JUDGMENT P. Subramanion Poti, J. 1. This appeal arises from a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell property. The plaintiff who lost the suit in both the courts has filed this second appeal. The defendant in the suit is the sister of the plaintiff. The plaint property is 3 acres in extent and is a portion of a property of larger area measuring 24 acres 78 cents. In this larger property the defendant obtained half share under a will executed by her father. The other half was to be enjoyed by the mother of the plaintiff and defendant during her life time and after her death each of her four sons including the plaintiff was to take the half share equally. The property was heavily indebted at that time. In 1952 all the brothers of the defendant excepting the plaintiff, along with their mother, released their rights in respect of their share to the defendant. On 29th September 1955 the plaintiff released his right also in favour of the defendant under document No. 1544. On the same day a document bearing register No. 1545 was executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff, wherein the defendant agreed to convey 3 acres in 24 acres and 78 cents to the plaintiff in the event of the plaintiff paying the defendant Rs. 2,500 and the period within which such payment was to be made was fixed as 8 years. The said period of 8 years was to expire on 29th September 1953. Subramonian A few days before the expiry of the period the wife of the plaintiff obtained a draft from the Changanacherry branch of the Canara Bank for Rs. 2,500 in favour of the defendant and posted the said draft along with a letter to the defendant who was at Palghat intending it to be the payment of the purchase price agreed to under Ext. P-8 dated 29th September 1955. This was so despatched on 25th September 1963. For some reason, which is not seen explained, the letter seems to have reached the place of the addressee only on 30th September 1963, at which time it was noticed that the defendant was not in station. The letter was kept in deposit and when the defendant returned to the station it was tendered to the defendant, but was refused by her. The letter was kept in deposit and when the defendant returned to the station it was tendered to the defendant, but was refused by her. According to the plaintiff, he had complied with the terms of Ext. P-8 which would entitle him to a conveyance of the suit property, but the defendant had defaulted to act in accordance with her obligations under Ext. P-8. This was the basis of the claim for specific performance. The defendant contended that the suit was not maintainable, since the tender was made only after the expiry of the period stipulated in Ext. P-8 and time being the essence of the contract the plaintiff must be deemed to have failed to perform his part of the contract within the period specified in the agreement. 2. The trial court found that the agreement under Ext.P-8 was not one to sell property but was really an agreement of re-conveyance and in such an agreement time would be the essence of the contract and as such the plaintiff was not entitled to compel a sale in his favour when the tender was made only after the expiry of the period specified in Ext. P-8 agreement. The appellate court also construed Ext. P-8 agreement to be an agreement to re-convey and therefore held that time was the essence of the contract. It held that the plaintiff had not performed his part of the contract within the time specified in the agreement. In this view that court agreed with the trial court and dismissed the suit. It is the plaintiff who thus lost in the courts below that has filed this second appeal. 3. Before me several questions were raised. It is the plaintiff's case that Ext. P-8 cannot be construed as an agreement to re-convey property, as, what was agreed to be sold under Ext. P-8 was not the property which was conveyed by the plaintiff to the defendant. It is also contended that in any view of the matter time would not be the essence of the contract, and even if it be the essence, in this particular instance there is no reason to hold that plaintiff was a defaulter. The default, if any, according to the plaintiff, was by the defendant who ought to have received the money tendered to her in time and ought to have executed the sale deed. The default, if any, according to the plaintiff, was by the defendant who ought to have received the money tendered to her in time and ought to have executed the sale deed. The defendant would argue that even if Ext. P-8 is not to be read as a contract of re-conveyance, the plaintiff would not be entitled to succeed for the reason that even in a contract to sell immovable property time could be the essence, if parties intended it to be so and that is the case here in view of certain stipulations in Ext. P-8. Alternatively it is urged that in all option contracts there is no element of mutuality and the exercise of the option is really in the nature of a privilege. Therefore, such contracts have to be distinguished from mere contracts to sell immovable property and time should be taken to be the essence of such option contracts. As to tender it is the defendant's case that the tender must be in legal currency and that tender by way of demand draft cannot be valid tender, nor would a tender operate unless it actually reaches the person to whom it is so tendered when it is sought to be made by post. 4. Normally in an agreement to sell immovable property time may not be the essence of the contract unless it is seen to be so not merely from the fact that a period has been stipulated in the