S. N. SHANKAR ( 1 ) THE short question involved in this petition is as to the meaning and scope of section 7 of the Limitation Act, 1563, with reference to the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. ( 2 ) ON September 12, 1965, at about 5. 45 P. M. one Mr. Dalpat Singh, while travelling in a passenger bus, fell down and was run over under the rear wheel of the bus due to the alleged negligence on the part of the driver of the bus. The deceased left two minor sons Ramesh and Banchhu aged 8 years and 5 years respectively and a widow. On April 22, 1966, the two minor sons filed an application under section 110- A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, against Bishan Dass driver of the bus and Messrs Safety Bus Service (P) Ltd. Sub-section (3) of section 110-A provided that no application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it was made within sixty days of the occurrence of the accident with proviso that the Claims Tribunal may entertain it if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within time. In answer to the claim, the respondents contended that it was barred by time. The learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal framed a preliminary issue on the question of limitation and by the impugned order dated November 21, 1966, decided it in favour of the claimants as according to the Tribunal there was sufficient cause within the meaning of this proviso. This revision is directed against this order. ( 3 ) IN order to bring the case within the proviso to sub-section (3) of the section 110-A the petitioners pleaded : (I) That their mother, after the death of their father Dalpat Singh, had become of unsound mind and, therefore, could not file the claim ; (ii) That the police authorities had colluded with the respondents and had not registered a case until after the intervention of some social workers so that the claim could not be filed in time ; (iii) That the petitioners were minors and they could not file the claim within the prescribed time on account of their minority. ( 4 ) THE learned Tribunal found on evidence produced that it was not proved that the mother of the petitioners had become of unsound mind also that the question of collusion of the police and the alleged failure to register the case was wholly irrelevant and could not extend time for the filing of the claim for compensation. On the last contention it held that as the petitioners were minors, provisions of section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were attracted and the application was therefore, within time. ( 5 ) MR. Dhanda, learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the Tribunal was in error in ignoring the provisions of section 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The claim for compensation on the death of Dalpat Singh, the learned counsel said, was a joint claim by the two minors and the widow of the deceased. The widow, he said, was under no disability and could have filed the application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and, therefore, was competent to give a discharge within the meaning of section 7 of the Limitation Act with the result that section 6 of this Act did not operate to save the prescribed limitation. ( 6 ) AFTER hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am unable to sustain the submission. Section 6 of the Act provides that where a person entitled to institute a a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the Suit or make the application within the same period after the disability had ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor. Relevant part of section 7 then reads as under. "where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability. . . . . . . . . ". . . . . . . . . ". ( 7 ) ACCORDING to sub-section (3) of section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the period of limitation prescribed as stated earlier, is sixty days after the occurrence with a further proviso that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of sixty days if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. Provisions of section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it was not disputed before me, were applicable to claims under the Motor Vehicles Act by reason of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Normally, therefore, by reason of section 6, the two sons of the deceased being minors were entitled to the benefit of this provision. The argument of Mr. Dhanda was that because the widow of the deceased was also alive and she was found by the learned Tribunal to be not of unsound mind, she could have made the application under section 110-A and, therefore, limitation would not be extended and time ran against all the claimants. This is not so because section 7 in clear terms lays down that where one of several persons jointly entitled to make the application is under a disability and discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person under disability then alone time will run against them all. It is true that of the three legal representatives of Dalpat Singh, his widow was competent to file an application for compensation under section 110-A but she was not competent to give discharge in respect of the claim of the two minor sons of the deceased. According to section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Tribunal has to make an award determining the amount of compensation and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The amount due to the minors was to be determined by the Tribunal only at the time of making of the award. There was no amount, therefore, due to the minors at the time when the application under section 110-A was filed. It was an indeterminate claim. Their mother was in no position to give a valid discharge in case of such a claim. There was no amount, therefore, due to the minors at the time when the application under section 110-A was filed. It was an indeterminate claim. Their mother was in no position to give a valid discharge in case of such a claim. The minors in that sense had also no joint claim with the widow of the deceased who was also the mother of the minors Each one of them had a separate cause of action and each one of them was entitled to the separate award of compensation by reasons of the status of each one of them and their respective relationship to the deceased. The learned Claims Tribunal was, therefore, correct in holding that the provisions of section 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963, were not attracted and the application under section 110-A was thus within time. ( 8 ) MR. Dhanda placed strong reliance on Sardar Prasad and others v. Lala Jamuna Prasad and others where a Manager of Joint Hindu Family was held to be competent to give discharge on behalf of the members of the family who were not sui juris. The Manager in this case was held to be competent under a partition decree to accept delivery of possession on behalf of the minor sons without their consent and in this view section 7 of the Limitation Act was held to be applicable so that time for execution of decree ran against the minors also. This does not help the petitioners because the position of a karta in the Joint Hindu Family is peculiar and the extent of the liability in respect of which discharge had to be given was also ascertained. The learned counsel also cited Gopi Nath v. Satish Chandra. But here also one of the several person jointly entitled to institute a suit was found to be capable of giving a discharge and, therefore, it was held that the running of time could not stop against the minor. The third case cited by the learned counsel was the High Court decision which was decided by the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1074, which has already been noticed. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons aforsaid. I see no merit in this petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.