JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - Facts relevant to the points in issue may be stated in short. The Petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police by the Superintendent of Police on 25-6-1947. He was confirmed in that post by the Superintendent of Police on 25-6-1949, in December, 1953 he was selected by the Central Selection Board consisting of three Deputy Inspectors-General of Police for promotion to the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police. On 3rd of January, 1956 he was confirmed as Sub-Inspector of Police by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Northern Range, Sambalpur. Thus the Petitioner's substantive rank was that of a Sub-Inspector of Police. In 1964 a number of charges were framed against him in proceedings No. 6 of 1964 and No. 7 of 1964. He has been found guilty in respect of charge No. 1 in proceeding No. 7 of 1964. That charge framed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police. Southern Range, Berhampur, runs thus: While attached to Jhorigam P.S. as Officer-in-charge on 10.3.1963 he demanded Rs. 200/. from one Tonko Majhi of village Pandragandi, P.S. Jhorigam with the threat that he kept a stolen bicycle and that he would criminally prosecute him if be would not pay him Rs. 200/-. The charge was enquired into by Sri G. Chakravarti, Addl. Superintendent of Police, Koraput. The enquiry report finding the Petitioner guilty of the charge is Annexure 'H' dated 29-8-1966. The finding is: Under the above circumstances, the first charge against the delinquent S.I. is proved beyond any doubt. The enquiring Officer placed reliance on the evidence of Nilamber Majhi (p.w. 1) K.O. Patra (p.w. 2) Sub-Inspector of Police at Umarkote P.S. at the relevant time, Tonka Majhi (p.w. 3) and Ratha Pujhari (p. w. 4) and the petitions filed by Nilambar Majhi (Ets. II and II(a). He relied on certain broad probabilities which may be put In his own words: Read together the versions of S.I. K.O. Patra and Nilambar Majhi point to only one possible conclusion. S.I. H.H. Das did have in his' possession a requisition giving the number of the stolen cycle. To verify that number from the cycle of Tonko Majhi would take only a few minutes. S.I. H.H. Das did have in his' possession a requisition giving the number of the stolen cycle. To verify that number from the cycle of Tonko Majhi would take only a few minutes. To summon Tonko Majhi to come to the P.S. to detain him in the P.S. 'for a long time and then again to discuss bail matters would be totally superfluous if the S.I.'s Action and motives were straight. It leads to one clear conclusion that the delinquent S.I. grabbed at this opportunity to extort some money from an innocent villager by applying pressure on him. Moreover ultimately the S.I. let off this man. But this happened only after Nilamber Majhi came to the P.S. and wanted to compare the number. He discussed the evidence of Nilambar Majhi and was of opinion that he was a man of suspicious character. Despite it, however, he accepted his evidence as corroborated by other evidence and inherent, probabilities of the case. The enquiry report was submitted to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Southern Range, Berhampur. The Petitioner was, asked to show cause as to why he would no be dismissed from service. After cause was shown the final order was passed by the concerned D.T.G. of Police on 8.6.1965. The Petitioner was reduced to the rank of A.S.T. at Rs. 180/- for a period of three years with effect from that date. On completion of this period he was to be restored to his former rank and pay subject to his work and conduct being found satisfactory otherwise. The disciplinary authority while examining the merits of the matter in the final order passed conveyed to the Petitioner on' 7.6.1965, (Annexure 'N'), observed thus: Besides to explain the monetary transaction of Rs. 200/. which, according to the enquiring Officer, was proved while Tonko Majhi was detained at the P.S. while enquiring into the enquiry slip received from S.I. Umerkote, the delinquent has come forward with a new defence plea that he asked Tonko Majhi to fetch the cycle on signing a P.R. for Rs. 200/- lest Nilam bar Majhi would cause disappearance of evidence and this P.R. for Rs. 200/- has been coloured as demand of bribe by the delinquent. 