JUDGMENT : S. Anwar Ahmad, J. 1. On a report of the Dehri police, dated the 11th November, 1962, a proceeding under Section 107, Code of Criminal Procedure, was started against the petitioners as well as against opposite party no. 2 and others and numbered as Case No. 24M and 25M of 1962, respectively. The proceedings continued from 1962 onwards up to 1968 when by ORDER :dated the 14th August, 1968, both the proceedings were dropped. The ORDER :dropping the proceeding in Case No. 24M (against the petitioners) ran as follows: Three opposite party present. Rest 24 opposite parties are absent and unrepresented. No P.W. is in attendance. First party has filed a petition praying therein that the action should be taken against the opposite parties who are absent. The proceeding was started in 1962 and since it is dragged on one point or the other, there can be no apprehension of breach of peace now. As such the proceeding is dropped and the opposite parties are discharged from the liabilities of bail bond. The ORDER :dropping the proceeding in Case No. 25M of 1962 is in the following terms: 17 opposite party present. Rest 17 opposite party are absent........1st party also present. No P.W. is in attendance. The 1st party's lawyer says that the proceeding be dropped as the 1st party members have no apprehension of breach of peace at the hands of the opposite party at present. As such proceeding is dropped and the opposite party are discharged from the liabilities of bail bond. On the 19th August, 1968, opposite party no. 2 filed a petition before the learned Magistrate for a recall and review of the ORDER :dated the 14th August, 1968, so that an ORDER :on merits regarding the allegations against him be passed; and suitable action may be taken against petitioner no. 4 and others for lodging false information to the police and giving false evidence in court. By the impugned ORDER :, the learned Magistrate reviewed his ORDER :dated the 14th August, 1968, on the ground that it was not passed on merits, it was not a JUDGMENT : and he had jurisdiction to revive the proceeding and pass ORDER :s on merits. But so far as the merits of the case is concerned, it is stated in the impugned ORDER :. But so far as the merits of the case is concerned, it is stated in the impugned ORDER :. As the party themselves say that there is no apprehension of breach of peace to them at the hands of the opposite party the opposite party cannot be bound down. This proceeding is, however, reviewed and the ORDER :dated 14.8.68 is recalled for the purpose of finding if the allegations of the 1st party that Lakhandeo Singh (opposite party no. 2 before the High Court) committed overt acts on 26.10.62 and 1.11.62 is correct or he has been falsely implicated. Finally, the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that the petitioners had intentionally given false evidence in the 107 Proceeding and, therefore, they should be prosecuted under Section 193, Indian Penal Code. 2. In support of the application, two points have been raised on behalf of the petitioners: (1) that as by ORDER :dated 14.8.68, the 107 Proceeding did come to a close, it was final ORDER :and could not be reviewed by the Magistrate and (2) that in any view of the matter the proceeding could not be revived for prosecuting the petitioners as it violated the spirit of Section 479A, Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the opposite party, the ORDER :dated the 14th August, 1968, was not a JUDGMENT : as it did not come under Sub-section (6) of Section 367, Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the ORDER :dated 14th August, 1968 discharging the opposite party cannot be regarded as a JUDGMENT : and the learned Magistrate had jurisdiction to review the same. 3. For the purposes of this case, I would proceed on the assumption that the ORDER :dated the 14th August, 1968, by which the proceeding against the opposite party was dropped was not a JUDGMENT : but even if so, as it terminated the 107 Proceeding pending against the opposite party, it has to be classified as a final ORDER :and the learned Magistrate could not review the same. Unlike the Code of Civil Procedure, the Criminal Procedure Code does not contain any provision for review of the ORDER :s passed by the Magistrate. As a general provision of law it has been held times without number that a Magistrate cannot review or alter an ORDER :once passed by him, vide (1) T. Narasinga Rao V. Vittcba Rai (A.I.R. 1916 Mad 1220 (1). As a general provision of law it has been held times without number that a Magistrate cannot review or alter an ORDER :once passed by him, vide (1) T. Narasinga Rao V. Vittcba Rai (A.I.R. 1916 Mad 1220 (1). In (2) re Hari Lal Buch (I.L.R. 22 Bom 949 and (3) Parbati Charan Roy V. Sajjad Ahma 1 Choudhury (I.L.R. 35 Cal 350); but some decisions have taken the view that if the ORDER :is of an interlocutory nature and not final, a Magistrate can recall the same. The consistent view, however, is that if the ORDER :is final it cannot be reviewed or recalled. The words "final ORDER :" have not been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, but its meaning is not settled by a large number of decisions on the point. 