J. B. MEHTA, S. N. PATEL, J. ( 1 ) THE driver the jeep owner and the insurer have filed an appeal in the first matter challenging the award of Rs. 20000/to the insured respondent applicant while the injured has filed the cross appeal confining her claim only to Rs. 50 0 Mr. Oza has passed a Purshis stating that he confines the claim of the applicant only to Rs. 50 0 all throughout. ( 2 ) THE accident in question took place on January 22nd 1966 at about 2 30 P. M. A jeep driven by opponent No. 1 and which belonged to opponent No. 2 was coming from the main road running from Deesa station running north south. There is a cross road running east west. On the western side is the village Rajpur. The applicants family had returned from Bhildi. The other members of the family had gone by bus from the railway station while the applicant Minaxiben was coming from the station side sitting on the carrier of her relation Rajendra who drove the cycle in question. The Panchnama Ex. 69 of the scene of the incident has been proved by the panch witness Manilal Ex. 71. The Panchnama shows that the tar road is about 16 ft. wide with kutcha road on the two sides to the east and west extending to about 9 ft. on each side. The accident has taken place as seen from the Panchnama at about 68 ft. distance after the cross road towards the south where there is a blood spot. The left hand wheel was at a distance of about 1-8 towards the west of this main road and the right hand wheel was at 5-9. The blood stains were at about 4 from the left wheel. There was blood found as seen from the Panchanama Ex. 69 as well as Ex. 70 of the jeep both on the front handle of the jeep and its spare and its spare wheel which was carried on the back on the right hand side. The cyclist carried two small cloth bags on both side of the governor carrier carrying a small tin (Dabba) of breakfast. Besides blood on the right handle there was a stream of blood on the door of the jeep. The cycle was lying at a distance of 4 ft. from the blood spots towards west. The cyclist carried two small cloth bags on both side of the governor carrier carrying a small tin (Dabba) of breakfast. Besides blood on the right handle there was a stream of blood on the door of the jeep. The cycle was lying at a distance of 4 ft. from the blood spots towards west. There is evidence of an independent witness Sagalchand Anandrao Ex. 45 who has deposed that the jeep was going at a speed of about 25-30 miles. It was coming from the opposite direction. He saw the cyclist in question going ahead of his car carrying one girl on the back carrier. At that time the right hand of the girl was smashed by the jeep which came from the opposite direction as a result of which both the cyclist and the girl fell down along with the cycle. The jeep was on the right side i. e. on the left of the road and was at a distance of 3 ft. from the tar road. The cycle was also on the correct side but was at a distance of 5 ft. from the tar road. He had seen the jeep from a distance of one furlong. He had also sounded his horn. In cross examination he stated that he had blown the horn because the cycle was coming ahead and the jeep was coming from the opposite direction. The handle of the jeep had dashed against the hand of the girl. There was no other vehicle on the road. Even Rajinder the cyclist Ex. 73 has deposed that when he heard the sound of the horn of the car following him he tried to give side to the car and the incident happened. He also deposed that the jeep was coming at great speed of about 30 miles. He was knowing cycling from the age of 10 years. The driver of the jeep Ranjitsingh Ex. 75 has deposed that he was driving the jeep at a speed of 15 to 20 miles per hour on left side of the road. He saw the cycle coming from a distance of about 45 ft. from the opposite direction. He then blew the horn and slowed the jeep. Then he passed by the cycle on the road by keeping a distance of about 21/2 ft. The cycle was going the middle of the road. He saw the cycle coming from a distance of about 45 ft. from the opposite direction. He then blew the horn and slowed the jeep. Then he passed by the cycle on the road by keeping a distance of about 21/2 ft. The cycle was going the middle of the road. Then he heard some noise and he felt that the cycle had fallen down and he stopped the jeep. At that time one car was coming from the opposite direction and that driver asked him to stop. The reason of accident given by him was that the cyclist had lost balance at the time of the incident. He also said that he had not dashed against the cycle. The evidence of this driver could hardly be believed that the jeep had not dashed against the cycle and he had cleared the cycle. In fact the collusion is by the front handle itself which tells its story by the blood marks. Even the blood stream is found at the door of the jeep as seen from the relevant panchnama. No doubt the spare wheel also had blood marks. Therefore the evidence of the independent eye witness gets clear corroboration from this panchnama that this was the case of the jeep knocking down the cyclist and the cycle. The primary facts which are established from this evidence show that the jeep was coming on the main road. It had just passed the cross