200/- lest Nilam bar Majhi would cause disappearance of evidence and this P.R. for Rs. 200/- has been coloured as demand of bribe by the delinquent. If the matter was so simple as that the delinquent should have taken this defence plea from the very beginning and not after getting a copy of the finding of the enquiring Officer. There was no occasion to take a P.R. from. Tonko Majhi or discuss about his bail matter as he was never under arrest nor was there any evidence against him. By this defence plea the delinquent has only strengthened the prosecution case against him as there being no reason to arrest Tonko Majhi his demand of P.R. of Rs. 200/- indirectly suggests the inference that Tonko was threatened with arrest and money was demanded for his release. So the conclusion of the enquiring Officer that "the delinquent S.I. grabbed at the opportunity to extort some money from an innocent villager by applying pressure on him has been correctly drawn." Against the order of D.I.G. imposing punishment, an appeal, was filed before the I.G. of Police which was dismissed by an order communicated to the Petitioner by Annexure 'Q' dated 29.3.1966. A memorial to the Government was rejected by an order which was communicated to him by Annexure 'R' dated 22.12.1967. After reversion the Petitioner did not join 'as A.S.I. He was, therefore, ultimately dismissed from service by the Superintendent of Police, Koraput, and the order of dismissal was served on him on 5.9.1967. The writ application has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the order reducing the Petitioner in rank from S.I. to A.S.I. If the impugned order of reduction in rank is ultimately quashed, the subsequent order of dismissal in necessarily to be vacated as being passed by the S.P. who has the power to dismiss an A.S.I. but not a Sub-Inspector of Police whose appointing authority is either the D.I.G. or the I.G. of Police which is not being determined in this case. 2. Mr. Behura raised a number of contentions in, the writ application but at the time of hearing pressed only two. These are: (1) The Inspector General of police is the appointing authority of a Sub-Inspector of Police and the order of the D.I.G. of Police reducing the Petitioner in rank is without jurisdiction. 2. Mr. Behura raised a number of contentions in, the writ application but at the time of hearing pressed only two. These are: (1) The Inspector General of police is the appointing authority of a Sub-Inspector of Police and the order of the D.I.G. of Police reducing the Petitioner in rank is without jurisdiction. (ii) The finding that the Petitioner demanded Rs. 200/- as bribe from Tonko Majhi is based on no evidence or at any rate is based on such materials on which no reasonable man would arrive at the conclusion that bribe was demanded. 3. We need not go into the question as to whether the I.G. of Police or the D.I.G. of Police is the appointing authority of a Sub-Inspector of Police. Even assuming that the I.G. of Police is the appointing authority the D.I.G is competent to pass an order of punishment reducing a Sub-Inspector of Police in rank to that of an A.S.I. Article 311(1) of the Constitution lays down that no person who is a member of civil service of the Union or an all. In a service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The language of the article is plain. The restriction imposed under the Article is that any authority subordinate to the appointing authority cannot dismiss or remove a member of the civil service of a State. In this case the punishment is not one of dismissal or removal but is one of reduction in rank. The D.I.G. was therefore competent to pass an order of reduction in rank even assuming that the I.G. was the appointing authority. The position is made clearer when Article 311(1) is compared with Article 311(2). In case of punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank the enquiry prescribed under, Article 311(2) is mandatory. Thus, where a punishment of reduction in rank is imposed the enquiry is mandatory. The authority to impose such a punishment need not however be the appointing authority. 4. The second argument requires closer scrutiny. Law is now well settled that in an application under Articles 226 and 227 the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent tribunal in a departmental enquiry. It cannot re-appreciate the evidence. The authority to impose such a punishment need not however be the appointing authority. 4. The second argument requires closer scrutiny. Law is now well settled that in an application under Articles 226 and 227 the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent tribunal in a departmental enquiry. It cannot re-appreciate the evidence. It would however be justified in setting aside the finding if it is based on no evidence. A finding based merely on suspicion and conjecture is no proof of an allegation whether in a civil, criminal or departmental proceeding. In considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt does not apply. A departmental enquiry is not a criminal trial and the delinquent is not an accused. Where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent Officer is guilty of the charge, the High Court cannot review the evidence and arrive at an independent finding unless the conclusion on the very face of it is a arbitrary and capriciously that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are all judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which the findings can be based the adequacy or reliability of that evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed in a proceeding under Articles 226 of the Constitution. See The State of Orissa and Anr. v. Murlidhar Jena AIR 1963 S.C. 404 , State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Sree Rama Rao Union of India (UOI) Vs. H.C. Goel and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra v. Supdt. of Police Balasore and Anr. 1971 C.L.T. (Note. 20), 13 The aforesaid principle applicable to a departmental proceeding that a finding based on no evidence or which cannot be arrived at by a reasonable person is liable to be quashed was followed in Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. Prakash Chand Jain in an enquiry under the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. It would be appropriate for proper understanding to narrate the story relating to the charge. Prakash Chand Jain in an enquiry under the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. It would be appropriate for proper understanding to narrate the story relating to the charge. It appear 8 that the Petitioner got a requisition from a neighbouring police station that a stolen cycle bearing a particular number was in possession of Tonko Majhi. On getting the requisition he Bent for Tonko Majhi through a constable to come to the police station with the cycle. Without making verification and disposing of the matter quickly he detained Tonko Majhi and demanded a bribe of Rs. 200/- from him with a threat that unless the amount was paid he would send him to jail. While Tonko Majhi was in the thana, his son-in-law Ratha Pojhari got information and came to the police station to release him. Nilambar Majhi came to the thana later on and argued with the Petitioner as to why he was harassing Tonko Majhi as on verification the numbers of the stolen cycle and Tonko's cycle did not tally. Soon after, Tonko was released. Though Ratha Pujhari had brought Rs. 60/- for payment to the Petitioner, no money was paid or accepted ultimately. The defence of the Petitioner is that Tonko Majhi did not come with the cycle first and so he detained him and when he was approached by Ratha Pujhari he asked him to pay Rs. 200/. for a P.R. but did not ask for any bribe. 6. The finding is based on the following pieces of direct and circumstantial evidence: (i) Statement of Tonko Majhi (p. w. 3) that the Babu asked him to pay Rs. 200/- and threatened to send him to jail if he did not pay and the Babu did not specify his fault. None else was present when the Petitioner asked for money from Tonko Majhi. (ii) Statement of Ratha Pojhari (p.w. 4) that he came to the police station to release Tonko. Tonko was released by the Petitioner who told Ratha that he would pay Rs. 200/- if Tonko was not produced. (iii) Statement of K.C. Patra (p.w. 2) that he had sent a requisition to the Petitioner that a stolen cycle was in the possession of Tonko Majhi. Tonko was released by the Petitioner who told Ratha that he would pay Rs. 200/- if Tonko was not produced. (iii) Statement of K.C. Patra (p.w. 2) that he had sent a requisition to the Petitioner that a stolen cycle was in the possession of Tonko Majhi. (iv) Statement of Nilambar Majhi (p.w. 1) that he came to the police station, argued with the Petitioner and told him that he should not unnecessarily harass Tonko when the number of the cycle did not tally with that of the stolen cycle for which a requisition had been made. (v) The circumstantial evidence was that Tonko Majhi had not been arrested and the question of his giving bail did not arise. The number of the stolen cycle was with he Petitioner. He could have in a short time discharged Tonko after verification. The plea of the Petitioner that he asked for a P.R. Bond of Rs. 200/- was belated and not borne out by any documentary evidence. There will no occasion to ask for bail as Tonko was not arrested and there was no evidence against him. No money is paid in cash for P.R. bond. 7. If the evidence of p.ws. 1 to 4 is examined as in a Court of law a different view may be taken that theft are unreliable; but the legal position is that the sufficiency, adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be questioned. The High Court wild take the evidence as it stands and will only examine whether on the evidence, legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. 8. Mr. Behura commented on the evidence of Nilamber Majhi that he had enmity with the Petitioner and his evidence should not be accepted. After having taken into consideration the fact of enmity and that Nilamber was an unreliable person the enquiring officer has accepted his evidence and an inference has been drawn from it that but for the interposition of Nilamber the cycle would not have been returned and Tonko Majhi would not have been released without payment of bribe. On this point the evidence of Nilamber Majhi, Tonko Majhi and Ratha Pujhari in consistent. The inference drawn by the enquiring Officer and the disciplinary authority cannot be said to be either unreasonable or absurd. On this point the evidence of Nilamber Majhi, Tonko Majhi and Ratha Pujhari in consistent. The inference drawn by the enquiring Officer and the disciplinary authority cannot be said to be either unreasonable or absurd. The evidence of Tonko Majhi was commented upon as not acceptable inasmuch as he was unable to identify the Petitioner as the Sub-Inspector of Police who demanded the money. He however narrated the entire fact though at the time of demand no other witness was present the identity of the Sub-Inspector was accepted as being fixed by the statement of Ratha and Nilambar. Nilambar and Ratha approached the Petitioner who did not deny before them that he did not demand any money from Tonko. Even before them he demanded Rs. 200/- which he explained as being for the "Purpose of a P.R. No cash of Rs. 200/- is payable in a P.R. bond. It was open to the departmental authority to accept the evidence of Tonko in the light of the evidence given by Nilambar arid Ratha and the broad probabilities of the case. To reject the evidence of Tonko Majhi, on the ground that his eye-sight was bad and he could not recognise the Petitioner despite the evidence of Nilamber and Ratha would be discarding the evidence on the ground that it was not sufficient or reliable. Such a power the High Court does not possess in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the I Constitution. It is exactly on this ground that the decision of the Orissa High Court was reversed in State of Orissa and Anr. v. M Muralidhar Jena AIR 1963 S.C. 404 . 9. The facts in Union of India (UOI) Vs. H.C. Goel stand altogether on a different footing. There the whole case rested on a very narrow point. The question was whether bribe was offered. The Officer to whom bribe was offered candidly admitted that he did not see any currency note being offered to him but saw the delinquent bringing out a piece of paper from his pocket having some resemblance in colour with a currency note their Lordships held that even if he entire evidence is accepted no reasonable person would come to the conclusion that a currency note was offered. State of Orissa and Anr. v. Muralidhar Jena AIR 1963 S.C. 404 , is rather applicable to the facts of this case. 10. State of Orissa and Anr. v. Muralidhar Jena AIR 1963 S.C. 404 , is rather applicable to the facts of this case. 10. On the aforesaid analysis it cannot be said that the finding of the departmental authority was either based on no evidence or was based on evidence on which a reasonable person would not come to the conclusion that bribe was not asked for by the Petitioner from Tonko Majhi. It may be that the evidence may not be sufficient for conviction in a criminal case where the charge must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The identical principle has no application to a finding reached in a disciplinary proceeding. 11. In this connection Mr. Behura placed reliance on Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. Prakash Chand Jain in sport of a proposition that hearsay evidence is not admissible in a departmental proceeding. In this particular case no hearsay evidence has been utilised against the Petitioner. Even assuming that some hearsay evidence was taken into consideration, we are unable to accept the broad proposition that hearsay evidence is not admissible in a disciplinary proceeding. Law is well settled that the Evidence Act has no application to a proceeding under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. If the Evidence Act has no application then the principles of that Act have equally no strict application. It is the principles of natural justice which should be followed. See Regina v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner 1965 (1) Q.B. 456 , and T.A. Miller Ltd. v. Minister of pousing and Local Government and Anr. (1962) I W.L.R. 992. In the first case while operating a crane in the course of her employment the claimant, M., felt a sharp pain in her back. Subsequently, she was diagnosed as having a prolapsed intervertebral disc. Her claim for industrial injury benefit was refused by the Insurance Officer, and on appeal, by the local Appeal Tribunal. She appealed u/s 47 of the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946, to the Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner. At the hearing reference was made to medical opinions concerning the a etiology of prolapsed intervertebral discs reported to have been expressed in two previous cases before other commissioners. Those opinions were put the medical witnesses called on behalf of the claimant and the Insurance Officer respectively, and the latter expressed agreement with them. The Deputy Commissioner dismissed the claimant's appeal. Those opinions were put the medical witnesses called on behalf of the claimant and the Insurance Officer respectively, and the latter expressed agreement with them. The Deputy Commissioner dismissed the claimant's appeal. The claimant applied for an order of certiorari on the grounds, inter-alia, that the Deputy Commissioner had erred in law and that his decision was contrary to natural justice in that he had treated as evidence in the case before him matters which were not evidence, namely, the medical opinions expressed in previous cases. The Divisional Court held that the Deputy Commissioner had treated the opinions expressed in the previous cases as independent evidence in the case before him and had erred in law in so doing, but refused an order for certiorari on the ground that the Deputy Commissioner had given an alternative reason for his decision which was not tainted with the same error. In appeal the opinion of the Divisional Court was not accepted as laying down the correct law. Their Lordships said that proceedings before the Industrial Injuries Commissioners were not governed by the strict rules of evidence applicable to ordinary civil trials. The only real limitation on the discretion of the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner was to adopt a procedure in accordance with natural justice and as both parties and their witnesses had fun opportunity of commenting upon the opinions expressed in the previous cases, there will be no breach of the principles of natural justice. This decision was approved in the subsequent case. In the second case the Inspector had admitted in evidence an unsworn letter upon which the Minister based him conclusion contrary to the sworn evidence of the witnesses. Their Lordships said that subject to the rules of natural justice the Commissioner could admit hearsay evidence. As the owners had a fair opportunity of commenting upon and contradicting the contents of the letter there was nothing contrary to natural justice in admitting it. These two decisions were approved and followed in P.M. Kurien Vs. P.S. Raghavan and Others, . We have carefully gone through the facts and analysis of law in Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. Prakash Chand Jain. These two decisions were approved and followed in P.M. Kurien Vs. P.S. Raghavan and Others, . We have carefully gone through the facts and analysis of law in Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. Prakash Chand Jain. At the end of paragraph 8 their Lordships observed thus: In fact, learned Counsel for the Appellant Bank was unable to point out any case at all where it may have been held by this Court or by any other Court that a domestic tribunal will be justified in recording its findings on the basis of hearsay evidence without having any direct or circumstantial evidence in support of those findings. The two English decisions referred to above are direct authorities on the point that hearsay evidence is admissible before a domestic tribunal provided the essential condition that an opportunity was afforded to the parties to comment and contradict such evidence was fulfilled. Mr. Behura was not able to bring to our notice any piece of hearsay evidence which was admitted without any opportunity being given the delinquent for comment and contradiction. The facts referred to in the Supreme Court case are some what peculiar. In that case the substantive evidence was directly contrary the hearsay evidence. The tribunal did not accept the substantive evidence as reliable and was not prepared to record an adverse finding merely on the basis of hearsay evidence. Though hearsay evidence is admissible when opportunity for comment and contradiction had been afforded to the parties, it is open to a tribunal of fact not to render it any probative value. The observations in The Supreme Court decision are to be confined to its peculiar facts. 12. To sum up, we are satisfied on the aforesaid analysis that it cannot be said that the finding of the disciplinary authority is not based on any evidence. There were sufficient materials. It cannot also be said that on those materials a reasonable person would not arrive at the conclusion that bribe was not asked for by the Petitioner from Tonko Majhi. This contention must fail. 13. In the result, the writ application fails, and is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. S.K. Ray, J. 14. I agree. 15. It cannot also be said that on those materials a reasonable person would not arrive at the conclusion that bribe was not asked for by the Petitioner from Tonko Majhi. This contention must fail. 13. In the result, the writ application fails, and is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. S.K. Ray, J. 14. I agree. 15. At one time I was inclined to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that his second contention as set out in the judgment of My Lord the Chief Justice was sound; but in view of the integrated analysis of evidence, both direct and circumstantial, made by him, I am satisfied that the said contention is not sustainable, and that this is not a case where it can be said that the conclusion of fact regarding demand of bribe reached by the departmental authority is either arbitrary, capricious, or is one which no reasonable person can reach. Final Result : Dismissed