A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE parties to both these appeals are the same and both these appeals raise common questions of law and fact. I have therefore thought it fit to dispose of both these appeals by this common judgment of mine. ( 2 ) FIRST Appeal No. 341 of 1978 is directed against the decision made by the learned Civil Judge (S D.) of Kutch at Bhuj on 30/11/1971 in Special Civil Suit No. 61 of 1975. First Appeal No. 342 of 1978 is directed against the decision rendered by the same Judge on he same date in Special Civil Suit No. 62 of 1975. The appellant in each case was the plaintiff in the Trial Court in each case. Each suit arose out of an application made by the plaintiff under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 (`the Act for brief) calling upon the respondents herein as the defendants to file their arbitration agreement and to refer the disputes between the parties to arbitration for their resolution. The plaintiff in Special Civil Suit No. 61 of 1976 had undertaken the contractual work between miles 113 and 125 on Malia Kandia Station of Jhund Kandia (BG) Project. The contract was executed between the parties on 9/09/1967. It appears that the work was completed some time in 1970 and the final bill was prepared some time in August 1970 and was signed by the plaintiff under protest on 21/08/1970 Since the disputes between the parties were not resolved and since the contract between the parties contained what is popularly known as an arbitration clause the plaintiff moved the court with an application under Section. 20 of the Act. It came to be registered as Special Civil Suit No. 61 of 1975. So far as Civil Suit No. 62 of 1975 is concerned it pertained to construction of one road overbridge on the State Highway (Sakakhiali Chitrod Road) at Railway Mile 102. 83 between Kataria and Samakhiali stations. The contract was entered with the Railways by the plaintiff on 8/01/1970. It appears that in that case also the contractual work was completed around 1971 and the final bill was prepared some time in July and was signed by the plaintiff some time on 16/09/1971. The plaintiff filed his application under Section 20 of the Act some time on 21/11/1975. It appears that in that case also the contractual work was completed around 1971 and the final bill was prepared some time in July and was signed by the plaintiff some time on 16/09/1971. The plaintiff filed his application under Section 20 of the Act some time on 21/11/1975. It came to be registered as Special Civil Suit No. 62 of 1975. The respondents as the defendants filed their written statements in both the suits and resisted them on various grounds. They inter alia pressed into service the Law of Limitation for defeating the plaintiffs claim in each suits. It appears that the plaintiff thereupon applied for condonation of delay in preferring the application in each suit. Such application in Special Civil Suit No. 61 of 1975 is at Exh. 20 and in Special Civil Suit No. 62 of 1975 at Exh. 30 on the record of the case. It was supported by the affidavit of the plaintiff. The defendants appeared to have filed their reply to each of these applications. The Rojkam (the proceedings) in each case show that both these applications were kept for hearing and were heard on 2 3/11/1977. The proceedings were thereupon adjourned to 30/11/1977 and then to 1/12/1977. On that day the fate of the condonation application was decided alongwith the suits itself. The delay was not condoned and consequently the suit in each case came to be dismissed as time-barred without examining the case on merits. The aggrieved plaintiff has thereupon invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Section 39 of the Act by means of both these appeals for questioning the correctness of the decisions of the Trial Court as aforesaid. ( 3 ) IT appears that the application for condonation of delay and its reply by and on behalf of the defendants kept in D file in each case. When the record in each case was received from the Trial Court D File was found to have been destroyed. It may be mentioned that the record of this Court shows that the necessary writ calling for the records of the Trial Court in each case was sent in or about July 1978 and it was received in the District Court of Kutch at Bhuj on 20/07/1978. The record was despatched by the District Court of Kutch at Bhuj some time around 19/09/1985 and it was received here on 24/09/1985. The record was despatched by the District Court of Kutch at Bhuj some time around 19/09/1985 and it was received here on 24/09/1985. It is strange and surprising that during the pendency of the requisition of the record of the Trial Court made by this Court D file has come to be destroyed. ( 4 ) AT this stage it would be quite proper to look at the provisions of the Civil Manual regarding destruction of records. Para 490 thereof deals with the rules framed in that regard under Section 3 of the Destruction of Records Act 1917 It has inter alia been provided thereunder that D files shall be destroyed at the end of 3 years and that period has to be calculated from the date of the final decree or order. When the writ of this Court summoning the record of the case in respect of which appeal has been admitted reaches the District Court before the period for destruction of record expires as provided in Para 490 of the Civil Manual it becomes the duty of the District Court if it is not the Trial Court whose record is summoned to direct the Trial Court not to destroy the record during the pendency of the appeal before this Court. It is needless to say that destruction of any record during the pendency of an appeal before the higher forum might create no few complications. Even in the instant case the application for condonation of delay and