junction road which was at a distance of 68 ft. from this spot as per the relevant motor regulations item 1 of the Schedule X of the Act the driver has to drive the vehicle as close to the left hand side as may be expedient allowing all traffic proceeding in the opposite direction to pass him on his right hand side. Under item 6 the driver of a motor vehicle has to slow down when approaching a road inter section a road junction or a road corner. If the driver had slowed down his vehicle on the cross junction road it would have been obviously easy for him to brake his vehicle or to swerve it on the Kutcha road when he had seen the cycle at a distance of about 45 ft. If he had slowed down the accident could never have happened. If the driver had slowed down his vehicle on the cross junction road it would have been obviously easy for him to brake his vehicle or to swerve it on the Kutcha road when he had seen the cycle at a distance of about 45 ft. If he had slowed down the accident could never have happened. The panchnama shows that the vehicle came to a stop at a distance of 69 ft. It is not the case of the driver that he applied any brake In fact his case is that he had cleared the cycle and it is not until when his attention was drawn and when he was asked to stop by the car driver coming from the opposite side that he had stopped the jeep. Therefore the drivers negligence is obvious from these uncontroverted facts on record. After the decision in First Appeal No. 210 of 1968 decided on December 17 1970 by the Division Bench consisting of myself and D. A. Desai J. (Hirji Virji Transport v. Basiranbibi) XII G. L. R. 783 (786) it is now well settled that where the primary facts have been proved to raise a prima facie inference that the accident was caused by the negligence on the part of the defendants the issue shall be decided in plaintiffs favour unless the defendants by their evidence provide some answer which is adequate to displace the prima facie evidence. It is in this situation that the evidentiary burden of proof rests on the defendants in such a case. The defendants who are in control of this injurious agency and the surrounding circumstances bad on the establishment of such primary facts to prove that in all the circumstances which they knew or ought to have known they took all proper steps to avoid danger and once they failed to prove that they must be held liable to pay damages to the plaintiff. In the present case as we have already considered the primary facts tell their own story that in the present case it was the driver of the jeep who was grossly negligent and he was not on the proper look out even when he w as coming on this main road. He should have been on proper look out on the station road especially at a time when the persons alighting from the train would be going on the road. He should have been on proper look out on the station road especially at a time when the persons alighting from the train would be going on the road. He was thus grossly negligent on the cross junction road. He was expected to slow down the jeep when he had seen the cycle and the car from the opposite direction from such long distance and he should have kept to the extreme left by going if necessary on the Kutcha road. Therefore if he had applied the brake or had swerved the vehicle the incident could never have happened when the cycle was on the middle of the road. Therefore it is obvious that the jeep driver had not done all which he ought to have done and had taken no Steps to avoid the danger and be had remained grossly negligent. ( 3 ) MR. Dave however vehemently argued that the driver was coming on the main road at a speed of about 30 miles per hour and it was not an excessive speed. The question is hardly material whether the speed was less or more as the proper speed has to be judged in the context of all the circumstances. What is material is that at the cross junction road the driver had seen the cycle coming from the opposite side. If he had at proper time slowed down and had not remained negligent and he would have gone on the extreme left side on the road even by going if necessary on the Kutcha road the accident could have been avoided. We have already rejected his theory that he had not collided with the cycle when there are clear collusion marks found from the blood marks on the front handle. ( 4 ) FINALLY Mr. Dave concentrated his attack on the aspect of contributory negligence by relying on the decision of the Division Bench consisting of Sarjoo Prasad C. J. and Chhangani J. in Kotah Transport Lt. v. Jhalawar T. Service A. I. R. 1969 Raj. 224 at page 227. The Division Bench pointed out that contributory negligence could be successfully pleaded only where it was shown that there was negligence on the part of the plaintiff which contributed to the accident so that the defendant even by ordinary care could not avoid it. v. Jhalawar T. Service A. I. R. 1969 Raj. 224 at page 227. The Division Bench pointed out that contributory negligence could be successfully pleaded only where it was shown that there was negligence on the part of the plaintiff which contributed to the accident so that the defendant even by ordinary care could not avoid it. It might be also available where notwithstanding