JUDGMENT Shiv Dayal, J. This appeal from the dismissal of his suit has been preferred by the Appellant, who was a Public Prosecutor attached to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Satna, up to June 15, 1964, on which date he was relieved of his cases, when another Public Prosecutor was appointed. The Appellant's claim is that he was a permanent Government servant so that his services could not be terminated except on compliance with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. The Appellant was initially appointed by the erstwhile Nagod State Government as an Assistant Teacher on Rs. 75 per month on probation for one year. The Appellant claims to have been promoted permanently as Head Master on July 9, 1947, on Rs. 110 per month. This was denied by the Defendants and the finding of the trial Court is against the Appellant. As a result of the covenant, the Nagod State merged into the United State of Vindhya Pradesh with effect from May 1, 1948. On August 22, 1948, he was appointed a Munsarim to the Court of the District and Sessions Judge on Rs. 150 per month, subject to confirmation by the High Court. It is the Appellant's claim that on August 25, 1948, he was confirmed by the High Court, but there is no such order on the record, nor could any such order be traced out to have ever been passed. It has, therefore, been so held. By order dated December 13, 1948, passed by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Vindhya Pradesh, Rewa, the services of the Appellant were transferred to that High Court. On April 5, 1949, the Appellant was appointed a Public Prosecutor attached to the Sessions Court on a salary of Rs. 110 per month (Ex. P-36). On December 26, 1948, a second agreement was entered into between the Governor General of India and the rulers of the States forming the United State of Vindhya Pradesh. The Central Government authorised the Chief Commissioner to appoint such Judge, Magistrates and other officers as may be necessary for the administration of Vindhya Pradesh, and further directed that until then the officers then exercising lawful functions would continue to exercise their respective functions (Ex. P-5). On January 1, 1950, a Chief Commissioner was appointed. The Central Government authorised the Chief Commissioner to appoint such Judge, Magistrates and other officers as may be necessary for the administration of Vindhya Pradesh, and further directed that until then the officers then exercising lawful functions would continue to exercise their respective functions (Ex. P-5). On January 1, 1950, a Chief Commissioner was appointed. On January 26, 1950, the Vindhya Pradesh became a Part C State under the Constitution and the Governments of Part C States Act, 1951, was enacted under Article 239 of the Constitution. A Lieutenant Governor was appointed in place of the Chief Commissioner and a Judicial Commissioner was also appointed. It is common ground that the Appellant continued to function as a Public Prosecutor attached to the Court of the Sessions Judge on a monthly salary of Rs. 110. By the Lieutenant Governor's order dated May 28, 1953 (Ex- P-11), the payment of remuneration to Public Prosecutor engaged for criminal work, with effect from May 1, 1953, was regulated according to the following scale: For 1st day in a case ... ... Rs. 15. For subsequent hearing in one or more cases ... ... Rs. 12. These were the "rates of fees" for full day's work, irrespective of the number of cases conducted during the day. It was further directed in this order: For civil work, which the public prosecutors may be required to do for Government, they shall be paid legal fees in accordance with the Vindhya Pradesh Legal Practitioner's Rules, 1951. It is again common ground that the Appellant continued to work as Public Prosecutor on payment of the above fees. By order of the Lieutenant Governor dated March 18, 1954,(Ex. P-7), the Appellant was appointed Public Prosecutor for Satna District on the terms and conditions hereinafter stated: For a term of three years. He will be paid remuneration as notified in Judicial Department order No. 76 dated the 28th May 1953, viz. Rs. 15 for first day in a case and Rs. 12 for each day of subsequent hearing in one or more cases. He will have the privilege of civil and revenue practice in cases in which Government is not a party. It is again an admitted position that the Appellant continued to function as Public Prosecutor by virtue of that order and on the same terms and conditions. By virtue of a subsequent order dated April 1, 1957, (Ex. He will have the privilege of civil and revenue practice in cases in which Government is not a party. It is again an admitted position that the Appellant continued to function as Public Prosecutor by virtue of that order and on the same terms and conditions. By virtue of a subsequent order dated April 1, 1957, (Ex. P-9) of the M. P. Government, the Appellant's term was extended "on the existing terms and conditions for a further period from the 18th March up to the 31st August 1957, or till his successor is appointed, whichever is earlier". And, by virtue of another order dated September 12, 1957, (Ex. P-13), the terms of the Appellant and three other Public Prosecutors were extended "on the existing terms and conditions with effect from 1-9-57 till further orders". By order dated April 22, 1959, (Ex. P-14), the Government of Madhya Pradesh decided to appoint the Appellant as Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor for a term of twelve months with effect from April 9, 1959. And, by virtue of Law Secretary, Madhya Pradesh, memorandum dated April 26, 1960, (Ex. P-15), the Appellant was "re-appointed" for a further period of three years with effect from April 9, 1960. By letter dated June 10, 1964, (Ex. P-20), the District Magistrate, Satna, informed the Appellant that the State Government had appointed Shri S. D. Mukerji, Advocate, to be the Government Pleader and the Appellant was therefore, asked to send a list of sessions trials in which he was already engaged so that the Government could be requested to issue a notification to keep his appointment alive in respect of the particular cases. The Appellant's grievance is that although the Collector's order did not specifically employ the expression "termination of services", yet, impliedly that was the meaning of the order. The Appellant then brought this suit for the following reliefs: (1) A decree declaring that he was a permanent Government servant and continues to be so and that his removal from permanent service is illegal and that he is entitled to work as Public Prosecutor and Government Pleader, Satna, until transferred to another suitable post. (2) A decree in his favour against the Defendants, State of Madhya Pradesh and the Union of India, jointly and severally, and a sum of Rs. 15,000 as arrears of remuneration from June 15, 1964, to the date of the suit (January 30, 1967). (2) A decree in his favour against the Defendants, State of Madhya Pradesh and the Union of India, jointly and severally, and a sum of Rs. 15,000 as arrears of remuneration from June 15, 1964, to the date of the suit (January 30, 1967). (3) A decree declaring him to be entitled to remuneration at the rate of Rs. 500 or more per month from the date of the suit to the date of reinstatement. The Defendants resisted the suit, inter alia, contending that the Appellant was never confirmed as Head Master; that his appointment was temporary throughout in the Nagod State and in the Vindhya Pradesh a+lso; that he was working as a temporary Munsarim in the Court of the District Judge; that the Plaintiff was a temporary clerk in the High Court of Vindhya Pradesh; and that he was never absorbed as a result of the reorganisation and integration of services in the United State of Vindhya Pradesh. His appointment as Public Prosecutor was of a temporary character. He was never absorbed on integration of services as a result of the reorganisation of the Part C State of Vindhya Pradesh. As a result of the merger of the erstwhile State of Nagod into the United State of Vindhya Pradesh and then the Chief Commissioner's Province of Vindhya Pradesh, the contract of the service of the Plaintiff automatically came to an end. The Plaintiff was allowed to work as a Public Prosecutor and Government Pleader. He was not absorbed in the services of the Part C State because the post of a Public Prosecutor and Government Pleader was not a civil post and the Plaintiff was not a permanent employee holding a permanent post. The appointment of the Plaintiff as a Public Prosecutor was subject to the terms and conditions contained in the notification dated March 18, 1954, which the Plaintiff accepted. The provisions of Sections 115 and 116 of the States Reorganization Act, 1956, were accordingly not applicable. The trial Court held that the Plaintiff was not a permanent Government servant. Although he was absorbed as a clerk in the High Court of Vindhya Pradesh, his appointment as Public Prosecutor was not as a permanent Government servant. In the result the suit was dismissed. It is contended for the Appellant that when he was absorbed as an employee in the High Court (Ex. Although he was absorbed as a clerk in the High Court of Vindhya Pradesh, his appointment as Public Prosecutor was not as a permanent Government servant. In the result the suit was dismissed. It is contended for the Appellant that when he was absorbed as an employee in the High Court (Ex. P-92), he became a permanent servant, irrespective of the nature of his earlier services. It is further contended that his appointment as Public Prosecutor was merely a posting for discharging specific functions. The subsequent order of Lieutenant Governor dated May 28, 1953, (Ex. P-11) merely altered the mode of payment, but not the nature and character of his employment. His appointment "for three years" by order dated March 18, 1954 (Ex. P-7) merely meant that his posting was for the specified period, but it did not alter the