PATHAK, J:- By this application under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has prayed for a writ quashing the order of the Assam Board of Revenue passed on 17-8-70. Tenders were called for by the settling authority for the settlement of Sonari Country Spirit Shop for the period 1970-73. The petitioner and several other persons including the respondent No. 2 Jogesh Chandra Dutta filed tenders. The shop was settled on 17-12-1969 with the petitioner by the Sub-divisional Officer o£ Sibsagar agreeing with the unanimous ad­vice of the Advisory Committee set up under the provisions of the Assam Excise Act. Against this order of settlement three appeals were preferred before the Assam Board of Revenue. Case No. 21E of 1970 was the appeal preferred by Jogesh Chan­dra Dutta respondent No. 2. The other two appeals were numbered as 36-E and 37-E of 1970. All the three appeals were heard together and by a common judgment and order the learned Board of Revenue set aside settlement of the shop with the petitioner and ordered settlement of the same with res­pondent No. 2. 2. Mr. P. Choudhuri, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 raises a preliminary point and submits that the petition praying for a writ of certiorari is not maintainable inasmuch as the pri­mary settling authority, namely the Sub-divisional Officer, has not been made a party. His submission is that unless the primary settling authority Is made a party in the case, no writ of certiorari can be issued. In this connection he has referred to Nazir­uddin Sirajuddin v. P. S. Lawale, AIR 1956 Nag 65. 3. Dr. t. C. Medhi, the learned Advocate-General of Assam appearing on be­half of the petitioner submits that in the instant case the primary settling authority made the settlement in favour of the peti­tioner, but on appeal the Board of Revenue set aside that order. The petitioner prays for restoration of the order of the primary settling authority by quashing the appellate order and the petitioner has no grievance against the sub-divisional Officer's order. 4. In AIR 1956 Nag 65 (supra) the petitioner questioned the order of the ap­pellate authority, which affirmed the order of the primary authority and as a result the petitioner in that case wanted the order of the primary authority as affirmed by the ap­pellate authority to be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari. 4. In AIR 1956 Nag 65 (supra) the petitioner questioned the order of the ap­pellate authority, which affirmed the order of the primary authority and as a result the petitioner in that case wanted the order of the primary authority as affirmed by the ap­pellate authority to be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari. The instant case is thus distinguishable on facts from AIR 1956 Nag 65 (supra). 5. In the instant case the petitioner prays for quashing the order of the Revenue Board and if that is quashed, the order of the primary authority will stand and there­fore in our opinion even though the primary authority has not been made a party in the instant case, a writ of certiorari may issue in the instant case if the petitioner is able to make out a case for such a writ. We may however observe that in such matters it is always advisable that both the primary authority as well as the appellate authority are made parties whether it is an order of affordance or reversal. We therefore rule out the preliminary objection. 6. The learned Advocate-General submits that in the instant case after consi­dering all the facts and circumstances of the case and in conformity with the unani­mous advice of the Advisory Committee constituted under the provisions of the Assam Excise Act, the primary authority settled the country spirit shop with the peti­tioner. The learned Revenue Board found that both the petitioner and respondent No. 2 had the requisite finance for smooth management of the shop and both of them were equally suitable tenderers. The learn­ed Revenue Board, however, took into con­sideration Executive Instruction 109 of the Assam Excise Manual and observed that res­pondent No. 2 being an unemployed edu­cated youth, he should have been given pre­ference and therefore set aside the order ol the Sub-divisional Officer. The learned Advocate-General submits that the impugn­ed order of the learned Revenue Board is liable to be quashed on two grounds:- (1) That the Assam Board of Revenue, which is a quasi-judicial authority, is not bound by the Executive Instructions but it has to decide the appeal independently ac­cording to law without being influenced by executive instructions. The learned Advocate-General submits that the impugn­ed order of the learned Revenue Board is liable to be quashed on two grounds:- (1) That the Assam Board of Revenue, which is a quasi-judicial authority, is not bound by the Executive Instructions but it has to decide the appeal independently ac­cording to law without being influenced by executive instructions. In the instant case the learned Board has been led by the Exe­cutive Instruction and therefore has failed to exercise its jurisdiction and its order is thus liable to be quashed; and (2) that even assuming that the Reve­nue Board may take into consideration the Executive Instruction No. 109, its order is not in accordance with that executive ins­truction inasmuch as there is no material on record to find that the respondent No. 2 was an unemployed educated youth. The educational qualification of the peti­tioner and the respondent No. 2 is more or less the same inasmuch as the petitioner read up to Class X and the respondent No. 2 read up to matriculation classes. If a per­son with such educational qualification may be called educated both are educated. The petitioner is stated to be aged about 46 years whereas