T. N. SHANKARARAO AND. BROS v. S. A. WAJID — 1971 DIGILAW 134 (KAR)

VENKATARAMIAH, J. ( 1 ) THE above four revision petitions arise out of four petitions filed in the Court of the First Munsiff, Bangalore, on behalf of a joint Hindu family carrying on business at Tiptur under the name and style of M/s. T. N. Shankar Rao and Brothers, under clauses (h), (i) and (j) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 21 of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, (here inafter referred to as the Act) seeking eviction of three persons, namely, s. A. Wajid, Mohammed Sukri and Mohammed Ismail, who are respondents before us, from four specified portions of a building situate in Avanue road. Bangalore City. The petitioners purchased the said building under a registered sale deed dated September 28, 1964, from its previous owner Eswarappa, under; whom the respondents were tenants, for a sum of Rs. 60,000. After the said sale in favour of the petitioners, notices were issued to the respondents duly terminating their tenancies and calling upon them to quit and deliver possession of the premises in occupation of the respondents to the petitioners at the expiry of the date mentioned in the notices. On the respondents failing to comply with the notices of demand, the petitioners filed four petitions, HRC. Nos. 12, 13, 14 and 15 of 1965 on the file of the first Munsiff, Bangalore, for recovery of possession as already stated above. HRC. 12 and 15 of 1965 were filed against a. S. Wajid who was in occupation of two portions of the building-one portion being in the first floor and another portion in the ground floor; hrc 13 of 1965 was filed against Mohammed Ismail; and HRC. 14 of 1965 was filed against Mohammed Sukri S. A. Wajid is carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling of caps; Mohammed Ismail is carrying on business of manufacturing of bread; and Mohammed Sukri is a dealer in silk goods. ( 2 ) THE case of the petitioners is that their family is engaged in the business of selling cloth at Tiptur which is a small town in Tumkur District; they intend to extend their business and shift a part of their business to the capital city of Bangalore and carry on business of their own-that they purchased the premises for a sum of Rs. 60,000 for the above purposes; that they reasonably and bona fide require the premises for their own use and occupation; that they have no other place of business in Bangalore city; that a large part of the building is in a dilapidated condition as it is a very old building and needs it-construction; that necessary arrangments have been made to demolish and re-construct the building to suit their conveniences and requirements; that they have also applied to the Corporation of the City of Bangalore seeking license for re-construction and license was about to be issued at the time the petitions were filed: that their object of shifting a part of their business from Tiptur to bangalore is to make provision for the male members of the family who have taken to business. In the above circumstances, the petitioners pray that the respondents should be directed to vacate the respective portions of the premises in their occupation and to deliver the same to the petitioners. The objections raised on behalf of the respondents are almost similar. ( 3 ) THE respondents contend that they have been carrying on business in the portions in their occupation for a long time and they had established their business in the locality and that if they are asked to vacate the premises, they would suffer serious hardship. They deny the allegation that the petitioners reasonably and bona fide require the premises. They have pleaded that the petitions have been filed because of the respondents not agreeing to pay higher rate of rent. They further plead that the building is in good condition and does not require any immediate re-construction. The respondents, therefore, pray that the petitions should be dismissed the learned Munsiff who tried the cases together and recorded common evidence came to the conclusion that the petitioners were entitled to evict the tenants and passed orders accordingly in all the four petitions. The respondents took up these matters in appeal before the Additional district Judge, Bangalore, who allowed the appeals and dismissed the petition presented by the petitioners. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned District Judge in appeal, the petitioners have filed these four revision petitions. The respondents took up these matters in appeal before the Additional district Judge, Bangalore, who allowed the appeals and dismissed the petition presented by the petitioners. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned District Judge in appeal, the petitioners have filed these four revision petitions. ( 4 ) WHEN these cases came up for hearing before Govinda Bhat, J. , he referred them to a Division Bench since he felt that there was some conflict between some of the decisions of this Court having a bearing on these cases, and. therefore, these cases required to be heard and decided by a Division Bench. Consequently these petitions came up before us sometime back for hearing. At the time of the hearing, we felt that adequate attention had not been given by the parties to the requirement of s. 21 (4) of the Act, and, there was need for recording additional evidence on the question whether greater hardship would be caused by passing the order of eviction than by refusing to pass it. After hearing the parties on the said question, we passed an order on 3-9-1970 directing the triad court to record additional evidence on the question covered by S. 21 (4) of the Act and to send back the records along with the additional evidence to this Court in order to facilitate proper disposal of these petitions. The trial Court has accordingly recorded additional evidence after notice to all the parties pursuant to the order passed by this Court and we have the additional evidence before UK now. Counsel for the parties have made their submissions not merely on the evidence which had been recorded earlier but also on the evidence recorded pursuant to the order of this court dated 3-9-1970. ( 5 ) BEFORE going into the merits of the respective cases of the parties, we deem it necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Act and refer to some of the cases relied on by the parties to understand the true question of law that arises for consideration in these cases. The relevant provisions ol thr Act nre set out below:"21. The relevant provisions ol thr Act nre set out below:"21. Projection of Tenants against eviction.