ORDER K.L. Pandey, J. The Petitioner, who is a Civil Judge working in the Judicial Department of this State, has called in question the promotion of the Respondents, 3 to 43 to posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges on the ground that, being Civil Judges junior to him in the cadre, they were promoted in circumstances in which his claim for such promotion was not considered. The material facts giving rise to this petition are, for the most part, not in contest and may be shortly stated. In the Judicial Department of the new State of Madhya Pradesh, there are only three cadres, the cadre of District and Sessions Judges, the cadre of Additional District and Sessions Judges and the cadre of Civil Judges. While recruitment to the cadres of District and Sessions Judges and the Additional District and Sessions Judges may be sometimes made by direct recruitment in accordance with rules made for the purpose, usually posts in the cadre of Additional District Judges are filled by promotion from Judges holding posts in the next lower cadre and the posts in the cadre of District and Sessions Judges are filled by promotion from amongst Additional District and Sessions Judges . The Petitioner was a Civil Judge belonging to the Madhya Bharat region and, upon the formation of the new State of Madhya Pradesh, he was absorbed as a Civil Judge in this State and, in the Final Gradation List published in the M. P. Rajpatra dated September 21, 1961, he was placed for purposes of seniority at No. 189 in the list of Civil Judges of the State. In making the list in order of seniority, the fact that certain Civil Judges were exercising powers of Civil Judge, Class I, was not regarded as of any significance or consequence. Even so, from the time when the M. P. Civil Courts Act, 1958, came into force, some period of service of Civil Judge, during which he exercised powers of Civil Judge, Class I, however small, was considered a necessary qualification for promotion to a post of Additional District and Sessions Judge. Thereafter, on or about May 3, 1968, a new principle was introduced for promotion to posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges. Thereafter, on or about May 3, 1968, a new principle was introduced for promotion to posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges. That principle was that, for such promotion, his seniority was to be counted from the date when he first exercised the powers of Civil Judge, Class I. Finally, this was formally accepted and adopted on October 1, 1969 by the following resolution passed in a meeting of the Court: Resolved that selection of a Civil Judge, Class II, as a Civil Judge, Class I, shall be deemed as promotion and, that being so, only the cases of Civil Judges, Class I, shall be considered for promotion as Additional District and Sessions Judges in order of their seniority. On the various grounds set out in the petition, the Petitioner averred that he was repeatedly denied equality of opportunity in the matter of promotion to a post in the cadre of the Additional District and Sessions Judges in that his claim to such promotion was not even considered when his juniors were promoted to such posts and this treatment accorded to him infringed the fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. These grounds and the submission made on the basis thereof to the effect that there was a denial to the Petitioner of such equality of opportunity were controverted in the returns filed on behalf of the High Court by the Registrar, by the State of Madhya Pradesh and by one of the Additional District Judges. It may be mentioned at this stage that, in this case, all the concerned Additional Judges have been impleaded as party Respondents. At the stage of arguments, only two points were canvassed for acceptance in support of the claim made in this petition. In order to appreciate them, it is necessary to state that promotion from amongst Civil Judges to the posts in the cadre of Additional District and Sessions Judges was made after considering the case of each Civil Judge on the principle of seniority-cum-merit. That means that every incumbent in the lower cadre was considered for promotion in order of his seniority in that cadre and, upon such consideration, he was promoted only if he was found fit for promotion. If he was not found fit, he was passed over and the claim of the next junior incumbent was similarly considered and so on. That means that every incumbent in the lower cadre was considered for promotion in order of his seniority in that cadre and, upon such consideration, he was promoted only if he was found fit for promotion. If he was not found fit, he was passed over and the claim of the next junior incumbent was similarly considered and so on. The first point according to the Petitioner is that he was denied such consideration because, to begin with, the claims of only those Civil Judges, who were exercising powers of Civil Judge, Class I, no matter for how short a period, were considered for promotion. It was contended that the fact that a Civil Judge exercised powers of Civil Judge, Class I, was irrelevant for eligibility for the purpose of being considered for promotion, though it might have a bearing on the question of suitability for promotion on merits. According to the Petitioner, this was a denial of equality of opportunity envisaged by Article 16(1) of the Constitution in a very real sense because, for exercise of powers of Civil Judge, Class I, his juniors had been selected at random in a situation in which neither he nor several of his seniors were even considered for grant of such powers. The second point is that, even after he began exercising the powers of Civil Judge, Class I, from after November 30, 1968, his claims for promotion to posts in the cadre of Additional District and Sessions Judges were not considered on the ground. that his juniors, who were promoted, had exercised the powers of Civil Judge, Class I, from earlier dates. This was not so done in the past and the claims of those Civil Judges, who had exercised powers of Civil Judge, Class I, for a period much shorter than that of the Petitioner, were considered in order of their seniority in the cadre of Civil Judges and they were even promoted. This also was, therefore, a denial of equality of opportunity under Article 16(1) of the Constitution. Before we consider the points just mentioned, it is necessary to briefly notice the nature of the right of a civil servant in the matter of promotion to posts in a higher grade and examine how far this right may be regarded as falling within the ambit of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Before we consider the points just mentioned, it is necessary to briefly notice the nature of the right of a civil servant in the matter of promotion to posts in a higher grade and examine how far this right may be regarded as falling within the ambit of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. While Article 14 generally provides for equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, Article 