JUDGMENT : Narain, J. By this revision application a prayer has been made to quash the proceedings of G. R. N. 366/68 T. R. No. 767/1970 pending in the Court of Sri I. D. Ram, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Patna. 2. Since the 2nd May, 1967, Devendra Prasad Srivastava, opposite party no. 2, was an accountant of the Anugrah Seva Sadan (hereinafter to be referred to as Sadan). Under the terms of his appointment he was occupying rent free quarters provided to him by the Sadan. His services were terminated with effect from 1. 8. 1968. Accordingly on 19.8.1968 he filed Title Suit No. 200 of 1968 for a declaration that his appointment could not be terminated and also prayed for an injunction restraining the opposite party from terminating his appointment and relieving him of his duty and from making him to vacate the quarters occupied by him. His prayer of injunction was granted, on the same day i. e. 19.9.1968. On appeal, however, it was vacated on 17.6.1970. 3. Mean while some occurrence took place on 8.10.1968 for which Devendra Pd. Srivastava lodged a first information report on 9.10.1968. It was allegcd therein that he had to undergo an operation of his prostate gland in July, 1968 and while he was lying on sick bed be was discharged from his service with effect from 1.8.1968. He was away from the quarters on 8.10.1968 and when he went there next morning he found that some persons of the Sadan had broken his tiger lock and had forcibly entered into his quarters. The Secretary of the Sadan had previously administered a threat to him that if he did not vacate the quarters possession will be taken, and Devendra Prasad Srivastava complained that it was the outcome of this threat that men of the Sadan had forcibly entered into his quarters. Since the civil court was closed those days he could not approach it for violation of the injunction ORDER :which was in force and accordingly he approached the police. This first information report was lodged against Narain Chandra Laheri, the Secretary of the Sadan. The police submitted charge-sheet against the petitioner Akhauri Ramesh Chandra Sinha another employee of the Sadan. The trial of the case is proceeding in the Court of Sri I.D. Ham in which one prosecution witness has been examined. 4. This first information report was lodged against Narain Chandra Laheri, the Secretary of the Sadan. The police submitted charge-sheet against the petitioner Akhauri Ramesh Chandra Sinha another employee of the Sadan. The trial of the case is proceeding in the Court of Sri I.D. Ham in which one prosecution witness has been examined. 4. Before the trying Magistrate, on 8.8.1970 a petition was filed on behalf of the accused-petitioner, Akhauri Ramesh Chandra Sinha, praying that the case proceeding against him should be dropped. The learned Magistrate rejected the prayer and said that there was sufficient ground to proceed against the petitioner for an offence under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code. Hence this application. 5. For the petitioner it has been strenuously argued that the case pending against him under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code is fit to be quashed inasmuch as the first information report does not disclose such an offence. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon (1) R. P. Kanpur V. State of Punjab (A.I.R 1960 Supreme Court 866). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in this case that : “Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises, it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not." It was further held that in such circumstances the inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceeding in law should be exercised. Naturally, therefore, it is pertinent to enquire whether allegations made in the first information report constitute an offence contemplated by Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code or not. 6. Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code provides punishment for house trespass and for this purpose it is to be seen whether criminal trespass has been committed or not. Naturally, therefore, it is pertinent to enquire whether allegations made in the first information report constitute an offence contemplated by Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code or not. 6. Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code provides punishment for house trespass and for this purpose it is to be seen whether criminal trespass has been committed or not. Criminal trespass has been defined in Section 441 of the Indian Penal Code and it runs as fallows : “Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit criminal trespass". The contention of the petitioner is that on the date of occurrence Devendra Prasad Srivastava, the informant, was not in possession of the quarters and that the act said to have been committed by the petitioner was not with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy and that being so, on the face of the first information report itself, offence of criminal trespass is not made out, and therefore the proceeding is fit to be quashed. The fact one prosecution witness has been examined is said to be of no consequence and for this purpose reliance is placed upon (2) Sheoshankar Prasad V. State (A.I.R 1960 Patna 552) and (1) R. P. Kapur V. State of Punjab(A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 866). In (1) 1960 Patna 552 (Sheoshankar Prasad V. State) it was held that: "It seems to me that, when this Court has materials before it on the basis of which it can come to the conclusion that a fresh trial of an accused will undoubtedly be barred under Section 403, it will be sheer waste of public time and money if the proceeding is not quashed at whatever stage the petitioner comes up to this Court. As I am convinced that there is nothing except some fresh evidence against the petitioner and that the fresh trial of the petitioner will be barred under Section 403 of the Cr. P. C., I do not think that I should allow the proceeding to continue" . As I am convinced that there is nothing except some fresh evidence against the petitioner and that the fresh trial of the petitioner will be barred under Section 403 of the Cr. P. C., I do not think that I should allow the proceeding to continue" . (1) 1960 Supreme Court 866 (R. P. Kanpur V. State of Punjab) says that in the case where the first information report does not constitute the offence alleged, no question of appreciation of evidence arises. Therefore, I agree with the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that despite examination of one prosecution witness, if the facts so warrant, proceeding pending in the Court of Shri I. D. Ram can be quashed. 6. It was next argued that on the date of occurrence Devendra Prasad Srivastava cannot be deemed to be in possession of the quarters inasmuch as this is his own case in the first information report. For this purpose reliance is also placed on the fact that his services had been terminated with effect from 1.8.1968. It was further argued that as a result of the ORDER :of injunction Devendra Prasad Srivastava may, by legal fiction, be held to be in possession of quarters but he cannot be said to be in actual physical possession of the quarters. It is difficult for me to sustain these contentions. No doubt services of Devendra Prasad Srivastava had been terminated with effect from 1.8.1968 but this does not necessarily mean that he had vacated the quarters. As I have stated above, under the terms of his appointment, he was occupying a rent free quarters and there is nothing to show that immediately after 1.8.1968 he had vacated the quarters. In fact, the first information report shows that the tiger lock was there which had been broken. The first information report further shows that there was a threat administered by the Secretary of the Sadan that Devendra Prasad Srivastava would be evicted from the quarters if he did not vacate it of his own free will and therefore as the facts stand it cannot be said that the first information report does not indicate possession of the quarters by Devendra Prasad Srivastava. It is not necessary for me to refer to the effect of the injunction ORDER :because it is not quite relevant for the present purpose. 7. It is not necessary for me to refer to the effect of the injunction ORDER :because it is not quite relevant for the present purpose. 7. The argument that has been next advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that not only at the time of occurrence the possession should be of Devendra Prasad Srivastava but that he should also have been physically present then. It is true that at the time of occurrence Devendra Prasad Srivastava was not present, but this, in law, makes no difference. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (3) Rash Behari Chatterjee V. Fagu Shaw and others (A.I.R 1970 Supreme Court 20), while dealing with the case under Sections 441 and 447 of Indian Penal Code, held: "The law does not require that intention must be to annoy person who is actually present at the time of the trespass.” Therefore, the fact that Devendra Prasad Srivastava was absent at the timeof the occurrence cannot militate against the offence of criminal trespass. 8. The contention of the petitioner founded on the word 'intent' occurring in the definition of criminal trespass, however, has substance. The word 'intent' has been elucidated by Batty, J. in (4) Bhagwant Appaji V. Kedari Kashinath and others (I.L.R. 25 Bombay 202). His Lordship observed as follows:- "The word 'intent' by its etmology, seems to have metaphorical allusion to archery, and implies 'aim' and thus connotes not a casual or merely possible result foreseen perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desired-but rather connotes the one object for which the effort is made-and thus has reference to what has been called the dominant motive, without which the action would not have been taken.". 9. This meaning of the word 'intent' has been adopted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (5) Smt. Mathri and others V. The State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 986), Their Lordships considered the JUDGMENT :s of different High Courts and they also took into consideration that line of reasoning adopted by some of the High Courts which said that the natural consequences of the entry would be an annoyance to the person in possession. Their Lordships observed ;- "The correct position in law may, in our opinion, be stated thus. Their Lordships observed ;- "The correct position in law may, in our opinion, be stated thus. In ORDER :to establish that the entry on the property was with the intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was the aim of the entry; that it is not sufficient for that purpose to show merely that the natural consequence of the entry was likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult, and that this likely consequence was known to the persons entering; that in deciding whether the aim of the entry was the causing of such annoyance, intimidation or insult, the Court has to consider all the relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge that its natural consequences would be such annoyance, intimidation or insult and including also the probability of something else than the causing of such intimidation, insult or annoyance, being the dominant intention which promoted the entry." 10. Naturally, therefore, the pertinent question to be enquired is : what was the dominant intention of the petitioner when he broke open the lock. The first information report itself furnishes the answer. That the dominant intention was to take possession of the quarters is writ large in the first information report. That being so, the necessary ingredient of the offence of criminal intent is lacking and the allegation in the first information report does not constitute the offence of criminal trespass. 11. In a similar case in (6) Phul Kumari V. Sheodahin Tiwary & another (A. I. R. 1965 Patna 507) it was held that the dominant intention was to take possession and intimidation, insult or annoyance was only the casual result and as such offence of criminal trespass was not established. 12. Before I close, I must refer to two of the decisions which have been cited on behalf of the opposite party, They are (7) 1964 Punjab 145 (Mata Din Singh Bharun Singh V. The State) and (3) 1970 Supreme Court 20 (Rash Behari Chatterjee V. Fagu Shaw and others) In (7) 1964 Punjab 145 (Mata Din Singh Bharun Singh V. the State) the landlord had broken open the house of tenant and had taken possession. It was held that the intention to annoy the tenant must be drawn. It was held that the intention to annoy the tenant must be drawn. It was observed that although it may be correct that the object of the petitioner was to take possession of the house in question, it shows that his intention was to cause annoyance to the petitioner. Exactly this line of reasoning has not been wholly accepted by the Supreme Court in (5) Smt. Mathri and others V. The State of Punjab (A. I. R. 1964 Supreme Court 986) and therefore (7) 1964 Punjab 145 Mata Din Singh Bharun Singh V. The State is of no avail to the opposite party. 13. The facts of (3) Rash Behari Chatterjee V. Fagu Shaw & others (A.I.R. 1970 S. C. 20), however, are clearly distinguishable. The appellant in that case had come in possession and was in possession from February 3rd, 1963 upto February 17, 1963 when the occurrence took place. The respondents trespassed on the land on the night of February 16, 1963 and on February 17, 1963, they were found making preparations for construction of bamboo structures on the same land and some bamboo pegs had already been posted. In the circumstance, their Lordships of the Supreme Court said: "It seems to us that on the facts of this case there cannot be any doubt that the intention of the respondents was to annoy the appellant who was in possession of the case land. There could have been no hope on the part of the respondents that they would be able to stay in possession of the land. The litigation started in 1951 and it was on February 3, 1963 that the appellant was able to obtain possession. It is only after two weeks after that day that the respondents chose to trespass and start construction. In this case we cannot find any other dominant intention which promoted the trespass. Therefore (3) 1970 Supreme Court 20 (Rash Behari Chatterjee V. Fagu Shaw and others) cannot be held against the petitioners. 14. In the result, the application is allowed. Application allowed