T. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE point involved in this Revision Application is whether the petitioners who are the accused can be tried together for the offence of defamation contemplated by sec. 500 of the Indian Penal Code in view of the provisions contained in sec. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this revision application are that the petitioners Nos. 4 5 and 7 signed one application on 19th June 1970 making certain allegations against the character of opponent No. 1 Rekhaben and alleging that she was causing nuisance in the neighbour hood as certain undesired elements were visiting her house. This application was submitted to Jyoti Sangh. The Jyoti Sangh authorities in their turn forwarded this application to the police as a result of which the police undertook some investigation. During the course of this investigation the police recorded the statements of petitioners Nos. 1 to 6 on 23rd June 1970 and of petitioner No. 7 on 25th June 1970 During these statements all the petitioners supported the application made by the petitioners Nos. 4 to 7 to the Jyoti Sangh and repeated the allegations against the character of the opponent No. 1 Rekhaben. ( 3 ) THE opponent No. 1 thereafter filed a complaint for defamation punishable under sec. 500 of the Indian Penal Code against these petitioners in the 5th City Magistrate Court at Ahmedabad where the said complaint is registered as criminal case No. 1254 of 1970. The complaint is that all the petitioners have defamed the complainant opponent No. 1 by making false allegations against her chastity during the course of their statements recorded by the head constable Abhaysinh Prithvising. On this complaint the learned Magistrate recorded some evidence and thereafter framed a charge against all the petitioners for the offence under sec. 500 of the Indian Penal Code. Before this charge was framed the petitioners submitted an application to the learned Magistrate raising a contention that defamation which is said to have been committed by each of the petitioners being an act complete in itself the petitioners should be tried separately and not jointly in one trial. The learned Magistrate has rejected this contention and has framed the charge as said above. Being aggrieved by this action of the learned Magistrate the petitioners have approached this court in this revision. The learned Magistrate has rejected this contention and has framed the charge as said above. Being aggrieved by this action of the learned Magistrate the petitioners have approached this court in this revision. ( 4 ) SHRI Bhatt who appeared on behalf of the petitioners has contended that the act of defamation said to have been committed by each of the petitioners is separate distinct and complete in itself and therefore the alleged offence of defamation is committed by each of the petitioners individually on different occasions and that being so the learned Magistrate could not have framed one charge against all the petitioners. According to Shri Bhatt the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate therefore offends the provisions contained in sec. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As against this it was contended on behalf of the opponents including the State that the several acts of defamation which are said to have been committed by the petitioners are committed during the course of the same transaction and therefore one and the same charge can be framed against all the petitioners as contemplated by clause (a) of sec. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code. ( 5 ) SEC. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code prescribes what persons may be charged jointly. Clause (a) thereof says that the persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction can be charged and tried together. The section therefore contemplates that even if the action complained of is committed by several persons individually all these persons can be charged and tried together in the same trial if it is found that the acts have been committed in the course of the same transaction. Under the circumstances the pertinent point to be considered is whether the acts of the petitioners which are complained of are found to have been committed during the course of the same transaction. ( 6 ) THE word transaction is not defined by the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore when it is found used in sec. 239 and other sections of the Code it is not intended to be interpreted in any artificial or technical sense. In other words it carries its ordinary and plain dictionary meaning and hence it should be interpreted with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore when it is found used in sec. 239 and other sections of the Code it is not intended to be interpreted in any artificial or technical sense. In other words it carries its ordinary and plain dictionary meaning and hence it should be interpreted with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. Usual tests which are applied by the courts with a view to find out whether several acts form part of the same transaction are identity or community of purpose proximity or time unity of place and continuity of action. Out of these tests the test of finding out identity or community of purpose is considered to be the most effective one. The first question which therefore arises to be determined is how shall we find out the identity or community of purpose in a given case. In my opinion if by scrutiny of cause and effect of several acts which are said to constitute the same transaction it is found that these acts were caused by the same event and were intended to produce the same effect and if it is further found by reference to the proximity of time and place that a combined effect was intended to be produced through them by their authors there should not be any hesitation in concluding that the authors of these acts shared the community of purpose. Thus collocation of several acts or the events and the relevant circumstances under which these acts have been committed furnish a sound clue to determine whether there was any unity of purpose behind them. ( 7 ) IF we now apply these tests to the facts of the instant case what we find is that the events first took a concrete shape when the petitioners Nos. 4 5 6 and 7 and three other persons who are not before us signed the application which was given to Jyoti Sangh and which formed the basis of subsequent investigation during the course of which the petitioners are said to have made defamatory statements. As stated above there is no dispute about the fact that all the petitioners have made defamatory statements before the same police officer on the same day and with reference to the same application which was submitted to Jyoti Sangh by petitioners Nos. 4 to 7. As stated above there is no dispute about the fact that all the petitioners have made defamatory statements before the same police officer on the same day and with reference to the same application which was submitted to Jyoti Sangh by petitioners Nos. 4 to 7. These facts therefore show beyond doubt that the cause which resulted in these statements was the same. The effect of these statements was to give complete corroboration to the allegation made in the application submitted by petitioners Nos. 4 to 7 to Jyoti Sangh. It was to prove that the opponent No. 1 (the complainant) was a woman of bad character and was therefore a nuisance to her neighbourhood. It is thus found that the statements which are said to be defamatory were the result of the same cause and were intended to produce the same effect. Since these statements are also found to have been made at the same place and before the same officer on the same day (except the statement made by petitioner No. 7) it would be quite reasonable to conclude that they have been made during the course of the same transaction. Under these circumstances considering the peculiar facts of this case I am of the opinion that the