JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is directed against an adjudication order made by A. N. Ray J. in insolvency jurisdiction. The petitioning creditor, who is the respondent before us, obtain ed a consent decree against the appellant Dharamchand Dhiman, d. C. Dhiman, and Brothers Private Limited and others in Suit No. 543 of 1. 961. Among the terms of consent decree, clauses (d) and (e) are of relevance to the appeal. They are :- "(d) Premises No. 22 G. T. Road, lilooah, Howrah being the immovable property of the defendant No. 6 shall be charged by way of second charge in favour of the plaintiff for payment of the decretal amount and interest subject to paramount charge of Messrs. Mohta bros. (P) Ltd. (e) The machinery lying at premises no. 22 G. T. Road, Lilooah, Howrah being the properties of defendant No. 6 shall be charged in favour of the plaintiff by way of third charge for payment of the decretal amount and interest subject to the first charge of Messrs. United Bank of India Ltd. and second charge of Hariprokash Mohta " 2. IT may be stated at once that the defendant No. 6 is Steel Equipment and construction Private Ltd. It was contended before us, as it was contended before the learned trial judge, that the petitioning creditor is a secured creditor and, therefore, not having relinquished his security for the benefit of the creditors he is not entitled to an adjudication order having regard to bee. 12 of the Presidency Towns In solvency Act. The term 'secured creditor' is defined in section 2 (g) of the presidency Towns Insolvency Act as follows:- "Secured creditor includes a landlord who under any enactment for the time being in force has a charge on land for the rent of that land. " 3. THE definition, it will be readily seen, does not answer the question who is a secured creditor. A proper definition will be found in Provincial Insolvency Act S. 2 (1) (e ). There 'secured creditor is defined to mean a person holding a mortgage, charge or lien on the property of the debtor, or in part thereof, as a security for a debt due to him from the debtor. The adjudication order was made not under the Provincial insolvency Act but under the Presidency towns Insolvency Act. There 'secured creditor is defined to mean a person holding a mortgage, charge or lien on the property of the debtor, or in part thereof, as a security for a debt due to him from the debtor. The adjudication order was made not under the Provincial insolvency Act but under the Presidency towns Insolvency Act. Nevertheless, as was held in (3) Krishna Chinoo and sons v. Matubfiai Kasanbhai I. L. R. 53 bombay 290 the definition of secured creditor' in the Provincial Insolvency act is also valid for the purposes of the presidency Towns Insolvency Act. 4. HAVING regard to the fact that the security given under the consent decree is in respect of properties which are not the properties of the debtor against whom the adjudication order has been made, it cannot be said that the petitioning creditor is a secured creditor of the insolvent. In that view of the matter, section 12 of the Presidency towns Insolvency Act appears to have no application in the facts of this case. It was then contended that the consent decree is nullity because by one of its terms, immoveable property situate outside the original jurisdiction of this court has been charged for payment of the decretal sum. The Court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree. In (4) Kanjit Singh Nahar and Ors. y. Gobardhan chandra, 50 C. W. N. 447 a Division bench presided over by Derbyshire C. J. held that an agreement for compromise of a suit may validly include matters which are not the subject matter of the suit, and a court which has jurisdiction to try the suit, has jurisdiction to pass a decree under Order 23 rule 3 of the civil Procedure Code in accordance with the agreement, so long as the agreement relates to the suit. In that case a suit for money, brought on the Original Side of this Court with leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent was decreed on eco promise. By the decree, a charge was created upon land situate outside the origional jurisdiction of the Court and power was given to the decree holder to enforce the charge in execution by sale without recourse to a fresh suit 5. IN the present case, the suit was filed with leave under clause 12 of the letters Patent. By the decree, a charge was created upon land situate outside the origional jurisdiction of the Court and power was given to the decree holder to enforce the charge in execution by sale without recourse to a fresh suit 5. IN the present case, the suit was filed with leave under clause 12 of the letters Patent. The terms of the con sent decree which created a charge on immovable properties situate outside the territorial limits of the Original Side are perfectly valid on the authority of the Division Bench judgment to which reference has been made. 6. INCIDENTALLY, in the case of (1)Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P. J. Pappu, A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 634, it was held that, the defect as to the place of suing under sections 15 to 20 of the Civil Procedure Code may be waived and the defendant may be subsequently precluded from taking an objection on the score of jurisdiction. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants relied on the case of (2) In re. Steel Equipment and Construction Pvt. Ltd. (1960) 1 Comp. Law Journal 172, where S. K. Datta J. jkmbted whether the Court has jurisdiction to pass a decree by consent under which a charge is created on immovable properties situate outside its territorial limits. It appears that the attention of the learned judge was not drawn to the decision in (4) Ranjit Slngh Nahar v. Gobardhan chandra Chandra which was binding on him. We are unable to share the doubts expressed by his Lordship. 7. IT was said that a suit has been instituted by Steel Equipment and Construction Co. Ltd. the defendant No. 6, for a declaration that that the consent decree passed on 5th September 1962 in suit No. 543 of 1961 is nullity and is not binding on the parties to the decree. In that suit, an interlocutory order has been made by A. N. Sen J. staying the execution of the decree. By analogy, we are invited to stay the operation of the order under appeal, pending the decision in the suit, even if we do not set aside the order. In view of the division Bench judgment we are unable to do either. In our opinion, there is nothing wrong with the decree. 8. By analogy, we are invited to stay the operation of the order under appeal, pending the decision in the suit, even if we do not set aside the order. In view of the division Bench judgment we are unable to do either. In our opinion, there is nothing wrong with the decree. 8. IT was contended that at the material time, the debtor did not work for gain within the jurisdiction of this court and the Court was therefore, not competent to make the order. The petition was presented on 9th January, 1964. In the petition, jurisdiction is sought to be attracted on the ground that the debtor personally worked for gain at no. 3 Esplanade East, Calcutta at the material time. The debtor in his affidavit states that since 1937 up to the present day he has been residing St No. 115 Benaras Road, Salkia, in Howrah and that since the beginning of 1961 he has never carried on any business or worked for gain at No. 3 Esplanade East or at any other place within the original jurisdiction of this Court. The learned judge found that in the cause title of suit No. 543 of 1961 in which the con sent decree was passed, the debtor1 was described as carrying on business and working for gain at premises No. 3 esplanade East Calcutta within jurisdiction. There is no denial in the Written statement filed by the debtor of this description in the cause title. The cause title of the Notice of Motion dated september 4, 1963, and of the consent decree dated September 5, 1962, states that the debtor works for gain at No. 3 esplanade East, Calcutta. On the basis of the averments in the cause title and the absence of denial by the debtor, the learned Judge held that the debtor was working for gain within jurisdiction at the material time. The question of jurisdiction, in and opinion, cannot be decided in the present case on those materials. The court has to be satisfied that on the date of the presentation of the petition, the debtor was working for gain within jurisdiction. It does not necessarily follow from the cause title of the plaint, the decree or the Notice of Motion that the debtor continued to work for gain at the same address till the date of presentation of the petition, i. e. 9th January 1964. It does not necessarily follow from the cause title of the plaint, the decree or the Notice of Motion that the debtor continued to work for gain at the same address till the date of presentation of the petition, i. e. 9th January 1964. We should have decided the question on fresh evidence had we not been told by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent that in the records of this court, there is ample material on the basis of which it ought to be held that the debtor was working for gain within jurisdiction at the material time. 9. THERE is an affidavit of the debtor affirmed on 6th January, 1962, used in support of a petition for winding up of D. C. Dhiman and Bros. Pvt. Ltd. where he has himself stated that he was a director of the company. It is not in dispute that the said company carried cm business at No. 3 Esplanade East at all material times. We were also told that d. C. Dhiman and Bros. Pvt. Ltd. was directed to be wound up by an order dated 7th September 1965. On the winding up of the said company the court made an order1 on 12th March, 1968, directing the debtor to file his statement of Affairs as a director of the company under section 454 of the companies Act. In an affidavit affirmed on behalf of the Official Liquidator on 20th september, 1967, it was stated that it appeared from the records of the registrar of Companies, West Bengal that the debtor was a director of the said company on the relevant date. The order directing the debtor to file his Statement of Affairs was made on that basis. There is, therefore, an adjudication by this court that the debtor was a director of the company on the date of the winding up order i. e. on 7th September 1965. Our attention having been drawn, to the existence of these materials which are part of the record, we thought it advisable to ask for those documents to be produced in Court under Order 41 rule 27a of the Civil Procedure Code to enable us to pronounce judgment in this case and to obviate the unnecessary and dilatory process of a fresh trial on evidence. On reference to the documents, we are satisfied that the debtor" was working for gain as a director of D. C. Dhiman and Bros. Private Ltd. on the relevant date. 10. IN our view, there as no merit in this appeal. The appeal therefore, fails and is dismissed. Cost of the respondent will be added to his claim. All ad-interim orders are hereby dissolved. Appeal dismissed.