the respondent No. 2 is stated to be aged about 25 years and therefore both are covered by the term youth. The learned Board observes that both the petitioner and the respondent No. 2 being suitable, the settling authority should have preferred respondent No. 2 inasmuch as he was an unemployed educated youth. The learned Advocate-General submits that the finding of the learned Revenue Board that the respondent No. 2 was an unem­ployed person is without any material on re­cord. On the contrary there are materials on record to show that the respondent No. 2 is employed. The finding of the learned Board to the effect that respondent No. 2 is an unemployed person being based on no material is perverse and therefore the im­pugned order based on such perverse find­ing is liable to be quashed by issuing a writ of certiorari. In this connection the learn­ed Advocate-General draws our attention to Annexure B the tender of the respondent No. 2 wherein he has shown cultivation as his present and past occupation. In An­nexure C the declaration made by the res­pondent No. 2 regarding his assets and pro­perties he has shown that he has seventy bighas of land. 7. Mr. In this connection the learn­ed Advocate-General draws our attention to Annexure B the tender of the respondent No. 2 wherein he has shown cultivation as his present and past occupation. In An­nexure C the declaration made by the res­pondent No. 2 regarding his assets and pro­perties he has shown that he has seventy bighas of land. 7. Mr. P. Choudhuri, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 submits that in the ground No. VI in the appeal memorandum filed before the Revenue Board it was stated that the respondent No. 2 (who was appellant before the Reve­nue Board) was an unemployed educated youth and there was no denial of that state­ment by counter affidavit. The learned counsel therefore submits that it was not correct to say that there were no materials on record for the finding that the respon­dent No. 2 was an unemployed person. 8. Let us consider the second sub­mission of the learned Advocate General first. The learned Revenue Board has found both the petitioner and respondent No. 2 equally suitable but has preferred respondent No. 2 in view of Executive Instruction No. 109 which says that preference should be given to unemployed educated youth. So far as "educated" and "youth" both of them stand on the same footing more or less and the learned Board has laid stress on the unem­ployed condition of the respondent No. 2. 9. The tender form requires the tenderer to state his present and past occu­pation. In his tender (Annexure B to the petition) respondent No. 2 has stated that his present and past occupation is cultiva­tion. In his declaration of assets and pro­perties (Annexure C to the petition) res­pondent No. 2 stated that he had 70 bighas of land of several periodic pattas. In his appeal petition before the Board respondent No. 2 did not make any verified statement or any statement on oath that he was an unemployed person. He however stated in ground No. VI of the appeal memorandum that he was an unemployed educated youth. But that statement is found only in the ground of the memorandum of appeal and it is neither verified nor supported by any affidavit. That being the position this state­ment could not be taken into consideration as evidence in the case. He however stated in ground No. VI of the appeal memorandum that he was an unemployed educated youth. But that statement is found only in the ground of the memorandum of appeal and it is neither verified nor supported by any affidavit. That being the position this state­ment could not be taken into consideration as evidence in the case. On the other hand it is quite clear from the tender and the declaration that the respondent No. 2's occupation is cultiva­tion and he has got 70 bighas of land. The dictionary meaning of 'occupation' is 'the state of being employed or occupied; habi­tual employment, profession, craft or trade'. We are therefore clearly of the opinion that the materials on record clearly go to show that respondent No. 2 admittedly has the occupation of cultivation and therefore the finding of the learned Board to the eject that the respondent No. 2 is an unemployed person is based on no evidence or materials on record and it is contrary to the mate­rials on record. This finding is thus per­verse. 10. Mr. Choudhuri, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 submits that the finding of the learned Board to the effect that the respondent No. 2 is an un­employed educated youth is a finding of fact and even if there be any error in arriving at that finding, it is not an error of law apparent on the face of the record calling for issue of a writ of certiorari. In this connection he has referred to Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, AIR 1958 SC 398 . The learned counsel submits that it has been de­finitely held in the aforesaid case by the Supreme Court that a Writ of certiorari can be issued only when there is an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record. In the instant case the finding of the Board that the respondent No. 2 is an unemployed person is a clear finding of fact and it cannot be said to be an error of law, far less, an error of law apparent on the face of the record. In the circumstances the learned counsel submits that no writ of cer­tiorari may be issued in the instant case. 11. In the circumstances the learned counsel submits that no writ of cer­tiorari may be issued in the instant case. 11. The precise question that arises for consideration in the instant case is whe­ther an order based on a finding of fact arrived at by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority, which is supported by no