nature and character of his employment. No doubt, the word "re-appoint" was used in the order dated April 22, 1959 (Ex. P-14), whereupon, he made successive representations but they were rejected by the M. P. Government, without assigning any reasons and without forwarding them to the Central Government which, in the case of servants of Part C States, was the Supreme Authority. In our opinion, as there is no order on the record to show that the Plaintiff's appointment, at any time, was permanent, the trial Court has rightly decided issue No. 1, against the Appellant holding that there was no evidence of the Plaintiff's permanent appointment as Head Master. There is no order of the High Court on record confirming the Appellant's appointment of Munsarim. The Appellant, in the trial Court called upon the Respondent's counsel to produce the alleged order. An affidavit was filed by the learned Counsel for the Defendants that there was no such order available and he was so intimated by the Registrar of the High Court. Nor is there any other order on record to show that any other appointment of the Appellant was permanent. It is clear law that on the merger or integration of a State with a new State, the contracts of employment between the former State and its employees terminate automatically and that those who opt to serve in the new State or are taken by it, must serve on such terms as the new State may choose to impose. It is clear law that on the merger or integration of a State with a new State, the contracts of employment between the former State and its employees terminate automatically and that those who opt to serve in the new State or are taken by it, must serve on such terms as the new State may choose to impose. (See for instance, Amar Singh v. State of Rajastharn AIR 1958 SC 228 . Article IX of the second covenant dated December 20, 1949, entered into between the Governor General of India and the Rulers of the States forming the United State of Vindhya Pradesh was relied on for the Appellant. That article guaranteed either the continuance in service of the permanent members of the public service of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh, or payment of reasonable compensation, or retirement on proportionate pension. Since the Appellant's appointment was not permanent, Article IX did not apply to him. The Appellant averred in the plaint that in the reorganisation and integration of services by the Government of Vindhya Pradesh, he was absorbed on Rs. 111 per month as an Upper Division Clerk with effect from January 2, 1949, by virtue of an order passed by the then Chief Justice of the Vindhya Pradesh High Court, Rewa. That contention was denied in the written statement. The Appellant produced a copy of the order dated April 12, 1949, (Ex. P-92) passed by the Honourable the Chief Justice of the Vindhya Pradesh High Court in support of his contention. It shows that his name was included as administration clerk in the ministerial staff, which was absorbed in the High Court of Judicature at Rewa, on Rs. 111 in the grade 75-4-115, with effect from January 2, 1949. But there is no order of the Government of Vindhya Pradesh for his absorption. It is remarkable that the order of the Honourable the Chief Justice is dated April 12, 1949. The Appellant had already been appointed a Public Prosecutor by the Government of Vindhya Pradesh (Ex. P-95), and he had taken over his new assignment. Whatever may have been the position of the Appellant earlier than March 18, 1954, his services became contractual on that date, by virtue of the order of that date (Ex. P-7), which we have already reproduced above. He was appointed Public Prosecutor on those terms and conditions. P-95), and he had taken over his new assignment. Whatever may have been the position of the Appellant earlier than March 18, 1954, his services became contractual on that date, by virtue of the order of that date (Ex. P-7), which we have already reproduced above. He was appointed Public Prosecutor on those terms and conditions. Learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that this appointment was unilateral so that the nature and character of his earlier appointment could not be altered. We are unable to accept this contention. To put it at the highest, the order of the Lieutenant Governor (Ex. P-7) was an offer. The Appellant accepted it by taking up that appointment on those terms and conditions. It, therefore, became a contract. It was open to the Appellant to decline the appointment and insist on continuance in service under the State Government, if he had acquired title to any post. The Appellant found the new contractual post more remunerative, and he took advantage of it. Learned Government Advocate has relied on the evidence of the Treasury Clerk, Kalyanji (P. W. 3), who states that no salary was paid to the Appellant from June 1953 to February 1954, but he was being paid "fees". There are entries in the Treasury Register to that effect. Once the Appellant accepted the contractual appointment for a fixed term, it was open to the Government to reemploy him on the same terms or on fresh terms or not to re-employ him at all, on the expiry of the fixed term. Where a person's services are terminated on the expiry of the term for which he was engaged, there is no question of application of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Further more, in order to attract the provisions of Article 311, it must be shown that the Plaintiff held a civil post. Every employment is not a "post". (See State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra AIR 1967 SC 884 . The test is whether there is relationship of Master and servant between the State and the Plaintiff. In the present case, when the Appellant was appointed a Public Prosecutor, there was mere relationship of a standing counsel and his client. Every employment is not a "post". (See State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra AIR 1967 SC 884 . The test is whether there is relationship of Master and servant between the State and the Plaintiff. In the present case, when the Appellant was appointed a Public Prosecutor, there was mere relationship of a standing counsel and his client. The contract between the parties was entirely a provisional contract and did not involve relationship of master and servant.) This view was also taken in State of Rajasthan v. Madanswarup AIR 1960 Raj 138 . The Appellant has not produced the integration list of any department, either of the State of Madhya Pradesh, or the Part C State of Vindhya Pradesh, which includes his name. This means that he was never absorbed either in the new State of Madhya Pradesh or in the Part C State of Vindhya Pradesh. The only document on which the Appellant relies is the order dated April 12, 1949 (Ex. P-92), passed by the Honourable the Chief Justice of the Vindhya Pradesh High Court, where the Appellant's name is included in the ministerial staff absorbed in that High Court with effect from January 2, 1949. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that he had a lien on his post held, that is, as a clerk in the High Court. Reliance is placed on Fundamental Rules 9(13), 12(a) and 14(a). Therefore, to put it at the highest, the Appellant can claim to have been absorbed in the services of the High Court but it was not his case in the trial Court, nor before us, that he approached the High Court for a suitable posting after he was relieved from the duties of a Public Prosecutor on June 15, 1964. Under Article 229 of the Constitution, the appointment, dismissal and control over the staff of the High Court is of the Chief Justice. The Appellant, having accepted a contractual appointment on March 18, 1954, continued to draw its benefits for about 10 years, or for at least six years, without any murmur. In this view of the matter, Section 116 of the States Reorganisation Act is out of the way. The Appellant, having accepted a contractual appointment on March 18, 1954, continued to draw its benefits for about 10 years, or for at least six years, without any murmur. In this view of the matter, Section 116 of the States Reorganisation Act is out of the way. Above all, the nature of the Plaintiff's appointment was such that even if his contention was accepted and it was held, as claimed by him, that he is entitled to work as a Public Prosecutor and Government Pleader, he gets no substantial relief. His remuneration was on daily basis. To hold that he is entitled to work as a Public Prosecutor will be without benefit to him, if the Government does not ask him to conduct or appear in any case. On the contrary, if the Government desires to give him work in the Sessions Court, no decree is necessary for that purpose. He will then receive his remuneration on daily basis as may be agreed upon. It is not the case of the Appellant that benefits of pension, gratuity or Government contribution to provident fund were available to him; nor does he say that he was required to contribute to the Government Provident Fund. It also follows that since the Appellant has not worked as Public Prosecutor after June 15, 1954, no decree can be passed in his favour for any arrears of remuneration. It is argued for the Appellant that if another Public Prosecutor had not been appointed, he would have worked as Public Prosecutor and would have received that remuneration. In our opinion, that argument cannot be accepted. The Government was not bound to entrust any case to the Appellant and was free to appoint one or more Public Prosecutors and to entrust all cases to them, so that the Appellant would have got nothing. Nothing has been shown to us that the Government could not appoint more than one Public Prosecutor for a district. For the Appellant reliance was placed on P. K. P. Bidi Factory v. O. L. Thenge AIR 1970 SC 823 , but, in our opinion, that ruling is not opposite. Here, there was no lending of the Appellant's services to any third party. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed