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1971 DIGILAW 136 (ORI)

NIRANJAN SAHU v. KEONJHAR MUNICIPALITY

1971-07-14

S.ACHARYA

body1971
JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J. - The Petitioners were restrained by an order dated 25-4-1970, purporting to be one u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure . 2. The aforesaid order u/s 144(6), Code of Criminal Procedure has spent itself by efflux of time after the expiry of two months of its passing, and I would not have interfered with the order, for it is well settled that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, does not ordinarily interfere with an order u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure and specially when it ceased to have effect by efflux of time. But, on the basis of the decision reported in Iswar Behera and Ors. v. Iswar Dangua and Ors. ILR 1966 Cutt. 882, in special circumstances, such as, where the order was passed either without jurisdiction or improperly, this Court can interfere for the purpose of setting right such an order passed by the Magistrate u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure . 3. Mr. Patnaik, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, contends that the Court below, while restraining the Petitioners from disturbing the collection of tax by the Municipality u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure has Acted illegally and in excess of its jurisdiction, in ordering at the same strain that it is the Keonjhar Municipality who will undertake the collection of tolls from the Daily market and that the Petitioners shall not disturb such collection until an order to the contrary is obtained from the proper Court of law. Mr. Patnaik contends that the latter mentioned orders, being of absolute and permanent nature, are patently illegal and improper as the same could not have been legally passed by the Magistrate in exercise of his jurisdiction u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure Mr. Misra, the learned Counsel for the opposite party submits that there is nothing wrong in the above order as the same, when understood in its proper legal prospective was effective for a period of two months only. 4. Section 44, Code of Criminal Procedure is in Chapter XI providing for ?Temporary orders in urgent cases of Nuisance or Apprehended danger?, and an order under the said section is passed with the main object of preventing imminent breach of the peace and remains in force for a temporary period of only two months as specially provided under Clause (6) thereof. Accordingly, while passing an order u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, no such order should be passed and no direction should be made which, in terms and/or purport, has a permanent effect and/or would tend to adversely affect or prejudice the civil or private rights of the concerned parties for any period more than two months. 5. The impugned portion of the Magistrate?s order is as follow: It is ordered that it is the Keonjhar Municipality who will undertake the collection of tolls from the daily market and the Rahas Puja Committee shall not disturb the collection of the Municipality until an order to the contrary is obtained from the proper Court of law. The above ordering portion in the Magistrate?s order is seemingly of an absolute and/or permanent nature, and might create misgivings before other forums about the private rights of the Petitioner. The above order was legally effective only for a period of two-months and not thereafter, as after that time it ceased to have any effect by efflux of time as provided under Clause (6) of Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, Therefore, the said order, in all its scope and implications, has to be understood in the above context and perspective, and the same cannot have any absolute and/or permanent effect. 6. The revision is disposed of in accordance with and in terms of the observations made above.