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall bo made by any Court or other authority of the landlord against the tenant: provided that the Court may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: - (h) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust, that the premises are required for occupation for the purpose of the trust; or (i) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated; or (j) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building in place of thp premises sought to be demolished; or (4) No decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in clause (h) of thp proviso to sub-sec. (1) if the Court is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. If the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. " ( 6 ) IN his order referring these cases to a Division Bench, Govinda Bhat, j. felt that conflicting views had been expressed in some of the decisions of this Court, and, therefore, it was necessary to refer the matter to a Division bench. " ( 6 ) IN his order referring these cases to a Division Bench, Govinda Bhat, j. felt that conflicting views had been expressed in some of the decisions of this Court, and, therefore, it was necessary to refer the matter to a Division bench. We find it appropriate to set out below the relevant part of the order of reference made by Govinda Bhat, J. :"in these revision petitions the interpretation of S. 21 (1) (h) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, arises. On the interpretation of s. 21 (1) (h), conflicting views have beer expressed in this Court. In M. C. Vagappa v. R. Puttaswamy (CRP. 1216 of 1966 decided on 7-6-1967) I have stated that 'what the Court has to consider is not whether the landlord's desire for possession is reasonable, but whether it is reasonable to make an order for possession; the desire may be reasonable, but it does not follow that it is reasonable for the Court to gratify it' But in the decision in R. R. Paint Industries (India) (P)Ltd. v. Rahamathunisa Begum ( (1908) 1 Mys. L. J 453), and in the decision m Chendlal K. Wedbane v R. Chandrashekariah (1969 (2) Mys. L J 564 ). a different new has been expressed. In the said two decisions, Somnath Iyer, J. as he then was, and then narayana Pai, J have expressed the view that If the requirement claimed by the landlord under S 21 (1) (h) of the Mysore Rent Control act is not either capricious, unfair and absurd, it should be held to be bonafide and reasonable requirement'. The learned District judge against whose order the above revision petitions have been preferred has followed the view stated by me in M C. Vagappa's case. It is necessary that these conflicting views should be resolved by a division Bench. Therefore, I refer the above civil revision petitions to a Bench of two Judges for hearing and disposal under the proviso to S. 8 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1961. " ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the parties before us have taken us through all the decisions referred to in the order of reference and we have carefully gone through them. The facts of the case in M. C. Vagappa v R. Puttaswany, CRP. " ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the parties before us have taken us through all the decisions referred to in the order of reference and we have carefully gone through them. The facts of the case in M. C. Vagappa v R. Puttaswany, CRP. 1216/66 d. 7-6-67 by govinda Bhat, J were these: The petitioner therein was a tenant in occupation of a premises belonging to one Javaraiah who had earlier made a number of attempts to evict the petitioner Having failed to pot him evicted, he is stated to have mortgaged with possession the said property under a usufructuary mortgage deed for a term of six years in favour ot the respondent for an ostensible consideration of Rs. 2,500. The respondent the earlier issued a notice terminating the tenancy of the petitioner and called upon him to deliver possession of the same The respondent's case was that the premies were reasonably and bona fide required for his own use and occupation He alleged that ha required the premises since it was near to the place where he was working and the occupation of the said house would facilitate his attending the office in time and withoul much inconvenience to himself. It was shown in the course of the evidence that the landlord was an attender in an office and he was residing actually in a house which was about four miles from the office where he was working. The period of mortgage was only six years and it was due to expire on 23-8-1968. Under those circumstances this Court found that the requirement of the mortgagee-landlord was not a reasonable and bona fide one and held that the petition was liable to be dismissed. The learned judge held that what the Court had to consider was not whether the landlord's desire for possession was reasonable, but whether it was reasonable to make an order for possession It was observed that the desire might be a reasonable one, but it would not follow that it would be reasonable for the Court to gratify It. ( 8 ) THE next decision is one in R. R. Paint Industries (India) (P) Ltd. v. Rahamathunnisa Begum, (1968)1 Mys. L. J. 453. ( 8 ) THE next decision is one in R. R. Paint Industries (India) (P) Ltd. v. Rahamathunnisa Begum, (1968)1 Mys. L. J. 453. In that case the eviction of the tenant, which was a private limited company, was sought on two grounds, namely, that the company was in arrears of rents and that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord's husband for his business. Dealing with the question as to when the requirement of a landlord would be a reasonable and bona fide one, Somnath Iyer, J. (as he then was) observed:"it is the requirement of clause (h) of S. 21 (1) of the Act that the requirement should be both reasonable and bona fide. A requirement is bona fide if it is honest and it is not bona fide when the application for eviction is a mere artifice through which the landlord desires to recover possession of premises. It is not enough if the requirement is an honest requirement. It should, in addition, be a reasonable requirement. According to the dictionary meaning of the word 'reasonable' what is within the limits of reason is reasonable and so, the requirement which is either capricious or not fair or is absurd is not a reasonable requirement. Interpreting the expression 'reasonably required by the landlord' in the English Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) act, 1915, Banks LJ. said this in Esson Grand Association Ltd. v. Clarke ( (1919) Weekly Notes, 170): 'the exception relied on by the plaintiffs is ' that the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for