its reply in each case were placed in D file in the record of the Trial Court. This Court does not have the benefit of looking into the contents of the application as well as its reply because both the documents have come to be destroyed before the record in each was sent to this Court. A copy of the delay condonation application has been furnished by the learned Advocate for the appellant for my perusal. He has however no copy of the reply thereto given by and on behalf of the defendants. A copy of the delay condonation application has been furnished by the learned Advocate for the appellant for my perusal. He has however no copy of the reply thereto given by and on behalf of the defendants. The learned Advocate for the respondents states before me that the case papers have changed hands during the pendency of these two appeals before this Court and as such he was not in a position to lay his hand on a copy of the reply given by and on behalf of the defendants to the delay condonation application made by the plaintiff in each case. One can very well realise what complications are created by not remaining alert alive and active on the part of the concerned officers and officials of the District Court on receipt of the writ of this Court calling for the record in question with respect to these two appeals. I hope that the concerned officers and officials of every District Court would remain vigilant enough in that regard in future so as to avoid any kind of recurrence. ( 5 ) THE learned Trial Judge has referred to contents of the delay condonation application in his judgment in each case. A copy of the delay condonation application shown to me by the learned Advocate for the appellants shows that the contents thereof are correctly referred to by the learned Trial Judge in his judgment in each case. The ground pressed into service for condonation of delay in filing the application under Section 20 of the Act in each case was to the effect that after signing the final bill under protest the plaintiff went on making his demand and expected the Railway authorities to resolve the disputes in time so as to avoid any litigation with respect thereto. This ground pressed into service by and on behalf of the plaintiff for the purpose of condonation of delay has not found favour with the learned Trial Judge. ( 6 ) THE Supreme Court as well as this Court has time and again pronounced that the approach of the Court should be liberal in considering the delay condonation applications. The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag and Another v. Mst. ( 6 ) THE Supreme Court as well as this Court has time and again pronounced that the approach of the Court should be liberal in considering the delay condonation applications. The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag and Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court at page 1353 need not be lost sight of by the Court dealing with an application for condonation of delay. It has been clearly mentioned therein that the approach of the Court to such application should be liberal. The Supreme Court has set out its detailed reasoning why the approach of the Court should be liberal in such matters. ( 7 ) IT is true that the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Katiji (supra) was not before the Trial Court when the delay condonation application was dealt with in each case. The ruling of this Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama and Others reported in (1975) 16 Gujarat Law Reporter at page 835 was very much in existence at that time. The learned Trial Judge with respect could have gainfully referred to it for the purpose of deciding the delay condonation application in each matter. In the aforesaid ruling of this Court in the case of Karim Abdulla (supra) this Court has laid down guidelines for condonation of delay and they are in consonance with those laid down by the Supreme Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Mst. Katiji (supra ). The approach of the learned Trial Judge with respect to the delay condonation application in each case is found to be too technical to be upheld. ( 8 ) APART from overlooking the ruling of this Court in the case of Karim Abdulla (supra) the learned Trial Judge seems to have lost sight of the fact that the plaintiff was not to gain anything by making a belated application. With respect the learned Trial Judge has also not realised that substantial justice lies in deciding the matter on merits rather than dismissing it on technical considerations. With respect the learned Trial Judge has also not realised that substantial justice lies in deciding the matter on merits rather than dismissing it on technical considerations. It was desirable on the part of the learned Trial Judge to have found out whether or not the delay was on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides (on the part of the plaintiffs ). It is difficult to presume any culpable negligence or mala fides on the part of the plaintiff in making such belated application. ( 9 ) ONE cannot lose sight of one important feature of the human behaviour in our country. By and large people avoid going to law courts for redressal of their grievances. They would try to resolve their disputes as far as possible out of court. They avoid litigations for diverse reasons. One such reason could be inability to afford the cost of litigation. Even if it is possible to afford such expenses another good reason for not approaching the Court for resolution of disputes is paucity of time. It is unfortunate that the administration of justice these days is plagued with inordinate delay. It involves quite often futile visits not only to the lawyers chamber or house but also to the court. Such futile visits would cause no little harassment to the litigating