( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of the judgment and decree dated April 16, 1969, passed by R. M. Datta, J. in the suit instituted by the plaintiff-appellant against the Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr. , inter alia, for a declaration that the plaintiff is still in the employment of the defendants and the impugned order of termination of the plaintiff-appellant's employment dated October 16, 1958, is bad, void, illegal and inoperative; a decree for all arrears of salaries and other emoluments from the date of the termination of service, alternatively for a decree for Rs. 2,94,968/- as damages. ( 2 ) ON or about October 16, 1952, the appellant was appointed as Inspector by the National Insurance Co. Ltd. On January 1, 1953, the appellant was promoted to be a Divisional Superintendent in the said company. On January 19, 1956, the Life Insurance (emergency Provision) Ordinance of 1956 was promulgated whereby the controlled business of, amongst others, the National Insurance Co. became transferred to and vested in the Central Government from the said date. By virtue of the provision of the said Ordinance the appellant continued to be an employee of the Central Government. ( 3 ) ON September 1, 1956, the Life Insurance Corporation of India was established by a notification issued under section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act (Act XXXI) of 1956. All whole-time employees of the insurers, whose controlled business vested in the Corporation became employees of the Corporation on the same terms and conditions on which they held office under their previous employees. On or about December 2, 1957, certain rules were framed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India under section 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act for the purpose of categorization or fitting in of the existing salaries of field workers. The said rules are known as categorization order and have been set out at PP. 184 to 189 of the Paper Book. ( 4 ) ON December 30, 1957, the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred upon it by sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act promulgated an order containing rules and regulations where by one set of uniform rules were framed for the purpose of governing the terms and conditions of employment of the field officers under the Life Insurance Corporation of India. The said order is commonly known and referred to as the 'blue Order'. ( 5 ) ON February 17, 1958, the appellant was required to work as field officer in accordance with the rules and regulations contained in the said 'blue Order'. The said letter requiring the appellant to work as aforesaid was dated February 17, 1958, and was to the following effect, to wit: sri Debabrata Mukherjee, 100, Ballygunge Place, Calcutta-19. Dear Sir, in terms of the Government Order No. 53 (1)-INSURANCE (1)/57 dated 30th December, 1957, you are required to work as a Field Officer. You will continue to be attached to City Branch Unit No. 10, until further orders. Yours faithfully, sd. Illegible divisional Manager. ( 6 ) BETWEEN February 27, 1958 and October 16, 1958, the appellant acted as such field officer in terms of the said letter. ( 7 ) ON Oct 16, 1958, the appellant's service was terminated in accordance with the provisions of para 5 of the said categorization order. The said letter is as follows, to wit: ref. DEV 16th October, 1958 sri Debabrata Mukherjee, field Officer, Code No. 1035 city Unit No. 10, Calcutta dear Sir, in terms of Section 5 of the categorization circular of the 2nd December, 1957, your case was examined by the Special Committee appointed by the Board of the Corporation to review the cases of Exercise-Branch Secretaries etc. In accordance with the recommendations of the Committee which have been accepted by the Corporation, it has been decided to terminate your service with immediate effect. You will be paid your emoluments upto the current month and one month's salary in lieu of notice. Yours faithfully, sd. Illegible senior Divisional Manager. ( 8 ) ON the same day the services of quite a number of field officers were terminated by letters in identical terms as quoted above. ( 9 ) ON October 29, 1958, the appellant received one month's salary in lieu of notice and granted a receipt 'in full and final settlement on termination of service'. On March 17, 1959, four months and a few days after the receipt of one month's salary in lieu of notice the appellant received a sum of Rs. 1,010. 75 on account of money lying to his credit interest he Provident Fund. On March 17, 1959, four months and a few days after the receipt of one month's salary in lieu of notice the appellant received a sum of Rs. 1,010. 75 on account of money lying to his credit interest he Provident Fund. We shall revert to the receipts granted by the appellant for the salary and Provident Fund money latter in the judgment. The appellant also signed a debit voucher in acknowledgement of the receipt of the Provident Fund money in full and final settlement of Provident Fund Account. ( 10 ) THEREAFTER, nothing seems to have been done by the appellant until the appellant came to know that on or about November 22, 1963, the Sc had struck down the purported orders of termination of services in the cases of some other persons whose services were purported to be terminated on the same day, i. e. , October 16, 1958, by letters of termination in identical terms. ( 11 ) AFTER having come to know of the said decision of the Supreme Court, the appellant on September 23, 1968, instituted this suit for the reliefs mentioned above. More than four years after the suit had been instituted, the appellant applied for amendments of his plaint for incorporating reliefs regarding payment of arrears of salaries. The said amendments were allowed by the learned trial Judge although he granted leave to the defendant to make submission on question of limitation at the trial. The suit was thereafter heard on contest and dismissed by the judgment and decree mentioned above. This appeal is directed against the said judgment and decree. ( 12 ) MR. J. N. Roy, appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that, although originally the terms and conditions of services of the appellant under the National Insurance Co. Ltd. were purely contractual, some of the terms and conditions of services of the field officers including the appellant were given a statutory status and effect by promulgation of the order under section 11 (2) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act mentioned above. The said order commonly known as Blue Order, as stated earlier, has been reproduced in pages 190 to 195 of the Paper Book. The said order commonly known as Blue Order, as stated earlier, has been reproduced in pages 190 to 195 of the Paper Book. By virtue of the said order various terms and conditions governing the employment of different field officers employed by different employers were done away with and one set of uniform terms and conditions were made to apply to or govern the employment of all the field officers under the Life Insurance Corporation of India. In the instant appeal, we are concerned with para. 10 (a) of the said Blue Order which is set out below: -10. Penalties and Termination of Service (a)in case of unsatisfactory performance of duties by a Field Officer or if a Field Officer shows negligence in his work or is guilty of misconduct or its otherwise incapable of discharging his duties satisfactorily, his remuneration may be reduced or his services may be terminated, after giving him an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him and after conducting such enquiry as the Corporation thinks fit. ( 13 ) WE shall be concerned in this appeal with the categorization order mentioned above and in particular with para. 5 of the said categorization order, dated December 2, 1957. The said categorization order has been set out at pages 184 to 189 of the Paper Book Clause 5 thereof appears at page 189 of the Paper Book and is to the following effect: 5. Ex-Branch Secretaries and Supervisory Officers a Special Committee will be appointed by the end of December, 1957 by the Central Office of the Corporation to examine and review the cases of all Ex-Branch Secretaries and Supervisory Officers who were required to work as Field Officers, and whose services have not been terminated. The Committee will make recommendations as to the utilization of those personnel in the best interest of the Corporation. For this purpose, the Committee will take into account age, qualifications past service, business record, etc. of these persons as also their performance during the period of service as Inspector in the Corporation, in specific cases where the performance is poor and there has been consistent negligence in work, the Committee may recommend termination of the services of the officers concerned. of these persons as also their performance during the period of service as Inspector in the Corporation, in specific cases where the performance is poor and there has been consistent negligence in work, the Committee may recommend termination of the services of the officers concerned. In other cases, after scrutiny of each individual case, the Committee will make recommendations as to (i)whether to continue such Inspectors as Field Officers and, if so, on what remuneration; or (ii) whether the services of such Inspectors could be utilized in any other capacity in the Corporation, either in administration or development and, if so, on what remuneration. ( 14 ) ON or about October 16, 1958, the appellant's service with the Life Insurance Corporation of India was terminated by letter dated, October 16, 1958. The said letter appears at page 179 of the Paper Book and has already been quoted above in this judgment. ( 15 ) FROM the said letters it appears that the appellant's performance as a field officer was scrutinized and on the basis of recommendation made by the Special Committee the appellant's service was terminated with immediate effect. It appears from a perusal of section 5 of the categorization order as well as the letter, dated October 16, 1958, that the appellant's services were terminated on the ground of poor performance and negligence in work. On the aforesaid grounds it appears from a perusal of Clause 10 (a) of the Blur Order that service of a field officer could be terminated might be reduced only after giving him an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken by the employer in regard to him and after conducting an enquiry in the mater. It appears, therefore, that the Life Insurance Corporation's act in terminating the employment of the appellant without complying with the requirements of Clause 10 (a) of the Blue Order was contrary to the provisions having statutory force or effect. ( 16 ) IN similar cases where services of field officers were purported to have been terminated in exactly similar circumstances by identical notices of the very same date, the Supreme Court struck down the impugned orders of termination on the ground that they did not comply with the requirements laid down in para. 10 (a) of the Blue Order. ( 16 ) IN similar cases where services of field officers were purported to have been terminated in exactly similar circumstances by identical notices of the very same date, the Supreme Court struck down the impugned orders of termination on the ground that they did not comply with the requirements laid down in para. 10 (a) of the Blue Order. One of such cases was the case of (1) Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee and Ors. , AIR 1964 SC 847 . In the said case, the Supreme Court pointed out the distinction or difference between regulations framed under section 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act and rules frame under section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act and/or orders promulgated under section 1 (2) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act. The Supreme Court held that rules framed under section 48 of the said Act or orders promulgated under section 11 (2) of the said Act were statutory force and effect while the regulations framed by the Corporation under section 49 were really regulations framed under executive authority and had no statutory force or effect. The Supreme Court further held that the services of field officers coming under the Blue Order could be terminated only in accordance with Clause 10 of the Blue Order. The Blue Order, according to the Supreme Court, "pertake of all the characters of the rules framed under section 48 of the Act. " ( 17 ) IN view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee and Ors. (supra) there cannot be any doubt that the termination of service of the appellant in the instant case was also invalid. ( 18 ) BUT this conclusion does