SHINGHAL, J.— Plaintiff Messrs Stoneware Pipe and Sanitary Fittings Manufacturing Company Limited, Jaipur, was under members voluntary winding up. Shri Ramgopal Chokhani was appointed its liquidator, but he obtained an order on July 9, 1964 for the and for supervision by appointment of the Official Liquidator to be the liquidator, Court. The plaintiff has stated that Messrs Madanlal Kishore Singh of Kishangarh obtained the permission of the former Jaipur State on January 17, 1946 for establishing a factory for the manufacture of stoneware pipes and other sanitary fittings in Jaipur They and some others promoted a public company under the name and style of Messrs Stone Ware Pipes and Sanitary Fittings Manufacturing Company Limited, and it was incorporated on March 16, 1946, under the Jaipur Companies Act. The permission and the rights and concessions etc. granted to Messrs Madanlal Kishore Singh were transferred to the Company, which appointed Messrs Madanlal Kishore Singh as its managing agents. 2. The managing agents pursued their efforts to obtain allotment of a plot of land to the Company, in the industrial area, for the setting up of the Companys factory. Plot No. 3 which is the suit plot, was allotted for the purpose. The managing agents then addressed letter Ex 3 dated April 25, 1946 to the Director of Industries and Commerce for delivery of possession of the plot. The Director conveyed the sanction for the sale of that plot measuring 450 ft x 483 ft. for the establishment of a factory, at the rate of annas 4 per square yard. A sum of Rs. 6,114/13/6 was accordingly deposited by the plaintiff against cash receipt Ex 5 dated September 6, 1947. Possession of the plot was given to the plaintiff and it provided a wire fencing where necessary. The plaintiff has contended that it then became the full owner, in possession, of the suit plot. 3. The plaintiff has stated further that it constructed roads, buildings, sheds etc in and over the suit plot, installed machinery and other equipment at a cost of about Rs. 58,956/4/- and started the production. Its grievance is that although it was the owner in possession of the suit plot, the Urban Improvement Trust, defendant No. 2, illegally and forcibly occupied an area measuring 340 ft x 483 ft (18246| square yards) in May, 1958. 58,956/4/- and started the production. Its grievance is that although it was the owner in possession of the suit plot, the Urban Improvement Trust, defendant No. 2, illegally and forcibly occupied an area measuring 340 ft x 483 ft (18246| square yards) in May, 1958. That area has been marked ABFE in site-plan Ex 8, while the entire area purchased by the plaintiff has been marked ABCD in that plan. Shri Rampal Singh, who was a shareholder and ex-director of the Company, held a discussion with the Organizer, Industrial States. Industries and Supplies Department, in that connection, and the Organizer sent him reply Ex. 9 dated January 3, 1959 enquiring about his expectation of the price for the total area, excluding the area enclosed by the factory. While these efforts to recover the land were going on, an extra-ordinary meeting of the members of the Company was held on August 31, 1961 in which the aforesaid decision was taken to wind it up voluntarily and to appoint Shri Ramgopal Chokhani as the liquidator. Shri Chokhani found letter Ex. 11 of April 1962 pasted on the factory premises stating that as the plaintiff was under liquidation and had not fulfilled the conditions on which the land was alloted and there was no chance of the land being utilised for the purpose for which it was allotted, it stood forfeited its possession resumed by the Government with effect from the date of the order. Shri Chokhani lodged a protect under letter Ex. 12 dated April 23, 1962, but did not receive a reply. The plaintiff then gave a notice under sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on June 30, 1962. 4. When the Official Liquidator took over the winding up proceedings under the supervision of the Court, he gave a notice (Ex 14) to the authorities concerned under sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on December 22/30, 1965. No reply was received, and the Official Liquidator advertised the sale of the plot by public auction, along with the structures and the machinery, fixing December 22, 1966, as the date of auction. The Director of Industries informed the Official Liquidator (by his letter Ex. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on December 22/30, 1965. No reply was received, and the Official Liquidator advertised the sale of the plot by public auction, along with the structures and the machinery, fixing December 22, 1966, as the date of auction. The Director of Industries informed the Official Liquidator (by his letter Ex. 20 dated December 12, 1966) that the plot was in the possession of the Government since April 7, 1962 and that the Official Liquidator had no right to sell it but could remove the structures or the machinery installed in the shed. 5. The plaintiff has filed the present suit with these allegations, on November 15, 1957, in forma pauperis, and prayed for a decree for (1) restoration of possession of 18246-2/3 square yards of land marked ABFE in site-plan Ex. 8 and, if need be, for demolition of the construction made by the defendants, and (ii) payment of Rs. 11,450/- by way of mesne profits up to date of the suit and thereafter at the rate of Rs. 1,200/-per annum until restoration of possession. In the alternative, the plaintiff has prayed that a decree may be passed for the payment of Rs. 82 465/66 as compensation in lieu of the price of the land marked ABFE. The plaintiff has further prayed that the defendants may be restrained, by means of a prohibitory injunction, from interfering with its possession on the remaining land measuring 5903-1/3 square yards marked CDEF in site plan Ex 8. In the alternative, the plaintiff has prayed for restoration of possession of that land by ejecting the defendants, or for the payment of Rs. 59,033/34 as compensation at the rate of Rs. 10/- per square yard It has prayed for the award of interest and costs also. 6. A written statement has been filed by the State of Rajasthan, defendant No. 1, but not by the Urban Improvement Trust. The State has traversed the claim altogether by denying almost all the important averments in the plaint. If has pleaded that the plaintiff has no right, title or interest in the suit land, and that it is not its owner. The plaintiffs possession on the suit land has also been denied. It has been stated that the letter [Ex. 9] dated January 3. If has pleaded that the plaintiff has no right, title or interest in the suit land, and that it is not its owner. The plaintiffs possession on the suit land has also been denied. It has been stated that the letter [Ex. 9] dated January 3. 