the defendants negligence the plaintiff by exercising ordinary care could have avoided the accident. If the proximate cause of the injury was the negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant the injury should be allowed to rest where it lay and the plaintiff could not recover anything. It is not necessary for us to pronounce on the correctness of the ultimate ratio of this decision as to whether in case of contributory negligence the doctrine of apportionment should be applied or not and whether on such assumption of any identification between the cyclist and the victim any such plea of contributory negligence could be urged in such a case. What is material for our decision is that there is no evidence of any contributory negligence in the present case. Mr. Dave vehemently argued that the cyclist was carrying someone on the carrier and his cycle must be unbalanced because there were cloth bags and one tin Daba. The cyclist was an experienced person and there is nothing suggested in the evidence except for the bare plea of the defendant that the cyclist must have lost balance. Nothing is suggested even to the independent witness Sagalchand Ex. 45 who was just following the cycle. The fact that the cycle had to come in the middle of the road would not help the jeep driver for the simple reason that when the cyclist heard the blowing of the horn from the motor car following him he was bound to come in the middle when placed in that predicament between the vehicles coming from both the sides. If the jeep driver was on the proper look out from such a long distance of at least 45 ft. as admitted by him he could have seen both the cyclist and the car coming from the opposite direction and he would have slowed down by applying the brake to his vehicle or by moving on the Kutcha road so that the car from the opposite could easily pass the road. as admitted by him he could have seen both the cyclist and the car coming from the opposite direction and he would have slowed down by applying the brake to his vehicle or by moving on the Kutcha road so that the car from the opposite could easily pass the road. Therefore there is no contributory negligence on the part of the applicant or the cyclist carrying the applicant and the whole proximate cause of the accident is gross negligence on the part of the driver. Therefore that finding of the Tribunal must be maintained. ( 5 ) AS regards the quantum of damages Mr. Dave is justified in his attack that howsoever difficult may be the task of assessing damages in such cases the Tribunal cannot arrive at a conjectural figure. The Tribunal has to assess damages and it is in the context of such assessment of damages which is based on the recognised principles after considering the facts of the case that the appellate Court would refuse to interfere unless the award is too low or high or beyond the brackets as laid down by us in the aforesaid decision in F. A. No. 210 of 1968 decided on December 17 1970 Hirji Virji Transport v. Basiranbibi 12 G. L. R. 783 (787 ). It is true that the injured applicant has lost the right arm and nothing can really compensate the loss of a right arm especially of a female. She cannot do her household work which was done with the right hand. She cannot cook she cannot wash clothes clean utensils or carry out any household duties. The evidence shows that she cannot write. She was writing with her right hand. The status and the family history of the applicant is as deposed to by Rajmal Ex. 38 the father of the applicant. Rajmal says that he believes in giving education to his sons and daughters. The daughters of this family have gone upto matriculation level or college level. The father is a man of means. He is settled in business and his family expenses every month are about 500 to 600 for a family of about 12 persons. The father wanted to educate this girl. The girl is aged 11 years. That is why besides the loss of limb which has resulted in great pain and mental shock the personal loss is also very great. He is settled in business and his family expenses every month are about 500 to 600 for a family of about 12 persons. The father wanted to educate this girl. The girl is aged 11 years. That is why besides the loss of limb which has resulted in great pain and mental shock the personal loss is also very great. She cannot perform any household duties and would always need a servant. Therefore besides pain and suffering and this personal handicap she would have to loose her marital happiness. She would loose all her independence and would always be at the mercy of others during her entire life for personal and other work. As pointed out by us in the F. A. No. 210 of 1968 decided on December 17 1971 ( 12 G. L. R. 783 (787) ) a pattern has emerged in this country so far as the cases of death are concerned after the various decisions of the Supreme Court. In dependency benefit which has the maintenance element or in the loss to the estate which has a saving element reasonable figure is worked out of this economic loss on Lord Wrights method in Davies case by multiplying the average loss by years purchase factor. As per the approved method adopted in all English cases their Lordships settled in the Iyer case A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 