Judgment KOTVAL C. J. -There then remains the question regarding the suspension of his licence for two months, which was ordered by the Presidency Magistrate. In this respect Mr. Ingale has brought to my notice a decision in Criminal Revision Application No. 52 of 1971 of Mr. Justice Vaidya decided on February 1, 1971 wherein no doubt a view has been taken that "contravention of Rule like Rule 26 (34) cannot be read into the provisions of section 17 of the Act" vide paras. 11 to 16 of that judgment. The view which the learned Judge took may be stated in his own words as follows: "In the present case the offence is of refusing to ply in contravention of Rule 26 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules 1959, which is framed under section 21 of the Motor Vehicles Act as one of the rules for regulating conduct and duties of drivers and motor cars. Refusing to ply is entirely a matter of conduct of a driver of a motor cab. It has nothing to do with driving as such. Even assuming that section 17 is applicable to such conduct, it is not an offence under the provisions of the Act, but it is an offence in contravention of Rule 26 (34) which provides.•• " and then the learned Judge quoted rule 26 (34) and further observed: "There is nothing in the Act, to indicate that the word Act in section 17 would include a rule like Rule 26. On the contrary if we turn to section 112, it makes a distinction between contravention of the Act and contravention of Rule..• " 2. Now this ruling directly covers the point before me and ordinarily I would be bound to follow it sitting singly, but, with the greatest respect, I am unable to agree with this reasoning and therefore I have decided to refer the matter to a larger Bench. I give my reasons for not being able to follow the decision as follows: 3. The power to disqualify an errant driver from holding a driving licence is conferred by sub-section (I) of section 17 upon the Magistrate. It is in the following language (I quote only the relevant portion): "Where a person is convicted of an offence under this Act•• the Court by which such person is convicted may subject to the provisions of this section. It is in the following language (I quote only the relevant portion): "Where a person is convicted of an offence under this Act•• the Court by which such person is convicted may subject to the provisions of this section. in addition to imposing any other punishment authorised by law, declare the person so convicted to be disqualified, for such period as the Court may specify for bolding any driving licence or for bolding a driving licence to drive a particular class or description of vehicle". Now this is the general power conferred upon the Magistrate and the generality of the section admits of a few exceptions. The important words in this subsection are "where a person is convicted of an offence under this Act." In other words, the power to suspend the licence is given in any and every case so long as the person convicted is convicted of an offence "under this Act" and that would obviously include every offence created by the Act. This is the first and foremost the general principle laid down in this section. The exceptions if any, are in the following sub-sections and are made applicable by the words used in sub-section (I) itself "subject to the provisions of the section." Therefore by the use of the words "subject to the provisions of this Act" a certain qualification or limitation is laid down upon the general rule mentioned in sub· section (I). In other words, if there is any exception created by sub-sections (2) to (7) of section 17, then the general rule stated in sub-section (I) of section I 7 will to that extent be modified but not otherwise. 4. Therefore I turn to examine the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (7) of section 17. The first and foremost thing that I notice is that section 112 under which the present applicant has been convicted is nowhere mentioned in any of those sub-sections. Therefore in respect of a conviction under section 112 the power under section 17 (I) has in no way been modified or taken away. A perusal of sub-sections (2) to (7) shows that certain peculiar and special provisions have been made for certain offences under sections 115, 116, 117, 120, and 123 of the Act. 5. Therefore in respect of a conviction under section 112 the power under section 17 (I) has in no way been modified or taken away. A perusal of sub-sections (2) to (7) shows that certain peculiar and special provisions have been made for certain offences under sections 115, 116, 117, 120, and 123 of the Act. 5. Sub-section (2) of section 17 says that a Court shall not order the disqualification of an offender convicted for the first and second time of an offence punishable under section 115. The offences under section 115 all arise out of driving at excessive speed or getting some one else to drive at an excessive speed and it seems that the Legislature intended to give the offender so to say a locus paenitentiae in respect of driving at excessive speed. Therefore, sub-section (2) says that he shall not be disqualified from holding licence for the first two offences of driving at excessive speed. If he commits such an offence the third time the provisions of sub-section (1) will operate. The exception to sub-section (1) created by sub-section (2) is therefore only in regard to the first two offences of driving at excessive speed. At any rate, this sub-section has nothing to do and has no effect upon an offence created by section 112 which continues to be governed by sub-section (1) of section 17. 