1959 was written because of a mis-representation of the facts to the Director and that it does not confer any right or title in the plaintiff. The defendant has also challenged the legality of the notice under sec 30 C.P.C. In particular, it has been pleaded that the plaintiff has not filed a copy of the sale-deed, that it does not appear that the sale deed was registered and that there was therefore no valid sale in favour of the plaintiff who had no locus standi to file the suit. Then it has been pleaded that the defendants are in lawful occupation of the suit land as owners. It has been pleaded further that the suit is not within limitation and that the valuation mentioned in the plaint is much below the market value which is not less than Rs. 25/- per square yard. A plea of non-joinder of parties has also been taken. 7. The following issues were framed on February 20, 1959, in consultation with the learned counsel for the parties who agreed that these were the only points for decision in the case : [1] Does the land covered by plot No. 3 of the Industrial area, Jaipur South, Jaipur, and described in para 3 of the plaint belong to the plaintiff-company ? [2] Has the Government taken illegal and unauthorised possession of the land marked ABFE in the plan [Annexure I] annexed to the plaint, in May 1958 ? [3] Is the plaintiff-company entitled to get mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1,200 p. a. from May, 1958 until restoration of possession ? [4] Is the plaintiff-company in possession of the land marked CDEF in the plan [Annexure I] appended to the plaint ? If so, is it entitled to restrain the defendants from interfering with its possession ? [5] Has the plaintiff company no locus-standi to file the present suit ? [6] Is the suit within limitation ? [4] Is the plaintiff-company in possession of the land marked CDEF in the plan [Annexure I] appended to the plaint ? If so, is it entitled to restrain the defendants from interfering with its possession ? [5] Has the plaintiff company no locus-standi to file the present suit ? [6] Is the suit within limitation ? [7] Is the plaintiff-company entitled to get compensation in lieu of the price of the land covered by plot No. 3 in question as stated in para 18 of the plaint ? [8] Is the notice served on the defendant not correct and if so, what is its effect ? [9] Relief? 8. Learned Government Advocate has frankly stated that he has nothing to say in regard to issues Nos. 6 and 8 and that the former may be decided in favour of the plaintiff and the latter against the defendants. A perusal of the record shows that this contention is quite justified, and the two issues are decided accordingly. I shall deal with the remaining issues ad seriatim. Issue No. 1—This issue relates to the question whether the suit plot belongs to the plaintiff? The learned counsel for the parties have addressed their arguments both on facts and law and I shall examine them separately. I shall examine the facts first. 9. It will be recalled that it is the plaintiffs case that M/s Madanlal Kishore Singh applied to the Government of the former Jaipur State for permission to establish a factory for the manufacture of stoneware pipes and other sanitary fittings, and that permission was granted to them on 17-1-1946. The plaintiff has been able to establish this contention by the statement of Kishoresingh P. W.3, Shiv Charan Das P.W. 4 and Ishwari Singh P.W 6. Kishore Singh was a partner of the firm of M/s Madanlal Kishoresingh, and so also his son-in-law Ishwarisingh PW. 6. Both these witnesses have stated that M/s Madanlal Kishoresingh obtained permission from the former Jaipur State for establishing a factory for manufacturing stoneware pipes and sanitary fittings etc. Kishore Singh was a partner of the firm of M/s Madanlal Kishoresingh, and so also his son-in-law Ishwarisingh PW. 6. Both these witnesses have stated that M/s Madanlal Kishoresingh obtained permission from the former Jaipur State for establishing a factory for manufacturing stoneware pipes and sanitary fittings etc. and that a company under the name and style of Messrs Stone Ware Pipes and Sanitary Fittings Manufacturing Company Limited was incorporated to carry on that business Agreement Ex.1 was made (on February 26, 1946) between Messrs Madanlal Kishore Singh and the plaintiff for the sale of the concessions obtained by the former from the Government of Jaipur as the right to acquire the land described in the letter of the Director of Industries [No 9660 dated November 2, 1945]. Both Kishore Singh and Ishwari Singh affixed their signatures to agreement Ex. 1, and they have proved the signatures of the other executants also. They have further stated that the agreement was ratified in a meeting of the Board of Directors of the plaintiff on May 4, 1948 and Ex. 2 has been produced as the record of those proceedings. Shivcharan Das Khandelwal P. W. 4 has also proved documents Exs. 1 and 2 The statements of Kishore Singh and Ishwari Singh also go to prove that Messrs Madanlal Kishore Singh were appointed as the managing agents of the plaintiff They have stated that letter Ex. 3 was sent by Ishwari Singh on April 25, 1945. on behalf of the plaintiff, for delivery of possession of the suit plot to the plaintiff, with the assurance that its cost would be paid as soon as the decision of the Director of Industries was received Ex. 21 dated April 20, 1946 is another letter of Ishwari Singh informing the Director of Industries about the incorporation of the plaintiff and requesting him to convey the sanction for the setting up of the factory in its name. Kishore Singh has stated that the managing agents of the plaintiff received Government sanction Ex.4 dated 21 -5-1946 for the sale of the suit plot measuring 450 ft x 483 ft at the rate of annas 4 per square yard, and asking for the immediate remittance of the cost. Kishore Singh has stated that the plaintiff deposited the full price under receipt Ex. 5 dated September 6, 1947]. Kishore Singh has stated that the plaintiff deposited the full price under receipt Ex. 5 dated September 6, 1947]. Both Kishore Singh and Ishwari Singh have stated that the Government then delivered possession of the suit to the plaintiff, which put up a fencing and built a chimney, tinsheds etc. A perusal of letter Ex. 9 of the Organizer, Industrial Estates, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur, dated January 3, 1959, also shows that that officer asked Shri Rampal Singh to intimate the expected price of the total area excluding the area enclosed by the factory, at an early date. The genuineness of this letter has been admitted by the respondents. Ex. 11 is a letter of the Director of Industries and Supplies, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur. It is of April 1962 and is addressed to Shri Ramgopal Chokhani, the former liquidator of the plaintiff. The genuineness of this letter has also been admitted. It states that as the plaintiff had not fulfilled the conditions on which land was allotted in Jaipur, and there were no chances of the land being utilised by the plaintiff for the purpose for which it was allotted, it stood forfeited to the State and its possession resumed with effect from the date of the issue of letter. The letter shows that the land had been allotted to the plaintiff. Shri Ramgopal Chokhani protested against that letter in communication Ex. 12 dated April 23,1962, which was sent by his counsel to the Director of Industries and Commerce. It also appears from letter Ex. 20 dated December 12, 1966 of the Director of Industries that the plot was in the possession of the Government only with effect from April 7, 1962. 10. As against this evidence of the plaintiff, learned Government Advocate has relied on letter Ex. A 3 dated December 10, 1958, of the Secretery, Urban Improvement Board, to the Director of Industries, advising that acquisition proceedings may be taken in respect of the suit land. But, for obvious reasons, the letter can be of no benefit to the defendant. Learned Government Advocate has invited my attention to the statements of C.M. Misra D. W. 1 and V.K. Gadhoke D. W. 4 also. But, for obvious reasons, the letter can be of no benefit to the defendant. Learned Government Advocate has invited my attention to the statements of C.M. Misra D. W. 1 and V.K. Gadhoke D. W. 4 also. G. M. Misra is the Manager of the Industrial Estates since July 1961 and he has stated nothing which can be said to have a bearing on the question of purchase of the suit land by the plaintiff. On the other hand he has stated that it appeared from letter Ex. 11 [of April 1962] that the suit land was in the possession of the Company before April 7. 1962. V. K. Gadhoke D. W. 4 was working as Executive Engineer of the Improvement Trust in Jaipur at the time of his statement, but he has not stated anything which could be said to bear on the purchase of the suit land by the plaintiff. 11. The evidence of the plaintiff is sufficient to prove that the suit land was allotted to the plaintiff, that sanction for its sale was conveyed in favour of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was asked to pay its price at the rate of annas 4 per square yard, that the price was paid by the plaintiff and that possession of the land was delivered to it. The question however remains whether this was enough to establish the transfer of the land to the plaintiff ? 12. It will be recalled that the defendant State has taken the plea that as there was no registered sale-deed of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff, no right, title or interest could have passed in its favour. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has tried to meet this plea in two ways. Firstly, he has argued that as the transfer took place during the period when the land belonged to the Maharaja of Jaipur, who was a Sovereign, it was not necessary for him to effect the sale in accordance with the provisions of sec 54 of the Jaipur Transfer of Property Act, 1944 or sec, 17 of the Jaipur Registration Act, 1944, which came into force on February, 8, 1944. The learned counsel has thus argued that the Maharaja was not bound by the two Acts by virtue of his prerogative as the Sovereign of Jaipur. The learned counsel has thus argued that the Maharaja was not bound by the two Acts by virtue of his prerogative as the Sovereign of Jaipur. He has placed reliance on Director of Rationing and Distribution vs. Corporation of Calcutta[l], in support of his argument Secondly, the learned counsel has argued that the plaintiff is, at any rate, entitled to maintain the suit under sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. 13. So far as the first argument is concerned, the learned counsel his pointed out that His Highness sanction for the sale of the suit plot was conveyed in the Directors letter Ex. 4 dated May, 21, 1946, on payment of its price at the rate of annas 4 per square yard When that price was paid under receipt Ex. 5 dated September 6, 1947, there was, according to the learned counsel, a completed sale in favour of the plaintiff for it was not necessary for a sale by the Sovereign to comely with requirements of section 54 of the Jaipur Transfer of Property Act, 1944 or sec. 17 of the Jaipur Registration Act, 1944. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate has pointed out that the decision in Director of Rationing & Distribution vs. Corporation of Calcutta[l] has been overruled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal vs. Corporation of Calcutta[2]. He has made a reference to Union of India vs. Jubbi[3J also in which the view taken in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs case[3] has been affirmed. 14. It may be said to be beyond controversy, however, that the question of the existence of a prerogative of the nature urged by Mr. Lodha is essentially a question of fact. As has been been held by their Lordships in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal[2] with reference to the common law doctrine that the Crown is not bound by statute save by express prevision or necessary implication, such a question has to be examined on the facts of the case. It was therefore necessary for the plaintiff to plead and establish that the Maharaja of the former Jaipur State enjoyed the prerogative he was not bound by statute save by express provision or by necessary implication. It was therefore necessary for the plaintiff to plead and establish that the Maharaja of the former Jaipur State enjoyed the prerogative he was not bound by statute save by express provision or by necessary implication. But no such plea has been taken and there is no evidence in regard to it at all. The learned counsel cannot therefore be heard on plea which has not been taken and for which there is no evidence whatsoever. 15. It may also be mentioned that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held in Superintendent and Remembrancer, Legal Affairs West Bengals case[2] that the common law doctrine that the Crown is not bound by statute save by express provision or necessary implication, is a rule or canon of interpretation as distinguished from a rule of substantive law; and there is nothing to show that such a rule or canon of interpretation was followed by the courts in the former Jaipur State so as to justify its consideration by me. 16. There is one more point against the argument of Mr. Lodha. The prerogative referred to by him has not been shown to be based on any legal doctrine prevalent in the former Jaipur State, but emerges from analogy from the common law doctrine that the Crown is not bound by statute save by express provision or necessary implication. Where, therefore, there is any express provision or necessary implication to the contrary, the alleged prerogative would not be available and the Ruler would be bound by the ordinary law. A perusal of the Jaipur Registration Act, 1944 shows that sec. 17[1] thereof provided, inter alia, for the compulsory registration of nontesta|mentary instruments purporting to or operating to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest, of the value of Rs. 100/- and upwards to or in immovable property by the Government. It will therefore be fair and reasonable to hold that even if there was any such prerogative in the former Jaipur State as has been urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the provision in sec. 17 of the Jaipur Registrition Act had the effect of exempting only those instruments which fell within the purview of sub-sec. [2] In other words, the statute provided, by necessary implication, that a sale of immoveable property of the value of Rs. 17 of the Jaipur Registrition Act had the effect of exempting only those instruments which fell within the purview of sub-sec. [2] In other words, the statute provided, by necessary implication, that a sale of immoveable property of the value of Rs. 100/-or more would be effected only by a registered instrument and not otherwise as there was no exemption in favour of sales made by the Ruler. Such a reasoning has found favour in the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal [2, paragraph 16]. 17. Before leaving this point it may be mentioned that learned Government Advocate has invited my attention to section 42 of the Government of Jaipur Act, 1944, for the purpose of showing that the only prerogative of His Highness the Maharaja of Jaipur, which was preserved from June 1, 1944 onwards when that Act was promulgated, was the prerogative to make and pass Acts, proclamations and Orders in His Highness"s discretion without reference to the Legislature Council. 18. The second argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff is based on sec. 53A of the Jaipur Transfer of Property Act, 1944. That section is similar in all respects to sec. 53A of the Indian Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which is now in force in Rajasthan. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has therefore argued that as the transfer of the suit land for consideration is evidenced by documents Exs. 4, 9,11,20 and A3, which have been signed on behalf of the transferor and from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee, namely the plaintiff, has, as part-performance of the contract taken possession of the land and has paid the price thereof as evidenced by cash receipt Ex. 5, and the plaintiff has performed or is willing to perform its part of the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or the instrument of transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the defendants are debarred from enforcing any right against the transferee in respect of the suit property. The learned counsel has argued further that as the defendants have forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff, it can maintain the present suit for restoration of possession, injunction and compensation. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the defendants are debarred from enforcing any right against the transferee in respect of the suit property. The learned counsel has argued further that as the defendants have forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff, it can maintain the present suit for restoration of possession, injunction and compensation. Developing the argument the learned counsel has contended that the words of sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act do not justify the view that the plaintiff, as such, is in all circumstances debarred from the benefit of the section, and that as long as he uses it as a shield, he should be entitled to the equity of part-performance contained in it, It has been urged that if this view is not upheld, a powerful transferer may always defeat the salutary provisions of the section by dispossessing the transferee by force and compelling him to take the position of a plaintiff. For this argument the learned counsel has placed reliance on Pandit Ramchander vs. Pandit Maharaj Kunwar(4), Mt. Firdos Jahan vs. Dr. Mohammad Yunus(5), Ewas Ali. vs. Mt Firdous Jehan(6), Bhulkoo Ghaslya vs. Mt. Hiriyabai(7), S. Fateh Mohd. vs. Mst Ghosi Bibi(8), Gulabchand Subh Karan vs. Madholal Sadha Sukh (9), Ettapparombath Atiyandi Pakkirichi Umma vs. Kai-prath Kalandan(lO) Yenugu Achayya vs. Ernaki Venkata Subba Rao(l 1), Maruti Gurappa vs. Krishna Bala(12) and Chaitan Das vs. Murali Dalai(13). 