agreement for the performance but from other circumstances also. It must appear that the parties intended that the contract should be unenforceable against a party thereto if the other party defaults to perform his obligations within the time specified. Section 55 of the Contract Act embodies this rule. What could be said on this question has been succinctly stated by the Privy Council in the leading case Jamshed Khedaram Irani v. Burjerji Dhunjibhai A.I.R. 1915 P.C. 83. Section 55 of the Contract Act embodies this rule. What could be said on this question has been succinctly stated by the Privy Council in the leading case Jamshed Khedaram Irani v. Burjerji Dhunjibhai A.I.R. 1915 P.C. 83. "Under that law, equity, which governs the rights of the parties in cases of specific performance of contracts to sell real estate, looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement in order to ascertain whether the parties notwithstanding that they named a specific time within which completion was to take place, really and in substance intended more than that it should take place within a reasonable time." Though this is the rule in regard to contracts for sale of immovable property, contracts for re-conveyance stand in a different position. Such contracts operate as options to re-purchase property and they form an exception to the rule of time being not the essence. In the case of a contract for re-conveyance the party who seeks to enforce the contract must exercise it within the time prescribed. This is because, in a contract for re-conveyance, there is no mutuality and since mutual obligations may not arise the contract must be construed strictly against the person in whose favour the option is provided for. The contract in the present case Ext. P-8 cannot be read as one of re-conveyance. In order to treat it as re-conveyance it is necessary to see whether the same right has been conveyed earlier. The concept of re-conveyance necessarily involves an earlier conveyance by the party in whose favour re-conveyance is provided for. Ext. P-8 agreement relates to 3 acres out of 24 acres 78 cents. May be that the plaintiff's share which was obtained under the will of his father and which was conveyed on the same day, earlier, to his sister, the defendant, might be somewhere about the same as the area covered by Ext. P-8, but it is not exactly the identical property. That sale deed which has been executed by him has not been produced in the trial court. It was produced in the appellate court and by agreement of parties I am marking it here as Ext. P-13. I have also marked the letter written by the defendant to the plaintiff on 2nd February, 1963 as Ext. P-14. Ext. That sale deed which has been executed by him has not been produced in the trial court. It was produced in the appellate court and by agreement of parties I am marking it here as Ext. P-13. I have also marked the letter written by the defendant to the plaintiff on 2nd February, 1963 as Ext. P-14. Ext. P-13 indicates that the right conveyed by him is Malayalam so long as it is not established that what was agreed to be conveyed under Ext. P-8 is the same as what was released under Ext. 13 it cannot be said that the agreement Ext. P-8 is one of re-conveyance. 5. But what is stated above as to the character of Ext. P-8 does not help the plaintiff. Even if it is not an agreement of re-conveyance, in the strict sense of that term it is really an agreement wherein an option to purchase is given to the plaintiff. Just as in the case of agreements for re-conveyance, in the case of agreements for option to purchase also mutual obligations would not arise. It is really conferment of a concession or privilege to one party by the other. Dealing with option contracts the Supreme Court has said in Caltex (India) Ltd. v. Bhagwan Devi Maredia A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 405 as follows: "At common law stipulations as to time in a Contract giving an option for renewal of a lease of land were considered to be of the essence of the contract even if they were not expressed to be so and were construed as conditions precedent. Equity followed the common law rule in respect of such contracts and did not regard the stipulation as to time as not of the essence of the bargain. As stated in Halsbury's Laws of England.3rd edition, Vol.3, Article 281. p. 165: 'An option for the renewal of a lease, or for the purchase or re-purchase of property, must in all cases be exercised strictly within the time limited for the purpose, otherwise it will lapse.' This passage was quoted with approval by Danckworts, L.J. in Hare v Nicell, 1966-2 Q.B. 130, 145. A similar statement of law is to be found in Foa's General Law of Landlord and Tenant, 8th Ed., Art. 453, p. 310, and in Hill and Redman's Law of Landlord and Tenant, 14th Ed., p. 54. A similar statement of law is to be found in Foa's General Law of Landlord and Tenant, 8th Ed., Art. 453, p. 310, and in Hill and Redman's Law of Landlord and Tenant, 14th Ed., p. 54. 'the reason is that a renewal of a lease is a privilege and if the tenant wishes to claim the privilege he must do so strictly within the time limited for the purpose." A provision such as for renewal of a lease, an option being given to the lessee to renew on certain terms arid conditions, has been construed to be one where the time element has to be treated as of the essence of the contract. I need refer only to the decision of the Federal Court reported in Shanmugham Pillai v. Annalakshmi Ammal A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 38. In view of what I have said here, it follows that though strictly speaking Ext. P-8 may not be termed as an agreement for re-conveyance as held by the courts below, still time is of essence as it is an option contract where there is no mutuality. 6. Even taking Ext. P-8 as a mere contract to sell immovable property I think that in the circumstances of the case time could be of the essence. It is not as if in every contract to sell immovable property time stipulated cannot be considered to be material. That again would depend upon the intention of the parties to the contract. Mere stipulation of a period of time within which the contract is to be performed does not necessarily indicate that parties intend that on breach of performance within that time by any one party the other is absolved from his obligation to perform his part of the contract. Even in such cases there may be sufficient indication in the contract to show that on the expiry of the period stipulated therein the defaulting party can no longer compel performance by the other party, if this be the case I think there is sufficient indication in Ext. P-8 to show such an intention. The period for payment of Rs. 2,500 stipulated under Ext. P-8 is fairly a long one. Normally such a period of 8 years is not provided in such a contract. P-8 to show such an intention. The period for payment of Rs. 2,500 stipulated under Ext. P-8 is fairly a long one. Normally such a period of 8 years is not provided in such a contract. It would appear that the defendant has paid off the debts on the properties obtained under the Will and in view of this her brothers and her mother jointly conveyed their rights in the properties to her. The plaintiff also so conveyed his rights. But he wanted the property back when he was in a position to pay Rs. 2,500 and possibly for enabling him to get together such a sum fairly long period of 8 years was stipulated. But the provision in Ext. P-8 that MALAYALAM would indicate that the parties did not contemplate claim to performance to subsist after the said period. The consequences of failure to perform the obligations under the contract within the specified period having been provided under the document itself, I do not think that there is any substance in the contention that parties did not consider time as the essence of the contract. Therefore, oil this question I am in agreement with the courts below. 7. The question whether on the facts of this case the courts below were right in thinking that there was no proper tender before the expiry of the period of 8 years is the one which should next engage my attention. Admittedly the period of 8 years expired on 29th September 1963. It is also not disputed that a demand draft was taken from a bank at Changanacherry on 25th September 1963 and was sent by post to the defendant at her address, on the same day. It is also seen from the evidence that in the normal course this should have reached the defendant before 29th September 1963. There is evidence to show that in the normal course it should have been received at Palghat before the expiry of the period fixed under Ext. P-8. The defendant herself admits that in the normal course it should have reached before 29th September 1963. But, for reasons not known, it is seen that the letter reached the defendant's place only on 30th. The letter sent to the defendant which is returned has been produced in court and has been marked Ext. P-5 and the cover has been marked Ext. P-6. But, for reasons not known, it is seen that the letter reached the defendant's place only on 30th. The letter sent to the defendant which is returned has been produced in court and has been marked Ext. P-5 and the cover has been marked Ext. P-6. The draft which was sent along with Ext. P-5 letter has been marked Ext. P-1. Ext. P-6 cover indicates that the address to which it was sent is the proper address of the defendant. Ext. P-13 letter marked by me here is in the letterhead of the defendant, it is the address shown in that letterhead that is seen in Ext. P-6 cover also. The case of the defendant is that since the letter could have been tendered to her at Palghat where she was then staying only on 30th, when it reached that place, the tender must be deemed to be only on 30th September 1963 which is a day after the expiry of the period specified in Ext. P-8 agreement. Besides this there are several other objections raised to the tender and I will dispose them of first. It is said that the tender was not proper as it was made not by cash but by a demand draft which the defendant was not obliged to accept. It is also said that the tender was not made by the plaintiff but by his wife who was not the person with whom the defendant entered into the agreement, Ext. P-8. Therefore it is the defendant's case that even assuming that the tender was in time it was not made in such form as would oblige the defendant to accept it. If so, according to the defendant, the plaintiff must be treated as a defaulter. 