Judgment B.D.Singh, J. 1. This appeal by the decree-holder is directed against the order dated the 20th July. 1967, passed by the Fourth Additional Subordinate Judge, Chapra, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 119/22 of 1965/66 reversing the order of the Munsif, Third court, in Miscellaneous case No. 18 of 1964 dated the 12th June 1965. In order to appreciate the point for decision in this appeal, it will be necessary to state briefly the facts. The appellant-decree holder executed a decree in Execution case No. 134 of 1961. In that execution, certain properties of the judgment-debtor-respondent were put to sale. The iudgment-debtor deposited Rs. 2958.70 P. by a chalan, and the execution case was disposed of with a note of full satisfaction on the 25th January, 1962. Subsequently, the appellant inspected the record and learnt that there had been a mistake .by the office of the executing court. Some of the decretal amount was left to be calculated, and the interest was not calculated in accordance with law. A part of the cost of the execution was also left out of consideration. The appellant thereafter filed a petition before the executing court under Sec.151 read with Order 21 Rule 89 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure pointing out the above mistakes made by the ministerial officer of the court, and prayed that the execution case may be restored and after rectifying the mistake made in the calculation the said amount be realised from the iudgment-debtor in accordance with law. The application so filed by the appellant save rise to miscellaneous case No. 18 of 1964. 2. After hearing the respondent, the executing court allowed the application filed by the appellant acting under its inherent power by order dated the 12th June 1965. Aggrieved by the said! order, the judgment-debtor-respondent filed an appeal, which was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 119/22 of 1965/ 66, as mentioned above. After hearing the parties the appellate court set aside the order passed by the executing court in the said miscellaneous case. Hence this appeal by the decree-holder. 3. Learned Counsel, appearing, on behalf of the appellant, has referred to the order dated the 12th June, 1965, passed by the executing court, particularly to paragraphs 5 and 6 of that order, where the learned Munsif has specifically stated that the mistake was committed by the court itself in calculating the exact decretal amount. 3. Learned Counsel, appearing, on behalf of the appellant, has referred to the order dated the 12th June, 1965, passed by the executing court, particularly to paragraphs 5 and 6 of that order, where the learned Munsif has specifically stated that the mistake was committed by the court itself in calculating the exact decretal amount. Learned counsel submitted that in that view of the matter, the appellate court has erred in sett-Ing aside the order of the Munsif. He submitted that a court has ample jurisdiction to rectify its own mistake, and. for the mistake of the court, the parties should not be allowed to suffer. 4. In order to substantiate his point, learned counsel relied on a judg-ment of this court by Agarwala, J. in Nanhu Prasad Singh V/s. Nandan Missir (AIR 1934 Pat 246) where his Lordship was dealing with the provisions contained under Order 21, Rule 89 of the Civil Procedure Code ("hereinafter referred to as the Code). It was held therein that where a deposit made for the purpose of setting aside a sale is short by a small amount, due to the applicant being misled by the office, whose duty it is to check the deposit such an act is not a casual act of an officer of the Court and if a party is misled by the act. the court should set the matter right. He also referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Keshardeo V/s. Radha Kissen ( AIR 1953 SC 23 ) where their Lordships at page 26 in paragraph 13 observed that as the subordinate judge was correcting his own error in the exercise of his inherent powers, it was not necessary for him to investigate into the correctness of the various allegations and counter-allegations made by the parties. He was the best judge of the procedure that was usually adopted in his court in such cases and there was no reason whatsoever for the supposition that when the subordinate Judge said that he had not given any opportunity to the decree-holders pleader to take any steps in execution of the decree after dismissal of the adjournment application, he was not right. Their Lordships further observed that the solid fact remained that he was rot given that opportunity and that being so, the order dismissing the execution was bad and was rightly corrected by the Court on its own initiative in the exercise of its inherent powers. 5. On the other hand. Mr. Janar-dan Prasad Singh. learned counsel appearing for the respondent, submitted that the decree was dated the 25th February, 1961. after the execution was levied by the decree-holder-appellant. he filed satisfaction petition on the 25th January. 1962 and the satisfaction was also recorded on the same date by the court. He submitted that once satisfaction had been recorded, the court becomes functus officio and. therefore, after that, execution could not have been reopened on the petition filed by the appellant on the 24th February. 1964. In order to find support to his contention, he relied on a Bench decision in Pitam Lal V/s. Balwant Singh. AIR 1925 All 556 where Daniels. J. observed that when a decree for money had been fully satisfied and discharged the court was functus officio and could no longer entertain an application for amendment under Sec.152 of the Code. He also referred to a "judgment of Spencer, J., in Muniswami Pillai V/s. Hussainkhan Sahib, AIR 1926 Mad 516 where his Lordship observed that a court would not be justified in making a correction under Sec.152 of the Code, which involved the payment of a larger sum of money by one party to another long after satisfaction had been recorded and when nothing remained to be done and the decree had become dead. In my view, in those cases, no general guide-line has been laid down by their Lordships. It depends upon the facts of each case. In Munuswami Mudali V/s. Jagannadha Red-di. AIR 1929 Mad 830 those two cases were distinguished and explained. 