Jugal Kishore Dhandhania v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL — 1971 DIGILAW 104 (CAL)

JUDGMENT 1. THIS Rule is at the instance of the complainant-petitioner, Jugal Kishore Dhandhania, against an order dated the 21st March, 1970 passed by Shri S. C. Roy. Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, dismissing the petition of complaint under section 203 Criminal Procedure Code in case No. C/36 of 1970, instituted under section's 217, 221 I. P. C, and 13b (c) and (d) of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866 read with section 34 I. P. C. 2. THE facts leading on to the Rule are short and simple. On the 9th February, 1970 a petition of complaint was filed in the court of Shree S. C. Roy, Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta by the complainant, Jugal Kishore Dhandhania, under sections 217, 221 I. P. C, and 13b (c) and (d) of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866 read with section 34 I. P. C, against three accused persons viz., Ajit Kumar Chatterjee, O. C Jorasanko P. S., S. I., P. Chakraborty and S. I. S. Ghosh, both attached to the said P. S. The prosecution case as made out inter alia is that on 7. 11. 69 at about 9-30 p. m. about 25 men who came to the complainant's residence at No. 203, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta made attempts on his life by hurling at him bombs which exploded with loud bangs but the complainant luckily escaped. Before the bombs were thrown the complainant, apprehending serious troubles, had already telephoned the lalbazar Headquarters for help but the police did not turn up. Immediately after the bombing, the petitioner telephoned again and was told by the officer on-duty that he had already informed the Jorasanko P. S. to send forces to the spot immediately. Some time after the incident, the accused No. 2, S. I., P. Chakraborty came to the place of occurrence and collected some bombs or their parts but neither the splinters of the bombs hurled were collected nor were the statements of the witness to the occurrence were recorded. On 8. 11. 69 the complainant wrote a letter to the accused No. 1, O. C., Jorasanko P S. relating to the abovementioned incident and requested him to take up the case and on 9. 11. On 8. 11. 69 the complainant wrote a letter to the accused No. 1, O. C., Jorasanko P S. relating to the abovementioned incident and requested him to take up the case and on 9. 11. 69 at about 11-15 p. m. one of the offenders, who had thrown bombs on the complainant, was arrested by the accused No. 3, S. Ghosh on identification by the complainant and taken to the accused No. 1. Repeated attempts how ever made by the complainant thereafter to ascertain the progress of the investigation brought no response and ultimately he had to move before the Joint commissioner of police on 20. 11. 1969 a petition addressed to the Commissioner of Police stating the facts of the incident and praying for orders for a proper investigation. Orders were passed there upon by the Joint Commissioner of police but inspite of the same there was no progress and on 27. 11. 69 the complainant again wrote to the Joint Com missioner of Police, Calcutta to see that justice was done and the police were not influenced by influential persons. A petition was also moved by him on 3. 12. 69 before the then Deputy Chief minister complaining that some persons having influence over the police were bent on having the case hushed up and he was assured of necessary orders. There was again no progress and being encouraged by the police inaction, some offenders threw bombs on another premises belonging to the complainant at 138, Ramdulal Sarkar Street Calcutta, causing some damages but no case was started by the O. C., Burtollah police or the accused No. 1. On 2. 1. 70 a petition was moved before the Additional chief presidency Magistrate, Calcutta praying for direction on the B. C., D. D. to hold an investigation into the case of bomb throwing. Orders were passed by the court accordingly and the D. C., D. D. directed S. I., A. K. Ganguly, attached to the Anti-Rowdy Department, Calcutta police, to hold an investigation. The complainant came to know from S. I. A. K. Ganguly that the person arrested on 9. 11. Orders were passed by the court accordingly and the D. C., D. D. directed S. I., A. K. Ganguly, attached to the Anti-Rowdy Department, Calcutta police, to hold an investigation. The complainant came to know from S. I. A. K. Ganguly that the person arrested on 9. 11. 1969 on the complainant's identification was set free by the accused No. 3 on the same night under the orders of the accused No. 1, without taking a recognition bond for his appearance before the Magistrate in violation of section 76 of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866 and the corresponding provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, committing thereby offences under sections 221 i. P. C. and 13b of the Calcutta Police act, 1866. It was further alleged by the complainant that the accused Nos. 1 and 2, in collusion with each other, are further guilty of dereliction of duty as laid down under sections 10a (1) (a)and (d) of the Calcutta Police Act, 1868 by refusing to obtain intelligence concerning the commission of the said cognizable offence and to arrest the other offenders, committing there by offences under sections 217 and 221 i. P. C. as also under section 13b of the calcutta Police Act, 1866. It was also alleged that all the accused persons had a common intention to save the offenders referred to above from legal punishment. It was prayed ultimately that in the circumstances, process as prayed for may be issued against the accused. The additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, calcutta examined the complainant and by his order dated 9. 