GOSWAMI, C. J.:- This application under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against an order passed by the State Transport Appellate Authority setting aside a. stage carriage permit which had been granted to the petitioner by the Regional Transport Authority, Nowgong, on the Now-Ejong-Hojai-Lanka-Lumding route extended upto Howraghat. The Appellate Authority's order, so far as the petitioner is concerned, may be set out below: It is found that the respondent Shri Babu Singh lives with his brother who has a permit for his vehicle No. ASN 793 for this region. Even though granting of per­mit to several members of the same family is not a legal bar, yet, when equally or more suitable candidates are available this res­pondent should concede to the claims of other suitable appellants. As such, the order granting permit to Shri Babu Singh is here­by set aside." 2. Before we deal with the conten­tions raised by the petitioner, we may refer to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so far as are material to the present controversy. Section 47 provides for the proce­dure of Regional Transport Authority in con­sidering application for stage carriage per­mit. Before we deal with the conten­tions raised by the petitioner, we may refer to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so far as are material to the present controversy. Section 47 provides for the proce­dure of Regional Transport Authority in con­sidering application for stage carriage per­mit. That section reads as follows: "(1) A Regional Transport Authority shall, in considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the following matters, namely,- (a) the interest of the public generally; (b) the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken; (c) the adequacy of other passenger transport services operating or likely to ope­rate in the near future, whether by road or other means, between the places to be serv­ed; (d) the benefit to any particular locality or localities likely to be afforded by the ser­vice; (e) the operation by the applicant of Other transport services including those in respect of which applications from him for permits are pending; (f) the condition of the roads included in the proposed route or area; and shall also take into consideration any representations made by persons already pro­viding passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any association representing per­sons interested in the provision of road transport faculties recognized in this behalf by the State Government, or by local autho­rity or police authority within whose jurisdic­tion any part of the proposed route or area lies: Provided that other conditions being equal, an application for a stage carriage permit from a co-operative society register­ed or deemed to have been registered under any enactment in force for the time being shall, as far as may be, be given preference over applications from individual owners." Section 57 (2) provides when an application for a stage carriage permit may be made. Under sub-section (3) of the said section, there is provision for inspection of the applications and for publication of the same in the prescribed manner together with a notice of the date before which representa­tions in connection therewith may be submitted and also the time and place at which the application and any representa­tion received will be considered. Under sub-section (3) of the said section, there is provision for inspection of the applications and for publication of the same in the prescribed manner together with a notice of the date before which representa­tions in connection therewith may be submitted and also the time and place at which the application and any representa­tion received will be considered. Sub-sec­tion (4) provides that no representation in connection with an application referred to in sub-section (3) shall be considered by the Regional Transport Authority unless it is made in writing before the appointed date and unless a copy thereof is furnished simul­taneously to the applicant by the person making such representation. Under sub­section (5) when any such representation is made, the Regional Transport Authority shall dispose of the application at a pub­lic hearing at which the applicant and the person making the representation shall have an opportunity of being heard either in person or by a duly authorised representa­tive. Under sub-section (7) when a Regio­nal Transport Authority refuses an applica­tion for a permit of any kind, it shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal. We need not refer to the other provisions in the section for our present purpose. Section 64 provides for appeals to the prescribed authority against the orders of refusal of permit by the Regio­nal Transport Authority. Under Section 64 any person aggrieved by the order may within the prescribed time and in the pres­cribed manner appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard. The 'prescribed authority' under Rule 89 of the Assam Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940, is the Chairman and two Members of the State Transport Authority appointed by the Chairman. It may be appropriate to read both the Rules 89 and 90: "89. Appeals against the orders of the Regional Transport Authority:- (a) The authority to decide an appeal against the orders of the Regional Transport Authority under Clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of Section 64 of the Act shall be the Chair­man and two members of the State Trans­port Authority appointed by the Chairman. Appeals against the orders of the Regional Transport Authority:- (a) The authority to decide an appeal against the orders of the Regional Transport Authority under Clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of Section 64 of the Act shall be the Chair­man and two members of the State Trans­port Authority appointed by the Chairman. Any person preferring an appeal against the order of the Regional Transport Authority in respect of such matters shall, within thirty days of the receipt of such order, do so in writing to the Secretary of the State Transport Authority in the form of a memo­randum in duplicate setting forth concisely the grounds of objection to the order of the Regional Transport Authority, accompanied & certified copy of that order which shall granted free. (b) Upon receipt of an appeal in accordance with sub-rule (a), the appellate authority shall appoint a time and place for hearing of the appeal giving the appellant not less than 30 days' notice and shall in that case order the appellant to deposit such fee, not exceeding Rs. 25/- as the ap­pellate authority may specify. (c) No further appeal shall lie against any order of the appellate authority consti­pated under sub-rule (a)." "90. The appellate authority shall inti­mate to the appellant the time and place of hearing an appeal under Rules 88 and 89. Within fourteen days of receipt of such intimation the appellant shall forward to the Appellate Authority copies of such docu­ments in duplicate upon which he proposes to rely, and upon the appointed date may appear either in person or through an agent or representative authorised by him in writ­ing in this behalf." 3. Reading the above provisions, it appears, under Section 64 the Appellate Au­thority has to give only the appellant and the Original Authority, in this case, the Regional Transport Authority, an opportunity of being heard! There is no express provi­sion for giving notice to the persons in whose favour the Regional Transport Authority had granted the permit, although if the appel­late order disturbs the original order, the rights of such persons are bound to be af­fected. Though this lacuna is seen in the Act, we are told that notice is invariably given to the permit-holders whose rights are affected and in this case it appears the af­fected persons were indeed notified and heard by the appellate authority. Though this lacuna is seen in the Act, we are told that notice is invariably given to the permit-holders whose rights are affected and in this case it appears the af­fected persons were indeed notified and heard by the appellate authority. We are therefore not required to consider the rea­sons for the existence of this lacuna in the law, nor is it an appropriate case to consi­der what will be the legal effect if no notice has been served on the persons affected by the order. 4. Section 47 specifies certain mat­ters mentioned therein which the Regional Transport Authority has to consider in dis­posing of an application for a stage carriage permit. Some of these matters may not have a direct bearing on the individual suit­ability of a particular candidate. For exam­ple, Section 47 (1) (c) which mentions about the adequacy of other passenger transport services operating or likely to operate in the near future, whether by road or other means, between the places to be served" may not have much relevance to the particular suit­ability of a person to hold a stage carriage permit. Section 47, therefore, is not ex­haustive of all the matters which require to be considered in selecting certain persons out of a large number of applicants for a per­mit. The manner of selection of a particu­lar permit-holder cannot, therefore, be put in the strait-jacket of a certain set formula. There must be enough discretion with the settling authorities in making the selection. But, while doing so, the authority must have due regard to the matters specified in Sec­tion 47 so far as applicable to particular case before it. 5. It is understandable that the Re­gional Transport Authority has to examine the cases of a large number of applicants and compare the merits of the candidates inter se before it is in a position to finally select a few out of them for the limited per­mits that are available. Under Section 57 '(7), a Regional Transport Authority, refus­ing an application for permit, has to give to the applicant in writing its reasons for refusal. In this particular case, the Regio­nal Transport Authority, having considered all the applicants, unanimously came to the conclusion in favour of the five persons in­cluding the petitioner and the other appli­cations were rejected. Strictly speaking, this may not be considered as compliance with Section 57 (7) of the Motor Vehicles Act. In this particular case, the Regio­nal Transport Authority, having considered all the applicants, unanimously came to the conclusion in favour of the five persons in­cluding the petitioner and the other appli­cations were rejected. Strictly speaking, this may not be considered as compliance with Section 57 (7) of the Motor Vehicles Act. In appeal before the Appellate Au­thority, the cases of a fewer persons for the same permits are involved since a large number of disappointed applicants generally step out from