376 the common multiplier as being 12 to 15 in such cases. Even the House of Lords had adopted multiple of 12 years purchase for a man of 50 as per the case in Taylor v. Oconnor 1970 (1) A. E. R. 367. We have also explained in that decision how even the other method in Nances case adopted by Viscount Simon led to the same result even when annual loss was multiplied by the remaining expected period of useful life. The result of the two methods was the same because the experienced Judges who applied this common multiple known as years purchase factor adopted this suitable multiple which took into account the deductions on the ground that the entire amount was paid as lump sum and on the ground that this was an estimate of future changes and chances. When Nances method was adopted the deduction was a substantial deduction even to the extent of 1/3rd. When Nances method was adopted the deduction was a substantial deduction even to the extent of 1/3rd. That is why even when 25 years was the remaining period of useful life time the said deduction gave the same amount as 16 years purchase factor. Therefore the simpler method in Davies has now become standard to be adopted in such cases where the annual loss is converted into a lump sum figure by the commonly accepted multiple of 15. Even this multiple may go to the level of 16. These decisions however would not be helpful in the present case except for working out the economic loss by simple capitalisation method of converting annual loss by a suitable multiple of 12 to 15 whether the annual loss is of the basic dependency figure or of the saving made by deceased when the loss to the estate is determined in that context keeping in mind that the loss is not assessed twice over. That is why where claimants were same after deducting amount spent by the deceased on himself the entire balance of the annual income is capitalised by the years purchase factor into a lump sum. ( 6 ) SO far as the disability cases are concerned the compensation goes to the living person and not to the dependents or to the estate of the deceased person. That is why it is a settled principle that in disablement cases the compensation awards are always higher than even in cases of death because the compensation has to be given to a living victim both for his personal loss and for the economic loss. As pointed out by Lord Hinchcliffe J. in S. v. Distillers Co. 1969 (3) A. E. R. 1412 where the learned Judge was dealing with the personal injury even in cases of children aged 8 years and where he made substantial award of compensation. As pointed out by Lord Hinchcliffe J. in S. v. Distillers Co. 1969 (3) A. E. R. 1412 where the learned Judge was dealing with the personal injury even in cases of children aged 8 years and where he made substantial award of compensation. The principles laid down by the House of Lords in West (H) and Sons Ltd. v. Shephard (1964) A. C. 326 can be summarised in three propositions as under :- (1) Bodily injury is to be treated as a deprivation which entitles a plaintiff to damages and that the amount of damages varies according to the gravity of the injury; (2) deprivation may bring with it three consequences loss of earnings or earning capacity expenses of having to pay others for what otherwise he would do for himself and loss of enjoyment of life or a diminution in full pleasures of living; (3) in considering the deprivation the court should have regard to the gravity and degree of the deprivation that is to say whether one or more limbs has been lost the duration of the deprivation and the degree of awareness of the deprivation. In the case before the learned Judge he found that as a result of administration of thalidomide drug to the mother the deprivation was very grievous because of the loss of limbs to these two congenitally deformed children. As regards the duration the learned Judge observed that there was no expectation of life as each child had to tolerate his deformities for life. Each child when not asleep was fully aware that he was not like others and could not behave like a normal child. In such circumstances the learned Judge also bore in mind the observations of Lord Denning M. R. in Ward V. James 1965 (1) A. E. R. 563 at page 574 where it is made clear that awards must be on a conventional figure derived from experience and from awards in other cases and that there should be some measure of uniformity in awards and that parties should be able to predict it with some measure of accuracy the sum which is likely to be awarded in a particular case so that cases can be settled peaceably and not brought to court. The learned Judge took into account not only economic loss because of the loss of limbs but also loss of deprivation of amenities in life especially as both the children in question were conscious of the deformities and there was likelihood of the loss of their remarriage and parenthood. There a substantial award had been made both for economic loss and for his material personal loss so that a global figure gave a sufficient amount which made the injured person free from financial worries and went some way towards ameliorating the discomfort and deprivations that he was bound to suffer. ( 7 ) SIMILAR is the pattern