2. 70 sent the matter to Shri P. C. Chakraborty, Presidency magistrate, 4th Court, Calcutta for holding a judicial enquiry and to report by the 24th February, 1970. The transferee magistrate thereafter examined six witnesses, including the complainant, during the judicial enquiry. A number of documents or their copies were also produced by the witnesses and marked as exhibits 1 to 18 and a report of investigation by S. I., A. Mazumdar, attached to the Jorasanko P. S. purported to have been submitted by the said Sub-Inspector to the Officer-in-Charge, Jorasanko Police Station was also filed and marked Id. 4. The enquiring magistrate submitted his report on the 20th March, 1970, recommending the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that no prima facie case was made out against any one of the accuse j under the offences as alleged. 4. The enquiring magistrate submitted his report on the 20th March, 1970, recommending the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that no prima facie case was made out against any one of the accuse j under the offences as alleged. The complainant filled a petition against the said report before the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate on the same date viz., 20. 3. 70 praying inter alia for a process also against the Sub-Inspector A. Mazumder, as being an active participant in the conspiracy to hush up the case. The additional Chief Presidency Magistrate on hearing the learned lawyer for the complainant fixed 24th March, 1970 for orders. On 24. 3. 70, on a perusal of the report of the judicial enquiry as also the petition of objection filed by the complainant and on a consideration of the submissions made by the learned lawyer for the complainant in support of the petition, the Additional Chief presidency Magistrate ultimately dismissed the petition of complaint under section 203 Criminal Procedure Code. This order has been impugned and forms the subject-matter of the present Rule. A short point of law is involved in the Rule relating to the scope and ambit of section 203 Criminal Procedure code with emphasis on the true meaning of the words "the result of the investigation or enquiry (if any ). Mr. Jugal Kishore Dhandhania, the com plainant-petitioner, appeared in person and contended that the expression "the result of the investigation or enquiry" contained in section 203 of the Code, though not limited to the ultimate report only and includes the materials adduced during the investigation or enquiry, certainly rules out any in admissible material let in during such enquiry or investigation under section 202 Criminal Procedure Code from consideration in the context of section 203 Criminal Procedure Code. The steps of Mr. The steps of Mr. Dhandhania's reasoning are that a proceeding under section 202 of the code is a judicial proceeding attracting the provisions of the Indian Evidence act, 1872; that section 4 (l) (m) Criminal Procedure Code defines a "judicial proceeding" as including "any proceeding in course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath"; that contents of G. D. entry are not pieces of substantive evidence; that copies of the documents without the originals being produced are not evidence as well as the report of investigation by a police officer; that the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate who had not taken into consideration a number of documents and witnesses proved or examined during the judicial enquiry has nonetheless taken into consideration the aforesaid pieces of inadmissible evidence to arrive at his ultimate conclusion and that as a result thereof the ultimate finding has been vitiated. The complainant-petitioner also cited two cases in support of his proposition and the same would be considered in their proper context. Mr. Debaprosad Chowdhury, Advocate appearing on behalf of the State joined issue. He submitted that there has been no misinterpretation of the scope and ambit of section 203 Criminal Procedure code by the court below the result of the investigation or enquiry" cannot be circumscribed to apply only to the ultimate report submitted under section 202 Criminal Procedure Code but that includes all the materials adduced during such enquiry or investigation including the G. D. Entries, the documents and the report of investigation filed; and that the court of fact can consider such materials whereto the magistrate or the person concerned, holding the investigation or enquiry, had applied his mind for "ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint" within the bounds of section 202 Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Chowdhury further submitted that it cannot also be overlooked that the g. D. Entries in question, impugned by the complainant-petitioner, have in fact been proved in course of the enquiry. In this context Mr. Chowdhury referred to two cases which will be duly considered. The point involved being one of law and of some importance, the court requested Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee, a Senior Advocate of this Court, to appear as amicus curiae and Mr. Banerjee agreed to do so. The matter came up thereafter for further hearing. 