16(1) specifically refers to "equality of opportunity" in "matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State". In our opinion, the expression "matters relating to employment or appointment in any office" is not restricted to initial appointment only but is wide enough to embrace within its sweep all matters relating to employment to any office under the State, both prior, and subsequent to, the appointment, including promotion to a higher grade. But Article 16(1) does not confer equality of right to such promotion though it does guarantee equality of opportunity to claim, and be considered for, it. As we will show immediately, this has been repeatedly laid down by the Supreme Court. In General Manager, Sothern Railway v. Rangachari AIR 1962 SC 36, their Lordships had occasion to consider whether promotion was included in the expression "matters relating to employment" occurring in Article 16(1) of the Constitution. Gajendragadkar J., who spoke for the majority, stated: If the narrow construction of the expression 'matters relating to employment' is accepted, it would make the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 16(1) illusory. In that case it would be open to the State to comply with the formal requirements of Article 16(1) by affording equality of opportunity to all citizens in the matter of initial employment and then to defeat its very aim and object by introducing discriminatory provisions in respect of employees soon after their employment. Would it, for instance, be open to the State to prescribe different scales of salary for the same or similar posts, different terms of leave or superannuation for the same or similar posts? On the narrow construction of Article 16(1), even if such a discriminatory course is adopted by the State in respect of its employees, that would not be violative of the equality of opportunity guaranteed by Article 36(1). Such a result could not obviously have been intended by the Constitution. On the narrow construction of Article 16(1), even if such a discriminatory course is adopted by the State in respect of its employees, that would not be violative of the equality of opportunity guaranteed by Article 36(1). Such a result could not obviously have been intended by the Constitution. In this connection it may be relevant to remember that Article 16 (1) and (2) really gives effect to the equality before law guaranteed by Article 14 and to the prohibition of discrimination guaranteed by Article 15(1). The three provisions form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. If that be so, there would be no difficulty in holding that the matters relating to employment must include all matters in relation to employment both prior, and subsequent, to the employment which are incidental to the employment and form part of the terms and conditions of such employment.[Para. 16, page 41] Article 16 (2) provides that no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State. This sub-Article emphatically brings out in a negative form what is guaranteed affirmatively by Article 16(1). Discrimination is a double-edged weapon; it would operate in favour of some persons and against others; and Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination and thus assures the effective enforcement of the fundamental right of equality of opportunity guaranteed by Article 16(1). The words 'in respect of any employment' used in Article 16(2) must, therefore, include all matters relating to employment as specified in Article 16(1). Therefore, we are satisfied that Mr. Sen is right when on behalf of the Attorney-General he conceded that promotion to selection posts is included both under Article 16 (1) and (2).[Para. 17, page 41] It was, however, made clear that what was guaranteed was only equality of opportunity for promotion and that it was not inconsistent with the existence of provisions relating to qualification for such promotion. So, it was further stated: This equality of opportunity need not be confused with absolute equality as such. What is guaranteed is the equality of opportunity and nothing more. Article 16 (1) or (2) does not prohibit the prescription of reasonable rules for selection to any employment or appointment to any office. So, it was further stated: This equality of opportunity need not be confused with absolute equality as such. What is guaranteed is the equality of opportunity and nothing more. Article 16 (1) or (2) does not prohibit the prescription of reasonable rules for selection to any employment or appointment to any office. Any provision as to the qualifications for the employment or the appointment to office reasonably fixed and applicable to all citizens would certainly be consistent with the doctrine of the equality of opportunity; but in regard to employment, like other terms and conditions associated with and incidental to it, the promotion to a selection post is also included in the matters relating to employment, and even in regard to such a promotion to a selection post, all that Article 16(1) guarantees is equality of opportunity to all citizens who enter service. In Kishori v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 1139 , their Lordships observed at page 1140: It might very well be that 'matters relating to employment or appointment to any office' are wide enough to include the matter of promotion. Inequality of opportunity for promotion as between citizens holding different posts in the same grade may, therefore, be an infringement of Article 16. Thus, if, of the Income-tax Inspectors some were made eligible for promotion as Income-tax Officers and others were not, there would be legitimate ground for complaint that Article 16(1) has been violated. However, this fundamental right is restricted to equality of opportunity for promotion and a civil servant of one grade cannot claim promotion to a post in a higher grade as a matter of right. So, in High Court, Calcutta v. Amal Kumar AIR 1962 SC 1704 , their Lordships stated at page 1709: One thing is clear with reference to Article 235, read with the service rules, that there is no right of promotion which the Plaintiff could have claimed to enforce by action in a Court. In that case, the Plaintiff's claim was considered along with those of others and he was not found fit for promotion. His grievance, however, was that he had not been promoted. So, their Lordships added: He had, therefore, along with others, equal opportunity. But equal opportunity does not mean getting the particular post for which a number of persons may have been considered. His grievance, however, was that he had not been promoted. So, their Lordships added: He had, therefore, along with others, equal opportunity. But equal opportunity does not mean getting the particular post for which a number of persons may have been considered. So long as the Plaintiff, along with others under consideration, had been given his chance, it cannot be said that he had not equal opportunity along with others, who may have been selected in preference to him. [Page 1711]