JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - In this appeal the vexed question arises whether the order terminating the services of the plaintiff-respondent, a temporary Government servant, attracted the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. The concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below is that the services of the plaintiff-respondent were not terminated in due course but the order was apparently drawn up in terms of the rules applicable to the temporary Government servants by giving one month's notice or one month's pay in lieu of the notice, though in face the termination amounted to punishment. The Union of India has appealed against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court which had affirmed the decree of the trial Court. 2. Shaktinandan Seth, the plaintiff, was appointed to the post of Civilian Equipment Assistant against Airman vacancy with effect from 24th of March 1961 in the Indian Air Force Establishment Agra. The appointment was provisional and temporary in nature. Admittedly Rule 5 of Civil and Defence Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 applied to the plaintiff. While in service the plaintiff was prosecuted at the instance of one Lyall on charges under Section 354/394 of the Indian Penal Code along with two other persons. On 18-5-1964 an order was. passed by the group captain placing the plaintiff under suspension. After undergoing a regular trial the plaintiff was honourably acquitted by a First Class Magistrate by his judgment dated 28-12-1964. Thereafter the plaintiff applied for the withdrawal of the suspension order, re-instatement and full salary with allowances. The Authorities did not withdraw the suspension order nor reinstated the plaintiff to his post but passed an order dated 4-1-1965 under the signature of the Wing Commander purporting to be under Rule 5 of the Civil and Defence Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, terminating the plaintiff's services with effect from the date of service of the order on payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay and allowances for one month. This order was communicated to the plaintiff on 21-1-1965 under the signature of the Wing Commander. Departmental appeals by the plaintiff against the said order were unsuccessful. This order was communicated to the plaintiff on 21-1-1965 under the signature of the Wing Commander. Departmental appeals by the plaintiff against the said order were unsuccessful. After serving a notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiff then instituted the suit giving rise to this appeal impleading Union of India as the defendant alleging that the order dated 4-1-1965 terminating his services was illegal, invalid, unconstitutional and- in-operative in law as the order in substance was an order of dismissal as a sequel to the criminal charges levelled against him and the plaintiff having not been afforded an opportunity to defend himself, the termination order in substance amounted to a punishment having been passed in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution. It was also urged that the authorities discriminated arbitrarily against the plaintiff inasmuch as the other employee who was also prosecuted along with the plaintiff and acquitted, was re-instated to his post in the Air Force. Further it was alleged that the order was really. an order of removal and dismissal though camouflaged in the garb of exercise of Rule 5 of Civil and Defence Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 and the said order carried with it a stigma on the plaintiff. The relief sought was for a declaration that the order dated 4-1-1965 removing or dismissing the plaintiff from service was wrongful, ultra vires, illegal, invalid and in-operative in law and the plaintiff be treated as continuing in service entitled to all benefits thereof. The suit was contested by the Union of India on the pleas, inter alia, that the order terminating the services of the plaintiff who was a temporary Government servant was passed in due course as the plaintiff's services were no longer required and the termination being in accordance with the rules and conditions of his service, the order was not by way of punishment and did not carry any stigma with it. 3. 3. The learned Munsif decreed the plaintiff's suit on the findings that the suspension order not having been withdrawn there being no relationship of employer and employee, the powers under Rule 5 terminating the services could not be exercised and that in fact the plaintiff was removed from service on account of his being prosecuted on criminal charges and no opportunity having been afforded to him to defend himself there was violation of the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The appeal by the Union of India from the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif was dismissed by the Additional Civil Judge. 4. Sri. J.N. Tiwari, Learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India, raised two contentions in support of the appeal. His first contention was that the Court below erred in law in holding that the plaintiff's services could not be terminated under Rule 5 of the Civil and Defence Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 without first withdrawing the suspension order and re-instating the plaintiff. His second contention was that the termination of the plaintiff's services being in accordance with the rules applicable, the order passed did not attach any stigma hence did not amount to punishment. 