3. MR. In this context Mr. Chowdhury referred to two cases which will be duly considered. The point involved being one of law and of some importance, the court requested Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee, a Senior Advocate of this Court, to appear as amicus curiae and Mr. Banerjee agreed to do so. The matter came up thereafter for further hearing. 3. MR. Nalin Chandra Banerjee, advocate, appearing as amicus curiae in the case submitted that a proper interpretation of the words the result of the investigation or enquiry (if any)'' under section 202 must rule out the letting in and consideration of statements or documents which do not come within the bounds of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The steps of Mr. Banerjee's reasoning are that the expression "the result of the investigation or enquiry" does not mean the mere report that is ultimately submitted under section 202 Criminal Procedure Code that the intention behind an investigation or an enquiry under section 202 criminal Procedure Code is "ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the com plaint" ; that in a proceeding under section 203 of the Code the magistrate concerned may dismiss the complaint on a consideration of the statement on oath (if any) of the complainant and the witnesses and the result of the investigation or inquiry (if any) under section 202 Criminal Procedure Code, if and when there in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding and after briefly recording his reasons for the same; that in the case of an investigation by a police officer the contents of a G. D. Entry may be considered because of the dominant consideration to ascertain the truth or falsity of the petition of com plaint and not the proof of guilt of the accused but in the case of an enquiry by a magistrate, the provisions laid down under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are to be strictly followed ruling out such G. D. Entries as being not substantive evidence; that the word "enquiry" as defined under section 4 (l) (k) includes "every enquiry other than a trial conducted under this Code by a magistrate or court; and that the consideration that helds good under section 203 Criminal Procedure Code is a judicial consideration, untinged and unfettered by a body of inadmissible evidence. The learned amicus curiae also relied on two decisions in support of his submission and the same would be considered in their proper context. 4. I have heard the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties as well as the learned amicus curiae and I have also gone through the materials on the record. For a proper appreciation of the point at issue, one will have to refer to the provisions of the Code, the principles of interpretation of Statute and the imprimatur of judicial decisions thereupon. The relevant provisions of the Stature are contained in Chapter XVI Criminal procedure Code. The scheme of chapter XVI Criminal Procedure code. relating to the procedure to be followed with regard to complaints to magistrates, particularly as to the examination of a complainant, the postponement of issue of process and the dismissal of a complaint, cannot be overlooked. The relevant provisions are sections 200, 202 and 203 Criminal Procedure Code. Section 200 provides as follows : "A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall at, once examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath, and the substance of the examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate". There are four provisos thereafter. Such examination of the complainant and the wit nesses present on oath by the court taking cognizance is not a mere formality but a mandatory provision compel ling compliance. Section 200 Criminal procedure Code therefore is not the end of the road but leads on in its turn to a cross-road one proceeding by way of section 204 and the other by section 202 of the Code. If the magistrate concern ed be satisfied on an examination of the complainant and his witnesses (if any)as enjoined in section 200 of the Code that "there is sufficient ground for proceeding and a summons or warrant should issue, as may be necessary he will proceed under section 204 in Chapter xvi Criminal Procedure Code and do so. If not, and he thinks fit "for reasons to be recorded in writing. If not, and he thinks fit "for reasons to be recorded in writing. " to postpone the issue of process, and either enquire into the case himself or as the case may be, direct an inquiry or investigation to be made by a subordinate magistrate or by a police officer or by such other person as he deems necessary "for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint." This constitutes the other way under section 202 Criminal Procedure Code, and the provisions thereof may now be considered. It is now pertinent to refer to the provisions of section 202 Criminal Procedure Code. Sub-section (1) to section 202 lays down as fallows : "Any magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance, or which has been transferred