not by itself put an end, in our opinion, to the controversy involved in this appeal. The next question that we are called upon to decide is as to whether the said purported termination in contravention of the provision of Clause 10 (a) of the Blue Order could be waived by the appellant and, if so, as to whether the appellant in fact waived the same. ( 19 ) MR. The next question that we are called upon to decide is as to whether the said purported termination in contravention of the provision of Clause 10 (a) of the Blue Order could be waived by the appellant and, if so, as to whether the appellant in fact waived the same. ( 19 ) MR. Roy's contentions on this point, to put simply and shortly, seem to be as follows:-the order of the termination in the instant case was illegal and null and void. Therefore, the same could not be waived and has to be held to be bad, declared to be null and void and set aside. ( 20 ) FROM a perusal of Clause 10 of the Blue Order it is clear that the said clause provided for safeguard against arbitrary dismissal of field officers including the appellant except in the manner laid down therein. The said clause, as we have already noted, is of statutory force and effect. ( 21 ) IN (2) Rajani Kanta Ghosh and Ors. v. Sheikh Rahman Gazi and Ors. , AIR 1924 Cal 408 a Division Bench of this Court presided over by Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee held that, if provisions of a statute were contravened, it could not be said at once that the proceedings taken in such contravention wee null and void. The test to arrive at a conclusion in such case was to apply the principle laid down by Coleridge, J. in (3) Holmes v. Russell, (1841) 9 Dowl 487, viz. , the safest rule to determine what is an irregularity and what is a nullity is to see whether the party can waive the objection; if he can waive it, it amounts to an irregularity; if he cannot, it is a nullity. ( 22 ) IF a statutory provision was enacted on ground of public policy, an individual certainly cannot waive it. But if the provision has been enacted for the benefit of the individual, the individual if he so desires may waive the same. ( 23 ) IN the said case it was held that failure to serve notice in accordance with mandatory provisions of section 158b (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act did not vitiate the sale of the tenancy altogether nor did it make the same a nullity. ( 23 ) IN the said case it was held that failure to serve notice in accordance with mandatory provisions of section 158b (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act did not vitiate the sale of the tenancy altogether nor did it make the same a nullity. The company-sharer landlord for whose benefit the said provision was enacted in section 158b (2) was entitled to waive the same and in the said case he was held to have waived the same. ( 24 ) THE said case of Rajani Kanta Ghosh and Ors. v. Sheikh Rahman Gazi and Ors. (supra) approved of an earlier decision in (4) Ashutosh Sikdar v. Beharilal Kirtania, ILR 35 Cal 61 which laid down the law on the subject in the following words: -the only rule that may be adopted is that, when the provisions of a statute have been contravened, if a question arises as to how far the proceedings are affected by such contravention the matter must be determined with regard to the nature, scope and object of the particular provision which has been violated. No hard and fast line can be drawn between a nullity and an irregularity. But this much is clear that an irregularity is a deviation from a rule of law which does not take away the foundation or authority for the proceeding or apply to its whole operation whereas a nullity is a proceeding or apply to its whole operation whereas a nullity is a proceeding that is taken without any foundation for it or is so essentially defective as to be of no avail or effect whatever or is void and incapable of being validated. One test is well-established and is often useful as was observed by Coleridge, J. in Holmes v. Russel (supra) "it is difficult sometimes to distinguish between an irregularity and a nullity; but the safest rule to determine what is an irregularity and what is nullity is to see whether the party can waive the objection; if he can waive it, it amounts to an irregularity, if he cannot, it is a nullity. " now if the provision has been enacted on grounds of public policy, an individual cannot be permitted to waive it. On the other hand, if the provision has been enacted for the benefit of an individual he is entitled to waive it. " now if the provision has been enacted on grounds of public policy, an individual cannot be permitted to waive it. On the other hand, if the provision has been enacted for the benefit of an individual he is entitled to waive it. ( 25 ) THE case of Ashutosh Sikdar v. Beharilal Kirtania (supra) was considered and approved of by the Supreme Court in the case of (5) Dhrendra Nath v. Sudhir Chandra, AIR 1964 SC 1300 . In the said case a sale in violation of the mandatory provisions of section 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act was held not to be a nullity on the ground that the judgment-debtor for whose benefit the said provisions were enacted did not object to the non-compliance of the same although notice of the proclamation for sale was served upon him. The judgment-debtor was deemed to have waived his rights under section 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case observed as follows: -7. Even then, the question arises whether an act done in breach of the mandatory provision is per force a nullity. In Ashutosh Sikdar v. Beharilal Kirtania, AIR 35 Cal 61 at p. 72, Mookerjee, J. , after referring to Macnamara on 'nullity and Irregularities', observed:. . . . no hard and fast line can be drawn between a nullity and an irregularity, but this much is clear that an irregularity is a deviation from a rule of law which does not take away the foundation or authority for the proceeding or apply to its whole operation, whereas a nullity is a proceeding that is taken without any foundation for it or is so essentially defective as to be of no avail or effect whatever or is void and incapable of being validated. Whether a provision falls under one category or the other is not easy of discernment, but in the ultimate analysis it depends upon the nature, scope and object of a particular provision. Whether a provision falls under one