JUDGMENT Jagmohan Lal, J. - The petitioner Ram Pratap Kulshrestha was a confirmed Noter and Drafter in the office of the Transport Commissioner, U.P., Lucknow and he was admittedly promoted as passenger tax superintendent under an order dated 23-3-1968, Annexure 2, to the writ petition. That order specifically provided that this officiating appointment was on a purely temporary basis and that the petitioner could be reverted from the post at any time without any prior notice. He continued to officiate at this post till 9-7-1970 when he was ordered by the Transport Commissioner to revert to his substantive post of Noter and Drafter vide Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition. Feeling aggrieved by that order he filed this writ petition for quashing that order. The grounds of attack made out by the petitioner in his writ petition were that this order was mala fide, that it was discriminatory as persons junior to him are still officiating on higher posts, that this reversion amounted to reduction in rank, and that the order not having been passed after complying with Article 311 of the Constitution was illegal. 2. The writ petition was contested on behalf of the opposite parties, who are the Transport Commissioner. U.P., Lucknow and the then Deputy Transport Commissioner, U.P., (Enforcement), Lucknow, Sri B. Mukerji. The counter affidavits were filed by both of them. 3. The first point that arises for our consideration is whether the impugned order of reversion was a mala fide order. This order was passed by the then Transport Commissioner Sri Gyan Prakash against whom no malice has been imputed by the petitioner. On the other hand, Sri Gyan Prakash had testified in his counter affidavit dated 5-8-1970 that the order of reversion of the petitioner was passed by him in the independent exercise of his discretion and that he was not in any manner biased against the petitioner. He had also sworn that he did not pass this order at the behest or dictation of Sri B. Mukerji, Deputy Transport Commissioner (Enforcement). There is no good reason to disbelieve this responsible officer. 4. The petitioner had, however, tried to impute some malice to Sri B. Mukerji, opposite party No. 2. The material allegations in this connection were made by the petitioner in para. 12 of his writ petition. There is no good reason to disbelieve this responsible officer. 4. The petitioner had, however, tried to impute some malice to Sri B. Mukerji, opposite party No. 2. The material allegations in this connection were made by the petitioner in para. 12 of his writ petition. These allegations of malice have been denied by Sri B. Mukerji in his counter affidavit dated 9.2.1971. After a perusal of these allegations and counter allegations I am not satisfied that the petitioner has successfully proved any malice being entertained against him by Sri B. Mukherji. In any case the impugned order having been passed by the Transport Commissioner in exercise of his independent discretion, it cannot be said to be a mala fide order. 5. It was then pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that the foundation of passing this order was an adverse and incorrect report made against him by Sri B. Mukerji to the Transport Commissioner on 7-7-1970 relating an incident that had taken place on 6-7-1970. It is contended that even Sri Gyan Prakash, Transport Commissioner, admitted in his affidavit that he had taken this report of Sri B. Mukerji into consideration before passing the impugned order of reversion. The petitioner's grievance is that the report of Sri B. Mukerji contained an incorrect and biased version of the incident that took place on 6-7-1970 and the Transport Commissioner without giving any opportunity to him to explain passed the order of reversion on the very basis of this report. The order of reversion does not contain any reason for the reversion and it is not possible to say that this order was passed on account of the adverse report of Sri B. Mukerji. The affidavit of Sri Gyan Prakash also does not say that it was only on the basis of the report of Sri B. Mukerji that he passed the impugned order. It only says that this report was taken by him into consideration, but so far as the passing of the reversion order is concerned it was done by him in the independent exercise of his discretion and without acting on the behest or dictation of Sri B. Mukerji. There is no other material on record to show that this report of the opposite party No. 2 was the foundation of passing this reversion order except an inference drawn by the petitioner to this effect. 6. There is no other material on record to show that this report of the opposite party No. 2 was the foundation of passing this reversion order except an inference drawn by the petitioner to this effect. 6. The next question that arises for consideration is whether this order of reversion amounts to reduction in rank so as to attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. The order is apparently an innocuous order of reversion made under the terms of appointment to this officiating post and it does not in any manner show that it was passed by way of punishment. Even if we go behind this order and look into the attendant circumstances, the only fact that has been brought on record is that some report was made by the opposite party No. 2 to the opposite party No. 1 against the petitioner with regard to an incident, that had taken place on 6-7-1970 and that report was also taken into consideration by the opposite party No. 1 before passing the impugned order. We do not know what that report contained and whether the opposite party No. 2 had made any recommendation therein for the reversion of the petitioner. It is not, therefore, possible to hold on these facts that the petitioner was reverted as a measure of punishment. 7. It was also contended on behalf of the petitioner that the order of reversion has visited him with evil consequences, in so far as he has been deprived by the higher pay and the fringe benefits attached to the higher post on which he was officiating. The loss of higher pay and the benefits attached to the higher post which is inevitable in every case of reversion cannot be deemed to be an evil consequence so as to convert an ordinary order of reversion into an order of reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. The evil consequences contemplated for that purpose must be independent of the loss of pay and other benefits attached to the higher post. It has not been alleged by the petitioner that due to this reversion he has been debarred from being considered for promotion to any higher post in future. The evil consequences contemplated for that purpose must be independent of the loss of pay and other benefits attached to the higher post. It has not been alleged by the petitioner that due to this reversion he has been debarred from being considered for promotion to any higher post in future. On the other hand, it was specifically stated by the opposite party No. 2 in his affidavit that the petitioner would be eligible for consideration to promotion to higher post in future as and when an opportunity would arise. The petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit had contended that since his reversion one other person junior to him had been promoted to a higher post. We do not know in what circumstances that person was promoted nor the promotion of that man has been challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition. There is nothing on record from which it may be inferred that due to his reversion order the petitioner has been debarred from any future promotion. So the impugned order cannot be said to have visited the petitioner with any evil consequences. 8. The last point that was argued on behalf of the petitioner was that the rules of natural justice required that the petitioner should have been given an opportunity to place his version regarding the incident of 6-7-1970 before the opposite party No. I to contradict the version of the opposite party No. 2 contained in his report dated 7-7-1970 which was admittedly taken into consideration by the opposite party No. 1 before passing the impugned order. In this connection reliance is placed on a decision of A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 150. In this case some general observations were made regarding the application of rules of natural justice to administrative acts without laying down any rule of law that the appointing authority before making up its mind to revert an officiating Government servant from a higher post to his substantive post should give him a notice to show cause. Unless the case falls within the purview of Article 311 no such notice is required as a matter of law. Unless the case falls within the purview of Article 311 no such notice is required as a matter of law. The matter was considered by a Full Bench of this Court recently in the case of R. S. Sial v. State of U.P., Writ Petition No. 1073 of 1968 decided on 12-1-1971." and it was held that no such notice is required by rules of natural justice in a case where an officiating Government servant is reverted to his substantive post without casting any stigma on him. The relevant observation made by Sahai, J., is as follows : "Merely because a person has been reverted to his substantive post from his officiating appointment by means of an innocuous order it cannot necessarily be inferred that a stigma has been cast on his professional ability or his previous record. A person who only officiates on a post and has no lien on it cannot claim any right in respect of that post. He has a right only in respect of the post over which he holds a lien or which he holds in a substantive capacity. Inasmuch as his reversion to his substantive post from an officiating one does not affect his rights or divest him of any vested interest but only places him on the position which belongs to him, it cannot be said that he is being prejudiced in any manner or is being condemned. That being the position, there can be no question of an opportunity to show cause being given to him. If he is not prejudiced or has not been condemned, the rule of natural justice that no one can be condemned without being heard would not be applicable in his case. It is true that the posting of a person to a post in an officiating capacity is an administrative act. Inasmuch as the Government servant concerned has no right to continue on a post held by him in an officiating capacity the Government can unilaterally terminate his officiating chance at any time, in public interest or to suit administrative exigencies or convenience." So far as the incident of 6-7-1970 is concerned two versions have been placed before the Court, one by the petitioner and the other by the opposite party No. 2. According to the petitioner he had finished his duty at Sandila at about 3.30 p.m. after checking the buses to see that they were carrying passengers to whom tickets had been duly issued and the prescribed passenger tax had been charged on those tickets. After finishing that duty he boarded Bus No. UPD 7036 for returning to Lucknow. When this bus stopped at Malihabad Bus stoppage at 4.15 p.m., Sri B. Mukerji (opposite party No. 2) boarded this bus and on seeing the petitioner he remarked that he had been caught red-handed. Sri B. Mukerji then checked the passengers of the bus even while some passengers were boarding and some were alighting therefrom and he declared after verifying the number of passengers with that given in the way-bill that 5 passengers were travelling without tickets and as such the passenger tax had also not been paid by them. According to the petitioner this was not the correct method of checking. On the other hand, the version of Sri B. Mukerji was that on that day he along with Sri G.S. Mital, the then Assistant Regional Transport Officer (Enforcement) Head-quarters, who had accompanied him, was on checking duty, on that day when at about 4 p.m. he signalled this bus No. UPD 7036 to stop one furlong away from Malihabad Bus stoppage and then he counted the passengers travelling in this bus and verified that number with the way-bill. He found that 5 passengers were travelling without tickets and payment of the prescribed passenger tax. The petitioner who was also present in this bus represented to Sri Mukerji that these passengers had boarded the bus at Rahimabad which was about 7 miles from the point of checking and that the conductor was in the process of issuing tickets and entering them in the way-bill. 9. It appears that Sri Mukerji did not consider this explanation of the petitioner satisfactory that the passengers who had boarded the bus 7 miles before had not upto that time been issued tickets and their numbers entered in the way-bill. It is likely that from this fact Sri B. Mukerji inferred that the tickets had not been issued to those passengers in order to evade passenger tax and since the petitioner was travelling in the same bus, it had been done with his connivance. It is likely that from this fact Sri B. Mukerji inferred that the tickets had not been issued to those passengers in order to evade passenger tax and since the petitioner was travelling in the same bus, it had been done with his connivance. It is not necessary for us to go into the merits of these versions nor it is possible for us to do so. In any case if the petitioner's version is correct and Sri B. Mukerji had observed then and there that he had been caught red-handed, he should have anticipated that a report against him would be submitted by Sri B. Mukerji. It was, therefore, open to him to approach the Transport Commissioner and place before him at the earliest, either verbally or in writing, his own version of the incident. Since Sri B. Mukerji was accompanied by another officer, it was difficult for him to give a wrong version in his report which could be contradicted by that officer who was not in any way biased against the petitioner. It was not incumbent on the Transport Commissioner to give any notice to the petitioner to show cause against this report of Sri B. Mukerji before taking it into consideration which was undoubtedly considered by him before passing the impugned order, since there is nothing on record to prove that this order of reversion was passed simply on the basis of this report and it is also difficult to draw an inference that the petitioner has been reverted on a specific charge and the order of reversion was innocuously worded simply to avoid the attraction of Article 311. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to certain decision of the Supreme Court on the subject. In State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshu Misra, Civil Appeal No. 1363 of 1966, decided on September 14, 1970, the petitioner against whom an order of reversion had been passed disputed the fact that he was holding a higher post in an officiating capacity and alleged that the post was held by him in a substantive capacity. The impugned order of reversion passed by the appointing authority, who was Inspector General of Police was a cryptic order, by simply writing `as proposed" (referring to the proposal made by his deputy). The impugned order of reversion passed by the appointing authority, who was Inspector General of Police was a cryptic order, by simply writing `as proposed" (referring to the proposal made by his deputy). That proposal which was also brought on record contained specific charges against the petitioner and recommended that he should be reverted from his present post and transferred to another place so that he may not temper with the evidence and it further contained an averment that the question whether he should be retained in service or not was already under enquiry before a Board. On these facts it was held by the High Court that it was not a simple order of reversion, but amounted to reduction in rank within the provisions of article 311 and since the requirement of that Article had not been complied with, it was illegal. The appeal filed by the Government against that order was dismissed by the Supreme Court, The Supreme Court reiterated the propositions which had been propounded earlier by Mitter, J. in the case of State of Punjab v. Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur, 1968, 3 S.C.R. 234. These propositions were : "1. The service of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. 2. The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. 3. If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. 4. An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. 5. If there be a full-scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311. 4. An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. 