evi­dence on record, may be quashed by issu­ing a writ of certiorari. It has been held in Nagendra Nath Bora's case, AIR 1958 SC 398 (supra) that a writ of certiorari may be issued to correct an error of law which is manifest on the face of the record. In the said case the Supreme Court has fur­ther observed as follows:- "But the question still remains as to what is the legal import of the expression 'error of law apparent on the face of the record'. Is it every error of law that can attract the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, to quash the order impugned? This Court, as observed above, has settled the law in this respect by laying down that in order to attract such jurisdiction, it is es­sential that the error should be something more than a mere error of law; that it must be one which is manifest on the face of the record. In this respect, the law in India and the law in England are, therefore, the same. It is also clear, on an examination of all the authorities of this Court and of those in England, referred to above, as also those considered in the several judgments of this Court, that the common-law writ, now called order of certiorari, which was adopted by our Constitution, is not meant to take the place of an appeal where the statute does not confer a right of appeal. Its purpose is only to determine, on an examination of the record, whether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceed­ed in accordance with the essential require­ments of the law which it was meant to ad­minister. Mere formal or technical errors, even though of law, will not be sufficient to attract this extraordinary jurisdiction." It is thus a settled law that a writ of cer­tiorari may be issued when it is found that there is some error of law apparent on the face of the record. Mere formal or technical errors, even though of law, will not be sufficient to attract this extraordinary jurisdiction." It is thus a settled law that a writ of cer­tiorari may be issued when it is found that there is some error of law apparent on the face of the record. The Supreme Court also has observed that the law on the point in India is same as in England. 12. Let us now consider in the light of decided cases whether a finding of fact based on no materials on record may be said to be an error of law apparent on the face of the record and an order based on such a finding of fact may be quashed by a writ of certiorari. 13. In Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow, 1956 AC 14 = (1955) 3 All ER 48, Lord Radcliffe observed as follows:- "I think that the true position of the court in all these cases can be shortly stated. If a party to a hearing before Commissioners expresses dissatisfaction with their determi­nation as being erroneous in point of law, it is for them to state a case and in the body of it to set out the facts that they have found as well as their determination. I do not think that inferences drawn from other facts are incapable of being themselves find­ings of fact, although there is value in the distinction between primary facts and infer­ences drawn from them. When the case comes before the Court it is its duty to examine the determination having regard to its knowledge of the relevant law. If the case contains anything ex facie which is bad law and which bears upon the determina­tion, it is, obviously, erroneous in point of law. But, without any such misconception appearing ex facie, it may be that the facts found are such that no person acting judi­cially and properly instructed as to the rele­vant law could have come to the determi­nation under appeal. In those circumstan­ces, too, the court must intervene. It has no option but to assume that there has been some misconception of the law and that this has been responsible for the determination. So there, too, there has been error in point of law. In those circumstan­ces, too, the court must intervene. It has no option but to assume that there has been some misconception of the law and that this has been responsible for the determination. So there, too, there has been error in point of law. I do not think that it much mat­ters whether this state of affairs is describ­ed as one in which there is no evidence to support the determination or as one in which the evidence is inconsistent with and contradictory of the determination, or as one in which the true and only reasonable conclusion contradicts the determination. Rightly understood, each phrase propounds the same test. For my part, I prefer the last of the three, since I think that it is rather misleading to speak of there being no evidence to support a conclusion when in cases such as these many of the facts are likely to be neutral in themselves, and only to take their colour from the combination of circumstances in which they are found to occur." 14. The above principle laid down by Lord Radcliffe was applied by Denning, L. J., in Regina v. Medical Appeal Tribu­nal, (1957) 1 QBD 574, wherein the Lord Justice observed as follows:- "It is now settled that when a tribunal came to a conclusion which could not rea­sonably be entertained by them if they pro­perly understood the relevant enactment, then they fall into error in point of law: see 1956 AC 14. When the primary facts ap­pear on the record, an error of this kind is sufficiently apparent for it to be regarded as an error on the face of the record such as to warrant the intervention of this Court by certiorari................ It seems to me that the tribunal can­not, by failing to find the material facts, de­feat an application for certiorari." 