JUDGMENT J.M.L. Sinha, J. - This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated 27th February. 1969 passed by Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge Bulandshahr convicting Ram Singh appellant of the offence under Section 396, I.P.C. and sentencing him to ten years R.I. 2. The prosecution case shortly stated was as follows :- On the night between 4th and 5th April, 68 near about midnight six dacoits armed with firearms and the lethal weapons raided village Ganjha P. S. Bisrikh. They first entered the house of Ghafoor and looted the property there. Ghafoor had been inflicted several injuries as a result of which he later on died. His wife Smt. Chhotan was also beaten by the dacoits. Having looted the house of Ghafoor the dacoits entered the house of Dalpat P.W. 1 and looted it. By this time a number of village people came out of their houses and took position near the house of Dalpat. They pelted brickbats on the dacoits, and also flashed their torches in their direction. Some people set fire to the thatch of Manik Pradhan which created Brilliant light. When the dacoity was still going on two license-holders of Shahpur arrived and they fired shots in the direction of the dacoits looting the house of Dalpat. Having been thus pressed by the village people the two dacoits standing guard outside the house ran away. A little later two other dacoits came out of the house and tried to run away but they were apprehended by the village people. Ram Singh was one of them. It is alleged that the village people mustered courage to bolt the house of Dalpat from outside when the remaining two dacoits were inside. They however continued to fire from inside the house and did not surrender. The license-Holders of village Shahpur therefore climbed over the roof of Dalpat's house and having bored a hole in that roof fired into the Kotha in which the two dacoits were present. In the mean time some village people unbolted the door and inflicted a beating to the dacoits with lathis. Thus those two dacoits were also apprehended. Since they had received severe injuries they died ten or twenty minutes after, they were apprehended. 3. In the mean time some village people unbolted the door and inflicted a beating to the dacoits with lathis. Thus those two dacoits were also apprehended. Since they had received severe injuries they died ten or twenty minutes after, they were apprehended. 3. A report about the incident was lodged at P.S. Bisrikh on 5-4-1968 at 6-30 A.M. A distance of six miles intervened between the place of occurrence and the police Station. 4. Sri O.P. Tyagi P.W. 10, who was then S.O. Police Station Bisrikh took over investigation of the case immediately after the report was lodged. He reached village Ganjha near about 8 A.M. and found the dead bodies of the two dacoits lying inside the house of Dalpat. Having prepared inquest report and other relevant papers he sent the dead bodies for postmortem examination. Dr. B.N. Tandon P.W. 11 conducted postmortem examination on the dead bodies, of the two deceased dacoits namely Khazan and Budha. The Doctor found several injuries on the person of the two dacoits which included lacerated wounds, contusions besides one gunshot wound on the person of Khazan and two gunshot wounds on the persons of Budha. 5. Since Dil sukh, Chidda, Khacheru, Smt. Chotan, Ram Das and Ghafoor had received injuries they too were sent for medical examination. Dr. K.L Sharma P.W. 4 of Dadri Dispensary medically examined them on 5-4-68. The evidence of Dr. Sharma confirmed the presence of injuries on the bodies of the aforesaid persons. Ghafoor had as many as eight injuries. He was later on shifted to Delhi where he was admitted in Irwin Hospital for better treatment. He died there on 8.4.68. 6. The Police after completing the investigation submitted Charge-sheet for the prosecution of the appellant. 7. The appellant in his statement in the trial court admitted his arrest in village Ganjha on the date and time alleged. He however pleaded that they used to go to village Ganjha for gambling, that on the night of occurrence also they had gone to the house of Dalpat in village Ganjha for the same purpose and had won a large amount, that thereupon Dalpat, Ram Das and other persons quarrelled with him and other persons and having inflicted a beating to them deprived them of their money. The appellant said that two of his companions were killed as a result of that beating while he and one more person were apprehended and falsely implicated in this case. 8. The trial court on a consideration of the evidence on record concluded that the prosecution case was made out beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant and, in the result, convicted and sentenced him as mentioned earlier. Feeling aggrieved against it he has come up in appeal before the court. 9. I have heard learned counsel on both the sides and have also gone through the record of the case. 10. In order to prove its case against the appellant the prosecution placed reliance on the direct evidence furnished by Dalpat P.W. 1, Slut. Chotan P.W. 2, Rama Nand P.W. 3 and Ram Das P.W. 8. 11. Out of the aforesaid witnesses Dalpat is the person at whose house the dacoity took place. He stated the entire prosecution case which has been set out earlier in this judgment. The dacoity having been committed at his house, his presence at the place of occurrence cannot be reasonable doubted. Smt. Chotan P.W. 2 is the widow of Ghafoor who died in the dacoity. It was proved by the medical evidence that she too had received injuries. Consequently her presence at her house at the time of dacoity cannot be reasonably doubted. Besides making a statement about the dacoity at her house she also deposed that two persons were arrested by the village people when they were running away via the rata in front of her house and that one of them was the present appellant. Nothing could be elicited in the cross-examination of Smt. Chotan to show that the statement made by her regarding the arrest of Ram Singh was false. Ram Das P. W. 8 is another witness who deposed about the dacoity at the house of Ghafoor and Dalpat. It is proved by medical evidence that Rain Das had received several injuries. In view of the injuries on his person his presence at the place of occurrence cannot legitimately be doubted. He also therefore is a reliable witness. Rama Nand P.W. 3 deposed that he lived in a house situated close to the house of Dalpat and came out on hearing the alarm raised in the village. In view of the injuries on his person his presence at the place of occurrence cannot legitimately be doubted. He also therefore is a reliable witness. Rama Nand P.W. 3 deposed that he lived in a house situated close to the house of Dalpat and came out on hearing the alarm raised in the village. He further made a statement fully supporting the prosecution case and connecting the appellant with the commission of the dacoity. Since the dacoity was committed at two houses and lasted for quite a long time it is natural that the village people should have raised alarm. Consequently there is no improbability in Rama Nand P.W. having come out of his house and having witnessed the dacoity as well as the arrest of the appellant. All the four witnesses viz. Dalpat P.W. 1, Smt. Chotan P.W. 2. Rama Nand P.W. 3 and Ram Das P.W. 8 thus appear to be reliable witnesses. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that there is some inconsistency in the evidence of aforesaid witnesses on the point whether the two dacoits (including the appellant) who were arrested by the village people carried any Potli of looted property or not and whether that Potli contained the property belonging to Ghafoor or Dalpat. It was also pointed out that there is also some discrepancy on the point whether the Potli was produced before the Sub-Inspector and whether the Sub-Inspector did or did not prepare any memo about it. Accepting that such a discrepancy exists in the statement of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses. I feel that it should be of no consequence at all. It cannot be ignored that the appellant himself admitted that he was arrested by the village people on the date and time alleged by the prosecution. Once the arrest is admitted the inconsistency pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant becomes immaterial. The inconsistency appears to be due to the lapse of time that occurred between the date of dacoity and the date on which the witnesses were examined. 13. So far as the plea set up by the appellant is concerned, that appears to be without any substance whatsoever. A perusal of the record shows that it was in village Ganjha where the appellant was admittedly arrested and at a dead hour of the night. 13. So far as the plea set up by the appellant is concerned, that appears to be without any substance whatsoever. A perusal of the record shows that it was in village Ganjha where the appellant was admittedly arrested and at a dead hour of the night. The appellant is a resident of village Kodli P. S. Gandhinagar which, I am told, lies within the province of Delhi. It could not be proved that the appellant had any relations in village Ganjha or that they had any association with Dalpat at whose house he was admittedly arrested. In that background the plea put forward by the appellant that on the night of occurrence he was gambling at the house of Dalpat and that since he won a large amount he and his companions were beaten and he was falsely implicated in this case, cannot be accepted. It is also worthy of notice in this connection that some persons on the side of the prosecution also received injuries and, as already indicated earlier, they are Dilsukh, Chhidda, Khacheru, Smt. Chhotan, Ram Das and Ghafoor. The plea set up by the appellant in his defence does not explain the injuries on the person of the aforesaid people. It may be mentioned at that the cost of repetition that out of aforsaid persons Ghafoor received as many as 8 injuries while Ram Das received as many as six injuries all of which are gunshot injuries. The injuries on the side of the prosecution thus completely belie the defence plea. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant then urged that a perusal of the postmortem reports relating to the two deceased dacoits point to the conclusion that the prosecution version of the occurrence is wholly untrue. Learned counsel pointed out that according to postmortem report Exh. Ka 25 Khazan had four gunshot wounds of entry in the abdominal region. It was argued that according to the prosecution Khazan had been shot at from over the roof after boring a hole in it. Learned counsel contended that then injuries could not have come into existence if the shot had been fired from over the roof. I am unable to accept this contention. It was argued that according to the prosecution Khazan had been shot at from over the roof after boring a hole in it. Learned counsel contended that then injuries could not have come into existence if the shot had been fired from over the roof. I am unable to accept this contention. If Khazan was in one corner of the Kotha and the roof was bored through at some distance from that point the person over the roof would have shot at Khazan by poising his gun slanting downwards. The shot could therefore conveniently hit Khazan in the abdominal region. Learned counsel then referred me to the postmortem examination report relating to Budha deceased and pointed out that the gunshot wound No. 6 of the postmortem report had blackening around it. It was urged that this shows that shot was fired from a very close range and not from over the roof. It is true that there was blackening around gunshot injury No. 6. There is however more than one reason which can account for it. It is quite likely that the cartridge fired by the person over the roof was indigenously filled and therefore did not carry good quality of gun-powder. If the gun-powder is of a bad quality it is not completely burnt and it can bring into existence blackening around the wound even if the shot is fired from a distance of more than four or five feet. The roof of Dalpat's house according to Dalpat was about 10 ft. High. A tiled roof in the village has greater height at the top while the height towards the eves is much lesser. It is therefore quite likely that the height of the roof near the eves was substantially less than 10 ft. The person firing the shot would have lowered the gun through the hole bored in the roof and this would have further reduced the distance between the mouth of the barrel and the site of the injury. With a cartridge carrying bad quality of gun-powder, the possibility of blackening having come into existence from that, distance cannot be ruled out. It may further be added that blood would have clotted along the edges of the gun-shot wound mentioned at serial No. 6 in the postmortem report. With a cartridge carrying bad quality of gun-powder, the possibility of blackening having come into existence from that, distance cannot be ruled out. It may further be added that blood would have clotted along the edges of the gun-shot wound mentioned at serial No. 6 in the postmortem report. If medical examination is not done very carefully the possibility of that clotted blood being confused with blackening also remains there. In the context if these circumstances the mere fact that the gunshot injuries found on the dead body of Budha dacoit cannot lead to the prosecution case being rejected as false. 15. Having carefully examined the evidence of Dalpat, Smt. Chhotan, Rama Nand and Ram Das P.Ws. I find that they were reliable witnesses and the trial court committed no error in placing reliance on the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses to conclude that the appellant was one of the dacoits who committed dacoity at the houses of Ghafoor and Dalpat on the night between 4th and 5th April 68. It is borne out from the evidence of prosecution witnesses that the dacoits at the house of Ghafoor inflicted injuries to Ghafoor which culminated in his death. The trial court therefore rightly held the appellant guilty of the offence under Sec. 396. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the words used in Sec. 396. I.P.C. are "commits murder" and, therefore, in order to make out a case under Section 396, I.P.C. the prosecution must prove that the act of causing death amounted to an offence of murder as defined in Section 302, I.P.C. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that a perusal of medical evidence in the instant case would show that Ghafoor had been inflicted only seven external injuries all of which were contusions existing on non-vital parts and consequently it cannot be held that in inflicting those injuries the concerned dacoit intended to cause bodily injuries to cause death or that he intended to cause such injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or that he knew that he was committing an act which was so imminent danger that it was in all probability bound to cause death. It was urged that the case thus does not fall under any of the clauses of Section 300, I.P.C. Learned counsel summed up his argument to say that the case made out against the appellant is therefore one under Section 395, I.P.C. and not under Section 396, I.P.C. 17. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments raised but I fail to find any force therein. In the first instance I do not feel inclined to accept that the word "murder" used in Section 396, I.P.C. means "murder" as defined in Section 300, I.P.C. Dr. Sir Hari Singh GaUr in his book "Penal Law of India" (6th Edition) Vol. III page 1802 said :- "To begin with, any death caused by a dacoit in the course of dacoity would be murder for the exceptions which mitigate that crime are obviously inapplicable to an act committed by men who embark on a crime so abrecious as dacoity. Proof of murder would consequently consist of the proof of committing culpable homcide." In the instant case it is proved by the evidence of Dr. Vishnu Kumar examined in the Committing court (Exh. Ka 27) that Ghafoor died as a result of the injuries inflicted to him. The case therefore would fall under Sec. 396. I.P.C. irrespective of the fact whether the act of causing death of Ghafoor fell under Section 300, I.P.C. or not. There is however evidence in the instant case of the fact that some of the injuries inflicted to Ghafoor deceased were on vital parts and that those injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. For this reference can again be made to the statement of Dr. Vishnu Kumar (Exh. Ka 27). According to Dr. Vishnu Kumar, apart from the external injuries found on the body of Ghafoor, he had also received injuries in his intestines and that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Nothing could be elicited in the cross examination of Dr. Vishnu Kumar to show that this part of his statement was not worthy of acceptance. The act of causing death of Ghafoor therefore clearly amounted to murder as defined in that section. The murder having been committed during the course of dacoity at the house of Ghafoor all the appellants were clearly guilty of the offence under Sec. 396. 18. Vishnu Kumar to show that this part of his statement was not worthy of acceptance. The act of causing death of Ghafoor therefore clearly amounted to murder as defined in that section. The murder having been committed during the course of dacoity at the house of Ghafoor all the appellants were clearly guilty of the offence under Sec. 396. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant then referred me to the Children Act passed by the Central Legislature and urged that in view of the provisions contained in this Act it was not within jurisdiction of the courts within the territory of Uttar Pradesh to take cognizance of the offence and that in any case it was not open to court which tried the appellant to award him a sentence of imprisonment. So far as first part of his argument is concerned, reference should be made to the provision contained in Chapter XXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sec. 177 occurring in that Chapter expressly states that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed. There is no controversy before me about the fact that the offence of dacoity in the instant case was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of learned Sessions Judge who tried this case. So far as the Children Act 1960 (Act No. 60 of 1960) is concerned I fail to find anything in that Act to override Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant referred me to Section 5 and Section 7 of Act No. 60 of 1960. Sec 5 (1) states that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code