the race at the primary stage itself. The Appellate Authority has to con­sider the merits and demerits of the appli­cants and its power is co-extensive with that of the primary authority. While it has to examine the reasons urged against the order of the Regional Transport Authority, it has also to consider for itself which of the parties is best entitled to the permit in their impartial consideration. The Appel­late Authority, however, in this case has not set aside the order of the Regional Trans­port Authority on the ground that there was no strict compliance with Section 57 (7) of the Motor Vehicles Act perhaps, it consi­dered even the cryptic order of the Regio­nal Transport Authority as sufficient in the circumstances of the case. We are, there­fore, not called upon to finally pass upon the question about the legal effect of omis­sion to give reasons or to give elaborate rea­sons for refusal of the application. 6. The learned Advocate-General, Meghalaya, in support of the petitioner has urged that the Appellate Authority has set aside the order of the primary authority on extraneous grounds and also without com­plying with the principles of natural justice. He submits that the only ground given against the petitioner is that he lives with his brother who has a permit for his Vehicle No. ASN 793_ for this region. In support of his submission, he draws our at­tention to an affidavit filed by the father of the petitioner stating that the petitioner stays at Nowgong separately from him and his other sons and is living on his own earn­ings. It is contended that in absence of any counter-affidavit from the respondents the Appellate Authority could not, in law, act on the allegations in the memorandum of appeal. It is contended that in absence of any counter-affidavit from the respondents the Appellate Authority could not, in law, act on the allegations in the memorandum of appeal. We are however not required to pursue this matter, since the Appellate Au­thority itself has not taken the fact of pos­session of a permit by the petitioner's bro­ther as a legal bar. On the other hand, the order clearly shows that the candidates pre­ferred by the Appellate Authority are more suitable than the petitioner. We do not therefore see that any extraneous ground has influenced the decision of the Appellate Authority. The further submission that the Appellate Authority has violated the princi­ples of natural justice is also not well- founded since the decision does not rest upon the allegation of the petitioner's bro­ther having a permit in the region. We are, therefore, unable to find that the Appellate Authority took into consideration any facts against the petitioner without giving him a reasonable opportunity. The application is therefore without merit and is dismissed. We however make no order as to costs. Civil Rule No. 736 of 1970 7. In this Civil Rule, the petitioner got a stage carriage permit from the Regio­nal Transport Authority and lost the same in appeal before the Appellate Authority. The relevant order of the Appellate Autho­rity with regard to this petitioner is as fol­lows: "Respondent Shri Topodhan Bharali is a businessman with businesses in almost all the districts of the State and it has been brought to our notice that his brother Shri Bilash Chandra Bharali, a member of the joint family is the owner of Bus No. ASZ 2153. Nothing has been said to substan­tiate his claims to hold a permit in prefer­ence to better claims of other appellants. The decision of the R. T. A. in granting him a permit in preference to the better claims of other superior applicants appears to be improper and unjustified and as such the permit granted to him is hereby cancelled." 8. It is submitted by Mr. K. M. Lahiri that the allegations which were made were never substantiated before the Appell­ate Authority and they remained as allega­tions unsupported by any affidavit. The order of the Appellate Authority, therefore, based as it is on these allegations without proof is perverse. This point has been speci­fically taken by the petitioner in paragraph 5 of his application before this Court. The order of the Appellate Authority, therefore, based as it is on these allegations without proof is perverse. This point has been speci­fically taken by the petitioner in paragraph 5 of his application before this Court. There is no clear and specific denial of the aver­ments in this paragraph in the sole affidavit of the respondent No. 8. That being the position, we are constrained to set aside the order of the Appellate Authority with re­gard to this petitioner, as the order of the Regional Transport Authority was set aside by taking into consideration facts which were not established before the Appellate Authority. It is not permissible for the Ap­pellate Authority to set aside the order of the primary authority merely on allegations without proof. The order of the Appellate Authority, so far as this petitioner is con­cerned, can be characterised as perverse and the same is therefore set aside. 9. The application is allowed, but there will be no order as to costs. Civil Rule No. 741 of 1970 10. The petitioner in this Civil Rule is another permit holder who has been grant­ed permit by the Regional Transport Au­thority, which was set aside by the Appel­late Authority. The Appellate Authority has set aside the order of the Regional Trans­port Authority with the following observa­tions: "As regards the respondent Shri Tara Nath Bora, no grounds have been adduced to support his superior claims and as such the permit granted to him is also cancelled." The Regional Transport Authority having considered this petitioner as a suitable can­didate, if the finding has got to be set aside on appeal, reasons for differing from the view of the primary authority have ordinarily to be given. However, before the Appellate Authority, the Regional Transport Authority is also given an opportunity of being heard (Section 64). It may therefore be assumed that that body had the opportunity to sup­port the order in favour of the petitioner before the Appellate Authority. When, therefore, the Appellate Authority, after taking into consideration all facts, states that no grounds have been adduced about the petitioner's superior claims, no valid ob­jection can be taken, although perhaps it would have been better if the Appellate Authority also gave reasons for preferring someone else in place of the petitioner. When, therefore, the Appellate Authority, after taking into consideration all facts, states that no grounds have been adduced about the petitioner's superior claims, no valid ob­jection can be taken, although perhaps it would have been better if the Appellate Authority also gave reasons for preferring someone else in place of the petitioner. Since however the Regional Transport Au­thority itself had not given any clear reasons for refusal of the permit to the respondent, there was not much for the Appellate Autho­rity to dilate with regard to the infirmities of the order of the Regional Transport Au­thority. We are therefore not inclined to interfere with the impugned order with re­gard to this petitioner. The petition is therefore rejected and there will be no order as to costs. Civil Rule No. 742 of 1970 11. The petitioner, Digen Chandra Laskar, in this Rule was granted a stage carriage permit by the Regional Transport Authority which he lost in appeal before the State Transport Appellate Authority. That Authority has given the following reasons: "Respondent Shri Digen Chandra Las­kar is engaged in other businesses. He has a fair price shop and is also the lessee of the Doboka Bazar which keeps him other­wise busy. Nothing has been said in sup­port of his claim. Hence we hold him to be unsuitable and as a result, the permit grant­ed to him is set aside." 12. The petitioner contends that he had no knowledge of the allegations made against him and as such had no reasonable opportunity of meeting the allegations be­fore the Appellate Authority. Respondent No. 1, however, denies this fact and stated that although the hearing of the appeal was concluded on 12th September, 1970, the appellants' including the petitioner's appeal were heard in part on an earlier occasion, on which date the petitioner had all the op­portunity of inspecting the records including the memos of appeal. The petitioner made no grievance before the Appellate Authority, nor is it a case where he was refused any adjournment to controvert the allegations. There are similar statements in the affidavits »f the other respondents also in this Court. We are, therefore, satisfied that there was no failure of principles of natural justice in dis­posing of the appeal against the petitioner.. The application is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Civil Rule No. 743 of 1970 13. There are similar statements in the affidavits »f the other respondents also in this Court. We are, therefore, satisfied that there was no failure of principles of natural justice in dis­posing of the appeal against the petitioner.. The application is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Civil Rule No. 743 of 1970 13. The permit of the petitioner Syed Abdul Matin was also similarly can­celled by the State Transport Appellate Au­thority and the reasons given are as follows: 'It is contended that respondent Syed Abdul Matin is a member of a Gaon Pan-chayat and as such a public servant as de­fined under Section 48 of the Assam Pan-chayat Act. But in our opinion he is not a public servant for the purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act. However, we find that nothing could be brought out to establish his superior claim over the other appellants whose merits have already been discussed above. His permit is therefore cancelled." 14. The order of the Appellate Au­thority is challenged on the ground that the petitioner had no reasonable opportunity to show cause against the allegations made against him in the appeal before the Appel­late Authority. The reasons which we have given in the case of the petitioner Digen Chandra Laskar are also applicable to the case of the petitioner in this Rule. We are not satisfied that there is any violation of the principles of natural justice in disposing of his appeal by the Appellate Authority. The application is dismissed and we make no order as to costs. 15. In the result, the applications in Civil Rule Nos. 735, 741, 742 and 743 of 1970 are dismissed The stay order in Civil Rule No. 735 of 1970 stands vacated. The application in Civil Rule No. 736 of 1970 is allowed and that part of the order of the State Transport Appellate Authority relating to the petitioner is quashed and the permit granted to him by the Regional Transport Authority is restored. We will, however, make no order as to costs. M. C. PATHAK, J.:- 16. I agree. Order accordingly.