6. Sub-section (3) deals with an offence punishable under section 117. Section 117 makes it an offence to drive while under the influence of drink or a drug "to such an extent as to be incapable of exercising proper control over the vehicle." Now this is a serious offence and therefore the Legislature has enjoined by sub-section (3) of section 17 that the Court shall order the disqualification of an offender convicted of an offence punishable under section 117 and such disqualification shall be for a period of not less than six months. It was within the discretion of the Legislature to make the disqualification mandatory since the Legislature considered the offence of driving while under the influence of drink or a drug as serious enough to prescribe that the disqualification laid down under sub-section (1) shall be imposed and it shall also be imposed for a period of not less than six months. Nonetheless the discretionary power under sub-section (l) to disqualify for a longer period is not affected, the minimum being six months. Here again the provisions of this sub-section cannot affect an offence under section 112 being governed by sub section (1) of section 17. 7. Sub-section (4) says that a Court shall order the disqualification of an offender convicted of an offence against the provisions of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 87 or of section 89 and such disqualification shall be for a period of not less than one month. Section 87 (1) prescribes the duty of a driver to cause the vehicle to stop and remain stationary so long as may reasonably be necessary; Clause (c) says, "when the vehicle is involved in the occurrence of an accident to a person, animal or vehicle or of damage to any property, whether the driving or management of the vehicle was or was not the cause of the accident or damage", and imposes a duty upon the driver to give his name and address and the name and address of the owner of the vehicle to any person affected by any such accident or damage who demands it provided such person also furnishes his name and address. Section 89 prescribes similar duties of a driver. In case of accident and injury to any person the driver is bound to take all reasonable steps to secure medical attention for the injured person, and, if necessary convey him to the nearest hospital and to give on demand by a police officer any information required by him or to report the circumstances of the occurrence at the nearest police station as soon as possible and in any case within twenty-four hours of the occurrence. Under section 87 (1) (c) and 89 the duties are prescribed of a driver in case of accidents involving injury to a person or damage to property and if these duties prescribed by section 87 (1) (c) and section 89 are breached, then sub-section (4) of section 17 prescribes that the Court shall order the disqualification of an offender upon conviction and "such disqualification shall be for a period of not less than one month". The Legislature considered that drivers who run away from the scene of an accident deserve to be dealt with somewhat more severely than other drivers and therefore their licence must be suspended for a minimum period of not less than month. This is another statutory exception created to the general created to the general rule in section 17 (1). Here again I do not see what sub-section (4) has got to do with section 112. 8. Sub-section (5), of section 17 makes it obligatory upon the Court in case of a second conviction under section 116 or a conviction under section 120 or section 123 to give special reasons to be recorded in writing why a licence is not suspended. In other words it is a provision similar to the provisions of section 66 {a) of the Bombay Prohibition Act. The Court is bound to order the disqualification for a certain period which is left to its discretion "unless for special reasons to be recorded in writing it thinks fit to order otherwise." This sub-section is again concerned with only offenses under sections 116, 120 and 123 and cannot affect offences under section 112. 9. Sub-section (6) gives power to the Court in addition to ordering disqualification of an offender convicted under section 116 to direct the offender to pass a second driving test to the satisfaction of the licensing authority, whether he has previously passed the test of competence to drive or not. 10. Sub-section (7) gives certain rights of appeal against an order of disqualification. 11. It appears from these provisions of section 17 that the Legislature first of all laid down a general rule, giving power to a Magistrate to disqualify a driver convicted of any of the offences under the Act from holding any driving licence or from holding a driving licence to drive a particular class or description of vehicles. Then in the succeeding sub-sections (2) to (6) the Legislature made certain special provisions for special kinds of offences which constitute exceptions or lay down limitations to the general rule, According to the comparative gravity of the offence the Legislature prescribed a special mode or degree of punishment so far as the power to suspend a licence is concerned. These special modes may be classified as under: (1) No suspension for the first two offences [sub-section (2) read with section 115). These special modes may be classified as under: (1) No suspension for the first two offences [sub-section (2) read with section 115). (2) Court must disqualify for a period of six months at least (sub-section (3) read with section 117). (3) Court must order the disqualification for a period of at least one month (sub-section (4) read with sections 87 (1) (c) and 89) (4) Court must give special reasons why licence is not suspended (sub-section (5) read with sections 116, 120 and 123-2nd offence only). (5) Court has discretion to order the offender to pass a second driving test (sub-section (61 read with section 116). 12 Thus, in sub-sections (2) to (6) the Legislature picked out certain specific offences to be dealt with in a specific manner and it has mentioned these specific offences by indicating the number of the section. In the case of some offences which are comparatively venial the Legislature has directed that the first two offences of that kind (e. g. s. 115) shall not be visited with the penalty of disqualification. In other cases, the Legislature has directed that the Court shall exercise its powers under sub-section (I) subject to a maximum limit prescribed. These are offences under sections 116, 120 and 123. Yet in another class of cases which are considered most serious, the Court is enjoined to order disqualification for a minimum period of one month (offences against the duties prescribed under section 87 (1) (c) or section 89) or a minimum period of not less than six months (in the case of an offence punishable under section 117). The Legislature therefore in its wisdom has distinguished· between several different offences under the Act specially which it considered necessary to deal with specifically, but in none of these special or exceptional cases was the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 17 ever completely done away with or negatived. On the other hand, it seems to me that the provisions of sub-section (1) were only modified in respect of only those offences which are specifically mentioned, but as regards all other offences under the Act sub-section (1) of section 17 would continue to apply. Some of such offences which are not touched are those referred to in section 112 which is so to say a residuary section. Some of such offences which are not touched are those referred to in section 112 which is so to say a residuary section. Therefore, in my opinion, all offences under section 112 would fall to be governed by the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 17. In every case of an offence under section 112 the discretionary power to suspend the licence would remain in the Court. I have advisedly used the word "discretionary" because whether to exercise it or not in a particular case would be for the Magistrate to determine in such cases. 13. The contrary view is based upon a distinction which I am unable to accept. The distinction is brought out in the passages which I have quoted from the judgment of Mr. Justice Vaidya between an offence under the Rules and an offence under the Act. No doubt sub-section (1) of section 17 only talks of "conviction of an offence under this Act" and therefore it would not include an offence under the Rules, if the rules create the offence but so far as rule 26 (34) is concerned, I am, with the greatest respect, unable to agree with the view of the learned Judge that rule 26 (34) creates any offence nor am I able to agree with the remark that "it is not an offence under the provisions of the Act, but it is an offence in contravention of rule 26 (34)." A perusal of rule 26 of the Motor Vehicles Rules shows that Rule 26 does not create any offence whatsoever. In fact in terms rule 26 deals with "Rules for conduct and duties of drivers of motor cabs." In other words, the rule prescribes the duties and leaves it to other provisions of the law to create the offences committed by breach of the rules. That provision is contained in section 112. In my opinion, therefore, it is not correct to say that rule 26 creates any offences, Rule 26 only prescribes duties and it is section 112 which creates the offence for breach of all the duties mentioned in rule 26 and other rules. Since a breach of any of the duties prescribed under the Rules could be punishable under section 112 of the Act, the conviction could only be for an offence -under this Act" within the meaning of section 17 (I) of the. the Act. Since a breach of any of the duties prescribed under the Rules could be punishable under section 112 of the Act, the conviction could only be for an offence -under this Act" within the meaning of section 17 (I) of the. the Act. It cannot be termed a conviction under the rules. I t is here I think that the difference lies. 14. It was also pointed out to me that certain remarks of Mr. Justice Bhasme in Criminal Revision Application No. Il42 of 1970 decided on March 22, 1971, vide the third but last paragraph of the judgment, also take the same view as Mr. Justice Vaidya. That appears to be so though the discussion is very brief. The learned Judge held: "Section 17 (1) will be controlled by section 17 (2) of the Act. Section 17 (2) mentions some sections of the Motor Vehicles Act. But section 112 of the Act is not one of those sections. It is obvious that the legislature did not intend that there should be disqualification following the conviction under section 1l:l of the Motor Vehicles Act." I am unable to agree with this statement of the law. In my opinion, the plenary power is conferred by section 17 (1) and its subsequent sub-sections (2) to (6) carve out exceptions either in the way of enlarging or curbing that power conferred by sub-section (l) of section 17 and that too in respect of particular offences under the Act specifically mentioned in those sub-sections. Therefore, because section 112 of the Act is not one of the sections mentioned in sub-sections (2) to (7) of section 17, it would not imply that the power to suspend the licence was taken away so far as the offence under section 112 is concerned. On the contrary it would imply that the general power to impose suspension is not taken away so far as the offences under section 112 are concerned. For the reasons I have already given, I think I must refer the following question to a Division Bench "Whether Criminal Revision Application No. 52 of 1971 and Criminal Revision Application No. 1142 of 1970 are correctly decided? The question is of great general importance and a request has been made on behalf of Government that the matter should be speedily determined. The papers be put up before me for the constitution of a special Bench. The question is of great general importance and a request has been made on behalf of Government that the matter should be speedily determined. The papers be put up before me for the constitution of a special Bench. [The question referred to a Division Bench was considered by a Bench composed of Mody and Chandrachud JJ.] CHANDRACHUD J.- In Criminal Revision Application No. 52 of 1971, Vaidya J. took the view that the power conferred by section 17 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (herein, "the Act") to disqualify a person for holding a driving licence cannot be exercised in cases where the contravention is of a rule relating to the mere conduct of the driver. Bhasme J., also sitting singly, took the same view in Criminal Revision Application No. 1142 of 1970. 2. A similar question arose before the learned Chief Justice in Criminal Revision Application No. 1101 of 1970. He was inclined to a different view and therefore he has referred for our decision the question as regards the correctness of the two earlier decisions. In his referring judgment of July 16, 1971, the learned Chief Justice has expressed the opinion that the power conferred by section 17 (1) to suspend a driving licence is exercisable even where the conviction is for the breach of a rule governing the conduct of the driver. 3. Only a few facts are relevant. The petitioner is a taxi driver and the prosecution arose out of his refusal to drive the complainant to the desired destination. The complainant got into the taxi when the meter flag was in vertical position but rather than take him where he wanted to go, the petitioner held him by his legs and threatened to throw him out. For this, the petitioner was convicted by the learned Presidency Magistrate under section 112 of the Act read with rule 26 (34) of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 (hereinafter called "the Rules"). This rule provides that "No driver shall without reasonable excuse refuse to let the cab for hire when the flag is in a vertical position." The Magistrate sentenced the petitioner to pay a fine of Rs. 100 and under section 17 (1) he suspended the petitioners driving licence for a period of two months. 4. The learned Chief Justice has confirmed the order of conviction and the sentence of fine. 100 and under section 17 (1) he suspended the petitioners driving licence for a period of two months. 4. The learned Chief Justice has confirmed the order of conviction and the sentence of fine. He was also inclined to confirm the order of suspension but he felt that he could not differ from the view taken by Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. He has therefore referred for our consideration the question as regards the correctness of that view. 5. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised two preliminary objections to the reference made by the learned Chief Justice. Counsel says that two single Judges having taken the same view, the judgments are on a par with the judgment of a Division Bench and therefore the learned chief Justice had no power to differ from the view taken by the "Division Bench" and refer the matter to another Division Bench. This objection is untenable. One plus one equals two is plain arithmetic but you cannot roll two judgments of two single judges into one and give to those judgments the authority of the judgment of a Division Bench. This novel method will bring into being a new class of privileged judgments-of "Division Benches", "Full Benches" and "Special Benches"- unknown to the law of precedents. The objection is devoid of merit. 6. Of no different variety is the second preliminary objection that the question referred to us cannot possibly arise as section 17 (I) of the Act offends against Article 20 (2) of the Constitution. Article 20 (2) provides that no person shall be "prosecuted and punished" for the same offence more than once. Even assuming that the suspension of the petitioners licence is punishment within the meaning of Article 20 (2), the petitioner has not been prosecuted for the same offence more than once. It is in the same prosecution that he is being fined and disqualified for holding a licence. Therefore, this objection must also fail. 7. The question for consideration is whether the power of the Court to disqualify a person for holding a driving licence extends to cases in which the conviction is recorded under section 112 of the Act for the breach of a rule made under the Act. 8. Section 17 (1) of the Act is in these terms: "17. 7. The question for consideration is whether the power of the Court to disqualify a person for holding a driving licence extends to cases in which the conviction is recorded under section 112 of the Act for the breach of a rule made under the Act. 8. Section 17 (1) of the Act is in these terms: "17. Power of Court to Disqualify-Where a person is convicted of an offence under this Act, or of an offence in the commission of which B motor vehicle was used, the Court by which such person is convicted may, subject to the provisions of this section, in addition to imposing any other punishment authorised by law, declare the person so convicted to be disqualified, for such period as the Court may specify, for holding any driving licence or for holding a driving licence to drive a particular class or description of vehicle." 9. Section 21 of the Act confers on the State Government the power to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter II of the Act, in which section 17 occurs. 10 Section 112 of the Act provides: "Whoever contravenes any provision of this Act or of any rule made there under shall, if no other penalty is provided for the offence, be punishable with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees, or if having been previously convicted of any offence under this Act he is again convicted of an offence under this Act, with fine which may extend to three hundred rupees" 11. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that section 112 makes a distinction between the contravention of a provision of the Act and the contravention of a provision of a rule made under the Act and, therefore, the power conferred by section 17 (1) to suspend the driving licence of "a person convicted of an offence under this Act" is not available in regard to offenders convicted for breach of a rule. We find it difficult to accede to this contention whether the contravention is of a provision of the Act or of the provision of a rule made under the Act, the offence is committed under the Act. Therefore, even if the breach alleged is of a rule, the offence is not committed under the Rules but it is committed under the Act. Therefore, even if the breach alleged is of a rule, the offence is not committed under the Rules but it is committed under the Act. It is the Act which prescribes punishment and penalties for contravention of the rules, so that offences, though they may consist in breach of rules, can be committed only under the Act and not under the rules. That is the plain position. 12. Section 112 undoubtedly refers separately to contravention of the provisions of the Act and contravention of any of the rules made under the Act but it does not make a distinction between the two classes of offences. Far from it. It clubs them together and treats them on a par by declaring both classes of contraventions as offences under it and by prescribing the same puni8hment for both. Section 112 thus takes in breaches of the Act as well as breaches of the rules, with the result that breaches of the rules become offences under section 112, that is, offences under the Act. 13. It is important that the rules framed by the State Government in the exercise of its powers under section 21 of the Act do not create any offences, assuming that the rule-making power could extend that far. The rules provide • for contingencies of diverse kinds like licensing- of drivers and conductors, registration and control of motor vehicles, construction equipment and maintenance of vehicles etc. There is no rule among the 316 rules which are contained in the Rules of 1959, which either creates an offence or prescribes a penalty for any offence The rules prescribe norms, breaches w1ereof become offences under the Act and the Act provides for the punishment and penalties for those offences. Thus, the breach of a rule constitutes an offence not under the Rules but under the Act. 14. The relevant pre-condition of section 17 being that the person who is proposed to be disqualified for holding a driving licence must be convicted of an offence under the Act and as the petitioner was convicted for the contravention of rule 26 (34), which constitutes an offence under the Act, he was liable to be disqualified under section 17 (I). IS. The argument that the power to disqualify an offender can be exercised only if he is convicted of an offence directly connected with the act of driving fails to impress us. IS. The argument that the power to disqualify an offender can be exercised only if he is convicted of an offence directly connected with the act of driving fails to impress us. There is intrinsic evidence in section 17 itself to show that the power conferred by sub-section (I) can be exercised even if the breach is of a rule of conduct not directly connected with the act of driving. Clause (c) of section 17 (5) provides that a Court "shall" order disqualification of an offender convicted under section 123 of the Act, unless for special reasons to be recorded in writing it thinks fit to order otherwise. Now, acts which constitute an offence under section 123 are un-correlated to the want of care involved in the act of driving That section makes it an offence to drive an unregistered vehicle or to drive a motor vehicle without the permit required by section 42 (I) or in contravention of any condition of such permit relating to the route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used or a condition relating to the maximum number of passengers or the maximum weight that may be carried on the vehicle. You may drive your vehicle with all the care in the world but if you have transgressed the conditions of your permit, you are liable to be convicted under section 123 and that conviction entails a disqualification under section 17 (1) read with section 17 (5) (c). It is, therefore, manifest that the power to suspend the driving licence is not conditioned by the circumstance that the offender must be guilty of an offence connected directly with the act of driving. 16. In fact, section 17 (1) in terms provides that the penalty of disqualification may be imposed even "where a person is convicted of an offence in the commission of which a motor vehicle was used". To a proposed suspension of a driving licence it is no answer to say: "True, I used my car to transport illicit liquor but I took all the care possible while driving my car. If the car is used in the commission of an offence, the licence is liable to be suspended without more. 17. To a proposed suspension of a driving licence it is no answer to say: "True, I used my car to transport illicit liquor but I took all the care possible while driving my car. If the car is used in the commission of an offence, the licence is liable to be suspended without more. 17. Section 15 of the Act furnishes some clue to the question whether in order to suspend a driving licence it is necessary that the driver must be guilty of an offence involving the act of driving. That section confers on the "licensing authority" the power to disqualify a person for holding a driving licence, in cases where, inter alia, the driver is a habitual criminal or a habitual drunkard or has used a motor vehicle in the commission of a cognizable offence. If executive authorities can suspend the driving licence for reasons unconnected with the act of driving, it could not have been intended that Courts of law should possess a lesser power. 18. The petitioners reliance on Schedule V and sections 18 and 19 of the Act in support of the submission that the breach of a rule of conduct cannot involve the driver in suspension of his licence, is misplaced. Schedule V specifies "offences on conviction of which an endorsement shall be made on the licence of the person affected". It does not deal with the power to suspend the licence. Section 18 provides for the "Effect of disqualification order", while section 19 provides, inter alia, for the modes of endorsement. None of these provisions bears out the petitioners submission. 19. It is urged that section 112, on its terms, can apply only if "no other penalty is provided for the offence" and since suspension of a licence is a "penalty", breaches which attract that penalty would stand excluded from the compass of section 112. The argument proceeds that it could not have been intended that the breach of a rule could be penalised by suspension of the licence but is not punishable under section 112. We are unable to agree that the disqualification of a driver for holding a driving licence is a "penalty" within the meaning of section 112. The argument proceeds that it could not have been intended that the breach of a rule could be penalised by suspension of the licence but is not punishable under section 112. We are unable to agree that the disqualification of a driver for holding a driving licence is a "penalty" within the meaning of section 112. Chapter IX of the Act is entitled "Offences, Penalties and Procedure" and section 112 which occurs in that chapter uses the word "penalty" to comprehend the punishments prescribed for diverse offences, as detailed in that chapter. Section 17 occurs in Chapter II called "Licensing of Drivers of Motor Vehicles" and though suspension may involve serious consequences, it is not a "penalty" prescribed for an offence, within the meaning of section 112. It is clear from the context of that section that the word "penalty" is used in the sense of "sentence" following upon a conviction. The context is that if no other penalty is provided for the offence, the offence would be punishable with a sentence of fine, indicating thereby that if no other sentence is provided, the sentence of fine may be imposed. 20. Finally, we see no merit in the contention that the words of section 17 (1) must be construed in the light of the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (5) of section ) 7. Section 17 (I) confers on the Courts the power to disqualify a driver for holding a licence. Sub-sections (2) to (5) merely regulate the exercise of that power. 21. We are, therefore, of the opinion, and we say so with respect to the learned single Judges who decided to the contrary, that a person who contravenes a rule framed under the Act, commits an offence under the Act and on his conviction for that offence, he is liable to be disqualified under section 17 (I) for holding a driving licence. 22. The papers may be sent back to the learned Chief Justice, for passing final orders. Answer accordingly