5. If there be a full-scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311. i.e. an Enquiry Officer is appointed a charge-sheet submitted, explanation called for and considered, any order of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said article." In Jagdish Prasad Shastri v. State of U.P., Civil Appeal No. 1988 of 1966, decided on 13-10-1970, a public servant was not only reverted from his officiating post to his substantive post but it was, further ordered that his name shall be struck off from the list of Panchayat Secretaries maintained for appointment to the officiating post of Panchayat Inspectors. The order was challenged by the public servant on the ground that it was a mala fide order and also involved punishment. His writ petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge of this Court in limine. An appeal filed by him was also dismissed by a Bench. When the matter went before the Supreme Court in appeal, the Supreme Court set aside both the orders and directed the learned Single Judge to issue notices to the respondents in the petition and then to proceed and decide the petition on merits. After that the following observations were made: "it may be observed that according to the decisions of this Court the mere form of the order reverting an officer to his substantive post even if he is appointed temporarily or in an officiating capacity to a superior post is not decisive. If the order is made for a collateral purpose, or if in making the order officer is actuated by malice, the order is liable to be set aside. Again if the order involves a penalty, even it on the face of it the order does not bear any such impress, the Officer prejudiced by the making of that order is entitled to prove that he has been denied the protection of the guarantee under Article 311 of the Constitution, or of the protection of the rules governing his appointment. An order of reversion made due to exigencies of the services in consequence of which an officer who was temporarily appointed or appointed in an officiating vacancy may not be challenged. But the order passed maliciously or on collateral considerations or which involves penal consequences, or denied to the civil servant "the guarantee of the Constitution or of the rules governing his employment, is always open to challenge by appropriate proceedings." Another decision cited on behalf of the petitioner is Union of India v. R.S. Dhaba, Civil Appeal No. 882 of 1966, decided on 7th March, 1969. It was held in this case that the test for attracting Article 311 (2) of the Constitution in a case of the present nature that was before the Court was whether the misconduct or negligence is mere motive for the order of reversion or termination of service or whether it is the very foundation of the order of termination. In that case the order of reversion did not contain any express words of stigma attributed to the conduct of the servant and it could not, therefore, be held that the order of reversion was made by way of punishment to as to attract the provisions of Article 311. 11. Another unreported decision of the Supreme Court that was relied upon by the petitioner is State of Assam v. Biraja Mohen Deb, Civil Appeal No. 1227 of 1966, decided on 16-9-1969. In this case it was held that the appointment either on probation or on officiating basis is from the very nature of such employment itself of a very transitory character and in the absence of any special contract or specific rule regulating the conditions of service the implied team of such appointment, under the ordinary law of master and servant, is that it is terminable at any time. It was further held that the same principle would be applicable to a case of reversion from an officiating higher post to an original lower post to which a person has been specifically appointed and that it does not in any way amount to punishment and cannot be regarded as a reduction in rank so as to attract Art. 311 (2). 12. 12. Another decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is Appar Apar Singh v. The State of Punjab, Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1967, decided on 3-12-1970, in which it was held that it is well-settled that officiating and temporary Government servant are also entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) in the same manner as permanent Government servants, if the Government takes action against them by meting out one of the punishments i.e. dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. It was further held that in order to find out whether an impugned order is one passed by way of punishment, the form in which the order is expressed is not decisive and the circumstances preceding or attendant on the order have to be examined in each case. It is also clear that the motive behind the passing of the order is of no consequence. Further it has also to be investigated whether or not penal consequences flow from the order. On the facts proved in that case, it was held that the order of reversion was by way of punishment and since the requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution had not been complied with it was held as illegal. 13. From a perusal of these decisions it is evident that a Government servant who is officiating on a higher post is liable to be reverted to the lower post and he has no right to hold that post for all time. A simple order of reversion in such a case does not amount to reduction in rank so as to attract the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, but even though an order of reversion is innocuously worded it is not conclusive for that purpose and the Government servant can show by bringing on record the circumstances preceding or attendant on the passing of such an order that it was in fact passed by way of punishment. If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences (apart from the loss of salary and fringe benefits attached to the higher post) or casts an aspiration against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment. In such a case without complying with the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution the order shall be illegal. In such a case without complying with the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution the order shall be illegal. A mala fide order can also be quashed as illegal. However, when the facts of this case, as discussed above, are examined in the light of these propositions it cannot be held that the above order is a mala fide order or it was passed by way of punishment. 14. The petition has, therefore, no merits in it and it is dismissed accordingly with costs to the opposite parties.