JUDGMENT : K. B. N. Singh, J. In this revision petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing an ORDER :dated the 29th January, 1971, passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Darbhanga Sadar, taking cognizance and summoning the petitioners for trial for offences under Sections 147, 323 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code, and canceling the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry. 2. The case of the complainant-opposite party, in short, was that in the evening of the 29th May, 1969, Kasimunnissa (petitioner no. 3) purchased some meat from the shop of the opposite party, but when he demanded the price, she wanted to pay it some time later, to which he was not agreeable and snatched the meat which petitioner no. 3 had taken. There was exchange of hot words between them and petitioner no. 3 thereafter went away. After about two hours, petitioner no. 3, along with the other three petitioners, who were armed with Lathis, came to the Darwaza of the complainant-opposite party with the intention of assaulting him. On seeing them, the complainant-opposite party fled to his Angan, where also the petitioners are alleged to have chased him and after entering into the Angan assaulted him. The prosecution case further is that while leaving the place, the petitioners took away a bucket, a Bidhna and a Dari, worth about Rs.32/- 3. On the 31st May, 1969, the opposite party filed a complaint petition before the Sub-divisional Magistrate complaining about the said occurrence and alleging that the local police and the Gram Panchayat were in collusion with the accused persons, and, therefore, the complaint petition was filed in the court. The Sub-divisional Magistrate after perusing the complaint petition, sent the same to Shree R. P. Mukherjee, Magistrate First Class, Darbhanga, for an inquiry and report. On receipt of the report, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, dismissed the complaint on the 21st August, 1969. Thereafter, the complainant moved the Sessions Judge for further' inquiry and the learned Additional Sessions Judge who heard the matter, set aside the dismissal ORDER :as it was passed without examining the complainant on solemn affirmation and directed further inquiry to be made. On the 29th January, 1971 the complainant was examined on solemn affirmation and the impugned ORDER :, taking cognizance and summoning the petitioners was passed and the jurisdiction of the Gram Cut cherry was cancelled. 4. Mr. On the 29th January, 1971 the complainant was examined on solemn affirmation and the impugned ORDER :, taking cognizance and summoning the petitioners was passed and the jurisdiction of the Gram Cut cherry was cancelled. 4. Mr. Q. A. Rahman, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has urged that the ORDER :of the Sub-divisional Magistrate taking cognizance was illegal, inasmuch as the learned Magistrate has first taken cognizance and after that cancelled the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry. Relevant portion of the impugned ORDER :of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate may usefully be quoted :- "I, therefore, agreeing with the report of the Inquiring Officer, Shri R. P. Mukherjee, who has found the case prima facie true, take cognizance u/s 323/379/147 against the accused persons. Since the complainant has already mentioned in the complaint petition that the Gram Panchayat is in league with the accused persons, hence I cancel the jurisdiction of the Gram Panchayat and transfer the case to the file of Shri R. K. Sharma, Munsif Magistrate, 1st Class, for favour of disposal." Learned counsel has submitted that the above ORDER :clearly shows that first cognizance was taken and then the jurisdiction of the Gram Panchayat had been cancelled, which is contrary to Section 68 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, and unless the jurisdiction was legally cancelled, the Gram Cutcherry had the exclusive jurisdiction to try the offences, by virtue of the provisions of Section 62 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, for which the petitioners were summoned. 5. It will be useful to refer to the relevant portion of Section 68 of the Panchayat Raj Act :- 68 (l). "No Court shall take cognizance of any case or suit which is cognizable under the Act by a Bench of the Gram Cutcherry, unless an ORDER :to the contrary has been passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate... ...." Learned counsel has put emphasis on the word 'unless', which I have underlined in the above quoted portion, in support of his submission that the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry should have at first been cancelled and then alone cognizance could have been taken, which has not been done in the instant case. ...." Learned counsel has put emphasis on the word 'unless', which I have underlined in the above quoted portion, in support of his submission that the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry should have at first been cancelled and then alone cognizance could have been taken, which has not been done in the instant case. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has referred to four decisions, reported in (1) A.I.R 1957 Supreme Court 612 (Baldeo Singh V. the State of Bihar), (2) 1965 B.L.J.R. 661 (Bimal Singh and others V. The State of Bihar), (3) 1969 P.L.J.R. 147 (Damodar Prasad Singh V. Baijnath Singh and others), and (4) 1969 P.L.J.R. 494 (Motilal Yadav and others V. Rambilas Yadav. 6. The Supreme Court decision in the case of (1) Baldeo Singh V. The State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1957 Supreme Court page 612) is not a decision on the point. The question that arose for consideration in that case was whether Section 62 of the Act was hit by Article 14 of the Constitution, being discriminatory, inasmuch as it gave an option to a party either to go before the regular criminal court or to the Gram Panchayat having different procedure for trial of cases. Repelling this contention, it was held as follows :-- "On a proper construction of Sections 62 and 68, it is clear that there is really no discrimination and a case cognizable by a Bench of the Gram Cutcherry must be tried there, unless there has been an ORDER :to the contrary in the exercise of his judicial discretion by the Sub-divisional Magistrate or the Munsif concerned, as contemplated by the latter part of Section 68. The provisions of the Act under which such an ORDER :can be passed are contained in the succeeding sections, already referred to by us." In the case of (2) Bimal Singh and others V. The State of Bihar (1965 B.L.J.R. 661), the petitioners were convicted by a regular court without the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry being cancelled under Section 68 of the Act. This Court set aside the conviction and the question which arises for consideration in this case was not decided in that case. This Court set aside the conviction and the question which arises for consideration in this case was not decided in that case. In the case of (3) Damodar Prasad Singh V. Baijnath Singh and others (1969 P.L.J.R 147), cognizance was taken for offences under Sections 147 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, which were triable by Gram Cutcherry, and the case was transferred to a Munsif Magistrate. Thereafter, the complainant filed a petition to the effect that although the case was triable by the Gram Cutcherry, in the interest of justice, the case should be tried by a regular court. The Sub-divisional Magistrate thereupon cancelled the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry. That case is, therefore, of no assistance to the learned counsel, inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry was not cancelled by the same ORDER :by which cognizance was taken, as in the instant case. In the case of (4) Motilal Yadav V. Rambilas Yadav (1969 P.L.J.R. 494), the last case relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners, no doubt, the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry was cancelled by the same ORDER :by which cognizance was taken. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, in the first instance, had taken cognizance of an offence triable by a Gram Cutcherry and had transferred the case for trial to a Munsif Magistrate. The learned Munsif Magistrate found that cognizance had been taken without canceling the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry and acquitted the accused of the charge leveled against them. He, however, observed that the acquittal, being not on merit, was no bar for initiation of a fresh proceeding, if the complainant so desired. Thereafter, a complaint was filed on the same facts with the ORDER :of the Munsif Magistrate, for an offence under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code. It was stated in the complainant petition that the complainant had enmity with the Sarpanch and the Mukhiya of the Gram Panchayat who were in collusion with the accused. The relevant ORDER :of the Sub-divisional Magistrate on that complaint petition in that case runs thus :- “Perused the complaint petition and the JUDGMENT : dated 25.1.69 of the learned Munsif Magistrate, cognizance taken. Summon the accused u/s 379 I. P. C. The complainant has stated on S. A. that the G. P. of the area is in the 'Meli' of the accused. Summon the accused u/s 379 I. P. C. The complainant has stated on S. A. that the G. P. of the area is in the 'Meli' of the accused. So the jurisdiction of G. P. is cancelled. Case is transferred to the Court of Shri R. Singh, Munsif Magistrate, 2nd Class, for favour of disposal." A learned Single Judge of this Court in the revision against the above ORDER :came to the conclusion that while canceling the jurisdiction of the Gram Panchayat a Magistrate has to apply his judicial discretion and in that case the cancellation was not judicious and it was held that the reason assigned by the learned Magistrate to cancel the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry was “utterly inadequate and against the law" and the ORDER :was quashed. The allegation in the complaint petition in that case was that the complainant had enmity with the Mukhiya and the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat and on solemn affirmation the complainant had stated that the Gram Panchayat was in league with the accused. It was in those circumstances that it was held that the ORDER :canceling the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry was utterly inadequate and against law, inasmuch as, in absence of the Sarpanch, the case could be tried by the Up-Sarpanch, as provided under Section 57 (1) of the Act, against whom there was no allegation of enmity, if the Sarpanch was disqualified. That decision also does not support the extreme contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the ORDER :was quashed as the fact of cancellation of the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry was not mentioned in the earlier part of the ORDER :. In that case the ORDER :was not set aside on the ground that the facts of cancellation of the jurisdiction had not been mentioned before mentioning the fact of taking cognizance. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners, on the basis of the above decision also contended that the jurisdiction of the Gram Cut cherry had not been judiciously determined. Learned counsel referred to, an affidavit filed on behalf of the complainant on the 12th August, 1969, wherein the complainant stated that his village Asharafpur Dani fell within Dani Raj Gram Panchayat, the said Gram Panchayat is not an elected one, and that there is no Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch. Learned counsel referred to, an affidavit filed on behalf of the complainant on the 12th August, 1969, wherein the complainant stated that his village Asharafpur Dani fell within Dani Raj Gram Panchayat, the said Gram Panchayat is not an elected one, and that there is no Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch. It was also stated in the said affidavit that village Asharafpur Dani did not fall within Jalwara Gram Panchayat and that the Sarpanch of Jalwara Gram Panchayat was the own relation of accused Mojibur Rahman (petitioner no. 1). It was also stated in the affidavit that a counter case filed by Jamrul, own maternal cousin of Mojibur Rahman (petitioner no. 1) was proceeding in the Court of Shree P. N. Trivedi, Munsif Magistrate, Darbhanga. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the complainant made an allegation against the Sarpanch of Jalwara Gram Panchayat only, and, therefore, there was no difficulty in the case being tried by the said Gram Cutcherry, where the matter could have been taken up by the Up-Sarpanch. The affidavit relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners does not only raise the question of the Sarpanch being interested in the petitioners, but also raised other controversial questions that the village in question does not lie within the jurisdiction of the Jalwara Gram Panchayat, and there is no elected Gram Panchayat for the village in question. Under these circumstances, if the Sub-divisional Magistrate thought it prudent to cancel the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry in view of these controversies, he cannot be said to have acted illegally or having not exercised his discretion judiciously, in canceling the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry, and transferring the case to the Munsif Magistrate, as also in view of the fact that the counter-case was pending in the court of a Munsif Magistrate. 8. In a case, where the Sub-divisional Magistrate, by the same ORDER :, cancels the jurisdiction and takes cognizance and summons the accused, it is obvious that it was after he had decided to cancel the jurisdiction that he has taken cognizance. Simply because he has stated the factum of cancellation of the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry in the latter portion of the ORDER :will not ipso facto show that he had later thought of cancelling the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry. Simply because he has stated the factum of cancellation of the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry in the latter portion of the ORDER :will not ipso facto show that he had later thought of cancelling the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry. The word 'unless' in the context, obviously, means 'without’ canceling the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry. The view I have taken gains support from a Bench decision of this Court in the case of (5) Mohammad Naseem and others V. The State (1970 B. L. J. R 1051), and which is against any narrow construction being put on the wordings of Section 68 of the Act, as urged by learned counsel for the petitioners. In that case, the question that arose for decision was that the power to transfer a case or suit under Section 69 of the Act is available only in those Cases where cognizance has been taken by the Sub-divisional Magistrate after cancelling the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry under Section 68 of the Act, otherwise, Section 69 has no application. Rejecting the above contention, it was held as follows :- "This section does not contemplate that such a case must be necessarily one in which cognizance has been taken after a proper ORDER :to the contrary recorded under Section 68. There can be no doubt that both the two sections must be read together and so construed as not to render the one inconsistent with the other. If both the sections are read together, then it is quite clear that what Section 69 provides for is to meet a situation arising out of the failure or omission to follow the provisions of Section 68, whereunder the ordinary criminal court is precluded from taking cognizance of a case triable by a Bench of the Gram Cutcherry in the absence of an ORDER :to the contrary recorded by the Sub-divisional Magistrate. In respect of such a case, Section 69 provides a remedial provision, and lays down that if at any stage of the proceedings in the particular case pending before a Magistrate it 'appears' which would include ‘it is discovered’-that the case is really triable by a Bench of the Gram Cutcherry, then the ORDER :w here by cognizance was taken by regular court will not be automatically rendered nugatory or non set, but the Sub-divisional Magistrate will have to decide whether he must transfer that case to the Bench of the Gram Cutcherry having jurisdiction over it or whether in his opinion the case is of such a nature or difficulty that it ought to be retained in and tried by the regular court." 9. There is another hurdle in the way of the petitioners, as rightly urged by learned counsel for the opposite party. Learned counsel has pointed out that the com plaint petition discloses an offence under Section 452 of the Indian Penal Code also, which is not triable by a Bench of the Gram Cutcherry. It appears that in the complaint petition, at the top, amongst the offences which are said to have been committed, it is mentioned that the accused have committed an offence under Section 452 of the Indian Penal Code also. It is also alleged in the complaint petition that after the first quarrel, petitioner no. 3 went away and after two hours the petitioners came armed to the door of the complainant, and when the complainant fled inside, the petitioners entered into the house of the complainant and committed the offences of assault and theft. Reading the allegations made in the complaint petition it thus appears that a house trespass in ORDER :to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment under Section 451, if not under Section 452 of the Indian Penal Code, has been committed. Offences under Sections 451 and 452 of the Penal Code are not the offences mentioned under Section 62 of the Act, which a Gram Panchayat is competent to try. Offences under Sections 451 and 452 of the Penal Code are not the offences mentioned under Section 62 of the Act, which a Gram Panchayat is competent to try. That it is the allegations made in the petition of complaint that determines the forum of the trial, and not on the cognizance being taken by Sub divisional Magistrate under Section mentioned u/s 62 of the Act, cannot be disputed, in view of the Bench decision of this Court in the case of (6) Mehado Choudhary V. The State (1971 P.L.J.R. page 152). 10. I am, therefore, satisfied that the petitioners have not been able to make out any case for quashing the impugned ORDER :of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate. The revision application accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.