party. It would act as deterrent to be a litigating party. A modern Shakespeare might pronounce `neither the plaintiff (or the petitioner) nor the defendant (or the respondent) be. Such is the plight of the litigating public in our country. When this be the position can a fault be found with the litigant who waits for redressal of his grievances through correspondence rather than approaching the court for redressal thereof ? I think the answer to this question should be an emphatic NO. That is exactly what the plaintiff in this case appears to have said in his delay condonation application in each case. The liberal approach to such delay condonation application would require the Court to take into consideration various factors resulting into somewhat reluctance on the part of the litigating public to ventilate their grievances in a court of law with respect to some matter. The liberal approach to such delay condonation application would require the Court to take into consideration various factors resulting into somewhat reluctance on the part of the litigating public to ventilate their grievances in a court of law with respect to some matter. I think the ground pressed into service by the plaintiff for seeking condonation of delay in preferring his application under Section 20 of the Act ought to have been favourably considered and the delay ought to have been condoned. ( 10 ) THE learned Trial Judge has relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Boota Mal v. Union of India reported in AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1716 for not condoning the delay in each case. I think the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Boota Mal (supra) can be distinguished on its own facts. In that case Article 31 of the Limitation Act 1908 came up before the Court for interpretation. It provides the period of limitation to be one year for a suit against a carrier for non-delivery of or delay in delivering goods. The starting point of limitation is shown to be when the goods ought to be delivered. In that case the correspondence related to the tracing out of the goods not delivered by the Railways. The starting point of limitation did not depend upon tracing out of the goods but depended upon the expected time of their delivery. In that context the Supreme Court has held that the time consumed in correspondence would not save limitation. Besides Section 5 of the Limitation Act admittedly does not apply to suits. Different considerations however would apply to an application for condonation of delay with respect to an application under Section 20 of the Limitation Act. I am therefore of the opinion that the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Boota Mal (supra) is distinguishable on its own facts. ( 11 ) AT this stage it may be remembered that the Supreme Court has time and again condemned the practice on the part of the governments and governmental bodies to raise technical pleas like the limitation in their defences at times to defeat the just claims of the citizens. ( 11 ) AT this stage it may be remembered that the Supreme Court has time and again condemned the practice on the part of the governments and governmental bodies to raise technical pleas like the limitation in their defences at times to defeat the just claims of the citizens. A reference deserves to be made to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of The Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International reported in AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1144. It has been observed :"the plea of limitation based on this section is one which the Court always looks upon with disfavour and it is unfortunate that a public authority like the Port Trust should in all morality and justice take up such a plea to defeat a just claim of the citizen. It is high time that governments and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. When such observations flow from the Supreme Court it becomes all the more necessary to have a very liberal approach to the delay condonation application when the other side is the government or any governmental agency or body. ( 12 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion I am of the opinion that the decision of the lower court not to condone delay on the part of the plaintiff in making his application under Section 20 of the Act in each case cannot be sustained in law. It deserves to be quashed and set aside. Since the fate of the suit has been decided only on the point of limitation without going into the merits the matter in each case deserves to be sent back to the Trial Court for its decision on merits after giving a proper opportunity to the parties to have their say in the matter. ( 13 ) IN the result both the appeals are accepted. The impugned decision of the Trial Court in each case is quashed and set aside. The matter in each case is remanded to the Trial Court for the purpose of decision on merits of the matter after giving an opportunity to each side to have its say with respect to the controversies involved herein. The impugned decision of the Trial Court in each case is quashed and set aside. The matter in each case is remanded to the Trial Court for the purpose of decision on merits of the matter after giving an opportunity to each side to have its say with respect to the controversies involved herein. Since the matter in each case is very old the Trial Court is directed to accord the top-most priority to its disposal after restoring both the matters to file. They should be disposed of as far as possible on or before 31/03/1994. The Registry is directed to send the writ in each case latest by 2 1/08/1993. There shall be no order as to costs for these appeals on the facts and in the circumstances of he cases. (NVA) appeals allowed. .