the Administrator may, by notification in the official gazette, constitute for any area specified in the notification, one or more children courts exercising powers and discharging the duties conferred or imposed on such courts in relation to delinquent children under this Act. Sec. 7 only states that when a children court has been constituted for any area that court notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force shall have power to deal with all proceeding under the Children Act relating to neglected children or delinquent children. Sec. 7 only states that when a children court has been constituted for any area that court notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force shall have power to deal with all proceeding under the Children Act relating to neglected children or delinquent children. In my opinion there is nothing in Sec 5 and Section 7 to confer jurisdiction on a childrens court if the offence is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of that court. A childrens court created under Section 5 and functioning under Section 7 will have jurisdiction to deal with such offences alone which are committed by children within the Union territories covered by the notification to be issued under Section 1 (3). The argument raised on behalf of the appellant that Section 5 and Section 7 prohibited other courts to take cognizance of offences committed by a child even though the offence is committed within the territorial jurisdiction of those court cannot be accepted. It may also be added at this stage that learned counsel for the appellant also failed to show that village Kodli lies within the Union territories and that Administrator has issued any notification making the provisions of Children Act applicable to that village. 20. It was also argued on behalf of the appellant that Section 22 of Act No. 60 of 1960 prevented all courts from sentencing the delinquent child to death or imprisonment. The relevant portion of Section 22 reads as follows : "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force no delinquent child shall be sentenced to death of imprisonment or committed to prison in default of fine or in default of furnishing security." The above section should be read along with Section 1 (2) which states that the provisions of Act 60 of 1960 only extended to the Union territories. If Section 22 is read with Section 1 (2) of the Act it will only mean that the mandate contained in Section 22 will apply only to courts functioning within the Union territories. It cannot have application to a case when it is lawfully tried by any court outside the Union territories. Sec. 22 also cannot therefore be successfully invoked on behalf of the appellant. 21. It cannot have application to a case when it is lawfully tried by any court outside the Union territories. Sec. 22 also cannot therefore be successfully invoked on behalf of the appellant. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant then tried to fall back on the provisions contained in the U.P. Children Act (Act No. 1 of 1952). Sec. 1 of the Act stated that the provisions contained in that Act can be made applicable for any local area only by a notification in the official gazette. Learned counsel failed to refer me to any notification by which the provisions of U.P. Children Act may have been made applicable to the district of Bulandshahar where the appellant was found guilty and convicted. But even if it be assumed for moment that U.P. Children Act was made applicable to the district of Bulandshahar nothing can turn on it. Sec. 27 of the Act reads as follows :- "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, no court shall sentence a child to death or transportation or imprisonment for any term or commit him to prison in default of payment of fine : Provided that a child who is 12 years of age or upward may be committed to prison when tine court holds that he is of so unruly, or of so depraved character that he is not fit to be sent to an approved school and that none of the other methods in which the case may legally be dealt with is suitable." 22. A perusal of the above would show that while there is a mandate contained in it to the effect that no court can award a sentence of death or imprisonment to a child there is a rider to it and the rider is that when the child is 12 years of age or upwards and is of unruly or depraved character he can be sentenced to imprisonment despite anything contained in the Act. Now in the instant case the appellant was challenged with having committed an offence of dacoity with murder. No elaborate argument is needed to say that a person who commit dacoity with murder is a person of depraved character. The appellant could therefore be awarded the sentence of imprisonment despite being 15 years of age. 23. Now in the instant case the appellant was challenged with having committed an offence of dacoity with murder. No elaborate argument is needed to say that a person who commit dacoity with murder is a person of depraved character. The appellant could therefore be awarded the sentence of imprisonment despite being 15 years of age. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant lastly urged that in any case the appellant is a boy of a tender age being 15 years old and a lenient view may therefore be taken on the point of sentences. A perusal of Section 396, I.P.C. would show that the sentences prescribed thereunder are death, imprisonment for life and imprisonment extending to ten years. In the instant case the trial court has awarded the last mentioned sentence to the appellant, and in awarding this sentence the trial court was guided by the fact that the appellant was an young boy of 15 years of age. I do not think in a case under Section 396, I.P.C. a lesser sentence should be awarded. In my view therefore there is no scope for any reduction on the point of sentence as well. 24. The appeal accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. The conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant are confirmed. The appellant is on bail. He shall surrender forthwith failing which he shall be taken into custody and sent to jail to serve out the sentence awarded to him. His bail bonds are cancelled.