S. K. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by the plaintiff-landlord against a judgment of reversal dismissing her suit. The plaintiff's case is that she is the owner of the suit premises and the defendant had been a tenant of the same at a monthly rent of Rs. 100/- payable according to the English calendar. The tenancy was governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The ground of eviction was default in payment of rent since July, 1955, the suit being instituted on January 22, 1958. The plaintiff determined the tenancy of the defendant by a notice to quit with the expiry of the month of June, 1957 and the said notice was duly received by the defendant. As the defendant failed to vacate the suit premises in spite of the notice, the instant suit was instituted praying for recovery of possession and mesne profits. ( 2 ) THE defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement and contending, inter alia, that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was the further case of the defendant that he was the owner of the suit premises and he sold the property to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 10,000/-, even though the value of the property, according to the Municipal valuation, was Rs. 26,320/ -. The transaction was subject to an oral agreement entered between the parties on December 30, 1957 whereby the plaintiff agreed to reconvey the property to the defendant on receipt of Rs. 10,000/- with interest on Rs. 7,000/-, calculated at the rate of Rs. 4% per annum and such transaction was to be completed by May 1, 1959. It was pat-payment of the consideration. The defendant also brought a suit in the High Court for Specific Performance of Contract or for damages or cancellation of the plaintiff's conveyance. Further, the plaintiff retained a sum of Rs. 3,000/- for paying a loan of the defendant in favour of the Calcutta Loans Limited, but that amount was not paid and the said company instituted a suit against the defendant and obtained a decree which was affirmed on appeal for a sum of Rs. 2,600/- with costs. The decretal dues were payable by instalments whereof certain amounts had been paid by the defendant. 2,600/- with costs. The decretal dues were payable by instalments whereof certain amounts had been paid by the defendant. The defendant further stated that he was ready to perform his part of the contract but the plaintiff failed and neglected to execute the reconveyance. In these circumstances the defendant could not be said to be a tenant under the plaintiff and, accordingly, the suit was not maintainable. An additional written statement was filed subsequently by the defendant where it was stated that the purported sale was an ostensible safe, the real intention was to mortgage the property for securing the amount stated as consideration, advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant. For all these reasons the defendant contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree as prayed for in the suit. ( 3 ) THE suit was tried on evidence before the learned Munsif who came to the conclusion that the evidence sought to be adduced by the defendant to contradict the terms of the sale was inadmissible in view of the provision of sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act unless there was an agreement for reconveyance in writing. It was further held that the defendant being in possession of the suit premises it was also incumbent on him to explain his status regarding his possession and that he could stay only as a tenant or a licensee. It was further held that even though the defendant paid Corporation Tax for some time after the conveyance, it was also on record that the plaintiff latter on mutated her name in the Corporation records and non-payment of the Municipal Tax for some time could not colour the plaintiff's title. It was also held that P. W. 1, the husband of the plaintiff proved the counterfoil of rent receipt. Ext. 2 to establish the tenancy and the case of the plaintiff was established by the signature of the defendant on the counterfoil, marked Ext. 2 (a ). The learned Munsif himself compared this signature, which the defendant denied having executed with the admitted signatures on record and contained in the written statement and from such comparison he came to the conclusion that Ext. 2 (a) was the signature of the defendant, and this established the tenancy as claimed by the plaintiff. Further, there was a sum of Rs. 100/- which was remitted by the defendant as rent. 2 (a) was the signature of the defendant, and this established the tenancy as claimed by the plaintiff. Further, there was a sum of Rs. 100/- which was remitted by the defendant as rent. In the view that was taken the suit was decreed for recovery of possession and a sum of Rs. 200/- was also tentatively decreed as mesne profits. ( 4 ) AN appeal was taken against the said decision and the Appellate Court was of the opinion that the signature of the defendant Ext. 2 (a) was suspicious and doubtful. It was further held that according to P. W. 1, the payment, evidenced by Ext. 2 (a) was alleged to have been made on the date of conveyance i. e. 18th May, 1955, but the counterfoil bears the date June 7, 1955. On a consideration of the relevant facts the lower Appellate Court was of the opinion that the case of the plaintiff that the defendant, after the sale, remained in possession of the suit premises as a tenant, was myth and further, the impugned signature could not be said to be similar with the other admitted signatures except that there was some points of similarity and the plaintiff was also to prove the other circumstances and not merely the signature, to establish her case that the defendant was her tenant in respect of the suit premises. The lower Appellate Court was of further opinion that in the money order coupon which showed remittance of Rs. 100/- by the defendant to the plaintiff two years later, there was no mention of the account of remittance. Further, in the conveyance whereby the defendant sold the property to the plaintiff there was no mention of any tenancy to the defendant. The Appellate Court was also of the opinion that the property was sold at a gross under-value and the learned Munsif, according to the lower Appellate Court, committed an error in asking the defendant to explain his possession of the suit premises as the plaintiff was required to prove her case affirmatively. Without, however, expressing any final opinion about the transaction, claimed by the plaintiff as a sale, the lower Appellate Court was of the opinion that the plaintiff had failed to establish that there was any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Without, however, expressing any final opinion about the transaction, claimed by the plaintiff as a sale, the lower Appellate Court was of the opinion that the plaintiff had failed to establish that there was any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. However, assuming that there was such relationship, it was also held that the plaintiff failed to prove the month of the tenancy, and accordingly the notice determining the tenancy was invalid in law. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the judgment of the learned Munisf was set aside and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The present appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff-landlord against the said decision of the lower Appellate Court. ( 5 ) THE appeal came up for hearing before me at an earlier stage and I remitted the case to the lower Appellate Court for an opinion of the handwriting expert and also the said court's finding on the impugned signature Ext. 2 (a) in view of the contradictory findings arrived at by the Courts below in respect thereof. After the records were received in the lower Appellate Court, it appears, a handwriting expert was cited by the plaintiff and the said expert took the signatures of the defendant and submitted his report and he was also examined in Court. His evidence was that the signature, Ext. 2 (a) was the signature of the defendant and that was accepted by the Court of appeal below which also independently came to the same conclusion. Such findings along with the report and evidence of the said handwriting expert have now been sent up to this Court. The learned Advocate for the respondent has also field and objection to the said findings. ( 6 ) MR. A. D. Mukherji, the learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiff-appellant has contended that the findings arrived at by the Court of appeal below on the report and evidence of the expert conclusively establish that the signature appearing in Ext. 2 (2) was a genuine signature and such findings could not be further assailed. He also contended that the defendant was not entitled to set up a case or produce evidence against the transaction of sale in impugned in view of the provisions of sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. 2 (2) was a genuine signature and such findings could not be further assailed. He also contended that the defendant was not entitled to set up a case or produce evidence against the transaction of sale in impugned in view of the provisions of sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. He further submitted that the case of the defendant that the property was subject to reconveyance or mortgage was a matter outside the scope of the suit for which appropriate remedy lay in a different forum. The only case which was required to be considered in this case is whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that was amply established by Ext. 2 (a ). ( 7 ) MR. Pramatha Chandra Roy, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent contended, relying on the decision in (1) Sashi v. Subodh, reported in AIR 1964 SC 529 , that an expert's evidence is merely an opinion and non a substantive evidence as laid down in the said case and before acting on such evidence it is usual and proper to see that it is corroborated by other direct and circumstantial evidence, in absence of which the Court should not accept the expert's evidence as a conclusive or substantive evidence. He further contended that the report of the hand writing expert suffers from several infirmities, in that, he has not considered the inconspicuous words which should have been given complete and exhaustive attention by him as was laid down in Osborn's ?questionable Documents? (2nd Edition), pages 250 and 295 ). If such inconspicuous words are diverse, the conclusion should be that they were not by the same hand; if they coincide, the conclusion should be that they were by the same hand. The procedure was not adopted by the handwriting expert in coming to his conclusion. Further, scientific methods were not adopted in considering the impugned handwriting and the admitted signatures. Mr. Roy also contended that the expert on his own showing was not in a proper mental condition to come to any conclusion at the point of time he examined the signatures on account of illness and accordingly, his evidence should be given any worth. ( 8 ) THERE can be no dispute about the proposition of law which has been laid down in the case cited above. ( 8 ) THERE can be no dispute about the proposition of law which has been laid down in the case cited above. It is now to be seen whether the expert committed any error in the light of the principles enunciated in the book referred to above. It will appear that the expert has dealt with all the letters of the impugned signature and in his report has stated that the disputed signature agrees with the admitted signatures in respect of pen-hold (manual), movement, pressure, vertical slopes, shadings, speed and alignment and therefore, it cannot be said that the expert overlooked the inconspicuous words as contended by Mr. It will further appear that the expert adopted all scientific methods as were possible as will appear from the photographic enlargements taken of the signatures and his study of the same. It will further appear that the signatures of the defendant were also taken in Court in January, 1970 and the expert was till in April following. Therefore, it could not be said on all fours, nor was there any evidence to show that he did not apply his mind in considering the disputed signature as required of him by the Court. The lower Appellate Court also considered the report and itself compared the signature and came to its own conclusion. Apart from the report that the signature, Ext. 2 (a) was a genuine signature of the defendant. I have also carefully examined the impugned signature with other admitted signatures of the defendant in the written statement as also in the conveyance and I find that there is similarly between the impugned signature and the admitted signatures and they appear to have been written by the same person. In that view I am accordingly of the opinion that the signature Ext. 2 (a) is the signature of the defendant. ( 9 ) BY the signature which appears on the counterfoil of the rent receipt in respect of the suit premises, the defendant in fact admits the tenancy under the plaintiff. The lower Appellate Court has rejected this document also on the ground that P. W. 1 stated that this document was signed on May 18, 1955 while the signature bears another date i. e. June 7, 1955. The lower Appellate Court has rejected this document also on the ground that P. W. 1 stated that this document was signed on May 18, 1955 while the signature bears another date i. e. June 7, 1955. In the evidence this witness does not say that this amount was paid on the same day as the conveyance and, therefore, I do not think that the lower Appellate Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the story must be a myth because there was a material discrepancy in regard to the date. Further, the plaintiff has stated in the plaint that the defendant was in occupation of the suit premises as a tenant, while the defendant denied that thee was any relationship of landlord and tenant between parties. It is an admitted position that the tenant after the sale had been in possession of the suit premises. If that is so, it was for the defendant to produce rebuttal evidence to show the authority on the basis whereof he was staying in the suit premises. It cannot be said that merely because the plaintiff instituted the suit. The defendant has no onus to explain his occupation of the suit premises. The lower Appellate Court also committed an error in this respect is not considering that the defendant did not offer any explanation whatsoever about his occupation of the suit premises. ( 10 ) ABOUT the transaction, it is obvious that the premises were sold away to the plaintiff though the nature of the transaction has been disputed by the defendant. As held by the lower Appellate Court, in this suit, it is not possible or necessary to consider the case of the defendant as to whether the impugned transaction written statement really a sale subject to reconveyance or a mortgage and it has been stated in the written statement also that a suit for specific performance has been filed in the High Court. If that is so and if the defendant succeeds in his suit, he may be entitled to get back the property from the plaintiff on compliance with the terms of the decree, as may be, if at all, passed in the said suit or any other suit brought by him. If that is so and if the defendant succeeds in his suit, he may be entitled to get back the property from the plaintiff on compliance with the terms of the decree, as may be, if at all, passed in the said suit or any other suit brought by him. So, we are not really concerned with the nature of the transaction in this suit as alleged by the defendant and the position taken by the lower Appellate Court in this respect is quite proper and justified. Appeal disposed of of accordingly.