C. 231 (S. C. ). ). The Board of Revenue also concluded that the assessee was entitled to get exemption as his case fell within the general exemptions under section 8 (2-A) of the Central Sales Tax Act. 5. The Board of Revenue held against the assessee in so far as the assessees case was that it was not liable to pay the sales tax on pulses. The relevant notification is dated 22nd April, 1963, which provided exemption from sale of "husks of all grains, cereals, pulses and rice". On the basis of this notification, the Board of Revenue took the view that the assessee was not right in contending that sales of pulses were exempt from tax. It held that only the husks of pulses were exempted but not the pulses. As regards the imposition of penalty, the view taken by the Board of Revenue was that as the assessee had clearly avoided to pay tax on pulses, mens rea "in technical sense" could be inferred and as the penalty imposed was nominal, there was no reason to interfere with the order of the first appellate authority regarding penalty. 6. We may now take up the first point for consideration.
6. We may now take up the first point for consideration. In State of Mysore v. Yaddalam Lakshminarasimhiah Setty and Sons ([1965] 16 S. T. C. 231 (S. C. ).), the majority held that the expression "levied" in section 9 (1) of the Central Act referred to the expression "levied" in section 5 (3) (a) of the State Act and therefore the Central Act had not made a departure in the manner of levy of tax on the specified goods which were taxed only at a single point under the State Act. The minority view of Shah, J. , was that the use of the expression "in the same manner" in section 8 (2) of the Central Act has not the effect of assimilating the procedural and the substantive provisions relating to the imposition, levy and collection of tax as are provided by the State law in the matter of collection of tax under the Central Act. The learned Judge further held that under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 9 of the Central Act the power conferred upon the authority competent to assess the tax in the same manner as the tax on the sale or purchase of goods under the general sales tax law does not include the power to admit to exemptions provided by the State law inter-State sales taxable under the Central Act. The Board of Revenue understood the observations in the majority judgment to uphold the contention raised on behalf of the assessee that in all respects the tax must be levied as envisaged by the general sales tax law of the State. 7. However, the said view of the Board of Revenue cannot be upheld in view of the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act of 1969 having been enacted with retrospective effect from the date on which the principal Act was enacted. Before the Amendment Act was enacted, the President of India had promulgated the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 1969 (4 of 1969 ). All the provisions contained in the Ordinance are embodied in the Amendment Act. It is not necessary to state in detail the provisions of the Ordinance or the Act as their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered these provisions in the context of the said Ordinance in their judgment reported in State of Kerala v. P. P. Joseph and Co.
It is not necessary to state in detail the provisions of the Ordinance or the Act as their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered these provisions in the context of the said Ordinance in their judgment reported in State of Kerala v. P. P. Joseph and Co. , and Joseph Elias ([1970] 25 S. T. C. 483 (S. C. ). ). The effect of the Amendment Act of 1969 is clearly to supersede the majority view in the case of State of Mysore v. Yaddalam Lakshminarasimhiah Setty and Sons ([1965] 16 S. T. C. 231 (S. C. ). ). It is now made clear that even if no tax was leviable under the general sales tax law of the State in respect of intra-State transactions of sale, tax will be leviable under the Central Sales Tax Act on sale of goods effected by a dealer in the course of its inter-State trade or commerce according to the sales tax law of the appropriate State. This is very clearly provided in section 6 (1a), which has been introduced by the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1969. Section 6 (1a) reads thus : " A dealer shall be liable to pay tax under this Act on a sale of any goods effected by him in the course of inter-State, trade or commerce notwithstanding that no tax would have been leviable (whether on the seller or the purchaser) under the sales tax law of the appropriate State if that sale had taken place inside that State. " 8. By section 9 (2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, as amended, the procedural law prescribed by the general sales tax law of the State applies in the matter of assessment, reassessment, collection and enforcement of payment of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, but the liability to pay is determined by the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act. The clear effect of the amendment is that the turnover for the purpose of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, has to be determined in accordance with the provisions of that Act and the Rules made thereunder.
The clear effect of the amendment is that the turnover for the purpose of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, has to be determined in accordance with the provisions of that Act and the Rules made thereunder. In this view, the Board of Revenue cannot be held to be right that in the case of sale of goods in the course of inter-State trade, which were purchased after payment of State sales tax, the assessee was not liable to sales tax under the Central sales tax law. 9. The further question which arises for consideration is whether the assessee is entitled to claim exemption under section 8 (2a) of the Central Sales Tax Act. This section reads thus : " Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), if under the sales tax law of the appropriate State, the sale or purchase, as the case may be, of any goods by a dealer is exempt from tax generally or is subject to tax generally at a rate which is lower than two per cent. (whether called a tax or fee or by any other name), the tax payable under this Act on his turnover in so far as the turnover or any part thereof relates to the sale of such goods shall be nil or, as the case may be, shall be calculated at the lower rate. Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section a sale or purchase of goods shall not be deemed to be exempt from tax generally under the sales tax law of the appropriate State if under that law it is exempt only in specified circumstances or under specified conditions or in relation to which the tax is levied at specified stages or otherwise than with reference to the turnover of the goods. " The explanation makes it clear that unless there is exemption from tax generally under the State law the turnover in the course of inter-State trade and commerce will be liable to tax and that would be so notwithstanding the fact that under the State law, such turnover may be exempt from tax subject to certain specified conditions or in specified circumstances.
The definition of "taxable turnover" as it stands after its amendment by Madhya Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1962 reads thus : " (r) taxable turnover in relation to any period means that part of a dealers turnover for such period which remains after deducting therefrom - (i) the sale price of goods declared tax-free under section 10 or section 12; (ii) sale price of goods other than those mentioned in sub-clauses (i) and (iv) of this clause, which have been purchased otherwise than in the course of inter-State trade or commerce from a registered dealer : Provided that the sales of such goods by such registered dealer were taxable under the Act. (iii) all such other deductions as may be prescribed; (iv) sales to a registered dealer of goods specified in Part I of Schedule II and declared by him in the prescribed form as being intended for resale by him in the State of Madhya Pradesh or for sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. " From the provisions of section 2 (r) (ii) it may be seen that sub-clause (i) relates to goods which are declared tax-free under sections 10 and 12 of the Act. There can be no doubt that these two sections provide for general exemptions from tax and therefore they have to be excluded from the turnover on the basis of the provision contained in section 8 (2a ). But the exemptions which are permissible under sub-clauses (ii) and (iv) cannot be held to be general exemptions as they are available only in specified circumstances under specified conditions or in relation to which the tax is levied at specified stages. The exemptions are circumscribed by conditions attaching to them. In our opinion, therefore, the Board of Revenue was not right in treating the exemptions under other clauses with which we are concerned in this case as general exemptions. 10. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, we answer the first question by saying that on the facts and circumstances of this case a sale of goods purchased after payment of tax is liable to sales tax under the Central sales tax law in the event of such goods being sold in the course of inter-State trade and commerce. 11.
As a result of the discussion aforesaid, we answer the first question by saying that on the facts and circumstances of this case a sale of goods purchased after payment of tax is liable to sales tax under the Central sales tax law in the event of such goods being sold in the course of inter-State trade and commerce. 11. The second and third questions may be taken up for discussion together as a preliminary objection has been raised in respect of both of these questions. The preliminary objection is that as the assessee did not comply with the provisions of section 44 for getting a reference made to the High Court, the said questions should not be answered. 12. The contention of the learned counsel for the assessee is that as these legal questions arise out of the order of the Board of Revenue, they can be referred to the High Court for its opinion when the Board of Revenue makes a statement of the case and decides to refer any question of law which arises out of its order. The contention in effect is that whether tile reference is at the instance of the Commissioner or the assessee, all the questions of law which arise out of the order can be made the subject of reference. In support of his submission the learned counsel for the assessee has placed reliance on the view taken in Nemkumar v. Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur ([1953] 4 S. T. C. 327.) and Kalinga Construction Co. , Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax, Orissa, Cuttack ([1962] 13 S. T. C. 225. ). 13. The learned Advocate-General has, on the other hand, submitted that the final order may be partly in favour of one party and partly in favour of the other. In such a case, if both the parties feel aggrieved, they must both comply with the requirement of section 44 to get a reference made to the High Court. It is urged that as the answer of the Board of Revenue on questions (2) and (3) was against the assessee, it was necessary for the assessee to ask for a reference of these two questions after making an application in writing and after making payment of the prescribed fees.
It is urged that as the answer of the Board of Revenue on questions (2) and (3) was against the assessee, it was necessary for the assessee to ask for a reference of these two questions after making an application in writing and after making payment of the prescribed fees. It is urged that in the absence of an application in writing and without payment of the prescribed fee, the reference is unwarranted and cannot be made. 14. There does appear to be some difference of opinion in the various High Courts on this point. The Bombay High Court in Girdhardas and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Ahmedabad ([1957] 31 I. T. R. 82.), held : " Whoever may be a party who asks for a reference, once a reference is determined upon, all questions of law which arise out of the order of the Tribunal can be referred to the High Court for its determination. Questions may be suggested either by the party which wants a reference or by the party which is content with the decision of the Tribunal. " This opinion appears to be shared by the Calcutta High Court in In re Krishna Kumar (A. I. R. 1931 Cal. 543.) and the High Court of Orissa in Kalinga Construction Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax, Orissa, Cuttack ([1962] 13 S. T. C. 225. ). In Nemkumar v. Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur ([1953] 4 S. T. C. 327.), a Division Bench of this court held that the duty of the Board of Revenue was to refer all questions of law arising out of its order whether they were stated by the applicant in his application under section 23 (1) or not. This observation can be interpreted to mean that it was for the Board of Revenue to find the facts and then to state the point of law which arises out of those facts on which the opinion of the High Court was desired to be taken. If the question was material for answering the point on which a reference was sought to be made to the High Court, the Board of Revenue could frame the question even though it was not suggested by the party which desired the reference to be made.
If the question was material for answering the point on which a reference was sought to be made to the High Court, the Board of Revenue could frame the question even though it was not suggested by the party which desired the reference to be made. However, the facts of all these cases do not indicate clearly that the success of the parties was divided when the matter was decided by the Board of Revenue and an occasion arose when both parties desired the reference to be made. This question was precisely considered by a Division Bench of this court in M. C. C. No. 195 of 1964 decided on 3rd May, 1966 (The Commissioner of Income-tax, M. P. , Nagpur v. The Jiwajirao Sugar Co. Ltd. , Dalauda ). Their Lordships took the following view in the context of a reference made under section 66 (1) of the Income-tax Act : " Before a reference can be made, there must be an application which is made within the period of limitation prescribed by section 66 (1 ). Secondly, where it is made by an assessee, it must be accompanied by a deposit of Rs. 100. Thirdly, the application itself has to be made in the form prescribed by rule 22a of the Income-tax Rules, which must not only be signed by the assessee or by the authorised representative but which must also state the question of law arising out of the order that is desired to be referred to the High Court. Finally, the Rules of this court require that the amount deposited under section 66 (1) should continue to be there till the reference is answered. It is plain enough that, in this particular case, the assessee could have applied for referring the second question but it did not choose so to do. That being so, we see no good reason why the requirements of law should be dispensed with in favour of such an assessee and it should be allowed to derive the advantage of such a reference. We are not here concerned with a winning party who could never apply for a reference and we should not be regarded as expressing any opinion on the question whether it could ask for such a reference without a regular application under section 66 (1 ).
We are not here concerned with a winning party who could never apply for a reference and we should not be regarded as expressing any opinion on the question whether it could ask for such a reference without a regular application under section 66 (1 ). In our opinion, the second question could not have been referred to this court without any application under section 66 (1) duly made by the assessee and we decline to answer it. " The same view has been taken in Commissioner, Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. and Another ([1970] 26 S. T. C. 65. ). It has been held that : " At the time of hearing of a reference application filed by the Commissioner under section 11 (3), if the dealer has not made a separate application under section 11 (1) he cannot be permitted to ask for a reference of a question of law arising out of that part of the order of the revising authority with which he was aggrieved. If a dealer felt aggrieved with any part of the order of the revising authority passed under section 10 he should make a separate application under section 11. " The opinion of the Division Bench in M. C. C. No. 195 of 1964 decided on 3rd May, 1966, referred to above, is binding on us. Further we agree with the view taken in Commissioner, Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. ([1970] 26 S. T. C. 65. ). We therefore decline to answer questions (2) and (3) on the ground that the assessee should have made an application complying with the provisions of section 44 if he wanted these questions to be referred to this court for its opinion and on his failure to do so, these two questions have been referred in an unwarranted manner. 15. In the result, the first question is answered as indicated by us in paragraph 10 of this order in favour of the department, and we decline to answer questions (2) and (3 ). Parties shall bear the costs of this reference. .