4. In (4) Gajo Chaudhry V. Devi Chaudhry (A.I.R. 1923 Pat 532) Kulwant Sahay, J. was pleased to hold that an entry in the ORDER :-sheet enter false, mistake of law is an ORDER :finally disposing of the case and has the effect of destroying the proceedings and, therefore, under Section 369, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to alter or review that ORDER :. In (5) Rasik Tatma V. Bhagwan Tanti (A.I.R. 1958 Pat 239), Jamuar and Dayal, JJ. approved the above decision of Kulwant Sahay, J. and held that in a criminal case the Magistrate after once having signed and completed his ORDER :, has no jurisdiction to review or revise the same. In (6) Bozson V. Altrincham Urban Council [(1903) 1 King's Bench Division 547] Lord Alverstone, C.J. held: It seems to me that the real test for determining this question ought to be this: Does the JUDGMENT : or ORDER :, as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties? If it does, then I think it ought to be treated as a final ORDER :but if it does not, it is in my opinion, an interlocutory ORDER :. The above test of finality of the ORDER :was quoted with approval in (7) Issacs & Sons V. Salbstein [(1916) 2 King's Bench Division 139 at 146]. If it does, then I think it ought to be treated as a final ORDER :but if it does not, it is in my opinion, an interlocutory ORDER :. The above test of finality of the ORDER :was quoted with approval in (7) Issacs & Sons V. Salbstein [(1916) 2 King's Bench Division 139 at 146]. In (8) Salaman V. Warner [(1891) 1 Queen's Bench Division 734], on a review of a large number of decisions, the test of a final ORDER :was laid down as: A 'final ORDER :' is one made on such an application or proceeding that, for whichever side the decision is given, it will, if it stands, finally determine the matter in litigation. Relying on the above decisions (8) [(1891) 1 Queen's Bench Division 734 and (6) (1903) 1 King's Bench Division 547], the question as to what constitutes a final ORDER :was considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in (9) Firm Ramchand Manjimal V. Firm Goverdhandas Vishandas Ratanchand (A.I.R. 1920 PC 86) and it was held that if the effect of an ORDER :was not it finally disposed of the rights of the parties, it was a final ORDER :. In (10) Dr. Hori Ram Singh V. Emperor (A.I.R. 1939 FC 43 at p. 49), Sulaiman, J. held as follows: As the 'final ORDER :' may be either in a civil or criminal case the definition given by their Lordships in the civil case must by analogy be applied to a criminal case as well. In (11) Kuppuswami Rao V. The King (A.I.R. 1949 FC 1) it was laid down that the ORDER :was not final as the trial proceeded. The observations of Lord Esher, M.R. in (8) Salaman V. Warner [(1891) 1 Queen's Bench Division 734 supra] was quoted with approval and relied upon by their Lordships in (12) Messrs Moolji Jaitha and Co. V. The Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. (A.I.R. 1950 FC 83). There are also a large number of decisions on the point by their Lordships of the Supreme Court but reference may only be made to (13) Mohanlal Maganlal Thakkar V. State of Gujarat (A.I.R. 1968 SC 733) where on a consideration of the various earlier decisions, it was held that an ORDER :is final if it decided the rights of the parties conclusively or finally disposed of the controversy between them. So far as the present case is concerned, the ORDER :dated the 14th August, 1968, finally disposed of the proceeding under Section 107 against opposite party no. 2 and others on the ground that there was no more any apprehension of a breach of the peace. This ORDER :must, therefore, be held to be a final ORDER :which the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to review or recall. It follows, therefore, that the impugned ORDER :by which the ORDER :dated the 14th August, 1968, has been reviewed, has got to be set aside. 5. Counsel for the opposite party relying upon an observation of Kanhaiyaji, J. in (14) Rupdeo Singh V. Natha Singh (A.I.R. 1970 Pat 134) has contended that before any notice to show cause is issued under Section 112 of the Code, a Magistrate has inherent power to reconsider the truth or falsehood of the information received by him. According to learned counsel, he could not do so if notice under Section 112 has been issued. For the very same proposition learned counsel also relied upon (15) Santa Debi V. Lakhanlal Singh (A.I.R. 1968 Pat 326); but in paragraph four of the decision itself it has been stated: Once a proceeding under Section 107 is drawn up, the Magistrate can drop the proceeding only when he is satisfied that there is no longer any apprehension of a breach of the peace at the hands of a party or parties proceeded against. Similar view was expressed by Ramratna Singh, J. in (16) Sheodhar Prasad Singh V. Jagdhar Prasad Singh (1964 B.L.J.R. 105) and Kamla Sahai, J. in (17) Ishwar Prasad alias Ram Niwas V. Sagarmal Kejriwal (1965 B.L.J.R. xcii). We agree with respect with the decisions quoted above and hold that it is always open to a Magistrate, so long as he has not passed the final ORDER :one way or the other, to drop the proceeding when there is no more an apprehension of a breach of the peace. Learned counsel could not bring to our notice any decision wherein it was held that although there was no longer any apprehension of a breach of the peace, the Magistrate could still revive the proceeding, as has been done in the present case. 6. As the revival of the proceeding has been held to be without jurisdiction, point no. Learned counsel could not bring to our notice any decision wherein it was held that although there was no longer any apprehension of a breach of the peace, the Magistrate could still revive the proceeding, as has been done in the present case. 6. As the revival of the proceeding has been held to be without jurisdiction, point no. 2 raised by learned counsel for the petitioners does not require any consideration. The application is accordingly allowed and the ORDER :of the Magistrate, dated the 5th December, 1968, reviewing and recalling his ORDER :dated the 14th August, 1968, is set aside. I agree. Application allowed