8. It is true that at one time it was said that the tender made by a debtor to a creditor of money due to the latter must be made in cash and it was said "great importance was attached to the production of money as the right of it might tempt the creditor to yield". [Finch v. Brook (1834) 1 Bing N.C. 253] extracted in Anson on Contracts, 22nd Ed., page 435. The case of the defendant is that if tender is made in any form other than 'jingling cash' defendant is not bound to accept such tender. [Finch v. Brook (1834) 1 Bing N.C. 253] extracted in Anson on Contracts, 22nd Ed., page 435. The case of the defendant is that if tender is made in any form other than 'jingling cash' defendant is not bound to accept such tender. Tender by way of a demand draft, according to the defendant, is not a valid tender and therefore the defendant would be well within her rights not to recognise this offer of the money. In support of this learned counsel for the defendant brought to my notice certain decisions. The case in Salik Ram Upadhia v. B. Jai Gopal Singh A.I.R. 1955. All 350 was one where the tender of a sum of Rs. 5,200 in an insured cover alleged to contain the said sum was considered to be not legal tender. But on the facts of that case one has to notice that the reason why the court took that view was that the person who took the insured cover, said to have contained Rs. 5,200 in notes, would be taking a risk if it was ultimately found not to contain that amount, a fact which he may find difficult to prove later. Certainly such a risk is not attended in the matter of receipt of money by a demand draft. The decision in Raghbir Das v. Sundar Lal A.I.R. 1931 Lah. 205 to which my notice has been drawn by the learned counsel for the appellant was a case in which tender was made by a demand draft. What was held in that case was the tender was not in time and I do not find anything in that decision in support of the case that a draft is not to be considered as legal tender. My attention has been drawn to 'Chitty on Contracts', 22nd End. Dealing with the question of tender the learned author says at para 1088: "To constitute a valid tender there must either be an actual production of the money, or its production must be expressly or impliedly dispensed with by the creditor." and the author proceeds to illustrate this statement. These illustrations show that emphasis, was on the availability of the money for being paid forthwith when payment was offered in cash. The question whether in place of money payment by such means as demand drafts would be valid was not one which arose in that context. These illustrations show that emphasis, was on the availability of the money for being paid forthwith when payment was offered in cash. The question whether in place of money payment by such means as demand drafts would be valid was not one which arose in that context. That, apparently was not a matter with which the learned author was dealing. My attention has been drawn to a passage in Vol. 8 of Hallbury is Laws of England, Simonds Edition, at page 170. "A payment or tender of money must be made in legal currency. There must be an actual production of the money at the time of the tender, unless this is dispensed with by the creditor either expressly or by implication." But to understand this statement it is necessary to see what follows this. "If the debtor tells his creditor that he has come for the purpose of paying a specific amount, and the creditor says that it is too late, or is insufficient in amount, or otherwise indicates that he will not accept the money, the actual production is thereby dispensed with, and there is a good tender of the amount mentioned by the debtor." This again, as the context would indicate, deals with a different question. The question as to whether it is sufficient for a debtor to tell his creditor that he has got money with him to pay or whether he must be ready with the money in legal currency is the question that is seen considered. 9. According to me, an offer of payment may be made in any form in which, in the common course of events, the payment represents and produces cash and would be treated as such by persons placed in the position of the parties to the transaction. In business circles, payment by cheque or demand draft, by a party situate at one place to a party at another is a normal mode. It may be that the parties may not be willing to take a cheque. That depends upon the extent of faith in the party issuing the cheque and the commitment the party receiving the cheque has to make before cashing the cheque. But normally there would be no objection in receiving a demand draft in lieu if payment in cash. Such, mode of payment has come to stay. That depends upon the extent of faith in the party issuing the cheque and the commitment the party receiving the cheque has to make before cashing the cheque. But normally there would be no objection in receiving a demand draft in lieu if payment in cash. Such, mode of payment has come to stay. If in the normal course of event parties have come to view an offer of payment by demand draft as a valid form of offer, I see no reason why I should take the view that unless there is an offer of cash there is no offer of payment. Nothing said in the literature which has been placed before me by the learned counsel for the respondent compels me to take the view canvassed by him. On the other hand, I think there is much to be said in favour of what I have stated here. A reference, in this connection, to a passage in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay South, Bombay v. Ogale Glass Works Ltd. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 429 may be useful. At paragraph 10, page 432 Das J., speaking for the Court said: "That a sum of money may be received in more way than one cannot be doubted. It may be received by the transfer of coins or currency notes or a negotiable instrument which represents and produces cash and is treated as such by businessmen. [See per Lord Lindley in Greshan Life Assurance Society v. Bishop 1902 A.C. 287 at 296]. Reference in this connection may also be made to the decisions in Commissioner of Income-tax v, Kameshwar Singh [1933 (') I T.R. 107], Raghunandan Prasad v. Commissioner of Income tax [1933 (1) I.T.R. 113: 60 LA. 133] and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maheswari Saran Singh [1951 (19) I.T.R. 83]." 