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1971 DIGILAW 137 (KAR)

RAMACHANDRA APPAYYA DESURKAR v. TULASABAI

1971-04-08

DATAR

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( 1 ) PETITIONER is the landlord, and this revision application arises under the provisions of S. 50 of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961. The landlord, filed an application for eviction of the tenant under S. 21 (1) (d) of the Act on the ground that respondent-4 used the premises for illegal purpose and that he was convicted for offences committed by him ana hence liable for eviction under S. 21 (1) (d) of the Act. ( 2 ) THE other joint tenants resisted the said application contending that the deceased Dattatraya was the original tenant and after his death his widow and the sons were the joint tenants and that at the time when respondent 4 committed the offence they were staying at Sawantwadi and that after coming to know of this they have driven away opponent 4 from the premises. It was therefore submitted that opponent 4 has now no connection and no illegal activity is now being carried on and therefore the order for eviction should not be passed against them. ( 3 ) THE learned trial Judge rejected the contentions raised by the tenants and passed an order of eviction. This order was challenged before the District Judge who took a contrary view. He took the view that the provisions of S. 21 (1) (d) could not be invoked and hence allowed the appeal and set aside the order of eviction. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this revision application. ( 4 ) S. 21 (1) (d) of the Act reads as under" (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant: provided that the Court may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the following grounds only namely: - (d) that the tenant or any person residing with the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or annoyance to the adjoining or neighbouring occupiers, or has been convicted of using the premises or allowing the promises to be used for immoral or illegal purposes. " ( 5 ) IN the present case the contention of the petitioner-landlord is that one of the tenants has used the premises for an illlegal purpose, and the illegal purpose alleged against him is that he carried on a gaming activity in the premises and respondent 4 was convicted by the Court in c. C. No. 927 65. Tt was urged that when one of the joint tenants has committed an illegal activity in the premises, the provisions of S. 21 (1) (d) are invoked and therefore the view taken by the appellate Court was unsustainable. In support of the submission, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the High Court of Bombay in Jayantilal Motilal v. Dayaram ranchhoddas, AIR 1955 Bom. 111. In that case a tenant was prosecuted for an offence under the Bombay Prohibition Act, the offence being one of possession of liquor and conviction was recorded on 30-6-1950. It was held that:"the tenant had been convicted oi using the premises for illegal purpose within the meaning of S. 13 (1) (c), Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, that it was not necessary that the user of the premises for an illegal purpose should be continuous or frequent and that therefore the tenant was liable to be ejected. "the provisions of S. 13 (1) (c) of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging house Rates Control Act, 1947 and the provisions of S. 21 (1) (d) of the mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 are similar. Dixit J. while deciding the above case followed the judgment in schneiders and Sons Ltd. v. Abrahams, (1925) 1 KB. 301 and the relevant portion of the discussfon ot the matter is iound in para 6 which reads as under: ( 6 ) "a point similar to the one which I am considering arose for decision in an English case in s. Schneiders and Sons Ltd. v. Abrahams, in that case the facts were these: The landlords of a dwelling house within S. 4, Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1923, gave their tenant notice to quit. Betore the date of the notice the tenant had been convicted under S. 33 of the Larceny Act, 1916, of receiving at the demised premises certain property of the landlords well knowing the same to have been stolen, and it was held that the tenant, having made use of the premises in order to commit the crime of which he had been convicted, had been "convicted of using the premises for an illegal purpose" within the meaning of S. 4 of the Act of 1923. In this connection it is enough, I think, to quote the observations of Atkin L. J. at p. 311 where it is stated:"this leads to the conclusion that the words of S. 4 must be used in a less technical sense. In my opinion they cover a case where the tenant has been convicted of a criminal offence, and in the course of the trial it has been proved that he used the premises for an immoral or illegal purpose. In my view, the present case is covered by the decision in the above case, and with respect. I follow the same. "6 The only contention that is possible to be advanced on behalf of the other joint tenants and that is being advanced before this Court is that this is an act of one tenant and since this is an act of one tenant it is not proper to punish the other co-tenants It was submitted by the learned advocate for the respondents that at the time the offence was committed the other joint tenants were away from the place and soon after they came to know of if they have taken immediate action to see that he is thrown out of the premises. Under the circumstances, it was suggested that the provision of S 21 (1) (d) cannot be invoked ( 7 ) THE learned Advocate for the petitioner on the other hand, submitted that in a case like the present one when the tenancy is one and indivisible for thr set of any one of the joint tenants all the tenants are liable, and support is taken for this submission upon the wordings of S. 21 (1) (d) and upon the observations of some of the decisions to which I will make reference presently. Under the provisions of S. 21 (1) (d) if the tenants allow even a stranger to the use of the premises for an illegal purpose, the tenants have to pay the penalty of eviction under S. 21 (1) (d ). Tt was also submitted that when the tenancy is a joint one, for every act of any one of the tenants all persons are together liable. ( 8 ) AS stated by me earlier, Reliance was placed upon the observations made by the High Court of Bombay in Ramubai v. Jiyaram, AIR. 1964 Bom. 96. The relevant paragraph of the said decision in paragraph 10, and therein this is what has been stated:"if that be the true position with respect to totality of the rights under the lease-hold and there is unity of enjoyment and possession in respect of leasehold property vis-a-vis the landlord, it is difficult to see why notice to ona of these joint tenants could not be considered as a valid notice to all provided such a notice was given. "the stress that is laid is, upon the fact that there is a totality of the rights and unity of enjoyment and possession in respect of the leasehold. ( 9 ) THE learned Advocate for the petitioner also relied upon the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kanji v. The Trustees. Port of Bombay, AIR. 1963 SC. 469 wherein it was stated that once It is held that the tenancy was joint, a notice to one of the joint tenants is sufficient and the suit for the same reason is also good. On this observation it was submitted that if the notice is good for taking action, then it was submitted that the illegal action by any one would deprive the other members of the benefit of the right to remain in the premises. The learned Advocate for the petitioner also submitted that there is no question of condoning a default like the present one as the provisions of S. 21 (1) (d) do not provide for the same I am of the view that in the present case that last submission made does not arise. The learned Advocate for the petitioner also submitted that there is no question of condoning a default like the present one as the provisions of S. 21 (1) (d) do not provide for the same I am of the view that in the present case that last submission made does not arise. ( 10 ) IN thr present case it cannot be disputed that after the death of Dattatraya all the tennts became joint tenants and if they are joint tenants, in my view, any illegal act or use for illegal or immoral purpose by any one, would entail eviction of all under S. 21 (1) (d ). It is not necessary that every one of the tenants must be responsible for using the premises for immoral or illegal purpose. In ray view, what is important to see is whether the premises which belonged to the owner had been used for an illegal purpose by either the tenant or by some other persons on his behalf. If it is proved to have been used for an illegal purpose, then I am of the view that an order for eviction has to be passed. ( 11 ) IN the result, the order passed by the appellate Judge is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. In the circumstances, I grant 9 months time for respondents to vacate the premises in question. ( 12 ) IN the circumstances of this case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .