Judgment 1. There are two appellants in this appeal. Both have been convicted under Section 471, read with Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code), and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years each. It may be also mentioned here that they had also been prosecuted and charged for the offence under Section 467 of the Code, but the learned trial court has recorded an order of acquittal in respect of that charge. 2. The relevant facts, which have given rise to this appeal may be briefly stated as follows. Fekan Mandal, who figured as P.W. 1 in the case, was a decree holder, having obtained a decree on the basis of a hand-note against the appellants, who were judgement-debtors. Fekan Mandal filed an execution case for the execution of the decree and this was registered as Execution Case No. 25 of 1960. In the execution case a petition, purporting to be a petition of satisfaction and purporting to have been signed and executed by Fekan Mandal decree-holder, was filed on the 8th November, 1960, but, some how or other, it appears that no notice of this petition was taken until the 6th December, 1960. It was on this day that a mention of this petition was made in the order-sheet of the execution case. The decree-holder, Fekan Mandal, thereafter filed a petition which was registered as Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 195 of 1961 in the Munsifs First Court at Bhagalpur. It was urged in the petition that no such petition of satisfaction had been signed by the decree-holder and it had not been filed by him and that the decree-holder had not received a single farthing in respect of the decree. There were allegations also to the effect that the petition did not contain the signature of the lawyer of the decree-holder and it was not known as to who was the scribe, who had described himself as Arjun Mandal, Karpardaz of the decree-holder. The Judgement-debtors thereafter filed a rejoinder to the effect that the petition of satisfaction was a genuine document and that the decree-holder in spite of having received the money dishonestly was disowning the satisfaction petition. 3. The Judgement-debtors thereafter filed a rejoinder to the effect that the petition of satisfaction was a genuine document and that the decree-holder in spite of having received the money dishonestly was disowning the satisfaction petition. 3. As stated above, a miscellaneous case had been instituted and the learned Munsif made inquiry into the matter and he was of the view that the satisfaction petition was not a genuine document and, having not accepted the satisfaction as genuine, he held that the decree remained unsatisfied and further directed that a complaint be filed under the provisions of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the prosecution of the appellants for the offence under Section 471 read with Section 467 of the Code. In consequence of this direction of the learned Munsif, a regular complaint was filed and the learned Subdivisional Magistrate after having taken cognisance of the same, transferred the case to a Magistrate, before whom the usual commitment inquiry was held. The learned Magistrate having found a prima facie case against the appellants, committed them for trial to the court of session. There was a trial held in the court of Shree G.P. Sharma, Assistant Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur, and the learned Assistant Sessions Judge held that the petition of satisfaction had been filed by the judgement-debtors, i.e. the present appellants, but, he also held that there was no material to hold that the forgery had been committed by any of the appellants, and, therefore, in this view of the matter, he acquitted the appellants of the charge under Section 467 of the Code, but convicted them of the offence under Section 471 read with Section 467 of the Code. 4. It may be also mentioned here that the defence taken by the appellants in the sessions trial was to the same effect as in the miscellaneous case before the learned Munsif, about which I have stated above. There was an assertion on behalf of the appellants to the effect that the document was a genuine one and there were also allegations to the effect that one Mahendra Mandal who was a son of the decree-holder Fekan Mandal, was a person who had acted dishonestly on many other occasions, and, therefore, he might have perpetrated some kind of fraud. It may be mentioned here that this Mahendra Mandal was also examined at the sessions trial. 5. It may be mentioned here that this Mahendra Mandal was also examined at the sessions trial. 5. The appellants, being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgement of conviction of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, have preferred this appeal. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, at the time of the hearing of this appeal, substantially made three submissions. One of these is to the effect that the order of conviction under Section 471 read with Section 467 of the Code was illegal and stands vitiated in view of the fact that the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, as already stated above, recorded a finding of acquittal in respect of the charge under Section 467 of the Code. It has also been urged that since no appeal on behalf of the State has been filed in respect of the acquittal under Section 467 of the Code, this Court cannot disturb the finding of acquittal and the conviction under Section 471 of the Code in such circumstances is not sustainable. The second submission which has been made is that the finding was also bad because the petition of satisfaction cannot be regarded as a valuable security, but the learned Counsel for the appellants fairly conceded that he was not pressing this point. It has also been submitted that there was a serious lacuna in the prosecution evidence because the handwriting expert had not been examined and this should have been done, when, on the one hand it was urged that there was the signature of the decree-holder Fekan Mandal, which, on the other hand, was denied on his behalf. It has also been further submitted that taking an overall picture of the evidence and the circumstances the finding of conviction under S.471 of the Code is also bad. 7. I will take up first of all the question whether the conviction under Section 471 of the Code is bad and stands vitiated, as urged by learned Counsel for the appellants. There were two charges against the appellants. 7. I will take up first of all the question whether the conviction under Section 471 of the Code is bad and stands vitiated, as urged by learned Counsel for the appellants. There were two charges against the appellants. The first charge was under Section 471 read with Section 465/467 of the Code, and this charge is to the effect that on the 8th November, 1960, and 6th December, 1960, in the court of the Additional Munsif, Bhagalpur, the appellants fraudulently and dishonestly used as genuine a certain document, viz., satisfaction petition dated the 29th October, 1960, acknowledging payment of money, in Execution Case No. 25 of 1960. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge in paragraph 10 of his judgement stated. "But it is not possible to say with confidence that these accused actually forged this satisfaction petition," and thereafter, towards the concluding portion of this paragraph he stated. "Thus, these accused are acquitted of the charge under Section 467, I.P.C." The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants, therefore, is quite correct in this respect that there was a clear recording of acquittal in respect of the charge under Section 467 of the Code. But the last paragraph of, the judgement of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, which I will be quoting here in extenso, requires a fuller examination. In the last paragraph it is stated as follows : "These accused have been convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years under Section 471 read with Section 467 I.P.C. for dishonestly using a forged document as genuine knowing full well that it was forged. These accused have been sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment each for offence under S.471 I.P.C. because they have dishonestly used a forged satisfaction petition knowing full well that it was forged. It is obvious that such a conduct on the part of the judgement-debtors accused must not be encouraged and punishment for rigorous imprisonment for five years is quite fair in my view under the circumstances." The observations in the earlier part of this paragraph would, no doubt, necessarily lead to the conclusion that there was a conviction under Section 471 read with S.467 of the Code, but if the subsequent portion of the paragraph is read, then it means that the conviction was only under Section 471 of the Code. On a perusal of the entire judgement of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, particularly with reference to the observations made in the paragraphs referred to above, it appears to me that the learned Assistant Sessions Judge rather got confused with this aspect of the matter that having framed a charge under Section 471/467, Indian Penal Code, he thought that it was necessary to say the conviction was under Section 471 read with Section 467 of the Code. 8. Section 471 of the Code runs as follows : "Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document." The important ingredients of this section, therefore, are that a document although not genuine, and a person knowing it not to be genuine or having reasons to believe that it is not a genuine but a forged document, uses it and that also fraudulently and dishonestly, and then it comes within the mischief of Section 471 of the Code. It is not necessary that the use should be in a particular manner. If it is known to be not a genuine document and it is used, it is sufficient. The section does not lay down as to what would be the punishment for it, but it only lays down that the accused "shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document," and although the section does not specify the punishment, yet it clearly lays down that the punishment shall be just like a punishment for forgery. In the model charge given in the Law of Crimes of Rattanlal, there is a specific mention "That you, thereby committed an offence punishable under Sections 465 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code........." First of all, it has to be proved that the document is forged, as contemplated by Ss.463 and 464 and Section 471 can come into operation only if a document is not genuine but a forged one. But, I think that there can be no bar in law for a conviction under Section 471 only, although there is acquittal for the offence either under Sec. 465 or S.467 of the Code. But, I think that there can be no bar in law for a conviction under Section 471 only, although there is acquittal for the offence either under Sec. 465 or S.467 of the Code. 9 Learned Counsel for the appellants has relied on a Single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Mangal Singh v. The State, 1955 BLJR 453 : ( AIR 1956 Pat 154 ). In the concluding portion, his Lordship was pleased to observe that "If, therefore, the petitioner is acquitted of the charge under Section 467, Indian Penal Code it follows automatically that he cannot be held liable for the charge under Section 471, Indian Penal Code," and reliance has been put on this observation with a view to strengthen the argument on behalf of the appellants that when there has been an acquittal under Section 467, there cannot be a conviction under Section 471 of the Code. 10. The facts and the circumstances of the above case were quite distinguishable from the facts of the present case, because there was an allegation that the document produced in the proceeding was antedated and a question arose for consideration, whether the mere antedating of the document would be forgery within the meaning of the Code, and when the document was held to be not a forged document, then, naturally, it follows that there cannot be a punishment under Section 471 of the Code. Here, in this case, if the finding has been or if in appeal it was found that the document was not a forged document, there could not have been any conviction under Section 467. But, naturally, the acquittal under Section 467 only means that it has not been proved and the court could not come to a finding that these two appellants, were the persons who had actually forged the document. But using a document is quite independent and separate from forging a document. On a perusal of the entire judgement and in view of the facts, which I have stated above, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge may not have been able to express himself in so many clear words, but that is what he must be deemed to have meant. There is, therefore, no substance in this point raised in this appeal. 11. On a perusal of the entire judgement and in view of the facts, which I have stated above, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge may not have been able to express himself in so many clear words, but that is what he must be deemed to have meant. There is, therefore, no substance in this point raised in this appeal. 11. The second point, which has been urged, is that the evidence and the circumstances did not prove that the document was a forged and fabricated document. (After discussing the evidence, the judgement proceeded.) 12. There was thus the oral evidence and the circumstances emanating from the same, but it has been strongly urged that in such a case there was the necessity of examination of a hand-writing expert, but it had not been done. True, it is, that no hand-writing expert was examined, but it appears to me that at no stage, either when the inquiry was pending before the Munsif or in the court of the committing Magistrate or in the sessions court any prayer was made or any objection taken that the hand-writing expert had not been examined. In a case like this, the examination of an expert may be desirable, but a pertinent question arises, whether in absence of the examination of a hand-writing expert the prosecution case should fail. The obvious answer to this would be that if there is no hand-writing expert then the evidence on record and the circumstances have to be judged and it has to be seen whether the prosecution has been able to prove beyond all reasonable doubts the charge and, I think that, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, in view of the evidence on the record and the circumstances, came to the correct finding that the document was not a genuine document, but it could not be held, that appellants had forged the document, and so the appellants were guilty only for using the document under Section 471 of the Code. 13. The last point, which has been submitted in this case, is the sentence is too severe and the decretal amount has already been deposited. 13. The last point, which has been submitted in this case, is the sentence is too severe and the decretal amount has already been deposited. It appears from the material on the record (vide Order No. 56 of the execution case) that on the 24th January, 1963 the judgement-debtors, i.e., the present appellants, having obtained permission to deposit the decretal dues, deposited the entire decretal dues, which amounted to more than Rs. 1000/- and a payment order had also been passed for making payment to the decree-holder. The money has, therefore, been paid by the judgement-debtors. This would be a circumstance to be taken into consideration, as far as the sentence is concerned. Since it could not be proved that these appellants had committed forgery themselves, but the document was not genuine, and, since the deposit has been made, considering these aspects of the matter, there is scone for modification of the sentence. Therefore, the conviction under Section 471 is upheld but the sentence is modified to a period of two years rigorous imprisonment. 14. The appeal is dismissed, except for the modification in the sentence, referred to above. Sentence modified.