learned Magistrate was justified in framing the same charge against all the 7 petitioners. ( 8 ) IN this connection my attention is drawn by Shri Bhatt to two decisions in support of his contentions. These two decisions are (1) the one given in the case of Kotha Subba Chetti v. Queen decided by a Division Bench of Madras High Court and reported In I. L. R. 6 Madras 252 and (2) the other given in Imperator v. Haji Alu by Judicial Commissioner Sind and reported in 13 Criminal Law Journal Reports 23. In the Madras case three persons of whom one was a pleader were tried together and convicted under sec. 181 of the Indian Penal Code of having made false statements on solemn affirmation about the same matter in the course of an enquiry into the conduct of the pleader under the provisions of the Legal Practitioners Act. The High Court took the view that the trial of the three prisoners together was a grave error of procedure vitiating the trial. The High Court took the view that the trial of the three prisoners together was a grave error of procedure vitiating the trial. Reference to the reported judgment shows that there is no discussion as to whether the false statements in question were made during the course of the same transaction. The judgment proceeds on the footing that the joint trial of the three accused was an error and had resulted in obvious prejudice to the prisoners. In the Sind case above referred to there was a joint trial of two persons who were charged with giving false evidence in the same judicial proceedings. It was held that false evidence given by one witness was a transaction complete in itself and not connected with false evidence given by another witness even though in the same case and on the same point. It was further observed that such a trial was more than an irregularity and amounted to illegality which vitiated the trial. ( 9 ) THERE is one more case of Bombay High Court namely the case of King Emperor v. Krishnarao and Vishwanath reported in IV B. L. R. 53 where two persons were severally charged with giving false evidence in their depositions in a certain trial in a Sessions Court. It was held that their offence were distinct and they must be tried separately under the provisions of sec. 233 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 This Bombay case also does not discuss what is the scope and ambit of the expression same transaction and has proceeded on the footing that the offences in question were distinct and therefore should have been tried separately under the provisions of sec. 233 of the Code ( 10 ) I find that none of the decisions which are referred to above is helpful in deciding this case for the simple reason that the question whether several acts which are said to be the parts of the same transaction are actually committed during the course of the same transaction is an essentially a question of fact which has to be decided only by reference to the peculiar circumstances and facts of each individual case. Even in case of offences of perjury the courts have looked into the peculiar facts of each case and there have been decisions in which the courts have come to the conclusion that different acts of perjury were committed with a community of purpose and should therefore be treated as having been committed during the course of the same transaction. Here I may refer with advantage to the Bombay decision given in Sejmal Punamchand and another v. Emperor reported in 28 Criminal Law Journal 1927. The facts of that case were that accused No. I brought a suit as a member of a firm in whose favour a promissory note had been passed to recover the amount due thereunder on the basis that full consideration for the promissory note had been paid. He gave false evidence that full consideration had been in fact paid and denied the allegation of the executant of the instrument that a certain amount had been deducted. Accused No. 2 was a member of a firm which had one half interest in this loan. He also went to the witness box and deposed similarly that full consideration was paid in support of accused No. 1s case. Both the accused persons were charged and tried for offences under sec. 193 of the Indian Penal Code and were convicted. The question which arose for consideration initially before Mr. Justice Sir Lallubhai Shah and Mr. Justice Fawcett was whether the accused persons had given false evidence during the course of same transaction within the meaning of sec. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code and whether the joint trial of both of them was legal or not. There was a difference of opinion between Mr. Justice Lallubhai Shah and Mr. Justice Faweett. The matter was referred to Mr. Justice Crump. It was held by Mr. Justice Fawcatt and Mr. Justice Crump (Shah J. dissenting) that the two acts of the accused of giving false evidence were committed in the course of the same transaction within the meaning of sec. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the joint trial was therefore not illegal. This judgment has considered the previous decision given in King Emperor v. Krishnarao (supra ). Referring to that decision Crump J. has observed as under :-THE case of King Emperor v. Krishnarao was decided in 1902 when the Code of 1989 was in force. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the joint trial was therefore not illegal. This judgment has considered the previous decision given in King Emperor v. Krishnarao (supra ). Referring to that decision Crump J. has observed as under :-THE case of King Emperor v. Krishnarao was decided in 1902 when the Code of 1989 was in force. And sec. 239 of that Code as it then stood is substantially reproduced by the amending Acts of 1923. But I fail to find any universal rule laid down in that decision. The facts are not stated with sufficient fullness to make it possible to deduce any such rule and the language of the judgment does not indicate that any question arose there whether the offences were or were not committed in the same transaction. I cannot regard that case as binding upon me with reference to the facts here. What was in reality decided was that the facts of that case did not fall within the provision which now appears as sec. 239 (b ). IN view of this decision the decision given in King Emperor v. Krishnarao (supra) has no applicability to the facts of the case before me. I further find that the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the above referred case of Sejmal Punamchand v. Emperor gets support from the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the same point in Rafi-Uz-Eaman Khan v. Chhotey Lal reported in 27 Criminal Law Journal 1929 at 445. It has been held therein that where certain persons are witnesses on the same side in a criminal case and all give evidence on the same point and to the same effect to prove the same fact the evidence in the case of all the witnesses is given in the same transaction within sec. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code so as to make a joint trial of such persons for perjury legal because there is the most obvious identity of purpose in such a case. The said High Court further observed that for a joint trial under sec. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code identity of purpose is sufficient. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code so as to make a joint trial of such persons for perjury legal because there is the most obvious identity of purpose in such a case. The said High Court further observed that for a joint trial under sec. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code identity of purpose is sufficient. ( 11 ) CONSIDERING the above position of the case law on the subject and appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the instant case I am of the opinion that the framing of the charge against all the petitioners in one trial as done by the learned Magistrate was justified. This revision application should therefore fail. The same is dismissed and the rule is discharged. .