19. The point which therefore requires consideration is whether the benefit which has been allowed to the transferee under sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act gives him a right to institute a suit for the restoration of possession of the property lost by him by the machinations of the transferor, or for the issue of a prohibitory injunction or recovery of compensation. 20. It has to be remembered in this connection that in view of the provisions of sec. 54 of the Indian Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and sec. 17 read with sec. 40 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, a transfer of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards could be made only by a registered instrument. 54 of the Indian Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and sec. 17 read with sec. 40 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, a transfer of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards could be made only by a registered instrument. It was therefore held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in G. R. C. Ariff vs. Jadunath Majumdar Bahadur(14) that the English equitable doctrine of part performance could not prevail in India so as to set at naught the express statutory provisions of the aforesaid sections of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act. To relieve the hardship, the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929 introduced the equity of part performance in Indian law by enacting sec. 53A, and this was reinforced by amendments in the Registration and the Specific Relief Acts. It is significant, however, that the English equity of part-performance was only partially introduced in our country so that it can be availed of within the four corners of sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. As the Jaipur Transfer of Property Act, 1944 contained a provision similar to sec. 53A of the Indian Transfer of Property Act, a similar limitation will hold good in the present case. Thus for the purpose of understanding and applying sec. 53A it has to be borne in mind that if the section had not been in existence at all, no defence would have been available to the transferee if the transfer in his favour fell short of the requirement of S. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. The transferee, in that case, could not take resort even to a plea of estoppel in face of the statutory provisions of S. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and S. 49 of the Registration Act. It appears to me, therefore, that the effect of S. 53A is to provide that the transferee will be able to protect his possession against the transferor if the requirements of S. 53A are fulfilled. It appears to me, therefore, that the effect of S. 53A is to provide that the transferee will be able to protect his possession against the transferor if the requirements of S. 53A are fulfilled. The protection is statutory, but it is of limited import and efficacy for it has to be confined to the wordings of the statute The statute, as has been stated, raises a bar against the transferer inasmuch as it debarrs him from "enforcing against the transferee any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, The section does not therefore give to the transferee a right of action for a suit, including a so called defensive suit for restoration of possession forcibly taken by the transferor, or for injunction or compensation. Any other view will result in setting at naught the provisions of sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and sec. 17 of the Registration Act. 21. It will be recalled that sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act came into existence for the purpose of mitigating the effect of the judgment of their lordships of the Privy Council in Ariff vs. Jadunath(14). I have therefore looked into the two subsequent pronouncements of their Lordships in Probodh Kumar Das vs. Dhantamara Tea Co. Ltd.(15) S. N. Banerji vs. Kuchwar Lime & Stone Co. Ltd.(16). In Probodh Kumar Dass case(15) the plaintiffs were at least partly in possession of what may shortly be stated as the K. T. estate, under a contracts of sale dated October 10, 1931, but no conveyance was executed in their favour. On the other hand the defendants had a duly completed title, but were not in possession. A dispute arose between them about the right to export tea quota of the K. T. estate under the Indian Tea Control Act. The licensing Committee ultimately recognised the defendants as entitled to the export quota rights of the estate. The plaintiffs filed a suit for a declaration that the defendants had no such right or title to the estate and were debarred from enforcing any right to it, including the right to sell tea under the export quota. They also sought an injunction. In doing so, they relied on sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiffs filed a suit for a declaration that the defendants had no such right or title to the estate and were debarred from enforcing any right to it, including the right to sell tea under the export quota. They also sought an injunction. In doing so, they relied on sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. It may be said that, in a sense, they resorted to the remedy of the suit under compulsion, in order to defend their possession of the K. T. estate and all that the possession signified. Even so, the view that the amendment of law effected by the enactment of sec. 53A conferred no right of action on a transferee in possession under an unregistered contract of sale. In expressing themselves on the point, they observed as follows:— I "The sec. is so framed as to impose a statutory bar on the transferor; it confers no active title on the transferee. Indeed, any other reading of it would make a serious inroad on the whole scheme of the Transfer of Property Act." (Emphasis added). It therefore appears that sec. 53A cannot be said to confer a right of action on a transferee in possession under an unregistered contract of sale so that it is not permissible for him to institute a suit for restoration or injunction etc. under its authority. 