JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - These are two writ applications under Article 227 of the Constitution directed against the appellate decision under the Orissa House Rent Control Act. The Petitioner in both the writ applications is the landlord and opposite party is the tenant. 2. On 19.11.1963 the Petitioner made an application to the House Rent Controller for fixation of fair rent in respect of a holding located in front of the Ravenshaw College, Cuttack, where the opposite party-1, as a tenant, runs a hotel known as South Indian Hotel. The tenancy began in 1940 and the monthly rectal payable then was Rs. 60/From time to time the rent was being enhanced and by 1957 the rent was fixed amicably at Rs. 230/- a month. Sometime in 1962 municipal taxes were raised and a notice was issued by the Petitioner to opp. party-1 calling upon him to pay the enhanced rent, which according to the landlord Petitioner was Rs. 310/- a month. The tenant resisted the attempt of the landlord. Therefore, on 19.11.1963 the application for fair rent was filed. 3. Evidence was led before the Controller by both the sides. There was also a local inspection. The Controller determined the fair rent at Rs. 600/-. There were two appeals before the learned Additional District Magistrate-one by the landlord who wanted the rate to be further enhanced and the other by the tenant who was aggrieved by the fixation of the fair rent at Rs. 600/-. Both the appeals were beard together and the learned appellate authority in a common judgment dated 11.5.1968 dismissed the appeal of The landlord and allowed the appeal of the tenant. He reduced the fair rent to Rs. 310/- a month. Against the aforesaid common decision of the learned Additional District Magistrate, these two writ applications have been filed. 4. Mr. Mohanty, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, contends that the appellate decision of the learned Additional District Magistrate is vitiated inasmuch as he had taken into consideration materials extraneous to the record; he has disregarded the legal provisions applicable to the facts of the case and was refused to apply the same and he has disposed of the matter in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 5. It is not disputed that the jurisdiction which this Court would exercise in a certiorari proceeding is not appellate. 5. It is not disputed that the jurisdiction which this Court would exercise in a certiorari proceeding is not appellate. It has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan 1964 S.C.D. (Notes 24) 22. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals ; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as, a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the disputes is opposed to principles of natural Justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to Act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ but not an error off Act, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence which his influenced the impugned finding. Similarly if a finding of fact is based on evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. x x x x x x x x x xx x x. The legal position is restated recently by their lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Parry and Co. Ltd. Vs. x x x x x x x x x xx x x. The legal position is restated recently by their lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Parry and Co. Ltd. Vs. P.C. Pal and Others thus: A mere wrong decision cannot be corrected by a writ of certiorari as that would be using it as the clock of an appeal in disguise, but a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings based on it clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law or absence of or excess of jurisdiction, when shown, can be so corrected. Where the Tribunal having jurisdiction to decide a question comes to a finding of fact, such a finding is not open to question under Article 226 unless it could be shown to be wholly unwarranted by the evidence. Where the Tribunal has disabled itself from reaching fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or where its conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person can ever have arrived at that conclusion interference under Article 226 would be justified. 6. Keeping this as the legal position with reference to the present proceeding, we would now proceed to examine the contentions raised by Mr. Mohanty, with reference to the appellate decision Mr. Mohanty contended that the learned Additional District Magistrate was wrong when he said in paragraph 14 of his judgment: The fair rent of a house cannot be fixed with reference to rent, prevailing in the locality". Fair-rent has been defined in Section 2, Sub-section (2) of the Act as "Fair-rent" means rent reasonable having regard to the situation, locality, condition of the premises, amenities provided therein and the rental value fixed by the local authority, if any. Mr. Mohanty states that the words "situation" and "locality" used by the Legislature in the definition, are obviously with a view to take into account the circumstances existing in the locality. Mr. Rath, on the other hand, contends that the reference to the rent prevailing in the locality is not to be taken into account. He relies upon the provisions of Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act (Act XI) of 1951, which was the preceding statute. Mr. Rath, on the other hand, contends that the reference to the rent prevailing in the locality is not to be taken into account. He relies upon the provisions of Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act (Act XI) of 1951, which was the preceding statute. Section 7(i) provided that in fixing the fair rent, regard should be had to the prevailing rates of rent in the locality for the same or similar accommodation in similar circumstances during the year 1942. This was apparently with a view to put the rate of rent as prevailing in 1942 as a guide line in the definition of the word "fair-rent" under the 1958 Act, the words 'situation' and 'locality' were obviously introduced for the purpose of introducing into the concept of fair-rent the prevailing circumstances in the locality. Rent prevailing in the locality for similar accommodation is certainly a proper guide line for fixing the fair rent for a particular house. The observation of the learned appellate authority is not correct. 7. The learned Additional District Magistrate came to a finding that the prevailing rate of rent from 1958 was Rs. 230/-. He calculated the additional liability which the tenant was called upon to shoulder on account of enhanced municipal assessment and increase in expenses for repairs to be Rs. 526 plus Rs. 435/- and found that the rent was enhanced by Rs. 80/- per month. He accordingly fixed the fair rent at Rs. 310/- Mr. Mohanty challenges this mode and contends that the appellate authority omitted to consider material evidence on record and adopted this wrong formula to fix the fair rent,. We were invited to go into the evidence which has been produced before us. Mr. Rath objected that the evidence should not be appraised by us and we should not scrutinise the evidence to find out whether the conclusion arrived at is correct. We might have acceded to the request of Mr. Mohanty to peruse the evidence with a view to finding out whether there was any force in his contentions if we were not confronted with Ex. A, a letter addressed to the tenant by the landlord before the initiation of the proceeding before the Controller for fiction of fair rent. In Ex. A dated 8.7.1963, the landlord had called upon the tenant to pay rent at Rs. 310/- per month. A, a letter addressed to the tenant by the landlord before the initiation of the proceeding before the Controller for fiction of fair rent. In Ex. A dated 8.7.1963, the landlord had called upon the tenant to pay rent at Rs. 310/- per month. The relevant portion of that letter runs thus: 1 invite your kind attention to my letter of 24-8-1962, regarding increase in the house rent as a result of the revision of the assessment of the" rental value and impositions of new light taxes and water taxes with effect from 1-4-1962 by Cuttack Municipality. Since the appeal in respect of the holding has bee heard and no reduction has been given in the appeal, you will have to pay the rent for shops you are occupying at the enhanced rate of Rs. 310/- per month which includes Rs. 15/- towards light tax and water tap from the month of April, 1962. The difference in the rent since April, 1962 on account of the increased rent which is due from you may please be paid within 15 days of the receipt of this notice failing which 1 will take suitable steps in the matter. Also plea Be note that hereafter the rent is to be paid at Rs. 310/- per month. It is reasonable to presume on the basis of Ex. A that "the landlord was satisfied in July, 1963 that the tenant should pay fair rent of Rs. 310/- per month. It would be not improper on our part to presume that the landlord took all factors into account when he made the above demand of rent. There can be no "better evidence than what is contained in Ex, A. We understand that there is a fresh proceeding for fixation of fair rent in 1970. The Controller would certainly fix the fair rent in accordance with law. Therefore our non-interference with the impugned appellate decision dose not affect the Petitioner. If any mistake had been committed by the Controller or the appellate authority, it shall be open to the Controller now to remedy the fame in fixing the fair rent in the present proceeding. We would accordingly dismiss the writ application but make no order as to costs. B.C. Das, J. 8. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed