JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The Petitioner was appointed a literate constable in the Police Department of the State of Orissa on 1.7.1942, In 1946, he was promoted as an Assistant Sub-Inspector of police and came to be confirmed in that promoted post on 17.1951. In June 1962 the Petitioner had proceeded on casual leave for 4 days, but he did not report to duty on the expiry of the leave and alleged that he had been taken ill of gastric colic. A set of charges was framed against him in May 1963 mainly on account of unauthorised absence from duty for intermittent periods between 14-7-1962 and 18-11-1962. The Petitioner offered his explanation. An enquiry followed. The Enquiring Officer submitted a report exonerating the Petitioner, but the disciplinary authority differed from the conclusions of the enquiring "Officer and by his order dated 27.11-1965 The Petitioner was punished and awarded a black mark. 2. The Petitioner preferred an appeal against the aforesaid infliction of punishment to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Range. It appears the appellate authority was not satisfied with the quantum of punishment and directed a notice to issue to show cause against the proposed enhancement punishment of reduction to the rank of constable for two years. The Petitioner showed, cause against the proposed punishment, but by order dated 23-2-1967 the appellate authority (Opposite party No. 2) reduced the Petitioner to the rank of a constable on a scale of pay of Re. 95/- per month for 18 months with effect from 1.3.1967. The Petitioner preferred an appeal before the Inspector General of Police (Opposite party No. 1), but he declined to interfere. Further representation to Government went unheeded. 3. Mr. Rath does not challenge The proceeding before The disciplinary authority nor the punishment awarded by him, that is, the black mark, by his order dated 27.11.1965. The challenge is confined to the Enhanced punishment meted out by The appellate authority and it is contended that the Action of the appellate authority is without jurisdiction. In support of this stand reliance is placed upon a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.N. Srivastava v. State of Bihar AIR 1971 S.C. 1106 . Action in the reported decision was taken under the Bihar and Orissa Police Manual. The Orissa Manual which applies to the case before us has similar provisions. In support of this stand reliance is placed upon a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.N. Srivastava v. State of Bihar AIR 1971 S.C. 1106 . Action in the reported decision was taken under the Bihar and Orissa Police Manual. The Orissa Manual which applies to the case before us has similar provisions. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held, Under this rule (Rule 251) an appeal would lie before the Government against the order of the Inspector General reverting the Appellant to his substantive post of Sub-Inspector for one year. Such an appeal was in fact filed by the Appellant. But no appeal was,filed by the department against the order of The Inspector-General exonerating the Appellant of the charges of misappropriation and connivance of misappropriation by the two constables. Under Rule 851(b), therefore, the only question before the Government was whether the order of reversion should be sustained or not. There was no other matter by way of an appeal before the Government by the department or by anyone else being aggrieved against the order of the Inspector-General by which held that the charges against the Appellant had not been established. That being so, the Government could pass in exercise of its appellate power under Rule 851(b) such an order as it thought fit in he appeal filed by the Appellant, i.e. either upholding the order of reversion or setting it aside. In the absence of any other appeal, the Government could not sit in judgment over the findings of the Inspector General given by him under the power conferred upon him by Section 7 of Act. An appeal before the Government having been provided for under Rule 851(b), presumably both by the delinquent police officer, as also by the department, if aggrieved by an order passed by the Inspector-General, there would also be no question of the Government exercising its general power of superintendence u/s 3 of the Act. The exercise of such a power is ordinarily? possible when there is no provision for an appeal unless there are other provisions providing for it. The order of dismissal passed by the Government in the appeal filed by the Appellant, therefore, was not, sustainable. It is contended that Rule 851 does not confer power of enhancement, and in the absence of clear provision for such power the appellate authority cannot enhance the punishment. The order of dismissal passed by the Government in the appeal filed by the Appellant, therefore, was not, sustainable. It is contended that Rule 851 does not confer power of enhancement, and in the absence of clear provision for such power the appellate authority cannot enhance the punishment. The learned Government Advocate sought to place reliance on a decision of the Punjab High Court in Bishamber Lal v. State of Punjab AIR 1966 Punj. 175, in support of his contention that as an appeal by to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, he could exercise all the normal powers of an appellate authority, such as, to confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the punishment. He could also set aside the order require a fresh enquiry to be made. No authority is shown to us to take the view that merely because an appeal is provided without indicating the extent of jurisdiction all these powers would vest in the appellate authority. The Punjab decision does not support the contention of the learned Government Advocate because the relevant rule quoted in the decision at page 178 clearly conferred power to enhance on the appellate authority in a disciplinary proceeding. On the other hand, upon analogy from the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court it would follow that the appellate authority was Dot entitled to enhance the punishment. The rule that was before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was akin to the rule now before us and, therefore, the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case is in all fours with the present matter. We would accordingly hold that the appellate authority in this case had no jurisdiction to enhance the punishment inflicted by the disciplinary authority when the Department had not appealed against the quantum of punishment, but the appeal had been filed by the delinquent police Officer. We would direct that, a writ of certiorari shall issue quashing the appellate decision of the Deputy Inspector General of Police dated 23-2-1967. It is made clear that the punishment inflicted by the Superintendent of Police by order dated 27-11-1965 is not interfered with and our decision shall not affect it in any manner. The writ application is allowed o the extent indicated. We, however direct both the parties to bear their own costs. B.C. Das, J. 4. I agree. It is made clear that the punishment inflicted by the Superintendent of Police by order dated 27-11-1965 is not interfered with and our decision shall not affect it in any manner. The writ application is allowed o the extent indicated. We, however direct both the parties to bear their own costs. B.C. Das, J. 4. I agree. Final Result : Allowed