22. Their Lordships of the Privy Council again examined the nature of the equity of part-performance (in sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act) in S.N. Banerjis case(16 . The Secretary of State there granted to the Kuchawar Lime and Stone Company Limited quarrying leases for 20 yrars. The Company went in liquidation in 1933 and agreed with one Bose for the sale to him of the rights under the leases subject to the sanction of the Board of Revenue. The agreement was not registered. In 1934 the Government purported to forfeit the leases and gave permission to the appellant to enter and work the quarries, which they did. No formal lease to the appellants was executed. In September 1934, the respondent Company brought a suit against the Secretary of the State for a declaration that their leases had not been forfeited and for an injunction restraining the defendant from granting leases to the appellants or others. No formal lease to the appellants was executed. In September 1934, the respondent Company brought a suit against the Secretary of the State for a declaration that their leases had not been forfeited and for an injunction restraining the defendant from granting leases to the appellants or others. When the case came up before their Lordships on subsequent development, they made the following observation regarding scope of sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act: — "But the words of section make it quite plain that the section does not operate to create a form of transfer of property which is exempt from registration. It creates no real right, it merely creates rights of estoppel between the proposed transferee and transferor.............." (Emphasis added). It was therefore declared to be law, as far back as in 1941 that sec. 53A did not create any "real right" beyond the right to plead estoppel inspite of the provisions of sec. 54 of the Transfer of Proerty Act and sec. 17 read with sec. 49 of the Registration Act. 23. The view expressed by the their Lordships in Probodh Kumar Dass case(15) has been approved and followed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Delhi Motor Co.(17). The plaintiff in that case was the Delhi Motor Company, which was a partnership firm. It entered into a contract with the defendant Company for taking a sub-lease of a building of which the defendant Company was the tenant. Three unregistered documents evidenced that transaction which did not, in terms, purport to be a sub lease and was in the form of partnership. Possession of a portion of the building was given to the plaintiff on April 1, 1950, but it was dispossessed thereafter. It brought a suit for possession, damages and injunction. Their Lordships found that the lease was for a minimum period of 15 months so that it fell within the purview of sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and could be made by a registered instrument only. They accordingly held that the plaintiff could not claim any rights on the basis of the lease evidenced by the unregistered documents. While rejecting the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff to the centrary, their Lordships held as follows— "In our opinion, this argument proceeds on an incorrect interpretation of sec. They accordingly held that the plaintiff could not claim any rights on the basis of the lease evidenced by the unregistered documents. While rejecting the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff to the centrary, their Lordships held as follows— "In our opinion, this argument proceeds on an incorrect interpretation of sec. 53A, because that section is only meant to bring about a bar against enforcement of rights by a lessor in respect of property of which the lessee had already taken possession, but does not give any rights to the lessee to claim possession or to claim any other rights on the basis of an unregistered lease. Sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is only available as a defence to a lessee and not as conferring a right on basis of which the lessee can claim rights against the lessor. This interpretation of sec. 53A was clearly laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar Das vs. Dantamara Tea Co" (Emphasis added). If I may say so with respect, this decision will govern the controversy before me for in both the cases the plaintiff was put in possession by the transfer or and was compelled to raise a suit for restoration of possession, injunction and compensation. As their Lordships have laid it down that such a suit cannot be maintained, it follows that the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain the present suit. 24. The learned Government Advocate has cited a number of other decisions in support of the view I have taken, and I may as well refer to them before examining the cases cited by the plaintiffs learned counsel. It has thus been held in Ramrao Nadkarni vs. Shrimanth Purnand Saraswati Swami(18), on the authority of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar Dass case(15), that sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act serves as a defence and and cannot be made a ground of attack. A similar view has been taken in Madhu-ban Gonda vs. Basanta Khetri(l9), Bajrangi Gope vs. Rupnarain Mahton(20) and Parul Bala Ghosh vs. Saroj Kumar Goswami[2l], In Hari Prasad Agarwall vs. Abdul Haq[22], the suit was instituted by the lessors who were put in possession. The lease was however not made in accordance with the law and the defendants illegally started using the land for extracting fire-clay. The lease was however not made in accordance with the law and the defendants illegally started using the land for extracting fire-clay. It was held by Sinha J., that Sec. 53A gives no right to a transferee to come to court as a plaintiff either to maintain his possession or to recover possession if he is dispossessed. A