to him under section 192, may, if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against, and either inquire into the case himself or, if he is a Magistrate other than a Magistrate of the third class, direct an inquiry or investigation to be made by any magistrate subordinate to him, or by a police-officer, or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint". There is a proviso there under. Under sub-section (2a)"any Magistrate inquiring into a case under this section may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses onw oath." The intention therefore of the legislature, as incorporated in section 202, Criminal procedure Code, is to rule out frivolous complaints and unwarranted prosecutions, and direct an inquiry or investigation, as the case may be, for "ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the com plaint". The said section therefore stands as a silent sentinel at the threshold of a continuance of prosecutions. After the investigation or the inquiry is completed under section 202 and the report is submitted by the inquiring magistrate or the investigating officer, to the magistrate before whom the com plaint is made or to whom it was transferred the said magistrate shall there after proceed under section 203 Criminal Procedure Code. 5. After the investigation or the inquiry is completed under section 202 and the report is submitted by the inquiring magistrate or the investigating officer, to the magistrate before whom the com plaint is made or to whom it was transferred the said magistrate shall there after proceed under section 203 Criminal Procedure Code. 5. THE provisions of section 203 are as fallows: "The Magistrate before whom a complaint is made or to whom it has been transferred, may dismiss the complaint, if, after considering the statement on oath (if any) of the complainant and the witnesses and the result of the investigation or inquiry (if any) under section 203, there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding. In such cases he shall briefly record Ms reasons for so doing. " The first part of section 203 Criminal Procedure Code, about the consideration of the statement on oath of the complainant and the wit nesses, relates to section 200 and the second part dealing with the consideration of the result of the investigation or inquiry, relates to section 202 of the code. The sine qua non of an order of dismissal of a complaint, within the bounds of section 203 Criminal Procedure Code, is accordingly "no sufficient ground for proceeding" In the judgment of the magistrate concerned and such judgment is to be arrived at judicially on a consideration of (a) the statement on oath (if any) of the complainant (b) the statement on oath (if any) of the witnesses; and (c) the result of the investigation or inquiry (if any) under section 202 Criminal Procedure Code. The Statute further requires that the court shall briefly record its reasons for doing the same. Section 203 Criminal Procedure Code stands therefore on four pillars, none of which can be dispensed with, without disturbing the super structure itself. There is no ambiguity over the meaning of the words "statement on oath", a consideration whereof is a condition precedent to the ultimate order to be passed under section 203 of the Criminal Procedure code; but there is quite a cloud raised over the expression "the result of the investigation or enquiry (if any) under section 202" giving rise to a conflict of interpretations. The narrower interpretation is that by the result of investigation or inquiry is meant the report itself beyond which the court should not travel under section 203 of the Code while the broader interpretation brings within its ambit the entire body of materials collected legally by the officer or person holding the investigation or proved before the court holding the inquiry. There is not much difficulty in ruling out the first interpretation that the result of the investigation or inquiry means only the report ultimately submitted inasmuch as if the intention of the legislature had been so, the word "report" itself would have been used instead of the words "the result of the investigation or inquiry". There is some conflict of opinion again with regard to the extent of the broader interpretation viz., as to whether it would include even evidence which is otherwise inadmissible in a trial or enquiry but produced during an inquiry or investigation under section 202 Criminal Procedure Code for the purpose of "ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint". On a proper construction of the provisions of the statute and the intention of the legislature as contained in Chapters xvi and XVII Criminal Procedure code, I ultimately hold that an inquiry held by a magistrate under section 202 criminal Procedure Code is a judicial proceeding attracting the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and is such ruling out inadmissible evidence from consideration, although in the case of an investigation by a police officer or by such other person as thought fit, g. D. Entries and other such documents may be gone through because of the dominant purpose mentioned in section 202 of the Code for "ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint". The position under section 203 Criminal procedure Code is therefore clear. An order passed under section 203 of the code is a judicial act in the context of a judicial proceeding. Documents and reports, which are otherwise inadmissible under the Indian Evidence Act but let in during an inquiry under section 202 criminal Procedure Code, cannot be taken into consideration under section 203 Criminal Procedure Code by the magistrate concerned as coming within the bounds of the expression "the result of the inquiry". 