the occupation of himself or some other person in his employ'; that provision throws upon the landlord the onus of establishing the exception on which he relies. The conclusion arrived at bv Paterson, J. is not sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to possession. Tt is not enough that the Court should be satisfied of the bona fides of their requirements, or that the Court should be left in doubt as to the reasonableness of the requirement. The plaintiffs must satisfy the Court that the premises are reasonably required; that they are acting reasonably in requiring them Whether the requirement is reasonable or not must depend on all the circumstances of the case. The plaintiffs must satisfy the Court that the premises are reasonably required; that they are acting reasonably in requiring them Whether the requirement is reasonable or not must depend on all the circumstances of the case. " ( 9 ) SO, the question is whether the requirement in the present case is a fair requirement or whether it is so fanciful as to fall outside clause (h) of Section 21 (1) of the Act. The learned Judge after examining the facts of that case came to the conclusion that the requirement of the landlord in that case was reasonable and bona fide and held that the tenant was liable to be evicted. The above view was followed by Narayana Pai, J. as he then was in cherialal K. Wadhava v. R. Chandrasekaraiah, (1969) 2 Mys. L. J. 564. In that case, the landlord who was a mandy merchant carrying on trade in grains applied for eviction of two tenants who were occupying two portions of the building belonging to him on the ground that he required the premses in occupation of the tenants to start and carry on a large scale or wholesale business in cloth. This Court on a consideration of the evidence in that case felt that the petitioner-landlord had made out a case for eviction. Narayana pai, J. observed in the course of that judgment that it was not necessary to prove that there was necessity to start a business, but what must be shown was that the requirement was bonafide and reasonable and that the petition for eviction should not be mere artifice to get rid of the tenants. Ultimately he came to the conclusion that in the said case the landlord had established all that was required to be established under clause (h) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 21 of the Act to succeed in the petition for eviction. In another case, namely, Malai Kolandai Mudaliar v. M. R. Swaminathan, (1970) 1 Mys. L. J. 244 where the landlord sought the eviction of a tenant who was occupying a non-residential building on the ground that he required the same for starting a business. Chandrashekhar, J; held that in the circumstances of the case, the requirement of the landlord was a reasonable and bona fide one. In S. Chandra Prakash v. Central Tobacco Co. , CRP. 997/67 d/. Chandrashekhar, J; held that in the circumstances of the case, the requirement of the landlord was a reasonable and bona fide one. In S. Chandra Prakash v. Central Tobacco Co. , CRP. 997/67 d/. 6-12-68 the facts were that the landlord required the premises in the occupation of the tenant for using the same as a godown to a hotel which was being run by the landlord as a partner very near the premises in question. Bhimiah, j: held that the need of the landlord was a reasonable and bona fide one following the decision in R. R, Paint Industries (India) (P) Ltd. v. Rahamathunnisa Begum. In this case the lower appellate Court had dismissed the petition of the landlord and the landlord had filed the revision petition. This Court allowed the petition holding that a case under clause (h) of proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 21 of the Act had been made out. It may be mentioned here that this case was taken up before the supreme Court by the tenant in Central Tobacco Co. v. Chandra Prakash, CA. 1175/69 d/. 23-4-69 SC. ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court did not in that case disturb the finding of this court that the premises was required by the landlord reasonably and bona fide for his own use and occupation, but allowed the appeal only on the ground that the parties had not adduced evidence on the question covered by sub-sec. (4) of S. 21 of the Act and remanded the matter to high Court to give a decision in terms of sub-sec. (4) of S. 21 of the Art after giving opportunity to the parties to adduce further evidence, if any, on that question. If really the Supreme Court had felt that the decision of this Court on the question whether the premises was required by the landlord reasonably and bona fide for his own use and occupation, was erroneous it would have of course allowed the appeal without remanding the same to the High Court to examine the question of sub-sec. (4) of s. 21 of the Act. It should, therefore, be taken that the view of this Court on that question was acceptable to the Supreme Court. ( 11 ) ONE other case of this Court on this question which requires to be noticed is Venkappaiah v. M. S. Papanna, (1968)1 Mys. (4) of s. 21 of the Act. It should, therefore, be taken that the view of this Court on that question was acceptable to the Supreme Court. ( 11 ) ONE other case of this Court on this question which requires to be noticed is Venkappaiah v. M. S. Papanna, (1968)1 Mys. L. J. 435, which was relied on by this court in S. Chandra Prakash case. In this case the landlord applied for the eviction of the tenant on the ground that he required the same for his own use and occupation to use it as an office and as residence after demolishing the existing building which was in a dilapidated state and re-constructing another in its place to make it more suitable for his occupation. In that case Venkataswami, J: observed as follows:"it is well established that the claim of a landlord that the leased premises are required for his occupation is prima facie bonafide, in the absence of circumstances indicative of the fact that he was actuated by oblique motives, such as the intention to claim enhancement in rent or similar monetary benefits. " ( 12 ) ON a persual of all the decisions of this Court referred to above including the decision of Govinda Bhat, J. in M. C. Vagappa's case (1), we find that there is no conflict in the views expressed in any of them. S. 21 (1) of the act confers an immunity on the tenant against eviction from the demised premises, but the said immunity is subject to the proviso to S. 21 (1) of the Act. If a landlord brings his case under any one of the clauses under the proviso to S. 21 (1) of the Act, he would be able to get a tenant evicted notwithstanding the general immunity against