even of our Indian cases which dealt with such living victims compensation claims. In the earlier decision in Sorabji v. Jamshedji A. I. R. 1914 Bom. 218 a Division Bench consisting of Scott C. J. and Batchelor J. in such Motor Accident Claim awarded a sum of Rs. 10 0 on the score of pain and suffering and Rs. 20 0 on the score of economic loss past and prospective in addition to a sum of Rs. 6000/as special damages for expenses incurred for treatment. In that case the plaintiff was a young man who had a career of good promise before him. He had suffered intense pain and was likely to suffer in future as he was crippled for life and his means of earning a fair income in the future had been reduced. Therefore on neither of those heads the damages awarded were regarded as excessive by Their Lordships. In State of Madras v. J. Appadurai A. I. R. 1959 Mad. 369 the Division Bench consisting of Ramaswami and Subramaniam JJ. had very elaborately considered this question by reference to various English and Indian authorities. At page 370 the learned Judges considered three heads under which such damages should be considered; (1) personal suffering and loss of enjoyment of life; (2) actual pecuniary loss resulting to any expenses reasonably incurred by the plaintiff; and (3) the probable future loss of income by reason of incapacity or diminished capacity for work. The learned Judges had pointed out how the principle of restitution in integrum was unattainable as a perfect compensation in such cases but still the damages are to be assessed on a fair valuation standard on this head. Even for a person who was expected to earn like his brother Rs. The learned Judges had pointed out how the principle of restitution in integrum was unattainable as a perfect compensation in such cases but still the damages are to be assessed on a fair valuation standard on this head. Even for a person who was expected to earn like his brother Rs. 30/a month as a fitter the carpenters son in that case was awarded a sum of Rs. 10 0 Even in the Rajasthan decision in The Kotah Transport Ltd. v. Jhalawar Transport Service A. I. R. 1960 Rajasthan 224 the Division Bench consisting of Sarjoo Prasad C. J. and Chhangani J. had followed these principles at page 230 and it was held that a decree for substantial damages in such personal injury cases must be on both the heads of pain and suffering as well as of economic loss. On the head of the personal loss alone it was held that a sum of Rs. 10 0 was justified where the plaintiff had lost left leg. These authorities show that both in England and in this country the settled pattern of awards in personal injury cases is not to award merely token damages but to grant substantial amounts on both the head of personal loss as well as economic loss. Of course in order to avoid any overlapping a global estimate had to be made of the all told loss. Therefore even though theoretically there can be no real compensation for loss of the right arm we would have to arrive at a fair social evolution on the basis of these recognised standards by determining the loss of the injured applicant both on the ground of the economic loss and that her bodily integrity had been affected by this deformity with which she has to go in the society and which she had to endure for the whole life time. Besides the loss of limb and the consequent pain and suffering and mental shock she has been day-to day handicapped not only in the marriage market but in her personal and social life. As pointed out by Kemp and Kemp 2 Edition in the Quantum of Damages at page 15 in the case of a female plaintiff serious injury or disfigurement may greatly reduce her prospects of marriage. As pointed out by Kemp and Kemp 2 Edition in the Quantum of Damages at page 15 in the case of a female plaintiff serious injury or disfigurement may greatly reduce her prospects of marriage. Quite apart from other aspects of the matter which fall to be considered under the head of loss of amenities such a matter would represent a real material loss especially in the case of a woman who regarded marriage as her real prospective career and who had not been educated or trained for anything else. An injury which handicaps her in the marriage market represents a real pecuniary loss. Therefore besides economic loss as such in case of such female and especially where she has lost right arm it is such a handicapping injury as to be specially evaluated for this real material loss. ( 8 ) AS regards the economic loss this child has to give up her education now. She could not write in her examination and had to appear for the oral examination even though in this family daughters get fairly good education this girl has lost that benefit of opening the windows of her soul by getting education and to train herself for an educational career. Even as a simple house wife her prospects are almost ruined by this tragic accident as she has lost her right arm. The family is a fairly good middle class family. Mr. Dave was making much of the fathers help. Of course it must be In such a loving family but the girl must be made independent. She cannot be expected to remain at the mercy of her relations. The compensation award should attempt to make some kind of restitution to her. We