6. Documents and reports, which are otherwise inadmissible under the Indian Evidence Act but let in during an inquiry under section 202 criminal Procedure Code, cannot be taken into consideration under section 203 Criminal Procedure Code by the magistrate concerned as coming within the bounds of the expression "the result of the inquiry". 6. IT has to be ascertained now whether the principles of interpretation of statute reinforce the aforesaid conclusions based on a consideration of the provisions of the statute. In Salmond's jurisprudence (10th Edition) it has been observed at page 170 that "the duty of the judicature is to discover and act upon the true intention of the legislature the mens or sententialegis" The essence of the law lies in its spirit, not in its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it. One may again refer to Article 158 in Craw ford's Statutory Construction at page 244, dealing with the purpose of interpretation and construction. It has been stated therein that "the object or purpose of all construction or interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the law makers and to make it effective". This is the dominant purpose of such construction and this intention is conveyed either expressly or impliedly by the language used by the legislature. Lord ever shed, M. R. wrote in his foreword to the 11th Edition of Maxwell on the interpretation of Statutes that the length and detail of modern legislation has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule". Maxwell observed in "the Interpretation of Statutes" that "a statute is the will of the legislature and the fundamental rule of interpretation to which all others are subordinate is that a statute ''s to be expounded according to the intent of them that made it". This brings me to the golden rule of construction. The garden rule" as Viscount simond L. C. observed in (1) Nokes v, doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, reported in (1940) A. C. 1014 at page 1022 "that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning". A narrower construction, failing to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation must be avoided as otherwise the legislation would be reduced to futility". The Lord Chancellor aptly observed in the aforesaid case that "parliament would legislate for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. A narrower construction, failing to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation must be avoided as otherwise the legislation would be reduced to futility". The Lord Chancellor aptly observed in the aforesaid case that "parliament would legislate for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. I respectfully agree with the principles laid down above and I hold that a cir conscribed construction or a much too wide interpretation of the relevant pre visions of the Code would only fail to achieve "the manifest purpose of the legislation". The principles on which statute should be interpreted as was observed by Dallas Sand in his Roscee pound Lectures, are "the principle of intent and that of meaning" and applying the said test, I hold that the principles of interpretation of statute only reinforce the conclusions, arrived at before, on a consideration of the provisions of the Statute. I will now proceed to consider the imprimatur of judicial decisions on the point. Mr. Dhandhania appearing in person, referred to two cases. He refer red in the first instance to the case of (2) Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash chandra Bose and anr, reported in 1964 (1) Supreme Court Reports page 639 and relied on the observations made by mr. Justice Mudholkar delivering the judgment of the Court at pages 651 and 652 that "the magistrate acting under s. 203 has to satisfy himself that there is sufficient ground for proceeding. In order 1o come to this conclusion, he is entitled to consider the evidence taker, by him or recorded in an inquiry under s. 202, or statements made in an investigation under that section, as the case may be, he is not entitled to rely upon any materials besides this". I respect fully agree with the said observations and the report of investigation by a police officer as also the various G. D. Entries, contents whereof were not proved and even the originals not produced, have been wrongly considered in this case by the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate in dismissing the complaint under section 203. The next case cited by the complainant petitioner if the case of (3) Jumrati Mian, petitioner, v. Bisheshwar Prasad Bishwakarma and others, opposite party report ed in A. I. R. 1967 Patna page 3 (51. Mr. The next case cited by the complainant petitioner if the case of (3) Jumrati Mian, petitioner, v. Bisheshwar Prasad Bishwakarma and others, opposite party report ed in A. I. R. 1967 Patna page 3 (51. Mr. Justice Kamala Sahai observed therein that the Magistrate cannot