15. In the Provincial Transport Service v. State Industrial Court, (1963) 3 SCR 650 = ( AIR 1963 SC 114 ) die Supreme Court observed as follows:- "It has often been pointed out by emi­nent Judges that when it appears to an ap­pellate court that no person properly ins­tructed in law and acting judicially could have reached the particular decision the Court may proceed on the assumption that misconception of law has been responsible for the wrong decision. The decision of the Assistant Labour Commissioner that no enquiry had been held by the management amounts therefore, in out opinion, to a clear error in law. The Industrial Court erred in thinking that it was bound by this deci­sion of the Labour Commissioner and this error on its part was, in our opinion, an error so apparent on the face of the record that was proper and reasonable for the High Court to correct that error." 16. In State of Orissa v. Murlidhar Jena, AIR 1963 SC 404 the Supreme Court observed as follows:- "In the present appeal it has been urg­ed before us by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri on behalf of the appellants that the view taken by the High Court that the findings of the Tribunal were not supported by any evi­dence is obviously incorrect and that the High Court has in fact purported to reappreciate the evidence which it had no jurisdiction to do. It is common ground that in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent tribunal in a departmental enquiry so that if we are satisfied that in the present case the High Court has purported to reappreciate the evidence for itself that would be outside its jurisdiction. It is also common-ground that if it is shown that the impugned findings recorded by the Administrative Tribunal are not supported by any evidence the High Court would be justified in setting aside the said findings." 17. In Avadh Narain Singh v. Addl. Supdt. of Police, AIR 1960 All 304 the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court observed as follows:- "I make no apology for quoting exten­sively from the speeches of the Noble Lords who delivered the leading judgments in this case, for the case may well prove to be an­other land-mark in the history of certiorari. The Court examined a finding by the Com­missioners to the effect that a particular transaction was not an adventure in the nature of trade. There was no error or misconception of law in this finding ex facie but it was held that the finding could not stand because, on the facts, no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the law could have given it. There was no error or misconception of law in this finding ex facie but it was held that the finding could not stand because, on the facts, no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the law could have given it. The Court exa­mined the various links in the chain of rea­sonings of the Commissioners and held, in effect, that not one of them could stand the strain or rational argument. Viscount Simonds made it clear that the magic phrase 'finding of fact would not deter him from interfering with a decision which though a pure finding of fact, could not reasonably be entertained. To quote from his speech once again I would make it clear, that in my opinion, whatever test is adopted, that is whether the finding that the transaction was not an ad­venture in the nature of trade is to be re­garded as a pure finding of fact, or as the determination of a question of law, or of mixed law and fact, the same result is reach­ed in this case. The determination cannot stand: this appeal must be allowed and the assessment must be confirmed. This deci­sion is an authority for the principle that a finding of fact may be quashed by certiorari if on an examination of all the relevant facts on the record, the superior court holds that no reasonable person could have arriv­ed at it." 18. On consideration of the decisions referred to above, we are clearly of the opinion that if there are no materials on record to support a finding of fact arrived at by a tribunal any order passed by the Tribunal based on such a finding is liable to be quashed on the ground that there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. So also if a finding of fact is such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed could have given it on an examination of all the relevant facts on record, it may be quashed by certiorari. 19. In the instant case we find that the Revenue Board's finding to the effect that respondent No, 2 was an unemployed person is based on no materials on record and it goes directly contrary to the statement made by respondent No. 2 in his tender and as such the finding is perverse. 19. In the instant case we find that the Revenue Board's finding to the effect that respondent No, 2 was an unemployed person is based on no materials on record and it goes directly contrary to the statement made by respondent No. 2 in his tender and as such the finding is perverse. The Reve­nue Board's determination of the case is based on this perverse finding. Hence we find that the impugned order of the Board is liable to be quashed by certiorari. Even without entering into the question whether the Board which is a quasi-judicial tribu­nal, was correct in following the executive instruction in question, we are of the opinion that even in following the executive instruction 109, the Board's finding that respondent No. 2 is an unemployed person is without any materials on record but it is contrary to the materials on record. The impugned order of the learned Board being based on such finding of fact is not at afl sustainable and is liable to be quashed. In the circumstances we quash the impugned order of the learned Board of Revenue in exercise of our powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case we however make no order^ as to costs. The primary settling authority's order of settlement is restored. D. M. SEN, J.:- 20. I agree. Petition allowed