eviction recognised by sub-sec. (1) of S. 21 of the Act. The burden of showing that the case of the landlord falls under any one of those clauses, is no doubt on him and that burden he can discharge by placing before the Court necessary material to come to the conclusion that he has made out his right to get the tenant evicted under any one of the clauses referred to above. The very fact that the landlord is required to place sufficient material before the court to decide the question whether he is entitled to seek the eviction of a tenant under any one of the clauses set out under the proviso to S. 21 (1) of the Act implies that the Court which is hearing the petition has to be satisfied that the material so placed is sufficient in the eye of law, to order the eviction ol a tenant. In all the decisions of this Court referred to above, we find that the Court has come to the conclusion that the landlord required the premises reasonably and bona fide for his own use and occupation only after examining the material placed before the court. In none of these cases, eviction has been ordered merely because the landlord expressed his desire to occupy his own house It is no doubt true that in some cases the fact that the desire of the landlord is an honest one but not an oblique one has been taken as one of the factors in deciding whether the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide but not as the sole ground. We have, thereiore, not been able to find out any conflict between the observations of Govinda Bhat, J' namely, 'what the Court has to consider is not whether the landlord's desire for possession is reasonable, but whether it was reasonable to make an order for possessions the desire may be reasonable but it does not follow that it is reasonable to gratify it', and the observations made in the other cases. In all those cases we find, that the High Court has decided that the landlord's need was reasonable and bona fide only after an objective assessment of the evidence in each case We also notice that the same idea expressed by Govinda Bhat, J. in M. C. Vagappa's cane (1) has been adopted or followed in the other cases. It may be that in the other decisions, we may not find the view expressed in the same language in which govinda Bhat, J. has expressed. But that does not make any difference. We do not find, therefore, any conflict at all between the view expressed by Govinda Bhat, J. in M. C. Vagappa's case (1) and in the views expressed in the other decisions of this Court referred to above. But that does not make any difference. We do not find, therefore, any conflict at all between the view expressed by Govinda Bhat, J. in M. C. Vagappa's case (1) and in the views expressed in the other decisions of this Court referred to above. One other way of understanding the true meaning of clause (h) of the proviso to S. 21 (1) of the Act is by comparing it with a similar statute in force in England, namely, Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act, 1933. S. 8 of the said Act reads as follows:"3. Amendments as to restriction on right to possession.- (1) No order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any dwelling-house to which the principal Acts apply or for the ejectment of a tenant therefrom shall be made or given unless the Court considers it reasonable to make such an order or give such a judgment, and either- (a) the Court has power so to do under the provisions set out in the First Schedule to this Act; or (b) the Court is satisfied that suitable alternative accommodation is available for the tenant or will be available for him when the order or judgment takes effect. " ( 13 ) THE rest of the section is not necessary lor our purpose. One of the grounds mentioned in the First Schedule to the Act to which reference is made in clause (a) of S. 3 (1) of the Act reads as follows:" (h) the dwelling-house is reasonably required by the landlord (not being a landlord who has become landlord by purchasing thr dwelling-house or any interest therein after the sixth day of December, nineteen hundred and thirty-seven) for occupation as a residence for- (i) himself; or (ii) any son or daughter of his over eighteen years of age : or iii) his father or mother; provided that an order or judgment shall not be made or given on any ground specified in paragraph (h) of the foregoing provisions of this schedule it the Court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the question whether other accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused fay granting the order or judgment than by refusing to grant it. " ( 14 ) WE find in the provisions of the English Act, extracted above the words 'unless the Court considers it reasonable to make such an order or give such a judgment' in S. 3 (1) and the words 'dwelling-house is reasonably required by the landlord' in clause (h) of the Frist Schedule. The same question which is presented before us in construing the Act was raised before the English Courts while construing the provision of the English act and that was resolved by Acton, J; in Shrimpton v. Rabbits, (1924)131 LT. 478, 479, as follows:"a difficulty arises from a confusion of thought between the words 'reasonably required by the landlord' in this paragraph and the words 'the Court considers it reasonable to make such an order or/give such a judgment' in S. 3 (1 ). . . . The confusion of thought may be eliminated and disposed of by this sentence: Because a wish is reasonable, it does not follow that it is reasonable to a Court to gratify it. There are two processes which have to be gone through. The first process is to ascertain whether the wish which the landlord has for the possession of the premises is a reasonable wish, and of course unless that is demonstrated there is an end of his claim. But after it has been ascertained that the desire or requirement of the landlord is a reasonable desire or requirement, there follows a further question. . . . namely, is it in all the circumstances of the case reasonable that the Court should grant or gratify that reasonable requirement. " ( 15 ) THE way in which the difficulty felt by the English Courts was resolved by Acton, J: appears to be a reasonable vew to be taken about the provisions with which we are now concerned. A Court before deciding whether the landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his own use and occupation, should take into account all relevant circumstances as they exist at the time of the hearing of the case. It must approach the problem in a broad common sense way as a man of the world and come to a conclusion giving such weight as it thinks right to the various facts. Some factors may have little or no weight. It must approach the problem in a broad common sense way as a man of the world and come to a conclusion giving such weight as it thinks right to the various facts. Some factors may have little or no weight. Others may be decisive but it is quite wrong to exclude from consideration any matter which the Court should take into account. The Court first of all should find out having regard to the circumstances of the case whether the demand made by the landlord is motivated by improper considerations such as extracting a higher rate of rent for the same premises from the tenant in occupation or letting it out at a higher rate of rent to somebody else after the tenants have vacated A decision on these questions would show whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fi de or not Then the court should examine whether even though the requirement may be bonafide whether it is reasonable That has got to be determined, as already stated, by approaching the problem in the way in which any reasonable man would approach The Court may have to take into account the need of the landlord and the members of his family to occupy the premises while deciding the above question it is necessary for the Court to take into account all the factors which are relevant for the purpose of determining that question It is not possible to set out exhaustively all the factors which wrill go into the determination of these questions. They vary from case to case. If the Court on a consideration of the material before it, comes to the conclusion that the landlord does not reasonably and bona fide require the premises, it should proceed to dismiss the petition. ( 16 ) BUT if the Court comes to the conclusion that the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide, then it should proceed to examine the case in the light of S 21 (4) of the Act and determine whether having regard to all the circumstances including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landloid or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than bv return to pass it. We may however make it clear that merely because the landlord expresses a desire to occupy his own building which is in the occupation of a tenant, the Court will not allow his claim unless it is satisfied on the material placed before it that the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide We shall now proceed to examine the facts or the present case and find out whether the petitions filed by the landlord should succeed or not. ( 17 ) THE total area of the building which the respondents are occupying as tenants is 283/4' x 76' with an open space measuring 17 8' x 8 8'. There is a first floor for the building. The evidence of PW1 Venkatnranga Iyer, a retired official of the Department of Public Works is that the building is about 100 years old; the roof of the hall is terraced on rafters and stands on two wooden pillars which are placed inside the hall; that the beams are sunk to some extent on account of the foundation of the building being weak, and similarly the pillars are also sunk. According to him there are about 10 to 12 cracks in the wall on account of the old age of the building and the sinking of the foundation. He has stated that the stair-case is supported by casurina poles and according to him the building is in a dilapidated condition and requires immediate reconstruction. The evidence of PW. 1 is corroborated by the evidence of PW. 2 T. N. Shankar rao, one of the members of the petitioner-joint family. As against the above evidence placed by the petitioners regarding the condition of the building, we have the oral evidence of some witnesses examined by the tenants. ( 18 ) RW. 2 Nagaraj is a merchant carrying on business in a shop opposite to the building in question. His evidence is that the building is in good condition and not leaking. But he has admitted in cross-examination that he had not been inside the entire building and he had seen only one portion, namely, the place where silk goods are being sold. He has admitted that he has not gone to the up-stairs of the building and has not seen the condition of the foundation of the building. The evidence of RW. He has admitted that he has not gone to the up-stairs of the building and has not seen the condition of the foundation of the building. The evidence of RW. 2 kondappa, who is the owner of a tailoring shop, is that the building is in good condition. He admits that the roofing of the building is of bamboo rafters and it is supported by beams. He has stated that he has not entered the up-stairs. According to him, he has gone into only the silk house and has not seen the other portions of the building. RW. 3 Abdul Razack has given evidence to the same effect as that of RWs. 1 and 2. RW. 5 Syed ameeruddin admits that the building is more than sixty years old. He is said to have none to the building to inspect it at the instance of one of the respondents. He is a general merchant by profession and he is not a person whose evidence on the condition of the building can be accepted as he is not an expert who has the knowledge of the subject about which he has given evidence. The three other witnesses who have given evidence are RW 4 A. R. Mohammed Ismail and RW. 7 S. A. Wajid, both of whom are respondents and RW. 6 is one K. Ummarsaheb who claims to be a partner of the silk business which is carried on in one portion of the building ir the occupation of Mohammed Sukri. As against the independent evidence of PW. 1 which contains all the necessary particulars to come to a conclusion whether the building is in a good condition or not, the respondents have not led sufficient evidence to show that the building is in good condition. When admittedly the building is about sixty years old and the materials used in its construction are, as already, stated consist of bamboo rafters, casurina poles and wooden beams and when cracks have developed in several places in the walls of the building, it is reasonable to hold that the building is not in a good condition and it requires 1o be reconstructed. The petitioners have also obtained a license for reconstruction from the Corporation of the City of Bangalore and the same is produced and marked as Ext. P-1 in the case. The petitioners have also obtained a license for reconstruction from the Corporation of the City of Bangalore and the same is produced and marked as Ext. P-1 in the case. In these circumstances, we hold that the building is not in a good condition and requires to be reconstructed. ( 19 ) THE next question for determination is whether the building is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for his own occupation. On this question we have the evidence of PW. 2. According to him the said building was purchased by the joint family of this witness for the purpose of extending their trade to Bangalore City. According to this witness, he has six brothers and the shop was purchased out of the joint family assets He no doubt says that the family has been carrying on business in cloth at Tiptur, but according to him the business is not sufficient to meet the requirements of a growing family. He has stated that there is no other building belonging to the family in Bangalore City and the one and the only building which they have, namely, the building in question was bought for occupying the same after evicting the tenants. He has stated that before he bought it he consulted Lawyers whether it would be possible to get the tenants evicted and on being advised that it was possible to do so, the said property was purchased. PW. 2 has stated that the joint family wants to reconstruct the building at a cost of about forty to fifty thousand rupees and use one portion of it for purpose of cloth business and another portion for the residence of the members of the family who would be in-charge of the business at Bangalore. He has stated that the family owns property of the value of Rs. two lakhs and there are no debts The family has been carrying on business in cloth for several years and they have invested over forty thousand rupees in cloth business. Nothing has been brought out in the cross-examination of this witness to show that what he has stated in examination-in-chief is false. It is not unreasonable to hold that members of a joint Hindu family are entitled to occupy a premises belonging to them for the purpose of extending their business. Nothing has been brought out in the cross-examination of this witness to show that what he has stated in examination-in-chief is false. It is not unreasonable to hold that members of a joint Hindu family are entitled to occupy a premises belonging to them for the purpose of extending their business. The joint family in question consists of six brothers who are traders bv profession. No doubt they have got some agricultural lands also, but it is not shown that they arc personally carrying on agriculture. When the two shops at Tiptur in which the family members are carrying on business arc shown to be small shops and that there are six brothers in the family who have got to establish themselves in life, the family would ordinarily think of extending its trading activities and if it does so, it cannot be said that they must extend the same in the same place in which they have been carrying on business all along. Mere opening of more shops in a small town will not bring more business. If they have a business premises in which they can carry on business in a bigger town it should be open to them to move there in order to improve their prospects. Such a desire on the part of the growing family is a natural one and it appears to be the outcome of necessity. This is not a case where the petitioners are thinking of a new business in which they have no experience at all. They are persons who are carrying on business in cloth who wish to do whole-sale cloth businpss in Bangalore if they are able to secure the possession of the premises. It is not as if the petitioners have no means to carry on the said business It is contended for and on behalf of the respondents that the total assets of the petitioners is in the order of rupees two lakhs and under those circumstances, it could not reasonably be held that they would be able to reconstruct the building and thereafter carry on wholesale cloth business which according to the respondents would require a large amount of capital. It may be mentioned here that in the statement of objections filed by the respondents, it is not stated that the petitioners have no means to reconstruct the building and carry on business at Bangalore. It may be mentioned here that in the statement of objections filed by the respondents, it is not stated that the petitioners have no means to reconstruct the building and carry on business at Bangalore. It is in evidence that the petitioners have no debts at all and they have been able to purchase out of their savings a building of the value of Rs. 60,000 in the year 1964. When there is no material before the Court as to the actual amount that would be necessary for carrying on whole-sale cloth business, it would be hazardous for the Court to embark upon determining what amount is required for the whole-sale business in cloth. It is argued for the petitioners and not without force, that in these days when vast credit facilities are available, it would not be impossible for them to carry on the business in Bangalore, and more so because they are not new to the trade and they have established business connections. We also do not accept the finding of the lower appellate Court that the cost of construction would be double the estimate of Rs. 40,000 to Rs. 50,000 spoken to by PW. 2. When the extent of the plinth area is about 20 to 30 squares (i. e. 2000 sq. ft. to 3000 sq. ft.) even at Rs. 2,000 per square the cost of construction would be Rs. 60,000 and not double the estimate spoken to by PW. 2. We are of the opinion that the total outlay on the construction of the building and the intended cloth business is not beyond the means of the petitioners. In these circumstances, we feel that the petitioners' claim is not an extravagant one and that they have made out that they reasonably and bona fide require the premises in question for their own use and occupation the trial Court held that the petitioners reasonably and bona fide. require the premises for their own use and occupation. But this is what the lower appellate Court stated on that question:"it is no doubt true, as observed above, that the bona fides of the landlords as such cannot be doubted It may even be well intention on their part to expand their business to Bangalore. It may be reasonable also from their point of view to evict the tenants from the building which they have purchased. It may be reasonable also from their point of view to evict the tenants from the building which they have purchased. But, the real question is, whether it is reasonable for the Court, in the light of the principles enunciated above, to order eviction of the tenants. It has been well said that the term 'require' is something more than mere wish, though it need not amount to absolute necessity. In order to succeed in a case for eviction of the tenant, the landlord must be in a position to prove that it is not a mere wish on his part or even a well-intentioned desire to start business in Bangalore. There