10. In view of what I have stated above, I hold the view that a tender by way of demand draft is a valid tender of money. Apart from this there is also another answer to the contention of the defendant, and that is that it is not open to her to raise this objection now. It is not her case in the written statement that she was not prepared to execute the conveyance because the tender was only by way of demand draft and Annamma not in cash. It is not her case in the written statement that she was not prepared to execute the conveyance because the tender was only by way of demand draft and Annamma not in cash. If the tender is objected to not on any open to the party, to whom such tender was made, to challenge subsequently, the validity of the tender on any particular ground which was not so taken originally. any particular ground but generally it is not I need only refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in International contractors Ltd. v. Prasanta Kumar A.I.R.1962 S.C 77 for this purpose. I would refer to the following passage in this connection particular ground but generally it is not open to the party, to whom such tender was made, to challenge subsequently, the validity of the tender on any particular ground which was not so taken originally. I need only refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in International contractors Ltd. v. Prasanta Kumar (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 77) for this purpose. I would refer to the following passage in this connection. "The correspondence which has been proved in this case 'shows that when the respondent's, solicitor called upon the appellant to reconvey the property in dispute to the respondent and also sent a draft conveyance, the appellant denied that there was any concluded or valid agreement for sale in respect of the property in dispute. This was a complete repudiation of the contract to reconvey which the appellant had agreed to by clause 3 of the agreement which has set out above. As the appellant had repudiated the contract and had thus failed to carry out his part of the contract it was open to the respondent to sue for its enforcement. But it was argued on behalf of the appellant that the respondent did not tender the price, i.e., Rs. 10,001 nor was he in a position to do so and in that view of the matter the respondent is not entitled to get a decree for specific performance. But it was argued on behalf of the appellant that the respondent did not tender the price, i.e., Rs. 10,001 nor was he in a position to do so and in that view of the matter the respondent is not entitled to get a decree for specific performance. In cases of this kind no question of formal tender of the amount to be paid arises and the question to be decided is not whether any money was within the power of the respondent but whether the appellant definitely and unequivocally refused to carry out his part of the contract and intimated that money will be refused if tendered. The principle laid down in Hunter v. Daniel, (1645) 4 Hare 420 is applicable to cases of this kind. In that case Wigram, V.C., stated the position as follows:” "The practice of the Courts is not to require a party to make a formal tender where from the facts stated in the Bill or from the evidence it appears the tender would have been a mere form and that the party to whom it was made would have refused to accept the money". Lord Buckmaster in Venkatarayanim v. Zamindar of Tuni, (50 Ind. App. 41 at p. 47): (A.I.R. 1928 P.G. 26 at p. 28) accepted this statement of the law and observed: "Their Lordships think that that is a true and accurate expression of the law, and the question therefore is whether the answer that was sent on behalf of the mortgagee amounted to a clear refusal to accept the money". This principle applies to the facts of the present case also and the question is whether the answer sent on behalf of the appellant amounted to an unequivocal refusal to carry out its part of the contract which in our opinion it was." Whether a tender is sufficient would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. If the party to whom the tender was to be made would have been prepared to accept the tender in that particular form that would be sufficient, even if it is not strictly a tender in accordance with law. If the party to whom the tender was to be made would have been prepared to accept the tender in that particular form that would be sufficient, even if it is not strictly a tender in accordance with law. Since any objection to the form of the tender is being capable of being waived, so long as the particular form of tender itself is not objected to, it is not open to the party later to contend that the tender was bad for that reason. In this case, at any rate, in view of the defendant not objecting to the form of the tender in the written statement, I do not think it is open to the defendant to urge it now. 11. What I have said above with regard to the form in which tender was made would also apply to the objection raised that money was sent by the plaintiff's wife and not the plaintiff. Certainly there cannot be any objection on this ground because the plaintiff's wife was acting merely for her husband as is seen from her letter accompanying the demand draft. Normally one sees no reason why there should be any objection on that ground. Apart from that, no objection was raised on this score. Even if an objection could be raised it must therefore be assumed that it has been waived. 