category or the other is not easy of discernment, but in the ultimate analysis it depends upon the nature, scope and object of a particular provision. A workable test has been laid down by Justice Coleridge in Holmes v. Russel (1841) 9 Dowl 487, which reads: it is difficult sometimes to distinguish between an irregularity and a nullity; but the safest rule to determine what is an irregularity and what is a nullity is to see whether the party can waive the objection; if he can waive it, it amounts to an irregularity; if he cannot, it is a nullity. A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, but obviously an objection to jurisdiction cannot be waived, for consent cannot give a Court Court jurisdiction where there is none. Even if there is inherent jurisdiction, certain provisions cannot be waived. Maxwell in his book on the Interpretation of Statutes' 11th edn. , at page375, describes the rule thus: another maxim which sanctions the non-observance of a statutory provision is that cuilibet licet renuntiare juri pro se introducto. Every has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law of rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy. The same rule is stated in Craies on Statute Law, 6th edn, at page 269, thus: as a general rule, the conditions imposed by statutes which authorize legal proceedings are treated as being indispensable to giving the Court jurisdiction. But if it appears that the statutory conditions were inserted by the Legislature simply for the security or benefit of the parties to the action themselves, and that no public interests are involved, such conditions will not be considered as indispensable, and either party may waive them without affecting the jurisdiction of the Court. The Judicial Committee in (6) Al. Ar. Vellayam Chettiar v. Government of Madras, 74 Ind App 223 at p. 228 : AIR 1947 PC 197 at p. 199 pointed out that there was no inconsistency between the propositions that the provisions of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure were mandatory and must be enforced by the Court and that they might be waived by the authority for whose benefit they were provided. In that case the Judicial Committee held that section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was explicit and mandatory; but still it held that it could be waived by the authority for whose benefit that was provided. This aspect of the law in the context of section 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act was considered by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Gaya Prasad v. Dhanrupmal Bhandari, 58 Cal WN 503 at page 508 : A. I. R. 1954 Cal 492 at page 494. , Dealing with this argument, P. N. Mookerjee, J. , speaking for the Court, observed: it is true that section 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act casts a duty upon the Court but such delay is soley for the benefit - the private benefit - of the judgment-debtor. It is, therefore, open him to waive this benefit or, in other words, to waive his objection of non-observance of that statutory provision by the Court????? guha and Banerjee, JJ. expressed to the same effect in 64 Cal WN 20 : AIR 1960 Cal 138 thus at p. 30 of Cal WN (at p. 142 of AIR): the Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940, enacted for the purpose of making better provision for the control of money lenders and for the regulation and control of money lending, has certainly a public policy behind it. But some of its provisions, and section 35 one of them, are intended for the benefit of the individual judgment-debtors and have no public policy behind them. Such provisions may be waived by the person for whose benefit the same were enacted. A Division Bench of Patna High Court in Sheo Dayal narain v. Mst. Moti Kuer, ILR 21 pat 281 at page 286 :a. I. R. 1942 Pat 238 at p. 240 speaking through Meredith, J. in the context of the provisions of section 13 of the Bihar Money Lenders (Regulation of Transactions) act, 1939, which are pari materia with the provisions of section 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940, rejected the contention that a sale held in contravention thereof was a nullity in the following words: illegal the sale may have been in the limited sense that it was held in a manner at variance with a mandatory statutory provision. That provision, however, has no reference at all to the jurisdiction of the Court. That provision, however, has no reference at all to the jurisdiction of the Court. It affords no foundation for the contention that the sale was one, which the Court concerned had no power at all to hold. ( 26 ) IN Vellayan Chettiar v. Government of India of Madras, 74 I A 223 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council considered the mandatory provisions of the statutory enactment in section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure which forbids in imperative terms the institution or filing of suits against the Government or Public Officer without waiving notice under the said section. Nevertheless, in considering the said mandatory provision of the said section, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed as follows: -. . . . . There appears to their Lordships to be no reason why the notice required to be given under section 88 should not be waived in the authority concerned thinks fit to waive it. It is for his protection that notice is required, if in the particular case he does not require that protection and says so, he can lawfully waive his right. ( 27 ) IN the case of (7) Surajmull Nagoremull v. Triton Insurance Co. Ltd. 52 IA 126 it was also held that statutory provisions enacted for benefit of particular individuals could be waived by such individuals. ( 28 ) IN the instant case, we of the opinion that para. 10 (a) of the Blue Order was enacted for the purpose of protection and benefit of a class of employees of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, namely, the field officers. The said provision had or has nothing to do with public benefit or public policy or public interest. Thus, in our opinion, apart from any other consideration, the provisions of para. 10 (a) of the Blue Order could and can be waived by field officers for whose benefit and protection the same was enacted. ( 29 ) IT is settled law that a nullity or illegality cannot be waived. Because nullity is really non establishment in the eye of law and there is nothing to waive. Mr. Roy