must be some element of compulsion, may be by way of necessity to provide employment for one of the dependents, may be because the business in Tiptur is not flourishing and they want to seek fresh fields and pastures new. " ( 20 ) HAVING stated so, the lower appellate Court proceeded to hold that it would not be reasonable to allow the petitions because three tenants whose business was well settled in the building would be thrown on the street practically if they were evicted from the suit premises. The approach of the lower appellate Court regarding this question is faulty. What it should have first examined was whether the requirement of the landlords was reasonable and bona fide applying the objective tests and thereafter it should have tried to examine the relative hardship between the landlord and tenants that was likely to be caused by passing the order of eviction. We are satisfied that in these cases there is enough material to hold that the requirement of the landlords is a bona fide one and also a reasonable one. The finding of the lower appellate Court on this question is, therefore, liable to be set aside. This takes us to the question to be determined under S. 21 (4) of the Act. ( 21 ) THE Supreme Court has observed in Central Tobacco Co. The finding of the lower appellate Court on this question is, therefore, liable to be set aside. This takes us to the question to be determined under S. 21 (4) of the Act. ( 21 ) THE Supreme Court has observed in Central Tobacco Co. v. Chandra prakash that both sides must adduce all relevant evidence before court on the question which arises for determination under S. 21 (4) of the Act The landlord must show that other reasonable accommodation was not available to him and the tenant must also adduce evidence to that effect and it is only by sifting such evidence that the Court must form its conclusion on a consideration of all the circumstances of the case as to whether greater hardship v ould he caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. In these cases, on the side of the landlords, we have the evidence of PW. 2 who has stated that the landlords have no other premises in Bangalore to carry on business and if the petitions are dismissed, the family would seriously suffer. As against this, we have to examine the case of the three tenants who are liable to be evicted if the petitions are allowed so far as Mohammed Sulri is concerned, it can be stated that he would not suffer any serions hardship at all if the petition is allowed. Mohammed Sukri has not entered the witness box at all According to the evidence of Ummarsaheb, RW. 6, Mohammed Sukri has no interest in the shop which is being run under the name and syle 'silk House'. It is admitted that he has nothing to do with the business which is carried on there. ( 22 ) IT is no doubt stated that his wife is a partner in the business that is being carried on there. It is admitted that at the time the business was started, mohammed Sukri was not a partner. It is further admitted that Mohammed sukri was at Bombay from two years prior to the date on which this witness was examined, and his wife was at Murdeswar. It has come out in evidence that the sons of Mohammed Sukri are running a shop under the name and style 'colombo Stores' :n Chickoet. It is further admitted that Mohammed sukri was at Bombay from two years prior to the date on which this witness was examined, and his wife was at Murdeswar. It has come out in evidence that the sons of Mohammed Sukri are running a shop under the name and style 'colombo Stores' :n Chickoet. When he was questioned whether he has made any attempts to secure alternative accommodation, he has stated that he did not find any shops vacant while going on road He has stated that he tried for alternative accommodation through brokers, none of whom has been examined in this case. In the above state of evidence, it cannot be said that if an order of eviction is passed against Mohammed Sukri, he would suffer any hardship at all. The next tenant whose case requires to be examined is S. A. Wajid, who is stated to bf carrying on business of manufacturing caps in the first floor and selling them in the ground-floor. It has been brought out in evidence that he owns a building in which he has been residing and another building which he has let out to some tenants According to him, he is realising a rent of Rs. 100 per month whereas it is suggested on behalf of the landlords that he is realising a rent of Rs. 300 per month. On the question of alternative accommodation he has stated that cap business can be carried on in Bangalore City only in two roads, namely, Avenue road and Ragipet. He has denied his knowledge about the existence of cap shops in several other streets in Bangalore He has admitted that there is a newly constructed building by name Chandra Bhavan in Avenue Road within a short distance from the building in question and that there are fifteen to twenty shops ready for lease. He has stated that he was told they would not lease them to him and no reason was given as to why he was told that those shops would not be let out to him This witness has further admitted that he has a shop in Ragipet in Bangalore City. In another part of his deposition, he has stated that there are cap shops in other parts of Bangalore City. This respondent has not made any attempt to secure alternative accommodation even though vacant shops are available in close proximity. In another part of his deposition, he has stated that there are cap shops in other parts of Bangalore City. This respondent has not made any attempt to secure alternative accommodation even though vacant shops are available in close proximity. He would not suffer any great hardship, because he has admittedly another shop in Ragipet where he is selling caps. The manufacturing of caps can be carried on anywhere and the business when this witness has been carrying on in the premises in question is not at all one which cannot be shifted to any other place. The next tenant whose case requires to be examined is Mohammed Ismail, who is a baker. His case is that he has been manufacturing bread in the rear portion of this building by constructing an oven there. He is a whole-sale dealer in bread and according to him he is selling bread to some institutions such at government Hospitals, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, etc. He owns another shop where he has got a show-room within a distance of about 20 yards from the building in question. The only thing that this person has been doing in this building is the manufacture of bread which can be carried on anywhere else. This witness lias admitted that his net profit from his business is in the order of twenty-five to thirty thousand per year. There is evidence in the case to show that he has a house of his own in Kalasipalyam in which he has been residing and owns some other buildings also He has admitted that he owns seven shops in Cottonpet and all those shops if vacated would provide sufficient accommodation for him to carry on manufacture of bread. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that Mohammed Ismail would suffer any great hardship if an order of eviction is passed against him. ( 23 ) SRI Ethirajulu Naidu, the learned Counsel for Mohammed Ismail, contended that it would be difficult for his client to get a licence 10 manufacture bread anywhere else because a bread manufacturer has to satisfy number of conditions which are imposed under the license. That does not in any way advance the case of this respondent, because similar conditions will have to be obeyed even in the present place also. He has stated that it is not possible to get a license at all for manufacturing bread elsewhere. That does not in any way advance the case of this respondent, because similar conditions will have to be obeyed even in the present place also. He has stated that it is not possible to get a license at all for manufacturing bread elsewhere. We can take judicial notice of the fart that in Bangalore City there are number of bakeries situate inside the town which are run under license issuedi by the Corporation of the City of Bangalore. There is no substance in this submission. ( 24 ) ON a comparison of the hardship which is likely to be caused to the tenants in these cases by ordering their eviction with the hardship that is likely to be caused to the landlords by refusing to do so, we feel that the landlords would suffer greater hardship if their petitions are not allowed. It is no doubt true that in every case when a tenant is ordered to be evicted, some inconvenience would be caused to him on account of the shifting of his established business and he may have to pay a little higher rent for alternative accommodation These are inevitable. But that does not mean that on that score alone the landlord would be denied possession. In Malai Kolandai Muddliar v MR. Swaminathan (4), chandrashekhar, J: observed as follows:"in a place like Bangalore where new non-residential buildings are coming up in such large number, it is difficult to accept the plea that it is not possible for the tenant to get alternative accommodation. It may be, the tenant will be put to some inconvenience on account of shifting his established business from the nresent place Tt may be he mav have to pay a higher rent for alternative accommodation. Such difficulties are inevitable in practically every case of eviction of tenant from the premises he has been occupying. On that score the landlord cannot be denied possession of the premises for his own use. " ( 25 ) WE respectfully agree with the view expressed above and hold that the inconvenience which is likely to be caused to the tenants in these petitions should not deter us from making an order allowing the petitions of the landlords. Before concluding we would like to refer to a decision of the Supreme court in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, (1962) 2 SCJ 270, on which Sri Ethirajulu Naidu relied. Before concluding we would like to refer to a decision of the Supreme court in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, (1962) 2 SCJ 270, on which Sri Ethirajulu Naidu relied. That was a case which arose under the Patiala East Punjab States union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance which authorised a landlord to apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession when the Controller was satisfied that the building was required for re-erection or for its replacement by another building. In that case the landlord applied to the Controller for eviction of the tenant on three grounds: (1) non-payment of rent by tenant; (ii) non-payment of house tax by tenant; and (iii) that the shops were in a state of disrepair and were dilapidated, and "the landlord wished to rebuild them after dismantling the structures The Rent Controller held that there was no proof that the building was in a dilapidated condition and that the landlord himself did not give evidence in support of that plea. He held on the other hand there was evidence that the building was in good condition he also found that no reliable evidence had been given regarding the financial status of the landlord and the witnesses who gave evidence on his behalf had no means of knowing whether the landlord can spend the money required for the reconstruction of the premises According to that case, the plan showed that the building required about Rs. 20,000 to build, but the landlord's income was in the order of Rs,200 per month and his family consisted of his wife and five children The Rent Controller, therefore, came to the conclusion that he had no means to rebuild. 20,000 to build, but the landlord's income was in the order of Rs,200 per month and his family consisted of his wife and five children The Rent Controller, therefore, came to the conclusion that he had no means to rebuild. Under those circumstances, the claim of the landlord was negatived When the matter came up before the Supreme Court, it was observed that it was not possible to hold that the intention of the landlord to rebuild was bona fide since it had not been established that the landlord was capable of constructing that building This judgment is of no assistance to the tenants in this case We have already given reasons for our conclusion that the claim of the landlords in these cases is reasonable and bona fide and they are capable of constructing a building and carry on business there in the end it was urged on behalf of the tenants that it might not be necessary to evict all of them and that if it was possible, only a portion of the building may be ordered to be vacated We have examined this aspect of the case but we feel that having regard to the smallness of the area of the land on which the building is situated and the dilapidated condition of the building it would not be possible to confine the order of eviction only to a portion of the building. ( 26 ) WE therefore, set aside the orders passed in these four cases by the lower appellate Court and pass an order directing that the tenants shall deliver vacant possession of the respective portions of the building in their possession to the landlords within 31-7-1971. The petitions are accordingly allowed. In the circumstances of the cases, parties will bear their own costs in all the three Courts. --- *** --- .