12. The next contention raised as to the validity of the tender concerns the time of tender. I have stated earlier in this judgment that so far as this particular contract is concerned time is certainly the essence and performance contemplated must be before the 29th of September 1963. The question which arises in this case is whether there has been an offer of performance before that time. The demand draft was sent by the debtor by post to the defendant on 25th September 1963. There was sufficient time for it to reach the defendant, in the normal course. The address to which it was sent is the address of the defendant. For some reason or other it reached Palghat only a day late. If the Postal Department is constituted an agent of the defendant by agreement the fact that there is delay in transmission may not be material. There is no express constitution of the Postal Department as an agent of the defendant. For some reason or other it reached Palghat only a day late. If the Postal Department is constituted an agent of the defendant by agreement the fact that there is delay in transmission may not be material. There is no express constitution of the Postal Department as an agent of the defendant. There is no express agreement that the tender may be made by post. But if it is reasonable to assume that in the normal course such tender would be made by post, and parties contemplated it, that would be sufficient to constitute the Postal Department as the agent of the defendant for this purpose. In that event the offer should be deemed to have been made in time. In Ext. P-14, a letter written in February 1963 by the defendant to the plaintiff she reiterates her willingness to execute conveyance on payment made to her. She says therein Malayalam This letter is written from Palghat to plaintiff at his address. It would indicate that payment is to be made to the defendant at Palghat. It is only normal to assume contemplation by parties of such business being transacted by post. The essence of the question is what is the mode that was in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract. I need in this connection refer only to a passage in the decision of the Madras High Court reported in Hairoon Bibi v. The United India Life Insurance Co. Ltd., Madras (A.I.R. 1947 Mad. 122). In that case the question arose whether money remitted by post in payment of insurance premium before the death of the insured, and received only a day after such death must be taken to have been paid on the date it was sent by Money Order. Dealing with this question Chandasekhara Aiyar, J. said: "I agree that the word "remit" does not necessarily mean sending the money by post. The idea of a direct payment in person or by messenger might also be involved; but in construing a commercial letter we have to pay regard to the practice or course of dealing between the parties and find out what could have been intended Abdul Karim was in an out of the way village in the district and we have evidence of a number of occasions when premia were sent by postal money order. Therefore such remittance is not only one of the modes that must have been in the contemplation of the parties, but one is led to think in the present case, having regard to what happened previously that it was probably the mode of payment that was intended." The argument that such remittance cannot be said to be payment since the remitter had, under law, the right to recall was also met by the learned Judge: "That the remitter has got a right, qualified or absolute, to instruct the Post Office not to pay the money to the payee, which is sad to be provided by rules 275 and 276 of the rules framed under the Indian Post Office Act, has in my opinion nothing to do with the question whether when the person who is called upon to do a particular thing does it in the manner in which the proposer authorises him to do it, the proposer is not bound by what has been done. The law on the subject is very clear and is found laid down not only in section 4 of the Indian Contract Act and in the illustrations thereto but also in section 50 of the same Act, illustration (d). It is also found discussed at length in [(1892) 2 Ch. 27]. There is nothing in the rules referred to above which compels us to modify the general prepositions of law that if the promisee prescribes or sanctions any manner of performance, performance in that manner discharges the obligation of the promisor." 13. I think, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it is possible to say that parties would have contemplated payment being made in the manner it was attempted to be made, namely by sending the demand draft by post. If that was in the contemplation of the parties, that would be sufficient to hold that the plaintiff, having posted the demand draft sufficiently early, and in time for the same to have been received by the defendant in the normal course within the date of the expiry of the term, cannot be found to be a defaulter. It must be found that he had offered to perform his part of the contract in time. 14. For the reasons which I have stated above I find that the plaintiff is not a defaulter and is therefore entitled to succeed. It must be found that he had offered to perform his part of the contract in time. 14. For the reasons which I have stated above I find that the plaintiff is not a defaulter and is therefore entitled to succeed. In that view I hold the plaintiff is entitled to the decree for specific performance of the contract. I therefore allow this second appeal and grant plaintiff a decree for specific performance with costs in terms of the plaint.