refer to the record of statements in the course of investigation by the police into a counter case in a proceeding under section 202 criminal Procedure Code and he ultimately held that the order passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, in the ease under consideration, was vitiated. This decision therefore does not apply to the facts of the present case, in all fours. It is difficult to hold that the statements considered by the Additional chief Presidency Magistrate are not in course of the investigation of the present case and as such on the ground alone cannot constitute legal materials for consideration under section 203 of the code. Mr. Debaprosad Chowdhury, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the state also relied on two decisions. The first one is the case of (4) Ramanand Lal, petitioner v. All Hossain and others, opposite party reported in A. I. R. 1924 Patna page 797 wherein Kulwant sahay, J. observed at page 709 that "in the present case an investigation had been made by the police and the witnesses had been examined, by the investigating police officer, and there was nothing in law to prevent the Sub-divisional Magistrate from looking into those papers for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint. The enquiry contemplated by section 202 is not limited to any particular form of enquiry". The facts in the instant case however are different. The documents impugned are the copies of the G. D. Entries and the report of investigation and the stage of consideration is under section 203 Criminal Procedure Code by a magistrate passing a judicial order. The aforesaid case therefore does not hold Mr. Chowdhury contention. The next case cited by the learned Advocate is the case of (5) Mainal Haque and others, petitioners v. Ganga Prosad sarkar, opposite party reported in A. I. R. 1957 Assam page 76 wherein Mr. The aforesaid case therefore does not hold Mr. Chowdhury contention. The next case cited by the learned Advocate is the case of (5) Mainal Haque and others, petitioners v. Ganga Prosad sarkar, opposite party reported in A. I. R. 1957 Assam page 76 wherein Mr. Justice ram Labhaya observed that enquiry within the meaning of S. 202 is not limited to and does not necessarily mean an enquiry by examining witnesses or by holding investigation into the case in any particular form and it is open to him even to go to the scene of occurrence and make a local enquiry. The facts in the present case are again different and the principles laid down in the above mentioned case do not accordingly apply. I will now proceed to consider the cases cited by Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee, the learned amicus curiae. Mr. Banerjee referred to a Calcutta case viz., the case of (6) Bholaram Dalmia and ors. petitioners v. The State opposite party reported in 58 C. W. N. page 597. The case was decided by a Division Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Dasgupta and mr. Justice Debabrata Mookerjee. Mr. Justice Dasgupta (as His Lordship then was) delivering the judgment of the court observed at page 600 that "the issue of process under section 204 of the code of Criminal Procedure or dismissal under section 203 is clearly a matter for judicial determination. In my judgment, no Magistrate is entitled to bring to bear on the judicial determination of such matters information which came to his knowledge from other sources than in court in accordance with law". The high Court proceeded to observe that "if magistrates were to base conclusions on materials not properly before the court, there would be great scope for impartial people thinking that justice. has not been done". It was held ultimately that neither the proceedings before the Coroner nor the police papers could in law be relied upon by the magistrate in ordering issue of process. I respectfully agree with the principles laid down therein and hold that the same rules out the pieces of inadmissible evidence considered by the Additional chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta in proceeding to dismiss the petition of complaint under section 203 of the code. I respectfully agree with the principles laid down therein and hold that the same rules out the pieces of inadmissible evidence considered by the Additional chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta in proceeding to dismiss the petition of complaint under section 203 of the code. The other case cited by the learned amicus curing is the case of (7) Vadilal Panchal, appellant v. Dattatraya dulaji Ghadigaonkar and another, respondents reported in A. I. R. 1960 s. C. page 1113. Mr. Justice S. K. Das delivering the judgment of the court observed at page 1116 that under section 202 Criminal Procedure Code "the inquiry is for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint that is, for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so is to justify the issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the person concerned. . . . . . Section 203, be it noted consists of two parts; the first part indicates what are the materials which the magistrate must consider, and the second part says that if after considering those materials there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding he may dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court proceeded to observe at