contends that the said order termination made in contravention of the statutory provisions contend in para. ( 29 ) IT is settled law that a nullity or illegality cannot be waived. Because nullity is really non establishment in the eye of law and there is nothing to waive. Mr. Roy contends that the said order termination made in contravention of the statutory provisions contend in para. 10 (a) of the Blue Order was null and void because the statutory authority, namely the Life Insurance Corporation of India could terminate the employment only in accordance with the powers conferred upon it by the statute itself. In support of his contention Mr. Roy cited several decisions to which we shall presently advert. ( 30 ) OF the decisions cited by Mr. Roy the cases of (8) State of Bombay v. Gajanand Mahadev, AIR. 1954, Bom. 3541; (9) Union of India v. Someshwar Banerjee AIR 1954 Cal 399 ; (10) Motiram v. N. E. F. Railway AIR 1964 S C 600 and (11) I. M. Lal v. Governor-General in Council 75 I. A. 225 are all cases of wrongful dismissal of Civil Servants under the Government in violation of the provisions of section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, or Article 311 of the Constitution of India. In none of the said cases question of waiver was involved. The said cases, being dismissal of Government employees, in our opinion, also stand on a separate footing as has been said by the Supreme Court more than once. ( 31 ) THE case of (12) Albion Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Jute and Gunny Brokers Ltd. , A. I. R. 1953 Cal 458 decided that an Arbitrator whose lack of jurisdiction was total and absolute could not acquire jurisdiction over the subject-matter by mere conduct of a party in participating in the reference without any protest; the entire proceedings before the Arbitrator for inherent lack of jurisdiction would be null and void and the award made and published by the Arbitrator would also be null and void and could not have been validated by participation of the parties in the reference. ( 32 ) MR. Roy then contended that there was no occasion for this Court to go into the question whether the dismissal of the appellant was valid or not because such dismissal has already been struck down by the Supreme Court as invalid in Sunil Mukherjee's case mentioned above. ( 32 ) MR. Roy then contended that there was no occasion for this Court to go into the question whether the dismissal of the appellant was valid or not because such dismissal has already been struck down by the Supreme Court as invalid in Sunil Mukherjee's case mentioned above. The Supreme Court again in the case of (13) U. P. S. W. Corporation v. C. K. Tyagi, AIR 1970 SC 1245 in explaining the decision in Sunil Mukherjee's case distinguished the same from the facts in the said case before them and observed that the orders of dismissal in Sunil Mukherjee's case were nullities. Therefore, according to Mr. Roy, the said observation of the Supreme Court in Sunil Mukherjee's case as well as in U. P. S. W. Corporation's case are binding on this Court and this Court has to hold that the order of termination in the instant case was also nullity and, therefore, there cannot be any question of waiving the same. It is true that in Sunil Mukherjee's case the Supreme Court held that the impugned order of termination of service was invalid. It is further true that the order was explained in U. P. S. W. Corporation's case to be nullity. Mr. Roy showed us from Chamber's 20th Century Dictionary as well as Shorter Oxford Dictionary that the terms invalid, null and void ab initio are synonymous. Therefore, no question of waiving the said order could or can arise. In (14) Danish Marcantile Co. Ltd. and ors. v. Beaumont and Anr. , (1951) 1 All ER 925 it was held that an action which had been commenced by a Solicitor in the name of a company without having authority to do so could be ratified or adopted subsequently by the client and was not a nullity in the strict or technical sense of the term although Blackburn, J. , in (15) Reynolds v. Howell, LR 8 QB 399 and Atkin, J. J. in (16) Adams v. London Improved Motor Coach Builders Ltd. , (1921) 1 KB 503 used the word nullity with regard to such actions. It appears, therefore, to us that the expression nullity may be used in more than one sense. It may be used to mean void, it may also be used to mean an act which is voidable. It appears, therefore, to us that the expression nullity may be used in more than one sense. It may be used to mean void, it may also be used to mean an act which is voidable. It should be noted further that in Sunil Mukherjee's case the petitioner in filing the writ petition avoided the order of termination and, therefore, the order certainly became void on such avoidance. No question of waiver was involved in the matter as noted earlier. The case of (17) Ram Babu Rathore v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, AIR 1961 All 502 was a case of violation of staff regulations framed under section 49 of the Act only. There was no question of violation of any statutory rule or order like the Blue Order in the said case. The case of (18) S. R. Tiwari v. District Board, Agra, AIR 1964 SC 1680 approved of the said decision in Ram Babu Rathor's case. In view of the fact that the word nullity may be used in more senses than one and also in view of the fact that no question of wiaver was involved in the aforesaid case of Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. v. Sunil Mukherjee and Ors. (supra) we are of the opinion that the word void or invalid used in the said Sunil Mukherjee's case or the word nullity used with regard to the order of termination in Sunil Mukherjee's case by the Supreme Court in U. P. S. W. Corporation's case (supra) do not lead to the irresistible conclusion that the order of termination was a nullity in the absolute or technical sense of the term. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the said order of termination in violation of the mandatory provisions of para. 10 (a) of the Blue Order could be waived by the appellant for whose benefit the same was enacted. ( 33 ) THE next question that arises for our consideration is whether the appellant in the instant case did in fact waive the said non-compliance with the provisions of para. 10 (a) of the Blue Order. The evidence on record shows that the appellant, in any event, after the termination of his service by the letter dated October 16, 1958, knew of the contents or the provisions of the Blue Order (see Qs. 178-182and 191 ). 10 (a) of the Blue Order. The evidence on record shows that the appellant, in any event, after the termination of his service by the letter dated October 16, 1958, knew of the contents or the provisions of the Blue Order (see Qs. 178-182and 191 ). As a matter of fact, the Blue Order is mentioned in the letter written by the respondent to the appellant requiring the appellant to work as a field officer in terms of the Blue Order. The said letter has already been set out earlier in the judgment. Having been aware of the contents of the Blue Order the appellant must have come to know on the receipt of the letter of the letter of termination dated October 16, 1958, that the said termination was not in compliance with the provisions of para. 10 (a) of the Blue Order. On October 29, 1958, the appellant received one month's emoluments in lieu of notice in full and final settlement of 'termination of service' and granted the receipt dated October 29, 1958. The said receipt is set out hereunder from page 207 of the Paper Book: -suit No. 1842 of 1964 dated 11th March, 1969 ext. 1 receipt dated 29th October, 1958, for Rs. 509. 36 granted by the plaintiff. Received from Life Insurance Corporation of India, City Branch Unit No. 10, the sum of Rs. 509. 36 (Rupees Five hundred nine and naya paise thirty-six) only being the net amount due to me towards one month's emoluments in lieu of notice for one month in full and final settlement on termination of service. India Revenue Stamp field Officer, Code No. 1035 worth 10p. D. Mukherjee. ( 34 ) FOUR months and a few days after the receipt of the said money against the said receipt the appellant received a sum of Rs. 1,010. 71 as the amount standing to his credit in the books on account of the Provident Fund in satisfaction of all his claims on the said fund. The said money was received in full and final settlement of the Provident Fund account of the appellant. Provident Fund money could be paid and received only on the basis that the services of the appellant had been terminated (see Qs. 83-93 at pages 35-36 of the Paper Book and also Q, 64 of Dwijendra Nath Das at page 89 of the Paper Book ). Provident Fund money could be paid and received only on the basis that the services of the appellant had been terminated (see Qs. 83-93 at pages 35-36 of the Paper Book and also Q, 64 of Dwijendra Nath Das at page 89 of the Paper Book ). It is true, as contended by Mr. Roy, that waiver on the basis of receipt of Provident Fund money and the granting receipt therefore was neither pleaded in the written statement nor made an issue at the trial. Mr. Roy submitted that on the aforesaid ground the Court should not take any notice of the said receipt for the Provident Fund money. Notwithstanding the aforesaid objections of Mr. Roy now before us at the appellate stage, it must be noted that the evidence with regard to the receipt of the Provident Fund and the grant of receipt therefore was allowed to be led at the trial without any objection on behalf of the appellant. The said point was also the subject-matter of submissions on behalf of both the parties before the learned Judge. The learned Judge has considered the said evidence. In the grounds of appeal no specific grounds have been taken challenging the learned Judge's admitting the said evidence or acting thereupon. In that view of the mater, we are of the opinion that it would be unjust now if we do not take the said question into our consideration in the appeal. The receipt of the said moneys on the basis of termination of employment in full and final settlement of such termination seem to us to have amounted to waiver of all rights of the appellant that flowed from the termination of his employment in violation of the provisions of Clause 10 (a) of the Blue Order. Waiver is nothing but relinquishment of a known right. ( 35 ) IN the instant case, it is clear from the evidence on record that the appellant who was aware of his rights under para. 10 (a) of the Blue Order did not insist on the same, in fact waived and abandoned the same. Mr. Roy's contention that the receipt of salary in lieu of notice could not be a waiver of right to be heard which would have preceded the termination cannot be accepted. This wrongful termination in violation of the right can be waived subsequently. Mr. Roy's contention that the receipt of salary in lieu of notice could not be a waiver of right to be heard which would have preceded the termination cannot be accepted. This wrongful termination in violation of the right can be waived subsequently. We are of the opinion that the appellant waived such right subsequent to the termination. Thus the case in (19) Mangilal v. Sugan Chand Rathi, reported in AIR 1965 SC 101 in our opinion, does not assist Mr. Roy. The case of (20) Promode Ranjan Roy v. Life Insurance Corporation, AIR 1961 Cal 108 also does not support Roy as the said case turned on violation of staff regulation which had no statutory force or effect. In that case the relationship between the parties was entirely contractual. In (21) Chunilal Ghatak v. Life Insurance Corporation of India in C. R. No. 3212 of 1962, unreported the receipt of one month's emoluments in lieu of notice was held to be a waiver of the right of the employee. We must note, however, that in the said case the question of non-compliance of the statutory right under para. 10 (a) of the Blue Order or waiver of such statutory right was neither urged nor considered by the learned Judge. The cases of (22) Lal Kapurchand Godha v. Nawab Himay Ali Khan Azamjah, AIR 1963 SC 250 and (23) Mademsetti Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao, AIR 1965 SC 1405 on sections 62 and 63 of the Contract Act are irrelevant for the purpose of this appeal. Similarly, in (24) Basheshwar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, Rajasthan and Anr. , AIR 1959 SC 149 (175) with regard to waiver of fundamental right is, in our opinion, of no assistance to us in deciding the instant appeal. ( 36 ) SECTION 33 of the Tramways Act, 1870, of England provided for arbitration to resolve the difference contemplated by the section and ousted the jurisdiction of the High Court. The Corporation of Norwich instituted an action against the Tramway Company for the recovery of expenses incurred by the Corporation in doing certain repairs to roads on which the tramways belonging to the Tramway Company were laid by virtue of a right conferred upon the Corporation by the Norwich Electric Tramways Act, 1897. The Corporation of Norwich instituted an action against the Tramway Company for the recovery of expenses incurred by the Corporation in doing certain repairs to roads on which the tramways belonging to the Tramway Company were laid by virtue of a right conferred upon the Corporation by the Norwich Electric Tramways Act, 1897. The objection to the jurisdiction of the High Court was not taken either in the statement of defence or at the trial. In the appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court the Tramway Company took objection to the jurisdiction the High Court. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that the objection to the jurisdiction not having been taken either in the defence filed or at the trial, the appellant was precluded from urging the said point and the appellant must be deemed to have waived the said plea. It was held that the Tramways Act, 1870, was a public general Act applying to all the tramways in the Kingdom. It was not open to a party to a litigation to waive such a provision which had been introduced into the Act for the benefit of the public in general and, therefore, of nobody can waive them. Thus the decision in the said case of (25) Norwich Corporation v. Norwich Electric Tramways Co. , (1906) 2 KB 119 was based upon the fact that the benefit conferred by the said section 33 of the said Act was upon the public in general and no one person could waive the said benefit. It was further held that the said section did not give an option to choose the forum to the parties. It definitely ousted the jurisdiction of the High Court and the High Court lacked jurisdiction totally and absolutely. Thus the said decision, in our opinion, is of no assistance to Mr. Roy. ( 37 ) IN (26) Day v. Davies, (1939) 2 KB 74 a bailiff, who had not gone into actual possession in execution of a distress warrant but only visited the premises for a few minutes on each of the five days had charged the amount specified in and authorized by the Distress for Rent Rules 1920, Append. II, Scale II (2), which was also agreed to be paid by the owner of the goods and chattels upon which the distress warrant was to be levied. II, Scale II (2), which was also agreed to be paid by the owner of the goods and chattels upon which the distress warrant was to be levied. In a subsequent action by the owners of the goods and chattels for refund of all sums paid by him as the bailiff was never in actual possession and thus he was not entitled to any charge whatsoever by the Distress for Rent Rules, 1920, Append. II, Scale II (2), it was held that the bailiff had no power or authority to charge as he had done because he had never been actually in possession. The statutory rules absolutely prohibited such charges being made. Therefore, the special agreement to pay a charge for 'walking possession' could not take the case out of statutory rules nor could the said rules be waived by the parties or be the subject of a contract. The statutory rules prohibited absolutely the charge of any fees or costs without being in actual possession. Such absolute prohibition being made in public interest could not be waived as was held by the Court of Appeal. This case also, therefore, does not assist Mr. Roy. ( 38 ) IN (27) The Netherseal Colliery Co. Ltd. v. Bourne and Ors. , (1889) 14 AC 228 decided that where the statute lays down the formula in which the wages of the miners have to be ascertained by taking into consideration the amount of minerals 'gotten by them'. Such wages must be ascertained in accordance with the said formula. Any contract between the parties which militate against any part of the said statutory rules laid down in the statute itself in order to ascertain the quantum of wages must be struck down. It was held that it would be illegal to waive the provisions section 17 of the Coal Mines Regulations Act, 1872, because the last part of the section provided for penal consequences for contravention of the statutory provision. This case also, therefore, does not assist Mr. Roy. ( 39 ) IN (28) re South Eastern Railway Company and Wiffin's Contractor, (1907) 2 Ch. This case also, therefore, does not assist Mr. Roy. ( 39 ) IN (28) re South Eastern Railway Company and Wiffin's Contractor, (1907) 2 Ch. 366 it was held that a Railway Company which was authorized by a special Act to acquire land for the purpose of enlarging their stations and other purposes connected with their undertaking under an agreement covenanted to use the land so acquired for a passenger station and for no other purpose. This restrictive covenant was held to be ultra vires the Railway Company and was not binding upon it. It could, therefore, sell the said land free from the restrictions contained in the said covenant. The ratio in the said case, in our opinion, does not apply to the facts of the instant case. ( 40 ) IN (29) Benett Colman v. P. P. Das Gupta, AIR 1970 SC 427 waiver was negatived because the receipt which was given was for gratuity only. Even then the cheque received on account of gratuity was not encashed by the employee. On the same day, the employee wrote a letter to the company pointing out that the said receipt was only for the arrears of salary, allowances and gratuity. It was held on evidence that the receipt was given on compulsion since the resignation of the employee would not have been accepted but for the receipt. The employee there had already joined another employer's service and so had to obtain a discharge from Benett Colman. ( 41 ) IN the instant case, from the evidence it is clear that there was no compulsion on the part of the appellant either to receive one month's salary or Provident Fund money or to grant receipt therefore in complete discharge of all his rights flowing from the termination. The case of (30) Kiran Singh and Ors. v. Chaman Paswan and Ors. , AIR 1954 Supreme Court 340 cited by Mr. Roy was a case of total and absolute lack of jurisdiction which could not be conferred on the Court by consent in the case of (31) Laduram Hajarimal v. Ramrao Jankiram Kadam and Anr. , AIR 1950 Bom 195 was a case where public also was involved and thus there could not be waiver of statutory provisions. Mr. Roy's contention that if the non-compliance of the statutory provision contained in para. , AIR 1950 Bom 195 was a case where public also was involved and thus there could not be waiver of statutory provisions. Mr. Roy's contention that if the non-compliance of the statutory provision contained in para. 10 (a) of the Blue Order held to be capable of being waived that would enable parties to do something forbidden by law and thus would be contrary to the provisions of section 23 of the Contract Act and would be illegal. We are unable to accept the said contention of Mr. Roy for the simple reason that the act forbidden by para. (10) (a) is not visited with any penal consequences and so is not such an act which though forbidden cannot be waived. In view of the aforesaid conclusion it is not necessary for under Section to deal in details with other cases cited by Mr. Roy, viz. , (32) Mukul Dutta Gupta and Ors. v. Indian Airlines Corporation, AIR 1962 Cal 311 ; (33) Lakshmi Chand v. Niader Mal, AIR 1961 All 295 : (34) Gulab Chand Gambhirmal v. Kudilal Govindram and Anr. , AIR 1959 MP 151 and (35) Midnapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. V. Kumar Chandra Singh Dudhuria and Ors. , AIR 194 Cal 544. ( 42 ) MR. Roy lastly contended that in the case of Sunil Mukherjee (supra) the Court directed issue of Writs of Certiorari which could or can be issued only in case where the orders are passed without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural justice. We are of the view that only these three instances where orders for the issue of Writ of Certiorari may be made by Courts were enumerated by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. There may also be other instances, as for example where the order is erroneous on the face of itself where Writs of Certiorari would issue. ( 43 ) IN the instant case, we are not concerned with the question of limitation since, in any event, if we were with the appellant on the aforesaid questions in this appeal, the appellant would have been entitled to arrears of salary for three years next proceeding the date of institution of the suit. We, however, in view of our decision above, are not called upon to decide the said question in this appeal. We, however, in view of our decision above, are not called upon to decide the said question in this appeal. Similarly, we are not called upon, in our view, to decide the question whether the appellant, an employee, on a declaration of the continuity of his service should be granted all arrears of salary upto the date of the decree as and by way of consequential relief as was decided in (36) Ramanugrah Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors. , AIR 1966 Pat 97 . We do not decide the said question in this appeal. ( 44 ) FOR all the aforesaid reasons we are of the opinion that this appeal must fail and is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of this case we direct that each party shall pay and bear his or its costs of this appeal. ( 45 ) IN this case the appellant's service was terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation without complying with the procedure laid down in Clause 10 (a) of the Order, dated December 30, 1957, which has been described as the 'blue Order' by my Lord in his judgment. Clause 10 (a) of the Order enjoins that an opportunity should be given for showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to a field office whose service is sought to be terminated on account of unsatisfactory performance of duties or negligence in his work or misconduct. If further enjoins that the service of the filed office in question is to be determined only after conducting such enquiry as the Corporation thinks fit. ( 46 ) NON-COMPLIANCE with the relevant provisions of the Order without anything more would have certainly made the order of termination of service invalid. The procedure prescribed in Clause 10 (a) exists for the benefit of the field officers. If a field officer chooses to accept the order of termination without demur, acts upon it with the knowledge of the relevant provisions of the Order and the fact that those provisions have not been complied with, he cannot be heard to complain subsequently of such non-compliance, nor can he challenge the order of termination of service. He has acquiesced in and waived his objection to non-compliance with the relevant provisions which exist solely for his benefit. He has acquiesced in and waived his objection to non-compliance with the relevant provisions which exist solely for his benefit. Here the appellant has acquiesced in and waived his objection to the termination of service in spite of non-compliance with the provisions of Clause 10 (a) of the 'blue Order' by acceptance of a month's salary in lieu of notice and by his acceptance of the Provident Fund money, which are only consistent with his final discharge from the employ of the Life Insurance Corporation. No clearer case of acquiescence or waiver by conduct can be imagined. ( 47 ) A statutory provision which exists for the benefit of a class can be waived by those for whose benefit it exists provided the waiver does not result in an illegality or does not run counter to public policy. A classic illustration of this principle is provided by the case of Al. Ar. Vellayan Chettiar v. Government of Madras (supra) where it was said that there is no inconsistency between the principles that the provisions of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure are mandatory and must be enforced by the Court and that they may be waived by the authority for whose benefit they are provided. It was held in accordance with those principles that a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure could be properly waived. The language of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is of a prohibitory nature. The section is also mandatory as the Judicial Committee has held. It exists for the benefit of the State and for all Public Officers in general. ( 48 ) IF the State or Public Officer can waive the requirements of a statutory provision, which is prohibitory and mandatory, I do not se any reason why in the present case the appellant cannot in law waive his objection to non-compliance with the provision of Clause 10 (a) of the Blue Order. Having regard to my finding that non-compliance with Clause 10 (a) of the Blue Order may be waived and has been waived in the present case. I agree with the judgment delivered by my Lord and I concur with the order he has made. Appeal dismissed.