must evaluate first the economic loss which has resulted to her after the loss of her right arm by loosing the career. The father has deposed that he decided to educate her. We cannot doubt his words as even other members of the family had been given education including daughters. After marriage the daughters may not even have been required to pursue the educational career. Even as the school teacher or Bal Mandir teacher or even through her normal pursuits by the use of the right hand even by domestic household work she could have at least earned her bare animal existence which these days we can at least evaluate at Rs. Even as the school teacher or Bal Mandir teacher or even through her normal pursuits by the use of the right hand even by domestic household work she could have at least earned her bare animal existence which these days we can at least evaluate at Rs. 100/per month for keeping body and soul together. Even if Workmens Compensation Act tables are referred to which may not be relevant for judging the actual extent of the loss when the whole arm is lost the loss is to the extent of about 80% of the earning capacity. Therefore at least a loss of Rs. 80/per month and Rs. 960/per year would be the economic loss on this head which when capitalised even at the multiple of 15 which is commonly accepted multiple in these days for such healthy persons would be converted into a figure of Rs. 14 400 There has to be equally substantial award also for the personal loss of amenities in life and the real material loss of marriage prospects. Even if we accept the normally accepted standard of Rs. 10 0 in such cases for pain and suffering which is accepted by all these eminent Judges in the present case this figure could hardly compensate this personal loss is of the right hand and that too of a female. Therefore additional 75% amount at least would barely provide a reasonable compensation on this score. Thus a total amount of Rs. 17 500 by way of personal loss is only capitalising the annual loss at the monthly figure of Rs. 96/or 97. 00. That comes to a total monthly loss on this years purchases factor of 15 for arriving as the global amount of only Rs. 177. 00. The global amount of Rs. 31 900 for both the personal loss and the economic loss thus represents an equivalent amount of only this annual loss of a monthly benefit of Rs. 177 capitalising at 15 years purchase factor. We would hardly slice down this amount as we have selected only a multiplier of 15 even for this child who is aged 11 years. The Childs future duration of life is a substantially long period. 177 capitalising at 15 years purchase factor. We would hardly slice down this amount as we have selected only a multiplier of 15 even for this child who is aged 11 years. The Childs future duration of life is a substantially long period. We also are not taking into account the personal inconvenience and discomfort or the social discomfiture or consciousness of loss which she would be always suffering while going out in the society along with the cost of some servant whose services she would require. We are conscious of the fact that there is bound to be some over lapping and this global assessment would therefore take into account all these factors and we would be doing rough justice in this case keeping in mind the accepted standards. An alternative check to our calculations is provided by the fact that this amount if properly invested would give this girl fairly adequate security so as to make her free from financial worry and would go some way to ameliorate discomfort and deprivation that she is bound to suffer. ( 9 ) WE may here mention some of the awards on which Mr. Dave vehemently relied to show that our aforesaid calculation is not in the line of the accepted pattern in the country. Mr. Dave had vehemently relied upon the aforesaid Madras decision in State of Madras v. J. Appadurai A. I. R. 1959 Mad. 369 where only Rs. 10 0 were awarded. There the economic loss was worked out only on the basis of Rs. 30. 00as prospective wage which accounts for that lower figure. In 1966 A. C. J. 207 Rajinder Kaurs case a Single Judge of the Punjab High Court had not interfered with award of Rs. 10 400 where the girl had permanent limp which adversely affected marriage chances only with a good boy. Similarly in 1966 A. C. J 217 Deepti Tiwares case a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court had awarded Rs. 4000/only for pain and suffering as it was a case of only a spine fracture as a result of which she lost only academic year. Similarly in Champalals case A. I. R. 1966 Madras 466 the Single Judge had confirmed the award of Rs. 10 804 as the person had become lame and could not fully use his limbs. 