5. I have heard Sri Tej Pal Singh on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. Having given my due consideration to the learned arguments advanced before me at the Bar on behalf of the parties and having perused the record, I do not think the defendant-appellant has succeeded in showing that the decree of the Court below is legally erroneous. Even if I were to hold that there is some substance in the argument that the Services of a temporary Government servant can be terminated in accordance with, the rules during the subsistence of suspension pending a criminal trial and the withdrawal of suspension order and re-instatement is not a condition precedent for exercise of power of termination, the appellant will not succeed as I find myself in agreement with the finding of the Court below that on the facts and circumstances of the case the purported order of termination, at the face of it innocuous was a mere camouflage or cloak, the real basis for dispensing with the services of the plaintiff being his involvement in a criminal trial thus attracting the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as the termination would amount to punishment. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Sukh Rai Bahadur, A.I.R. 1968 SC 1089, laid down five propositions. Proposition No. 1: The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without any thing more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. Proposition No. 2: The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. Proposition No. 3: If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against the character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. I need not mention propositions Nos. 4 and 5 as they are not material for the purposes of this case. 6. The question which has to be considered then is whether there was "anything more" arising out of circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination dated 4-1-1965 from which it could reasonably be inferred that the exercise of power under Rule 5 was merely a camouflage or a cloak the real basis for dispensing with the plaintiff's. services being his alleged lack of character and integrity he having undergone a prosecution on heinous charges though acquitted. The circumstances preceding the termination of services of the plaintiff were that a report was made against him by one Lyall for offences under Section 354/394 of the Indian Penal Code. The plaintiff was suspended. The suspension order in its preface stated "whereas a complaint against Sri Shakti Nandan Seth Civilian Equipment Assistant of a criminal offence is under investigation". The plaintiff was acquitted on 28-12-1964. It has been found by the two courts below that the acquittal was a clear and clean one and not based on the benefit of doubt. Normally it would be expected that on intimation to the Air Force Authorities of the acquittal of the plaintiff (sic) re-instated. This, however, was not done, despite intimation of the acquittal the authorities allowed the suspension to continue. The plaintiff was all the time persisting for the withdrawal of suspension and for his re-instatement. Normally it would be expected that on intimation to the Air Force Authorities of the acquittal of the plaintiff (sic) re-instated. This, however, was not done, despite intimation of the acquittal the authorities allowed the suspension to continue. The plaintiff was all the time persisting for the withdrawal of suspension and for his re-instatement. On 4th January, 1965 only within a week's time from the date of acquittal recourse was taken by the authorities to Rule 5 of Rules 1949. As found by the Courts below the Union failed to substantiate its plea by any evidence on record that the plaintiff's services were no longer needed. In these circumstances if the Court below found that the power under Rule 5 terminating the plaintiff's services was exercised not in the normal course or ordinary course but under the stress of the above-said circumstances for getting rid of the plaintiff's services resulting in an aspersion against the character and integrity of the plaintiff, it cannot be said to have legally erred. The Learned Standing Counsel referred to two decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Transport Undertakings v. Balbir Saran Goel, (1970) 20 Fac LR 333 : (A.I.R. 1971 SC 836) and Somnath Sahu v. The State of Orissa, (1969) 3 SCC 384 . Both the above-said decisions related to the cases of employees who were not Government servants and the dispute was between the private employers and employees under the contract of service. In these cases the question of applicability of Article 311 of the Constitution did not arise. The said decisions of the Supreme Court, therefore, cannot be of much help. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent drew my attention to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.K. Bhatt v. Union of India, 1970 Ser LR 867 (SC). The facts of that case are very similar to the facts of the instant case. A learned Single Judge of the Punjab High Court held that the impugned order purporting to be on. of the termination of service of temporary Government servant in exercise of power conferred by Rule 5 of Central Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 (Similar to Rule 5 of Civil and Defence Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, was nullity, as it amounted to removal from service on the ground that the appellant was involved in a criminal case. of the termination of service of temporary Government servant in exercise of power conferred by Rule 5 of Central Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 (Similar to Rule 5 of Civil and Defence Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, was nullity, as it amounted to removal from service on the ground that the appellant was involved in a criminal case. The Division Bench of the High Court on appeal, however, reversed the decision of the learned Single Judge. When the matter went up to the Supreme Court the learned Judge did not approve of the decision of the Division Bench, allowed the appeal and remanded the case to the High Court for further investigation and for finding whether the termination of services of the appellant had been ordered in the order nary course because his services were no longer required or whether it was by way of punishment that the action was taken. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of 1970 Ser LR 867 (SC) (supra), I think fully supports the view taken by the learned Judge of the Court below. 7. For the reasons given above, do not find any force in this appeal and dismiss it with costs.