similar view has been taken in the case of a suit by a dispossessed transferee in Mt. Chambi Devi vs. L Gora Lal (23). In Sardarilal vs. Shakuntala Devi[24], it has been held that the right which is conferred by section 53A is in the nature of a pasaive equity available only to the defendant for the protection of his possession, without conferring upon him any active title and on its basis the law in India does not permit him to sue. 25 Hotilal vs. Jaswant Singh(25) is a decision of this court in a suit under O. 21 r. 63 C.P.C. It has been held by Bhandary J., (as he then was) that the language of see 53A must be construed as debarring any person coming to a court of law from enforcing any right against the transferee and that it Hoes not give any right to the transferee so that he can not maintain a suit for the declaration of his title under O. 21 r. 63 C. P. C. In Vora Mulla Taheralai Mulla Akbaralli vs. Manoranjan Barua(26 , the suit was instituted by the transferee who was in possession and had paid the price of the house to Alihussain. The defendant obtained a decree against Alihussain and got the house attached. The plaintiff raised an objection under O. 21 r. 58 C. P. C, but it was rejected. He therefore filed a suit for declaration that the house was not liable to attachment and sale Following the decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar Dass case (15) and of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Delhi Motor Companys case (17), their Lordships of the Gujarat High Court held that a transferee does not get any right under sec. 53A to claim possession for he can only plead estoppel against the transferor in order to defend his possession. He cannot maintain any suit. 26. The above cases support the view which I have taken against the maintainability of the present suit. 27. 53A to claim possession for he can only plead estoppel against the transferor in order to defend his possession. He cannot maintain any suit. 26. The above cases support the view which I have taken against the maintainability of the present suit. 27. I have gone through the cases cited by the learned councel for the plaintiff. The first of these is a judgment of Thomas C. J. in Pandit Ram Chander V9. Pandit Maharaj Kunwar(4). There the plaintiff was a lessee of certain properties under a deed of lease which was duly registered but was not signed by either the lessor or the lessee in accordance with the provisions of sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Nevertheless the plaintiff had obtained possession. The defendants demolished a part of the property and it was alleged that this was done in collusion with the Municipal Board on the ground that the building was dangerous The plaintiff brought a suit for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with any of his rights as the lessee. A controversy arose whether this was permissible under sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Chief Justice took the view that the plaintiff was not attempting to set up a transfer which was invalid; he had not instituted the suit for the declaration of the validity of the transfer and he had not instituted the suit in which he claimed an order against the defendant directing him to perform any covenant of the transfer. He therefore held that as the plaintiff was seeking to debar the defendant from interfering with his possession, he was, in a sense, "really a defendant" and there was nothing in sec. 53A to disentitle him from maintaining the suit. It will be sufficient for me to say that the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar Dass case(15) was not available by then Moreover the facts of the case were quite different. The learned counsel for the parties have not invited my attention to any recent judgment of their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court, but I have read a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Peareylal vs. Prithi Singh(27) in which a somewhat different view appears to have been taken. 28. Mt. Firdos Jahans case(5) was decided by a learned Single Judge following the decision in Pandit Ram Chanders case(4). 28. Mt. Firdos Jahans case(5) was decided by a learned Single Judge following the decision in Pandit Ram Chanders case(4). By then the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar Dass case(15) was not available. The suit was by the vendee under O. 21, r. 103 C.P.C. and it was held to be by way of a defence so that the benefit of sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was allowed to the plaintiff The appeal against that judgment was considered in Ewas Ali vs. Mt Firdous Jehan(6) It was heard by Thomas G. J. and Misra J., who followed the decision in Pandit Ram Chanders case (4). By that time, the decision in Probodh Kumar Dass case (15) had become available but their Lordships explained it away by saying that when their Lordships of the Privy Council used the word "defendant" they used it to describe the position of a person who pleaded sec. 53A and that what they had said was that his position must be that of a person who invoked the section for defending himself against his transferor. With utmost respect to the learned Judges, I am unable to think that this could be said to be a correct interpretation of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar Dass case(15). 29. The next case cited by Mr. Lodha is Bhulkoo Ghaslya vs. Mt Hiriyabai(7). It was held in that case that while sec. 53A creates a defence, it gives the part performer a right to resist dispossession, and if, in point of fact, he is forcibly ejected, he has his remedy, for were it otherwise, the shield would be useless against resolute men who relied on the strong arm of force. That was a judgment of a learned Single Judge, but he does not appear to have taken note of the other decision of his own court in Kashiprasad Sukhiram vs. Bedprasad Darmeswar(28). That was a case in which the plaintiff claimed to be the occupancy and the absolute occupancy tenant of the lands in the suit, on sale by the defendant under an unregistered sale-deed for a sum of Rs. 300/-. The plaintiff contended that he allowed the defendant to continue in possession as on an "adatiya contract which had been terminated, and so he was entitled to possession. 300/-. The plaintiff contended that he allowed the defendant to continue in possession as on an "adatiya contract which had been terminated, and so he was entitled to possession. It was held by Vivian Bose J , that sec. 53A did not entitle a person to sue. Reference may also be made to Dammulal Babulal Jain vs. Mohammad Bhai Haji Suleman Kacchi(29) in which it was held, following the decision in Probodh Kumar Dass case (15), that sec. 53A does not confer a right of action on the transferee in possession under an unregistered conveyance. In view of these decisions of the Nagpur High Court, the decision in Bhulkoo Ghaslya v. Mt, Hiriyabai(7) cannot be said to be the final opinion of that Honble Court. 30. I have gone through the decision in S. Fateh Mohammed vs. Mst. Ghosia Bibi 8), but it was based largely on Ewas Ali vs. Mt. Firdous Jehan(6 , to which reference has been made already. The same holds good in the case of the decision in Gulab Chand Subh Karan vs. Madholal Sadha Sukh(9) where the learned Judicial Commissioner really followed the decision in S. Fateh Mohd.s case(8). 31. The next case is Ettapparambath Atiyandi Pakkirichi Umma vs. Kaiprath Kalandan(lO). It was held, following the decision in Probodh Kumar Dass case(15), that sec. 53A confers no right of action on a transferee in possession under an unregistered contract of sale and that the right conferred is a right available only to defendant to protect his possession so that it confers no active title on the transferee. The abstract view of the law taken in that case does not therefore support the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff even though it was ultimately held in that case that a suit under O. 21 r. 63 or r. 103 C. P. C. was an exception to that rule. 32. Mr. Lodha has largely relied on a Bench Decision in Yenugu Achayya vs. Ernaki Venkata Subba Rao(ll). In that case a sale-deed of some land was executed in favour of the plaintiffs, and possession was delivered to them. It could not however be registered. The land in possession of the plaintiff was sold in other proceedings, in execution of a decree, for Rs. 1025/-. The plaintiff wanted to recover the balance of Rs. 704/-. In that case a sale-deed of some land was executed in favour of the plaintiffs, and possession was delivered to them. It could not however be registered. The land in possession of the plaintiff was sold in other proceedings, in execution of a decree, for Rs. 1025/-. The plaintiff wanted to recover the balance of Rs. 704/-. The Munsiff directed the plaintiffs to file a suit to establish their right to the land. It was in these circumstances that they filed a suit for a declaration that they were entitled to the surplus of Rs. 704/-. The two lower courts decreed the suit Their Lordships of the High Court held that the transferee could resist any attempt on the part of the transferor to enforce his rights in respect of the property irrespective of what position he occupied in the field of litigation. In the facts of the case before them they reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was using his right only as a shield and not as a sword. The decision was based largely on Pandit Ram Chanders case (4) and. Ewaz Alis case (6), which have been dealt with already, and it is not necessary to examine the matter once again beyond saying, with utmost respect, that every suit of a plaintiff may, in a sense, be said to be defensive and the view of their Lordships will therefore make a serious inroad on on the scheme of the Transfer of Property Act. 33. Maruti Gurappa vs. Krishna Bala(i2), on which also reliance has been placed by Mr. Lodha, was a suit under O. 21, r. 103 C.P.C. It was held by the learned Single Judge that the only right which the plaintiff put forward in a suit under O. 21, r. 103 C.P.C. was a right to maintain his possession and that the suit was therefore essentially for preserving that right. The learned Judge followed the decisions in favour of that view in preference to the other view on the subject, but although he noticed the decision of his own court in Ramrao Nilkanth Nadkarnis case(l8), in which it was held that sec. 53A serves as a defence and cannot be made a ground of attack, he did not follow its reasoning even though it was based largely on the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar Dass case(15). 34. 53A serves as a defence and cannot be made a ground of attack, he did not follow its reasoning even though it was based largely on the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar Dass case(15). 34. The remaining case cited by Mr. Lodha is Chaitan Das vs. Murali Dalai(13) In that case the plaintiff deposited "salami" and received delivery of possession but the "Patta" was not issued. The defendants disturbed the possession and their possession was upheld in proceedings under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. The plaintiffs therefore instituted a suit for its restoration. It was held by the learned Judge, that the suit was maintainable, and in reaching that conclusion he relied mainly on the decision in Yenuga Achayya vs. Ernali Venkata Subba Rao(11). It appears that the well-considered Bench decision of his own court in Padmalabha Panda vs. Appalanarasamma(30), in which a contrary view was taken, was not Drought to his notice. 35. For the reasons mentioned above, I am unable to follow the view taken in the cases on which reliance has been Placed by the learned counsel for the plain-titt. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain the suit under sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act also, so that it cannot be held to be the owner of the suit land. Issue No. 1 is decided accordingly. .... ....... .............. ............. ............. ............... ............... ......... ..... ...... .............. ................ ........... ............... ............... ......... ..... ....... ............. ................ ........... ............... .............. .......... 36. This leaves the question of relief. As it has been held that the suit is not maintainable it is dismissed with costs.