4000/only for pain and suffering as it was a case of only a spine fracture as a result of which she lost only academic year. Similarly in Champalals case A. I. R. 1966 Madras 466 the Single Judge had confirmed the award of Rs. 10 804 as the person had become lame and could not fully use his limbs. These cases could hardly help us when we have to evaluate personal and economic loss of a female when her entire right arm is lost. Finally the decision in Iyers case A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 376 is hardly relevant as there Rs. 6000/were awarded as compensation to the parent for loss of prospectus services of the child aged 8 years in the absence of any relevant evidence. ( 10 ) AS regards the special damages the father had deposed that he had incurred expenses of Rs. 300/when this child had to be treated in the hospital for a period of about 20 days even though he may not have produced medical bills he must at least be believed that he had incurred this token expenditure. Therefore that special expenditure of Rs. 300/must also be allowed and the total amount of damages in this case would which have to be Rs. 32 200 instead of Rs. 20 0 were allowed by mere guess work by the Tribunal. Mr. Oza also is right in claiming interest pendente lite at least. It is true that the award of damages cannot carry interest for the period prior to the date of the application. That is why sec. 34 of the C. P. C. has been enacted which gives discretion to the court to award 6% interest on such amounts for the entire claim during which litigation has gone on. A claim of interest on damages is a just claim and must form part of the just compensation award. The Tribunals attention was not directed to this aspect. Therefore the amount which we have awarded will carry 6% interest right from the date of the application till the date of payment. ( 11 ) FINALLY Mr. Oza vehemently argued that the direction of proportionate costs is not the right direction in these cases. In Rahim Baksh v. Bachcha Lal I. L. R. 51 All. 509 a Division Bench consisting of Sen and Niamat Ullah JJ. ( 11 ) FINALLY Mr. Oza vehemently argued that the direction of proportionate costs is not the right direction in these cases. In Rahim Baksh v. Bachcha Lal I. L. R. 51 All. 509 a Division Bench consisting of Sen and Niamat Ullah JJ. at page 518 in terms considered this question in the context of a claim for damages and held that the lower Court had not rightly used its discretion in allowing the plaintiff only proportionate costs. learned Judges pointed out that the plaintiffs cause of action was well founded. The defendant was clearly a wrong doer. In such cases where it was extremely difficult for the plaintiff to value his claim at a particular figure he had to just estimate his claim. Even if the Court did not fully decree such a claim at the time of quantifying the claim the plaintiff must get full costs of both the courts and accordingly a direction of proportionate costs was modified by the award of full costs. This principle has been always accepted so far as maintenance claims are concerned. In Audemma v. Varadareddy A. I. R. 1949 Mad. 31 a Division Bench consisting of Gentle C. J. and Govindarajachari J. at page 39 treated it as a settled position after the decision in Annapoornanamma v. Viraraghavreddi A. I. R. 1940 Mad. 547 to award to a plaintiff in a suit for maintenance her full costs of the suit even if her claim was not decreed in toto provided the claim to maintenance was genuine and true and the amount claimed was not out of all proportion to the amount that was found to be due. The reason of this salutary rule must surely apply in such matters where the Legislature has substituted a Claims Tribunal in place of Civil Court only to award a just compensation. Once liability in tort is established by negligence the plaintiffs claim for compensation is a just claim which has to be assessed. The plaintiff can only put his own estimate. It is difficult problem how to estimate compensation in such cases even for the experienced Judges and Tribunals by reference to the standard pattern. Therefore. merely because the plaintiff slightly overvalues his claim he cannot be deprived of his full costs. In the present case Mr. Oza has all throughout confined his claim at the hearing to the amount of Rs. Therefore. merely because the plaintiff slightly overvalues his claim he cannot be deprived of his full costs. In the present case Mr. Oza has all throughout confined his claim at the hearing to the amount of Rs. 50 0 The plaintiff evaluated her entire loss at this reasonable amount but had only demanded higher amount on the basis of her expected years of life. Merely because we scale down this compensation because larger awards cannot be made that would be no reason to say that the plaintiffs claim of compensation was not a just claim or a true claim or it was a wholly exaggerated claim. Therefore on the aforesaid established principle we would also consider direction of proportionate costs as wholly wrong use of discretion and we would therefore award full costs to the plaintiff on her entire claim which has now been confined in both the forums to the sum of Rs. 50 0 only. ( 12 ) IN the result we allow the appeal of the respondent partially and dismiss the other appeal of the driver owner and the Insurance company. The claimants appeal No. 42/68 is partially allowed by modifying the total award of compensation at Rs. 32 200 which will carry 6% interest from the date of the application till realisation. The injured appellant shall get full costs from the opponents in both the forums on the claim of Rs. 50 0 Appeal No. 580/67 is dismissed with costs and Appeal No. 42/68 is accordingly allowed with costs. The opponents shall bear their own costs all throughout. .