6. In my opinion, the principles laid down in AIR 1925 All 556 (supra) and AIR 192G Mad 516 (supra) are not applicable to the facts of the instant case. From the facts stated in those cases, it does not appear that the ministerial officers of the court had committed any mistake in calculating the decretal amount, as it was done in tho present case. In my judgment, it is well established that none should be allowed to suffer due to any fault or mistake of the court itself. From the facts stated in those cases, it does not appear that the ministerial officers of the court had committed any mistake in calculating the decretal amount, as it was done in tho present case. In my judgment, it is well established that none should be allowed to suffer due to any fault or mistake of the court itself. In Moti Dei V/s. Cuttack Bank Ltd., AIR 1964 Orissa 185. G. K. Misra. J. at page 186 in paragraph 7 observed: "The learned Judge failed to exercise his jurisdiction in not recalling his order dated 23-12-1961. There is high authority for the proposition that under the inherent power of the court, the court can rectify its own mistake and can recall the order. In AIR 1953 SC 23 their Lordships laid down that the court had full powers to correct its own error in exercise of its inherent powers. In the case before their Lordships, the decree-holder was not given opportunity and the court rightly corrected its order of dismissal of the execution case even on its own initiative in the exercise of its inherent powers. Their Lordships observed that the judge had jurisdiction to correct its own error even without entering into discussion of the grounds taken bv the decree-holder or the objections raised by the judgment-debtor." In Muthialpet Benefit Fund Ltd. V/s. V. Devarajulu Chetty. AIR 1955 Mad 455 Ramaswami. J. while dealing with the provisions contained under Sec.151 of the Code observed that every court must in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, be deemed to possess inherent in itself such powers as are necessary to do right and to undo wrongs in the course of administration of justice. Besides, in the instant case, the executing court has clearly admitted that by mistake some amount was left to be add-ed to the decretal amount. In that view of the matter, the satisfaction petition recorded by the Court is not valid, which can also be recalled by the court, in Konathala Sriramulu V/s. Board of Revenue (C. T.) Hyderabad, AIR 1965 Andh Pra 395. P. Chandra Reddy. In that view of the matter, the satisfaction petition recorded by the Court is not valid, which can also be recalled by the court, in Konathala Sriramulu V/s. Board of Revenue (C. T.) Hyderabad, AIR 1965 Andh Pra 395. P. Chandra Reddy. C. J. and Nara-simham, J. at pages 397-98 in paragraph 23 observed: - "Apart from the authority furnished by the case of Sri Ramakrishna Commercial Society Ltd. V/s. State of A. P. (1962) 2 Andh WR 244 = (AIR 1961 Andh Pra 86) (FB) in which the very learned counsel appeared for the petitioners and in which in similar circumstances the order for refund was recalled, there is an authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in B. V. Patankar V/s. C. G. Saptry. AIR 1961 SC 272 which laid down that a court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction derived from Sec.151 C. P. C. could set aside an order made contrary to the terms of the Rent Control Act. In support of their conclusion, their Lordships referred to a judgment of the Privv Council in J. Marret V/s. Mahomed Khaleel Shirazi & Sons. AIR 1930 PC 86 in which it was laid down that an order made by the executing court contrary to the terms of the decree directing payment of a certain fund to the decree-holder, could be set aside in exercise of the inherent powers". 7. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the decree was dated the 25th February. 1961. whereas the appellant had filed application for reopening the execution on the 24th February. 1964. On the ground of delay, according to him. his application aught not to have been entertained by the learned Munsif. In my view, his contention is not sound. When the mistake was not of the appellant, but of the court itself, in calculating the decretal amount, leaving out some of the decretal amount, the court could rectify its own mistake even suo motu. In such cases, the question of delay does not arise. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant drew my attention to the observation made by the appellate court that the appeal filed by the respondent before it, was not maintainable. as the learned Munsif had passed the order dated the 12th June. 1965 under Sec.151 of the Code. Therefore. In such cases, the question of delay does not arise. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant drew my attention to the observation made by the appellate court that the appeal filed by the respondent before it, was not maintainable. as the learned Munsif had passed the order dated the 12th June. 1965 under Sec.151 of the Code. Therefore. according to learned counsel, the appellate court erred in setting aside the said order of the learned Munsif. He argued that if the appeal was not maintainable, the appellate court had no iurisdiction to set aside the order of the Munsif on merit. In my opinion, in this case it is not necessary at this stage to decide whether the appeal was maintainable or not. 9. In view of the above discussions, in my opinion, the impugned order of the appellate court cannot be sustain-ed. In my judgment. it erred in setting aside the order passed by the learned Munsif. 10. Before I part with the judgment. I would direct the executing court to dispose of the execution case as soon as possible. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of the lower appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored In the circumstances of the case however, there will bp no order as to costs.