page 1117 that "it is manifestly clear from the provisions of s. 203 that the judgment which the Magistrate has to form must be based on the statements of the complainant and his wit nesses and the result of the investigation or inquiry. . . . . The Magistrate must apply his judicial mind to the materials on which he has to form his judgment. In arriving at his judgment he is not fettered in any way except by judicial consideration". I respectfully agree with the said observations and I hold that the proceedings being judicial, the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, calcutta, should have exercised his discretion judicially, by not basing his conclusions on materials which are de hors the Indian Evidence Act. In this context a reference may be made to the case of (8) Dattatraya Dulaji ghadigaonkar and another, petitioner v. Vadilal Panchal, accused opponent reported in A. I. R. 1958 Bombay page 335. The case reported in (7) A. I. R. 1960 s. C. 1113 referred to above is an appeal from this case. Mr. Justice Shelat and mr. In this context a reference may be made to the case of (8) Dattatraya Dulaji ghadigaonkar and another, petitioner v. Vadilal Panchal, accused opponent reported in A. I. R. 1958 Bombay page 335. The case reported in (7) A. I. R. 1960 s. C. 1113 referred to above is an appeal from this case. Mr. Justice Shelat and mr. Justice Miabhoy observed at page 336 that "there is nothing in s. 202 s. 203 of the Criminal P. C, which abrogates the rule as to the presumption laid down in s. 105 Evidence Act and the mode of proof or exception laid down in imperative language in that section. The Evidence Act, 1872 accordingly has not been given a go-by-to in the context of a consideration under section 203 of the- Code inasmuch as ultimately that consideration is a judicial one. The imprimatur of the judicial decisions on the point at issue, accordingly rules out the too wide interpretation put forward by Mr. Chowdhury fun including inadmissible evidence within the ambit of a judicial consideration under section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. THE order of dismissal by the additional Chief Presidency Magistrate also suffers from another defect viz., a non-consideration of relevant statements of witnesses examined during the inquiry. A reference in this connection may be made to the case of (9) Ananta kumar Mondal, petitioner v. Bepin behari Naskar and others, Opposite parties reported in A. I. R. 1957 Calcutta page 383 wherein Mr. Justice Debabrata mookerjee observed at page 384 that "section 203 requires that it is the magistrate's judgment which is to prevail and not the opinion of the enquiring officer". The learned Judge proceeded to give three reasons for holding that the order passed in that case under section 203 Criminal Procedure Code by the magistrate is bad. The second such reason given, is that "it does not even advert to the statements of the witnesses who were examined at the judicial inquiry". I agree with the same and I hold that the order impugned in this case also suffers from the defect of non-consideration and as such is not sustainable. 8. The second such reason given, is that "it does not even advert to the statements of the witnesses who were examined at the judicial inquiry". I agree with the same and I hold that the order impugned in this case also suffers from the defect of non-consideration and as such is not sustainable. 8. ON a consideration therefore of the provisions of the statute the principles of interpretation of statute; and also of the imprimatur of the judicial decisions on the point at issue, I ultimately hold that neither the circumscribed interpretation of the words "the result of the investigation or inquiry" in section 203 Criminal Procedure Code as meaning the ultimate report only nor the too wide definition thereof, as including all the materials adduced during an inquiry, both admissible and inadmissible, is intended by the legislature. It is only the materials admissible in law, transpiring in an inquiry under section 202 of the Code, that can form the basis of the Magistrate's consideration under section 203 as "the result of the investigation or inquiry". Anything short of that or beyond its periphery would be dc hors the provisions of section 203 Criminal Procedure Code and vitiate the ultimate order. Before I part with the case, i must place on record my appreciation of the able manner in which the complainant-petitioner, who appeared in person, and Mr. Debaprosad Chowdhury, who appeared on behalf of the State, placed their respective cases. I also appreciate the able assistance rendered to the court by Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee, Advocate, who appeared as amicus curiae, as without that assistance it would have been difficult for this court to come to its decision. 9. IN the result, the Rule is made absolute the order dated the 24th March, 1970, passed by Shri S. C. Roy, Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, dismissing the petition of com plaint under section 203 Criminal Procedure Code in Case No. C/96 of 1970 is set aside; and the case is sent back to the court below for being disposed of in accordance with law and expeditiously, in the light of the observations made above from the stage reached on 20. 3. 70. The records are to go down to the court below.